ML20031E517
| ML20031E517 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1981 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1887, NUDOCS 8110160052 | |
| Download: ML20031E517 (9) | |
Text
ISSUED: 8/27/81
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ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATERFORD-3 AUGUST 6, 1981 WASHINGTON, D.C.
Purpose:
To continue ACRS review of Waterford-3 for operating license.
Principal Attendees:
D. Ward, Chairman E. Blake, Shaw, Pittman, & Trowbridge J. Ebersole, Member L. Maurin, LP&L J. Ray, Member M. Horrell, Ebasco M t I @lf'f C. Siess, Member M. Jacob, CE c r.o A.
C. Mark, Member M. Green, CE
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D. Moeller, i' ember P. Sears, NRC i -C d\\
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u to P. Shewmon, Member J. Mauro, Ebasco hg I. Catton, Consultant J. Saacks, LP&L R. Pearson, Consultant E. Senac, LP&L Sy Jf -
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D. Bessette, Staff
- R. Azzarello, LP&L g
- Designated Federal Employee F. Grudlys, Ebasco J. Gootman, NRC D. Lester, LP&L S. Hanauer, NRC C. Gibbs, Middle South Utilities F. Drummond, LP6L E. O'Donnell, Ebasco J. Ehasz, Ebasco W. Krotink, Ebasco Wa Tsi Ten, Ebasco M. Pavone, Ebasco No oral or written statements were received from members of the public. The entiremeek.ingwasopen. Attached is the meeting agenda and a list of documents considered by the Subcommittee.
0110160052 810827 PDR ACRB 1887 PDF
v Waterford-3 Meeting AugJst 5,1981 t
Introduction by Louisiana Power & Light (LP&L)
L.
ourin (LP&L) noted that LP&L and New Orleans Public Service are being
.isolidated.
Both utilities are wholly owned by Middle South Utilities, Blake (Shaw, Pittman & Troubridge) summarized the contested issues.
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Discussion of Open Items M. Horrell (Ebasco) summarized the Waterford-3 fire protection program.
This items is expected to be resolved by October,1981. Mr. Horrcll indi-cated that there is no controversy between the Applicant and the Staff on resolution.
It will cost about $10 million to meet the Appendix R require-ments.
M. Jacob (CE) discussed analysis of steam voiding in the reactor coolant system from steam generator tube rupture and steam line break.
It was necessary to revise CESEC-I to CESEC-III to model void formation in the reactor coolant system.
Dr. Catton noted that it is difficult to insure the analyses of small breaks is conservative.
M. Jacob discussed the feedwater line break analysis where the break is between the steam generators and the reverse flow check valve. This is a pipe length of aobut 4 feet.
Loss of the affected steam generator as a heat sink is treated in a conservative manner. The reactor is assumed to trip on high primary system pressure.
M. Green (CE) discussed the analysis of main steam line break with concurrent tripping of the reactor coolant pumps and loss of offsite power. The analysis shows that this event does not result in fuel failures.
Staff Comments on LP&L Presentation of Open Items P. Sears (NRC) indicated that no problems are fore een in finishing the fire protection review.
J. Gootman said that the same is true for the analyses of:
steam voiding in the reactor coolarnt system; feedwater line break; main steam line break; and stuck open steam dump valve.
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Waterford-3 Meeting
-a-August 5, 1981 Hazards Considerations J. Mauro (Ebasco) discussed site hazards.
A toxic chemical analysis was performed to determine control room habitibiliti. Chlorine and amonia were determined to be the toxins of greatest importance. The control room will automatically isolate upon detection of these chemicals.
A hot-line has been set up with 16 area industries and the St. Charles Parish Emergency Center. The operators have been trained in odor detection.
Mr. Ebersole inquired whether the effect of troist chlorine gas on possibly$
shorting of electrical equipment had been investigated. The answer was no.
A state of atmospheric calm exists at the site 2.3% of the time. Mr. Mauro indicated that the upper limit on obtainable concentrations is, about 10%
Mr. Ebersole asked what effect this concentration of propane w~ould have on the diesels. The reply was that it had not been locked at, but that the prob-ability of getting a 10% mixture at the diesels was very low. Should a toxic release occur, nonessential personnel would be evacuated from the site.
Dr. Siess asked the Staff why, after 11 years of licensing activity on Waterford-3, is toxic hazards on open issue.
(In the January 17, 1973 ACRS letter on Water-ford, it was noted that the Staff should evaluate the Applicant's analysis of explosion hazards.)
D. Hunter (Ebasco) discussed weather hazards. The plant safety equipment is flood protected to 30 feet. Analysis performed for a probable maximum hurrime in conjunction with flood stage on the Mississippi River indicate adequate flood protection. Levee failure adjacent to the plant was also analyzed
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and determined not to pose a threat. The plant has been analyzed for 300 MPH tornado winds concurrent with a 3 psi pressure drop.
AC/DC Power Reliability J. Saacks (LP&L) and E. Senac (LP&L) discussed AC/DC power reliability.
Waterford-3 has full load rejection capability and can carry house loads.
The power lines to the plant are 230 kv.
In case of a station blackout, there is sufficient DC supply for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and sufficient condersete for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
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Waterfora-3 Meeting August 5,1981
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Emergency Planning R. Azzarello (LP&L) discussed emergency planning. NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0696 criteria were followed.
The technical support,. enter is adjacent to the control room. An operational support center is located in the service building.
The role of the NRC in the event of an accident is perceived to be that of.
offering advice and orders. The state of Lousiana has a nuclear energy division. Emergency drills have not yet been held.
Ultimate Heat Sink F. Guidlys (Ebasco) summarized the ultimate heat sink design.
It is a closed system with two independent trains, which include wet and dry [ cooling towers.
Temperature ir. the wet component cooling water system is controlled by a modu-lating valve. The system is protected from tornado missiles. The wet towers are required for 7 days following shutdown, after that, the dry towers alone are sufficient. Cooling tower operation requires about 600 kv.
Organization and Staffing L. Maurin, and D. Lester (LP&L) provided information on staffing and training.
L.Maurin is Assistant Vice-President in charge of nuclear.
Mr. Maurin had no nuclear experience prior to Waterford-3.
It was indicated that the position of Mr. Maurin within the LP&L war, sufficiently prominent and vested with sufficient authority to do the job.
The positilon of STA coordinator is currently unfilled.
It is planned to have 15 STAS. A local college professor will provide training to the STAS. The STA training program will last 6 months.
Each STA would have two duty days per month.
It has not been established what exactly the duties of the duty day will be.
The plant health physicist is curt :< Ty not certified. Dr. Moeller indicated it would be benefical for him to -
etified.
e Waterford-3 Meeting August 5,1981 6
NRC Staff Comments on Waterford-3 Staffing S. Hanauer (NRC) provided comments on Waterford-3 staffing. The management j
lacks commerical nuclear operating experience. There is a significant short fall in the number of staff on board at this time, compared with other plants at a similar point on their startup schedule.
Role of Middle South Utilities (MSU)
C. Gibbs (MSU) summarized the role of MSU, which owns LP&L. There are 32 professionals in the MSU nuclear group, with 22 additional positions planned by the end of 1982.
These people work primarily on core follow, licensing, and fuel procurement. There is a system operator for the MSU power system.
Safety Review Committee F. Drummond (LP&L) discussed the Safety Review Committee (SRC) composition.
The Training Superintendent has been added to the SRC. A human factors consultant will be used on an as-needed basis. Dr. Pearson indicated it would be also useful to have a physician availarle.
Use of PRA E. O'Donnell (Ebasco) discussed utili2ation of PRA. Analyses were performed on the auxiliary feedwater system, the onsite power system, and tne plant computer.
Fault tree' techniques are being used for develop-ment of emergency procedures.
Seismology and Geology Information Since CP J. Ehasz (Ebasco) discussed this topic. The literature search that was performed for the CP was updated. There is additional drill well data.
Remote sensing was used, including radar, infrared, and photography.
Deep I
seismic reflection surveys were reviewed. The studies have provided.confir-matory information that the 0.1g SSE value is adequate.
Systems Interaction M. Horrell (Ebasco) discussed systems interactions. There are no specific systems interactions studies being done for Waterford-3 and there is uo group that has specific respnsibility for the subject. Loss of station air is being analyzed. The. valves fail safe in ti)is instance.
It was
Waterford-3 Meeting 6-August 5,1981 s
said that systems interactions is high in the conciousness of LP&L and Ebasco.
Systems interactions will be one of the suhjects handled by the onsite safety review group.
Hydrogen Considerations W. Krotink (Ebasco) presented information on hydrogen. The spray headers are located close to the top of containment.
Dr. Catton noted that if the sprays are operating, there should be pc problem with mixing.
Infor- ~
mation was presented on circulation resulting from operation of the contain-ment air coolers.
The Subcommittee was not able to draw any conclusions from the information presented.
Wa Tsi Ten (Ebasco) discussed the pressure capability of conta',inment. Upc7 questioning from Dr. Siess, it was eventually determined that the failure pressure was probably on the order of 90 psig. The design pressure is 44 psig.
Control of Base Mat Settlement M. Pavone (Ebasco) discussed control of base mat monitoring. Excavation for the plant resulted in a 5" heave, which was recompressed upon plant construction.
The weight of the plant is approximately equal to the weight of material excavated.
Base mat monitoring will be a ongoing process.
Future Meetings No meetings are currently scheduled.
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's ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON WATERFORD-3 AUGUST 5, 1981 WASHINGTON, D.C.
5 min 8:30 am 1.
Opening Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman 40 min 8:35 am 2.
Open Items o Fire Protection Analysis of Steam Voiding in RY o
o Feedwater Line Break Analysis Loss of Offsite Power - RCP Trip During o
MSLB Analysis Transient Analyses with Potential for Fuel Damage o
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- 10 mi n 9:35 am 3.
Staff Connents on Open Items 30 min 9:50 am 4.
Hazards Considerations o Control Room Habitability Balance of Plant Habitability' Diesel Operation o
o Floods o Tornadaes & Hurricanes 10 min 10:35 am BREAK 30 min 10:45 am 5.
AC/DC Power Reliability o Station Blackout o Stability Analysis Consideration of Invertor Failures o
Consequence of Inadvertent Disconnection of o
DC Power with Plant Trip Capability of Diesels to Handle Loads o
15 min 11:30 am 6.
Emergency Planning Consideration of Flood or Hurr ? cane o
Emergency Support Facilities o
Role of NRC, FEMA, State, Local, and Other Agen 2s o
1 S-Waterford-3 August 5, 1981 7.
Ultimate Heat Sink 20 min 11:55 am LUNCH 60 min 12:25 pm 8.
Organization and Staffing 60 min 1:25 pm o Clarification of Change in Responsibilities and Authority cf Head of Nuclear Operations o STA Qualifications, Duty Schedule o Qualifications of Plant Chemist o Use of Middle South Services Comparison of Staffing and Qualifications with o
ANO-2 at a Similar Stage o Inclusion of Human Factors and Training and Outside Technical Expertise in Safety Review Group o Training Policy and Procedures for Habit Interference 9.
Use of PRA 20 min 2:55 pm
- 10. Seismology and Geology Infonnation Since CP 15 min 3:25 pm 10 min 3:50 pm BREAK 20 min 4:00 pm
- 11. Systems Interactions f
o Seismic o Air / Water o Internal Flooding 20 min 4:30 pm
- 12. Hydrogen Capabilities o Mixing o Utilization of EPRI Werk Pressure Capability of Conteinment, Shield Wall o
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Waterford-3 August 5, 1981 j
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- 13. Control of Base Mat Settlement 10 min 5:00 pm o Monitoring i
- 14. Summary Remarks 5 min 5:15 pm
- 15. Staff Comments 5 min 5:20 pm
- 16. Executive Session 5 min 5:25 pm Adjourn 5:30 pm O
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