ML20031B937
| ML20031B937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1981 |
| From: | Fasano A, Haverkamp D, Troskoski W, Young F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20031B931 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-81-19, NUDOCS 8110060250 | |
| Download: ML20031B937 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000289/1981019
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
50289-810507
0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
50289-810702
Region I
Report No.
50-289/81-19
Docket No.
50-289
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License No.
Priority
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Category _
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Licensee : Metropolitan Edison Company
P.O. Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057
Facility N.xie: Three Mile Island Nu.. ear Station, Unit i
Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania
Inspection conduc ed: July 1,1981 - August 31, 1981
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Inspectors -
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averkamp, Senior pident Inspector (TMI-1)
date signed
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W. Troskoski, Reactor IdlIspector
date signed
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M F. Young, Rerident Inspe Mor (TMI-1)
date signed
Approved by:
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A. Fasano, Thief, Three Mile Island Resident
dat signed
Section, PB#2
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on July 1,1931 - August 31,1981 (Report Number 50-283/81-19)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine safety inspection by resident and regional based
inspectors (216 hours0.0025 days <br />0.06 hours <br />3.571429e-4 weeks <br />8.2188e-5 months <br />) of plant operations during long term shutdown including
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facility tours and log and record reviews; review of safety limits, limiting
safety system settings and limiting conditions for operation; hot functional
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testing program and procedure review; emergency feedwater system 48-hour pump
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run; emergency feedwater system functional test; and, in office review of
licensee event reports.
Resul ts : No itens of noncompliance were identified.
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8110060250 810914'
DR ADOCK 05000289
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Detail s
1.
Person s, Contacted
General Public Utilities Nuclear Group (GPUNG)
M. Beers, Engineer Assistant Senior II, Nuclear Assurance
J. Colitz, Plant Engineering Director TMI-l
R. Harbin, Technical Analyst Senior I TMI-l
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T. Hawkins, Manager TMI-l Startup and Test, Technical Functions
G. Miller,, Director Startup and Test, Technical Functions
I. Porter, Supervisor Startup and Test TMI-1, Technical Functions
M. Ross, Manager Plant Operatione THI-1
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Stephenson, ?o: lear Licensing Engineer, Technical Functions
- R. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director 1MI-1
The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees
during the inspection.
Th2y included control room operators,
maintenance personnel, ent neering staff personnel and general
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office personnel .
- deactes those present at the exit meeting.
2.
Plant Operations During Long Term Shutdown
a.
Plant Logs and Operating Records
The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to
determine the licensee established requirements in this area
in preparation for a review of selected logs and records.
Administrative Procedure (AP) 1002, " Rules for the
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Protection of Employees Working on Electrical and
Mechanical Apparatus," Revision 22
AP 1007, " Control o f Records," Revision 4
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AP 1010, " Technical Specification Surveillance Program,"
Revision 18
AP 1012, " Shift Relief and Log Entries," Revision 14
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AP 1013, " Bypass of Safety functions ano Jumper Control ,"
Revision 8
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AP 1016, " Operating Surveillance Program," Revision 13
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AP 1033, " Operating Memcs and Standing Orders," Revision 2
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AP 1037, " Control of Caution and DN0 Tags," Revision 2
AP 1044, " Event Review and Reporting Requirements,"
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Revision 2
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The inspector reviewed the following plant logs and operating
records.
Shift Foreman Log and Control Room Log Book
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Primgy Auxiliary Operator's Log-Tour Readings, Secondary
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Auxiliary Operator's Log Sheets, and Auxiliary Operator
Log Sheets - Out-Building Tour
Unit 1 Operations Memo Book
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Shift Turnover Checklist
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Temporary Change Notic ' ~ CN) Log Book
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Active Tagging Application Book
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Locked Valve Log
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ISI Tag Book
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Night Ordtr Book
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Do Not Operate and Cautton Tag Log
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b.
Facility Tours
During the course of the inspection, the inspector conducted
multiple tours of the following plcnt areas.
Cor. trol Room (daily, including July 3, July 4, August 29*,
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and August 30*)
Auxiliary Building (July 1, July 21, August 6, August 25,
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August 29*, and August 30*)
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Reactor Building (July 2, July 3, August b, and Augus; 31)
Fuel Handling Building (July 3, August 4, August 26,
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August 29*, and August 30*)
Intermediate Building (July 2, July 3, July 24, August 27,
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August 29*, and August 30*)
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Pump House (July 24, August 25, and August 31)
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Vital Switchgear Rooms (July 22, August 6, and August 24)
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Diesel Generator Building (July 2, July 23, August 7,
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August 27, and August 29*)
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Yard Area (July 1, July 28, August 7, and Acqust 27)
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Site Perin:eter (July 1, July 28, August 7, and August ?7)
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- Tours conducted on 3-11 PM weekend shift to provide Oackshift
assessment of Hot Functional Testing program.
Plant logs and operating records were reviewed to verify the
following items.
Log keeping practices and log book reviews are conducted
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in accordance with established administrative controls
Log entries involving abnormal conditions provide sufficient
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detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status,
correction and restoration
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Operating orders do not conflict with Technical Specification
(TS) requirements
Jumper log and tagging log entries do not conflict with
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TS requirements
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Problem identification reports confirm compliance with TS
reporting and LC0 requirements
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Jumper / lifted lead / mechanical modification and tagging
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operations are conducted in conformance with established
administrative controls
The following observations / discussions / determinations were
made.
Control room annunciators: Selected lighted annunciators
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were discussed with control room operators to verify that
the reasons for them were understood and corrective
action, if required, was being taken.
Control room manning: By frequent observation through
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the inspection, the inspector verified the control room
manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the Technical
Specifications were being met.
In addition, the inspector
observed shift turnovers to verify that centinuity of
system status was maintained.
The inspector periodically
questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of
plant conditions and knowledge of emergency procedures.
Fire protection: The inspector verified that selected
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fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on
schedule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed, and
that adequate control over ignition sources and fire
hazards was maintainzd.
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Technical Specifications : Through log review and direct
observation during tours, the inspector verified compliance
with selected Technical Specification . Limiting Conditions
during shutdown plant operation.
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Plant housekeeping conaitions: Observations relative to
plant housekeeping identified no unsatisfactory conditions.
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Monitoring instrumentation: The inspector verified that
selected instruments were functional and demonstrated
parameters within Technical Specification limits.
Valve positions: The inspector verified that selected
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valves were in the position or condition required by
Technical Specifications for the applicable plant mode.
This verification included control board indication and
field observation of valve position.
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Radiation controls: The inspector verified by observation
that control point procedures and posting requirements
were being followed.
The inspeMr identified no failures
to properly post radiation and i 'gh radiation areas.
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Fluid leaks: No fluid ' iks were observed which had not
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been identified by station personnel and for which corrective
action had not been initiated, as necessary.
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Piping snubbers / restraints: Selected pipe hangers and
seismic restraints were observed and no adverse conditions
were noted.
Equipment tagging: The inspector selected plant components
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for which valid tagging requests were in effect and
verified that the tags were in place and the equipment in
the condition Specified.
Securi ty:
During the course of these inspections,
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observations relative to protected and vital area security
requirements were made, including access controls, boundary
integrity, search, escort, and badging.
No notable
conditions were identified.
Licensee meetings: The inspector frequently attended the
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Plan-of-the-Day (P00) meetings, held by the licensee
management and supervisory personnel .
The inspector
observed the neeting to assess licensee evaluation of
plant conditions, status and problems and to review the
licensee's plaas for conducting certain major plant
operations and nuintenance activities.
The inspector
also attended Construction Status Meetings and Engineering
Status Meetings to assess licensee progress and difficulties
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related to plant modifications required for restart and
Hot Functional Testing.
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Acceptance criteria for the above items included inspector
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judgement and requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k), Regulatory
Guide 1.114, Technical Specifications, and the following
procedures.
AP 1002, " Rules for the Protection of Employees Working
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on Electrical and Mechanical Apparatus," Revision 22
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AP 1008, " Good Housekeeping," Revision 7
AP 1037, " Control of Caution and DN0 Tags," Revision 2
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Review of Safety Limits, Limiting Safety System Settings and
Limiting Conditions for Operations
The inspector reviewed documentation listed below to ascertain
whether the licensee is complying with Technical Specification
requirements.
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Operating Procedure (0P) 1101-1, " Plant Limits and Precautions,"
Revision 12
OP 1101-2, " Plant Setpoints," Revision 17
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OP 1102-1, " Plant Heatup to 525 Degrees F," Revision 46
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OP 1102-16, "RCS Natural Circulation Cooling," Revision 6
OP 1103-4, " Soluble Poison Concentration Control," Revision 17
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OP 1101-3, " Containment Integrity and Access Limit," Revision 2
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OP 1103-2, " Filling and Venting the Reactor Coolant System,"
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Revision 29
OP 1103-5, " Pressurizer Operation," Revision 19
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OP 1103-6, " Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," Revision 21
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OP 1104-1, " Core Flood System," Revision 10
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OP 1104-4, " Decay Heat Removal System," Revision 31
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Surveillance Procedure (SP) 1301 ' , " Shift and Daily Checks,"
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Revision 34
SP 1301-9.9, " Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors," Revision 13
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SP 1303-4.11
"High Pressure Injection and Low Pressure
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Injection Logic and Analog Check," R2 vision 18
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SP 1303-12.8A, " Fire Protection Instrumer.tation Functional
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Test Control Building Elevation 355 ft," Revision 2
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SP 1305-12.9, " Fire Barrier Seal Inspection," Revision 0
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SP 3301-R1, " Fire Service Diesel Engine Inspection," Revision 1
Acceptance criteria for the above items included selected requirements
of facility operating procedures and the following Technical Specifications
(listed according to their respective systems).
Reactor Coolant System Technical Specifications 2. 2, 3.1.1.1,
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3.1.1.3, and 3.1.12
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Instrumentation Technical Specification 3.5.1, Table 3.5-1
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Emergency Core Cooling Systems Technical Specification 3.5.3.1
Containment Integrity Technical Specification 3.6.1
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Fire Protection Technical Specification 3.18
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The items observed and reviewed by the inspector were acceptable,
unless otherwise noted below.
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SP 1303-12.8A, " Fire Protection Instrumentation Functional
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Test," data sheet referenced an incorrect Technical Speci-
fication 4.17.l A on the cover sheet as compared to the
orocedure which referenced the appropriate Technical
f peci fication 4.18.1 A.
SF 3301-R-1, " Fire Service Diesel Engine Inspection," surveillance
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exception and deficiency list was rissing the shift supervisor's
initials and date.
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SP 1303-12.9, " Fire Barrier Seal Inspection," section 4.3.11
and 4.3.14 were missing several required initials.
(Note:
The shift supervisor corrected the problem when brought to his
attention.)
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OP 1103-6, " Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," procedure did not
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require starting of associated lift pumps when starting
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additional reactor coolant pumps.
These items were discussed with the Operations and Maintenance
Director TMI-1, who stated that appropriate measures would be
taken to correct the administrative or procedural discrep-
ancies.
The inspector considered that these items were
isolated examples of inadequate attention to detai1 regarding
procedure development and implementation. The inspector had
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no further questions concerning this matter.
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4.
Hot Functional Testing (HFT) Program and Procedure Review
a.
Program Review
The inspector reviewed the following procedures related to the
HFT program to determine overall program adequacy and to
verify that the procedures were reviewed and approved in
accordance with administrative controls.
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Prerequisite List for HFT, Revision 0, dated May 18, 1981
Test Procedure (TP) 600/1, Controlling Procedure for HFT,
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Revision 0, dated August 17, 1981
OP 1102-1, Plant Heatup, Revision 46 as revised for HFT,
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dated July 10,196
OP 1102-11, Plant Cooldown, Revision 31, dated June H,1981
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The prerequisite list for HFT prWdes the pretest requirements
for systems necessary to support nat functional testing.
The
prerequisite list is in the fonn of a signoff sheet whereby
each system and associated equipment tests (generic and functional)
are verified complete by the Startup and Test Group.
In
addition, the operability status of each system is verified by
the Startup and Test Group and the Operations Department.
(The Startup and Test Group verifies the acceptability of
design modification work necessary to support testing. The
Operations Department performs the approved operating procedures
to align apalicable plant systems for the appropriate plant
condition.'
The prerequisite list also tracks outstanding
items and exceptions that pertain to the design modifications.
The prerequisite list tracks all operating procedures, required
for milestone events and surveillance procedures needed for
heatup, and items that possibly affect the procedures.
TP 600/1 is the controlling accument that references and
sequences all operating and HFT procedures.
The procedure
controls plant mode changes from formation of the steam bubble
in the pressurizer through plant heatup to 532F and 2155 psig
and-subsequently through the plant cooldown phase to the
initial depressurized state.
The controlling test procedure
(TP 600/1) also includes a sequential logic schedule that
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defines the tests to be performed at specified temperature and
pressure plateaus. Actual plant heatup ard cooldown operations
are performed using approved operating proceduras (OP 1102-1
and OP 1102-11) that were modified for HFT conditions.
The inspector considered that the above procedures associated
with control, coordination and conduct of the HFT program were
adequate to assure the safe and accurate performance of the
H FT' s .
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b.
HFT Procedure ."sview (General)
Each TP that is scheduled and controlled by TP 600/1 contains
test specific prerequisites and acceptance criteria.
Prior to
HFT each TP is reviewed and approved by the licensee.
The inspector reviewed the sequential logic schedule to determine
what testing was planned and to verify that applicable procedures
were written and approved.
The inspector planned to review
approved copies of all the referenced TP's about one week or
.less prior tc the scheduled test performance dates. Al though
several approved TP's were provided when requested for NRC
review, other TP's were available only in draft form and a fw
TP's were not yet written.
The inspector discussed this
matter with licensee representatives from the Startup and Test
Group, who were responsible for preparing the TP's.
The
licensee's representative stated that some of the originally
listed tests would not be performed during the preliminary HFT
due to tFe d' /ficulty in obtaining the necessary procedures,
and that % remaining TP's were expected to be approved
shortly
'r to performance of the tests.
The inspector
state.
6 sufficient time had not been provided for the
desired NRC review of the TP's prior to scheduled testing.
Although .uch pre-testing NRC review of the TP's was not
required, any procedural or test inadequacies identified
during subsequent NRC review of the test results would have to
be satisfactorily resolved before the test is accepted.
The
licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
The inspector's
findings on final approved and draft TP's, including descriptions
of the test objectives and acceptance criteria, are discussed
in the paragraphs below.
c.
Review of Individual HFT Procedures
TP 651/1, " Intermediate Closed Coeling System Flow Test,"
Revision 0, approved August 4,1981
The Intermediate Cooling System is started in accordance
with OP 1104-8, Revision 11, approved February 20, 1981.
After t se system is in operation, TP 651/1 is conducted
to veri fy system performance.
The following items were
verified or performed by TP 651/1.
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Low Intermediate Closed Cooling Water (ICCW) flow
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interlock to Control Rod Drive Breakers
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Ability to satisfactorily cool plant equipment at
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250F, 400F, and 532F temperature plateaus
Adequate cooling to Reactor Coolant Letdown Coolers
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during normal and maximum letdown, and to Control
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Rod Drive Stators during hot shutdown conditions
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ICCW heat load and flow rate calcula;;ons while in
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het shutdown
The inspector reviewed TP 651/1 to verify that the test
was reviewed and approved per applicable administrative
prot.edures, that test objectives were clearly stated and
addressed in the body of the test, that acceptance
criteria wa; defined, and that appropriate Quality
Control (QC) holdpoints were identified.
Findings were
acceptable.
TP 654/1, " Main Steam Safeties Acoustic Monitor-Functional
Test" (Draft)
TP 654/1 provides instructions to verify the proper
operation of the acoustic monitors installed by the ltain
Steam Safety valves.
The test procedure contains details
that (nables verification that both the computer and
indicator lights on the audio monitoring cabinet correctly
identify which group of safety valves has lifted. Baseline .
data will also be obtained for noise levels in each
chamber.
The actual lift of the safety valves will be
performed in accordance with SP 1303-11.3, " Main Steam
Safety Valves," Revision 6.
The inspector reviewed the draft copy of TP 654/1 to
compare the assigned test objectives with the acceptance
criteria.
Findings were acceptable, pending the review
and final approval of the TP by the licensee.
TP 655/1, "High Pressure Injection System Functional
Test" (Draft)
The inspector reviewed the draft copy of TP 655/1 and
compared the proposed test objectives and acceptance
criteria to the following technical reports.
System Design Description for High Pressure Injection
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Cross Connect, System Design Document (SDD) 211 A,
Revision 2
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TMI-l Restart Report, Section 8.3.15, Small Break
TMI'l Restart Report, Supplement 1, Part 3, ResNnse
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to Questions 1, 2, and 3, Amendment 25
Constricting venturies were added to the high pressure
injection (HPI) discharge lines to prevent inadverteni.
pump runout and cavitation of the pump without the w.J
to throttling the individual discharge valves (MU-V16A/B/C/D).
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TP 655/1 provides instructions to test the HPI system
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with installed cross connects for the minimum flow split
of 70%/30% for all ca:5inations of three HPI. legs in both
the cavitating regime (Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
pressure less than 600 psig) and the non-cavitating
regime (RCS pressure approximately 1200 psig).
The test
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hiso verifies total flow for all four legs under both of
the previous pressure conditions.
The reviewed acceptance
criteria in the procedure reflects the values reported in
SDD-211 A and Response to Questions 1, 2, and 3 of the
Restart Report, Supplement 1. Part 3.
The test additionally
verifies the flow rate through the bypass valve, MU-V217,
which was installed to limit thermal shock to the "D" HPI
nozzle.
Findings were acceptable, pending a final review
and approval by the licensee.
TP 674/1, " Reactor Coolant Pump Operation and Flow Test,"
Revision 0, approved August 4,1981
The test provides instructions to obtain baseline operating
data for each reactor coolant pump (RCP) during initial
pump startup and at various temperature plateaus up to
and including hot shutdown conditions.
The RCP's are
started and operated in accordance with OP 1103-6,
" Reactor Coolant Pump Operation," Revision 21.
The inspector reviewed TP 674/1 for administrative review
and approval, test objectives, prerequisite conditions,
and acceptance criteria.
Findings were acceptable.
TP 677/1, "RCS Post-Accident Sampling Functional Test"
( Draft)
TP 677/1 was written to allow for documenting the time
required for three technicians to perform specific actions
in order to obtain an RCS sample during postulated post-
acciaont conditions.
Each action is to be timed and
witnessed by a QC inspector.
The estimated exposure is
then calculated and compared to a 5 rem upper limit.
The
assumed post-accident dose :<te used fc" the test is
199 rem /hr.
This exposure eate value p.aoduces a conservative
result when compared to the 180 rem /hr dose rate listed
in TMI-1 Restart Report, Se: tion 2.1.2.4.1, Amendment 25
findings were acceptable, pending final review and
approval of this TP by the licensee.
5.
Emergency Feedwater System - 48-Hour Pump Run
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References
TP 233/2, " Emergency Feeuwater Pumps 4b-Hour Run,"
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Revision 0, approved July 20, 1981
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SP 1300-3F, " Motor-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
Functional Test," Rev:sion 6
SP 1300-3G A/B, " Turbine-driven Emergency Feedwater Pump
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Functional Test and Valve Operability Test," Revision 6
TMI-l Restart Report, Supplement 1, ~ Part 2, Question 7,
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Amendment 25
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Test Scope
A 48-hour endurance test was conducted in accordance with
TP 233/2 on the turbine-driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump
and both motor-driven ErW pumps.
Parameters measured during
the test included pump f'ow . pump suction, and discharge
pressure, bearing temperatures, EFW temperature, turbine /
motcr/ pump vibrations, motor tempe.ature and current, ard pump
room temperature and humidity.
After completion of the 48-ho.r
test run, the pumos were allowed to remain idle for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />,
until the bearing temperatures ceoled to within 20F of the
value at the start of the test.
The pumps.were then restarted
and run for an additional I hoar before being secured and
returned to standby service.
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Inspection Scope _ and Findings
The inspector reviewed -TP 233/2 for proper review and approval
by the licensee.
The acceptance criteria specified for the
measured operating parameters in section 11.0 of the test were
compared to those in the normal plant surveillance procedures,
SP 1300-3F and SP 1300-3G A/B.
No discrepancies were observed.
The inspector witnessed endurance tests conducted for all
tnree EFW pumps to ve rify that test procedures and :dministrative
controls were be;ag adhered to by test personnal .
Data measuring,
recording, and review were also verified on a sampling basis.
Discussions were held with the startup test engineer on several
occasions during the test to ascertain that jurisdictional
controls were being exercised.
No items of noncompliance were
identified during the conduct of toe endurance test.
Data taken and plotted for trend analysis were reviewed by the
inspector and compared to the test acceptance criteria.
Pending the final review and approval of the test results by
the licensee to comply with restart commitments for the EfW
endurance test, the inspector had no further questions on this
matter.
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6.
Onergency Feedwater System - Functional Test
a,
.Re ferences
TP 233/1, " Emergency Feedwater System Functional Test,"
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Revision 0, dated July 23, 1981
Design Modification Task RM-13E
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TMI-l Restart Report, Section 2.1.1.7, Anendment 25
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b.
Test Scope
TP 233/1 was prepared to test the following design features /
modifications described in the TMI-l Restart Report.
Automatic start logic of all three EFW pumps on simulated
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loss of both main feeduster pumps or trip of all four
RCP's
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Ability of manual loader stations to control EFW valves
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EF-V30 A and B
Valves EF-V30 A and B fail open on loss of instrument a.ir
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Control room annunciation of all automatic start conditions
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of EFW systems
Instrumentation and indicators for EFW flow to the Once
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Through Steam Generators (OTSG)
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c.
Inspection Scope and Findings
TP 233/1 was reviewed by the inspector to verify that it was
reviewed and approved by the licensee in accordance with
administrative controls, that test objectives were clearly
stated, acceptance criteria were consistant with the test
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objectives, and that appropriate prerequisities were defined.
The inspector held discussions with the cognizant test engineer
on the technical content of the test.
Items discussed by the
inspector included (1) test or automatic loading to the diesel
generators for the motor driven pumps, (2) calibration and
setpoints of engineering safeguard (ES) contacts, and (3) power
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supply source of the OTSG flow instrume.: Lation.
The licensee's
representative stated that the dietel load test (to be conducted
at a later date) incorporated a verification of the motor-
driven' pumps automatically loading on to the diesel generator
in less than 30 seconds.
The ES contacts in question were
scheduled to be checked under design modification Task PM-5C,
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which was being conducted at this time by another startup
engineer. A review of the applicable drawings indicated that
the OTSG instrumentdion power was supplied by the 120V vital
busses GBC and GBB.
The inspector had no further questions
about the content of the test procedure at this time.
The inspector reviewed the approved field copy of TP 233/1 to
determine test progress and procedure adherence.
The licensee
nad successfully completed those sections of the test per-
taining to the EFW pump automatic start, contro! of valves
EF-V30 A and B, valves EF-V30 A and B tail open on loss of
air, and control room annunciation of all EFW automatic start-
conditions.
Due to late arrival of the Controlatron instruments
for EFW flow indication to the OTSG, sections 9.5 and 9.6 of
this test procedure were postponed to a later date.
TP 233/1
remained incomplete and could not be concluded until the above
modifications were finished.
The inspector had no further
questions at this time.
7.
In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LEO.'s)
The inspector reviewed the LER's listed below, which were submitted
to the NRC Region I office, to verify that the details of the event
'
were clearly reported, including the accuracy of the description of
cause and the adequacy of corrective action.
The inspecMr dHermined
whether further information was required from the' licensee, whether
the information involved with the event should be submitted to
Licensing Boards, whether generic implications were indicated, and
whethe. the event warranted onsite followup.
The following LER's were reviewed:
LER 81-006/3L-0, dated June 10,1981 (Fire Service Diesel
--
Engine Surveillance Procedure 3301-R1 was not performed within
the allowable time limit due to data being improperly entered
into the computer data base for scheduling)
--
LER 81-007/99X-0, dated July 8,1981 (Inspections resulting
from IEB 79-14 determined that numerous pipe supports had been
located or oriented improperly when installed)
The above LER's were closed based on satisfactory in-office review.
8.
Exit Interview
Meetings were held periodically with senior facility management
during the course of the inspection to discuss the inspection scope
and findings.
The inspectors met with the licensee representatives
(denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on
September 2,1981, and summarized the purpose and scoge of the
inspection and the findings.
The licensee representatives acknow-
ledged the findings.
. _