ML20030C345
| ML20030C345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1981 |
| From: | Carroll J JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-07-02, TASK-7-2, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8108260001 | |
| Download: ML20030C345 (4) | |
Text
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Jersey Central Pc.wer & Light Company Ap.>
Madison Avenue 't Punchbow! Road y
C Mornstown New Jersey 0796J 201 539-6111 August 17, 1981 9' \\, =, (/ p(.,
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N. I[4'l eg'- U /SgI A
-2 Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactor Branch No. 5 Q
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Division of Licensing
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Washington, D. C.
20555 J
Dear Sir:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 SEP Topic Vll-2 ESF System Control Logic and Design We have reviewed your Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Technical Eval uation of Top ic V l l-2 done f or the Oyster Creek Station by your staf f and transmitted to us by your March 30, 1981 letter.
As a result of our review, we have noted some items in your evaluation which need to be corrected, clarified or updated. Our comments are provided by attachment I to this letter.
If you should have any further questions on this subject, please call Mr.
J. Knubel (201) 299-2264.
Very truly yours,
/
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J. T. CarrolI, Jr Acting Director
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Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
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5 Ib 8108260001 010817 P7R ADOCK 05000219 P
PDR Jersey Central Power & Light Company is a Member of the General Pubkc Utihties System
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1.
General Comments:
1.
The NRC evaluation that was done did not take into consideration a 1978 modification that was performed on the station 125 vdc distribution system.
This modification included the instalition of a completely new safety grade battery, chargers and distribution system. Where applicable, the corrections to the evaluation, resulting f rom this modification, will be addressed under the specific comments below and drawings of the 125 vde system are attached.
2.
The original design of the Oyster Creek facility did not consider maintaining separation within the Control Room Panels.
As such, there is no guarantee that separation is maintained at all times within the Control Room Panels.
II.
Specific Comments:
1.
Containment Spray System:
a.
The Containment Spray bystem is single failure proof and redundant from a component standpoint, however, the automatic start logic is not single failure proof.
Based on this, senarios can be postulated where the containment spray system might not start automatically, but it still could be started remote / manually f rom the Control Room. This is not considered a deficiency in the system since Containment Spray is not required until a significant period of time (hours) after an accident.
b.
The Service Water pumps are in no way associated with the operation of the Containment Spray system and the reference to them on page 6 of the evaluation should be deleted.
2.
Automatic Depressurization System a.
The Low-low-low water level switches should be designated RE 18 A, B, C and D vice RE 19 A, B, C and D.
3.
Emergency (Isolation) Condenser System:
- a. The time delay on the isolation condenser has been reduced from 15 seconds to 3 seconds by a recent Technical Specification Amendment.
b.
The power supply for the DC motor operated valves is as follows:
V-14~34, V-14-33, V-14-31 are powered f rom MCC DC-1 ;
V-14-35 is powered from MCC DC-2.
Therefore the statement about redundant de valves being powered from the same supply is no longer true.
c.
The Staff evaluation did not consider the Logic interf ace between the Emergency condenser logic and the Recirc. Pump Trip (RPT) 'ogic.
Drawings are attached which show this interface.
4.
Containment Isolation System:
a.
A signi f icant upgrade in this sytem has resulted as an of fshoot of the
. TMl Lessons Learned.
In order to clarify this sytem, the following information is provided:
(i)
Those valves which are considered containment isolation valves are:
-RBCCW Valves V-5-147, 166,167 (1 )
-Clean-Up Valves V-16-1,2,14,61 (2)
-Shutdown Cooling Valves V-17-19,54 (2)
-Main Steam Vaives NS03A,B, NSO4A,B, V-1-106,107, 110,111 (3)
-instrument Air Valves V-6-395 (2)
-TIP Ball Valves (2)
-Isolation Condenser Valves V-14-1,5,19,20 (2)
-Torus Vacuum Breaker Valves V-26 16,18 (2)
-Torus /Drywell Atmosphere Control &
(2)
Sump Valves V-22-1,2,28,29 V-23-13,14,15 & 16 17,18,19,20,21,22, V-27-1,2,3,4 V-28-17,18&47 (1)
Isolates on triple low level or high drywell pressure and low low level.
(2)
Isolates on low low level or high drywell pressure.
(3)
Isolates on low low level, mainstream line high radiation, mainsteam line low pressure or mainsteam line break.
(ii) All of the above valves, with the exception of V-26-16 & 18, will have three position spring return normal controi switches by July 1, 1981. Further modification to the Contairment Vent & Purge System will be implemented during the next refueling outage
'o satisfy single failure criteria from an operational standpoint.
(iii) The following valves are powered from MCC1AB2.
V-1-106, 107 l
V-17-19, 54 V-16-1, 61 l
(iv) The following valves are powered from MCC DC-1 V-1-110, 111 V-16-2, 14 l
(v) The following valves are powered from VACP-1 V-22-1, 2, 28, 29 V-23-13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 V-27-1, 2, 3, 4 V-28-17, 18 & 47 (vi) Valves V-6-395, NS03A, B, & NSO4A, B are air actuated from redundant 120VAC (VACP-11) and 125 VDC (OC-F) coils.
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. (vil) Valve V-5-167 is powered from MCC 1A2!A (viii) Valve V-5-166 is powered from MCC 18218 (ix) Valve V-5-147 is powered from MCC IB21A (x) Valves V-14-1, 19 are powered from MCC DC-2 (xi)
Valves V-14-5, 20 are powered from MCC DC-1 (xil)
Valves V-24-29, 30 are powered from VACP-1 (xlii) The isolation sensor control logic for all valves are powered from the RPS MG-Sets with the following exceptions:
(1)
Isolation logic for all clean-up valves are 125VDC Control.
Sensor logic is powered from the RPS MG-Sets.
(See GE 237E566, Sheet 4).
(2) RBCCW isolation logic utilizes core spray system control power (125VDC);
V-5-167 (DC-F), V-5-147, 166 (DC-D).
(xiv) The emergency condenser AC valves for a particular loop, v.hich are normally open, will isolate on a line break in that loop. These valves were not consider ed containmer:t isolation valves.
.