ML20030C342
| ML20030C342 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1981 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20030C343 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR LAC-7747, NUDOCS 8108250717 | |
| Download: ML20030C342 (9) | |
Text
.
D DA/RYLAND h
[k COOPERAT/VE po Box si7 2615 EAST AV SOUTH. LA CROSSE WISCONSIN 54601 (coe) 7884000 f
j
- ,g August 17, 1981
/-
Q:
4 3,_ 8 N
a3 In reply, please J _ %_ O E6
.3 refer to LAC-7747 t
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DOCKET NO. 50-409 l -
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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regul(tip:n < d,/ fy ATTN:
Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield,
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d I Operating Reactors Branch No.
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Division of Operating Reactors U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 i
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE DOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 SEP TOPIC VI CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMS (LA CROSSE):
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
REFERENCES:
(1)
NRC Letter, Crutchfield to Linder, Dated May 26, 1981.
(2)
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Hazards Summary Report for Construction Author-ization (ACNP-62574, October 1962).
(3)
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Safeguards Report for Operating Authorization (ACNP-65544, Revised August 1967).
(4)
DPC Letter, Linder to Shea, LAC-6732, Dated January 14, 1981.
(5)
NRC Letter, Crutchfield to Linder, Dated June ll, 1981.
(6)
NRC Letter, Ziemann to Linder, Dated April 25, 1980 Gentlemen:
Your letter (Reference 1) requested additional information for SEP Topic VI-4, Containment Isolation Systems.
The description of the isolation capability for the systems that penetrate containment were initially described in Reference 2.
l Reference 3, Chapter 6, Section 6.5 Isolation Valves (Page 6-20) l describes the isolation valves for obtaining containment integrity, also states the criteria for the number, placement and operation of the valves, which are as follows:
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G108250717 810817 4
PDR ADOCK 05000409 i
P PDR
i Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield, Chief LAC-7747 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981 i
J 1
1
.i (1) "Two valves in series are used at containment penetrations for piping connected directly to j
the primary system.
At least one of these valves i
closes automatically following an accident, unless
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one is normally closed during plant operation.
l The second valve is operable either from the control room or from some other location which will be accessible after an accident.
The valves are on different sides of the containment build-j ing wall.
(2)
Two isolation valves in series are also used for any piping open to both the building atmosphere and the outside atmosphere-Unless one of the valves is normally closed, at least one of the valves must be a quick closing fail-safe valve interlocked to prevent reopening until conditions are safe.
The second valve is operable either from the control room or some other location accessible after an accident.
(3)
Piping that is open to the containment building atmosphere but that leaves and re-enters the containment building without being open to the outside atmosphere does not require isolation.
(4)
Piping that is open to the outside atmosphere but that enters and leaves the containment building without being open to the containment building l
atmosphere or the primary system does not require isolation.
Isolation is required for this type of penetration, however, if its chances for rupture are significantly increased by the conditions that require containment isolation."
r Section 6.5 also describes the valves that fall into each of the above categories as well as the action of each valve in order to I
fulfill the containment isolation funtion.
The following information is presented in response to your request contained in Reference 1.
! l
,_y
4 Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief LAC-7747 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981 l
1 Item 1:
The follouing non-sscential systems / penetrations do not appear to i
have the dual isolation barriers."
PENETRATION SYSTE'!
EXISTING C.
I.
V.
M-13 Station Air Check - Inside M-17 Decay Heat Removal AO Globe - Inside M-18 Scal Injection Check - Inside b
M-21 Vent Exhaust Damper A0 Butterfly (2) - Inside M-23 Resin Sluice Check - Outside b
M-2 2, 25, 27 Waste Water A0 Globc - Inside M-28 Reactor Cavity Purge Air Check - Outside i
j M-29 Off-Gas Vent Chimney A0 Globe - Inside 1
(Remo t e-Manua l-Ou t side )
i M-31 Ventilation Supply A0 Butterfly - Inside l
Justify the deviation of the above from GDC 55 and/or 56.
1 1
DPC RESPONSE:
I j
Penetration M-13 is a closed system and falla under the review criteria of GDC 57.
Station air has no normal usage in containment.
l It is piped to several hose stations and other occasional use loca-tions.
Leakage from containment via station air is measured annually and during every containment (Class A) leakage test.
There have been "j
ten (10) Class A and nine (9) individual (Class C) tests and there never has been any leakage observed during the tests.
Therefore, we j
consider the design to be adequate.
I Penetration M-18 falls under the review criteria of GDC 56.
There have been ten (10) Class A and six (6) Class C tests.
On two (2) i occasions, test results revealed leakage rates which exceeded limits i
established by Technical Specifications.
It was recognized that this penetration represented a potential leak source, therefore, several
]
years ago a second check valve was ir. stalled in the line just out-i e
I J
Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield, Chief LAC-7747 U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981 side containment.
LACBWR conducts tests for leakage through the series check valves on a routine basis with air.
Since the install-ation of the second check valve no leakage has been observed.
The present valve installation and testing requirements are considered to be adequate.
Penetration M-23 falls under the review criteria of GDC 55.
The check valve outside referred to above serves no containment isolation function.
It is installed such that flow through the vaJve is from containment.
This penetration is isolated from the reactor coolant pressure boundary by two normally locked closed manual valves within containment in all cases.
Since there has been no leakage observed in ten (10) Class A containment and seven (7) Class C tests, this arrangement is considered to be adequate.
Penetrations M-22, M-25, and M-27 fall under the review criteria of GDC 56.
Each of the lines from containment have a normally locked closed manual valve plus the common air-operated globe valve within containment that is normally closed.
The air-operated valve has an additional control station remotely located outside containment.
The arrangement of two (2) normally closed valves in the lines is consider-ed to be adequate since there has been no leakage observed from these sources in ten (10) Class A containment and six (6) Class C tests.
Penetration M-28 falls under the review criteria of GPC 56.
This system with its single check valve outside containment is considered adequate because the 100 psig air supply is from the cantainment control air system backup compressor, which is powered from the 1A l
The system would be supplied with an air pressure well above the maximum containment pressure after a postulated accident.
However, the check valve leakage has been measured when l
the air supply has been removed during ten (10) Class A containment and six (6) individual tests, with only one (1) occasion where the leakage rate exceeded the limits established by Technical Specifications, i
Penetration M-29 falls under the review criteria of GDC 56.
This penetration is normally isolated inside containment, i.e.,
even though the inside air operated valve is normally open (and closed on any of 3 diverse parameters) other valves are closed in the system inside containment.
Additionally, the remote manual air operated valve outside containment is closed during plant operation.
In response to IE Bulletin 79-08, our letter Reference 4, described the valve opera-tion.
Subsequent review and NRC approval of the installation and operation was transmitted to us by Reference 5.
There have been ten (10) Class A and twenty-four (24) Class C tests on only four (4) l
[
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield LAC-7747 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981 occasions test results revealed leakage rates which exceeded limits f
established by Technical Specifications.
The arrangement of this I
containment penetration is considered to be adequate.
i Penetrations M-21 and M-31 fall under the review criteria of GDC 56.
j Each of these two penetrations have two (2) air-operated valves in j
series within containment which are actuated to close on three (3) diverse parameters in redundant chains.
There have been ten (10)
Class A tests on each penetration. Additionally, there have been
)
twenty-six (26) Class C tests on the ventilation supply, twenty-j eight (28) Class C tests on the ventilation exhaust penetration.
On only nine (9) occasions tests results revealed leakage rates which exceeded limits established by Technical Specifications.
Our j
letter, Reference 4, in response to IE Bulletin 79-08 described the
~
valve operation.
Subsequent review and approval of the installation i
and operation was transmitted in NRC letter, Reference 5.
These containment penetrations are considered to be adequate.
Penetration M-17 falls under the review criteria of GDC 55.
The remote air-operated valve within containment from Decay Heat Removal i
is closed during reactor operation, but is opened to control reactor l
water level during reactor heatup and cooldown.
The valve is auto-4 matically closed upon any of two (2) diverse parameters in redundant chains for accident conditions.
Containment leakage through this 2
l penetration in ten (10) Class A and ten (10) Class C tests has never 1,
exceeded technical specification limits.
Additional information and approval of the adequacy of the operation of the decay heat valve is
]
contained in NRC letter, Reference 6.
1 I
Item 3
)
Penetration 1A on Allis-Chalmers Drawing Number 42-300-088 contains local manual valves on the contcinment building drain suction line and instrument lines through penetrations M-14, 16, 1A and 2B.
SRP Section 6.2.4.II.3 states that these valves should be locked closed and under administrative control.
Demonstrate tha: this is the case b
or justify Ohy not.
DPC RESPONSE:
The manual valves on the containment drain suction line are locked i
closed in accordance with procedures contained in the LACBWR Opera--
i ting Manual.
I I !
d I
i Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield LAC-7747 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981
~
1 The instrument lines through penetrations M-14 and M-16 are to containment building water level transmitters.
These redundant water level transmitters are required for emergency core cooling purposes in that they are used to determine water level relative i
to the core after a LOCA.
Therefore, it is concluded that valves j
37-28-003, -007, -008, -009, and -010 must be open.
I The instrument lines through penetrations lA and 2B are to contain-ment building pressure sensors.
These redundant pressure switches are required to provide one of the signals to isolate automatic containment valves in the event of a LOCA.
Also, these pressure
]
switches are used in the initiation of HPCS, ACS diesels and emer-l gency diesel generators.
Therefore, it is concluded that valves 37-28-001, -002, -011, and -012 must be open.
All of the lines in this item either out to the valve in the drain suction line, or out to and including the level and pressure sensors, t
is an extension of the containment boundary.
Ten (10) Class A tests i
of containment have never shown any leakage from these systems.
Item 4 SRP Sect *on C.2.4.II.3.e states that containment isolation for E.S.F.
or E.S.F.
related systems may consist of only one isolation valve, if it can be shoun that system reliability is greater with only one isolation valve and if a single active failure can be accommodated uith only one isolation valve in the line.
However, this valve should be located outside containment.
The follouing systems contain one l
isolation valve inside and none outside containment.
Penetration System M-19 Shutdoun Vent Off-Gas M-11 Demineralized Water M-8 High Pressure Service Water
- i Clarify if isolation valves exist for these lines outside containmert.
l DPC RESPONSE:
1
)
No automatic isolation valves exist outside containment for the three systems identified above.
In addition to the isolation valves inside, i
manual valves are located in the lines just outside containment.
i
! 3 J
a i
l i
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield LAC-7747 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981
)
i 1
j Item 5 1
1 LAC 6319 atatco that the failure position for the main etcam hydraulic j
plug-cock icolation valve on loco of motive poucr is "a s i s. "
Hou uould thic valva be isolated in the cuent or loco of motive poucr?
?
l
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)
DPC RESPONSE:
1
]
The main steam isolation valve is a hydraulically operated plug-cock j
valve.
The motive force is water from a stored energy system.
The j
stored energy system'contains sufficient hydraulic fluid under suffi-j cient pressure to operate the valve operator (and four other identical i
operators installed on the recirculation system) a minimum of three (3) 1 complete cycles, per LACBWR Technical Specifications.
Tests have j
demonstrated that the system can cycle a valve at least 100 times.
t Therefore, the loss of motive power is not considered to be an expected
]
occurrence.
4 Item 6 1
4 I
Closed loop lince auch ao thoac in ponctrationa M-9 and M-10 should bc l
provided uith an automatic isolation or remote manual valve outside
\\
containment or be locked clooed, according to GDC 57.
It doca not appear that thacc penetrations meet this provision.
Clarify this point and juotify any deviation from GDC 57.
DPC REPSONSE:
i These penetrations contain the component cooling water (CCW) and fall under the review criteria GDC 57.
The design of the system is such that the CCW system would be in operation at all times, even after a LOCA.
The CCW system operates at a pressure above design containment j
building pressure, therefore containment leakage into the system is not possible, unless the CCW system ruptures.
Upon a CCW piping rupture, system alarms of low flow and low surge tank level will j
annunciate in the control room.
Manual valves located in the system j
outside containment can then be closed.
For containment isolation a
purposes, this arrangement is considered to be satisfactory.
]
i Item 7 Allio-Chalmcro Draving Number 41-300-088, "LACBWR Reactor Plant Con-l tainment Vccact Penetrations Diagram" refers to tuo (2) additional drawinga: 41-503432 and 41-503432.
Please provide too (2) copico y
of thcoc drauinga.
i :
l 1
l e
E 1.
4 2
Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfic'i LAC-7747 i
U.
S. Nuclear Regulator, Commission August 17, 1981 I
a 4
DPC RESPONSE:
i l
Two copies of Allis-Chalmers drawings 41-503431, Rev. J.,
Reactor j
Containment Vessel Developed Interior Elev. & Sect. and 41-503432, j
Rev.
K., Reactor Containment Vessel Penetration Schedule & Details are enclosed 3
i A
- ]
Item 8 3
Tcat connectiona auch as thoac linco t.hrough ponctrationa M-11 and f
M-12 need to be under adminiatrative control to accure that they arc not inadvertently opened or left open.
Diccuco the administrativo l
controla that apply to all tcat connectionc.
I g
DPC RESPONSE:
Most of the lines penetrating containment on drawing 41-300-088, sheets 1 and 2, have test connections on them.
These are utilized
{
in determining containment out leakage, either during individual 4
(Class C) or building integrated (Class A) tests.
Specific test i
procedures are utilized for each test.
The Class A test procedure for containment leakage includes a requirement for the operator to initial a check list upon opening or closing of each test valve.
t The Class C test procedures contain steps that control opening and closing of the test valves, and requirement of an operator's signa-i ture upon completion of the test.
All the procedures are contained in the LACBWR Operating Manual.
1
/
j Item 9 Penetration M-34 doca not appear to have any decignated isolation valven. Picace indicato the isolation valuco on the "chutdoun condenser etcan - atmosphere" line, if any.
Juctify not having containment icolation on thic line if that in the cacc.
DPC RESPONSE:
i i
This line (on Dwg. 41-300-048, Sheet 2), which appears to be a containment penetration, is not applicable for review under either i
GDC 55, 56 or 57.
The pipe through penetration M-34 is connected i
to the shell side of the Shutdown condenser, an emergency tube and j
shell heat exchanger.
The outside of the shell is exposed to con-i tan.mont atmosphere, i.e.,
the shell is part of the containment
}
boundary.
The inside of the shell is open to outside atmospheric 1
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Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield LAC-7747 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981 a
j pressure through penetration M-34.
When a heat sink is required for reactor decay heat, and none is available external to the con-tainment, then reactor steam is condensed in the tubes of the j
shutdown condenser.
In this process, water from the demineralized water system, or HPSW, both of which come from outside the contain-ment, is admitted to the shell, and turns to steam, removing heat
}
from the primary system.
Therefore, in consideration of the required l
use and the absence of any connections to either the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment atmosphere, this installation is j
considered satisfactory as installed.
I j
Item 10 l
Discuse the provisiono for leakage monitoring for all remote ecnual j
an'd local manual containment isolation valves.
- l DPC RESPONSE
l The leakage through the valves of the systems connected to the 1
follcuing penetrations is-individually tested and measured annually and during the integrated containment leakage test:
M-32 M-29 M-7 M-36 M-26 M-19 M-33 M-13 M-23 l
M-31 M-6 M-28 M-21 M-17 M-22 j
M-ll M-18 M-25 M-12 M-8 M-27 Altelnate Core Spray valves through penetration lA.
I l
Drain suction through penetration lA.
j Pressure switches and piping through penetrations lA and 2B.
1 j
The leakage through the systems connected to th' following penetrations j
is monitored during the integrated containment leakage rate test:
i M-14 M-16 M-34 M-9 M-10 1' i t
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--.-,--m e..,.,.
,,, n.,, -,,.
w.--.--,..--n--.
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Mr. Dennis M.
Crutchfield LAC-7747 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 17, 1981 All capped penetrations.
If you have any further questions on this topic, please contact us.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
(
s
/L.
k Frank Linder, General Manager FL:llAT:eme cc:
J.
G.
Keppler, Director, NRC-DRO Ill NRC Resident Inspectors -