ML20030B120

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Forwards Evaluation Supporting NRC Safety Evaluation of SEP Topic VII-1.A,isolation of Reactor Protection Sys from Nonsafety Sys,Including Qualification of Isolation Devices. Mods to Reactor Protection Sys Recommended
ML20030B120
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 07/30/1981
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Finfrock I
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
TASK-07-01.A, TASK-7-1.A, TASK-RR LSO5-81-07-093, LSO5-81-7-93, NUDOCS 8108060093
Download: ML20030B120 (4)


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July 30,1981 LS05 07-093

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7 Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.

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Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731

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Dear Mr. Finfrock:

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VII-1.A. ISOLATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS, INCLUDING QUALIFICATION OF ISOLATION DEVICES, SAFETY EVALUATION FOR OYSTER CREEK The enclosed staff safety evaldation is based on a contractor document that has been made available to you previously. This evaluation supports the findings of the staff safety evaluation of Topic VII-1.A and recommends modi-fications to the Reactor Protection System.

The need to actually implement these changes will be determined during the integrated safety assessment. This topic assessmentsmay be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if HRC cetteria relating to this topic are modified before the integrated assessment is completed.

Sincerely, Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 Division of Licensing

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0YSTER CREEK Docket No. 50-219 CC G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Gene Fisher Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge Bureau Chief 1800 M Street, N. W.

Bureau of Radiation Protection Washington, D. C.

20036 380 Scotts Road Trenton, New Jersey 08628 J. B. Liebernan, Esquire Berlack, Israels & Lieberman Coamissioner 26 Broadway New Jersey Department of Energy New York, New York 10004 101 Commerce Street Newark, New Jersey 07102 Natural Resources Defense Council 91715th Street, N. W.

Licensing Supervisor Washington, D. C.

20006 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station J. Knubel P. O. Box 388 BWR Licensing Manager Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Jersey Central Power & Light Conpany

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Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Resident Inspector Morristown, New Jersey 07960 c/o U. S. NRC P. O. Box 445 Joseph W. Ferraro, Jr., Esquire Forked River, New Jersey

  • 08731 Deputy Attorney General.

State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety 1100 Raymond Boulevard Newark, New Jersey 07012 0:ean County Library Brick Township Branch 401 Chambers Bridge Road _

Brick Town, New Jersey 08723 Mayor Lacey Township P. O. Box 475 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Connissioner Department of Public Utilities State of New Jersey 101 Commerce Street Newark, New Jersey 07102 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN: EIS C0ORDINATOR 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 e

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N TOPIC:

VII-1.A, ISOLATION OF REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FROM NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS, INCLUDING QUALIFICATION OF IS0LATION DEVICES I.

Introduction Non-safety systems generally receive control signals from the reactor protection system (RPS) sensor current loops. The non-safety circuits i

are required to have isolation devices to insure the independence of the RPS channels. Requirements for the design and qualification of isolation devices are quite specific. Recent operating experience has shown that some of the earlier isolation devices or arrangements at operating plants may not be effective. The objective of our review was to verify that operating reactors have RPS designs which provide effective and qualified isolation of non-safety systems from safety systems to assure that safety systems will function as required.

II. Review Criteria The review criteria are presented in Section 2 of EG&G Report 0375J,

" Iso'iation of Reactor Protection System from Non-Safety Systems".

III. Related Safety Topics and Interfaces The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under related topics. The related topics and the subject matter are identified bel ow. Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance cri-teria and review guidance for its subject matter.

VI-7.C.1 Independence of Onsite Sources VIII-1.A Degraded Grid IX-6 Fire Protection There are no safety topics dependent on the present topic information because proper isolation has been assumed.

IV. Review Guidelines The review guidelines are presentc$ in Section 3 of Report 0375J.

V.

Evaluation 9ased on current licensing criteria and review guidelines, the plant reactor protection system complies to all current licensing criteria except for the following:

1)

IEEE Standard 279, Section 4.7.2 requires isolation devices between RPS and non-safety systems. There are no isolation devices between the nuclear flux monitoring systems and the process recorders for these systems.

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2) The licensee has not provided sufficient information upon which to conduct an independent safety assessment of the isolation between the reactor protection system analog signals and the plant process computer.
3) The power supplies for the RPS channels do not qualify as lE equi pment.

Isolation between each RPS channel and its respective power supply is by a single protective device. However, the li-censee has committed, by a letter dated December 4,1980, to install a system identical to that approved for Match 1.

The installation is to be done during the 1981 refueling outage.

VI. Conclusion The staff's position is that suitably qualified isolators should be provided between the nuclear instrumentation and the plant process com-puter and process recorders.

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