ML20028G183
| ML20028G183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1982 |
| From: | Peters R, Schechter K, Shiosaka D BECHTEL GROUP, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028G173 | List: |
| References | |
| 81-14, 81-14-R, 81-14-R00, NUDOCS 8302070493 | |
| Download: ML20028G183 (173) | |
Text
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT i. cEFORT No. 81-14
REv. NO
.0-AND/OR DATE May 15. 1981 PME8Ev" Mon 10 CFR PART 21 PAGE I
OF 1 n
kv)
- 2. PROJECT - N AME/ JOB N UMBER
- 3. UNIT
- 4. Q CLASS
- 5. REFERENCE DOCUMENTS PVNGS/10407 3
Q NCR C-C-2643
)
- 6. SEISMIC C ATEGORY 7. HOW DISCOVERED 1
Containment Installation
- 8. REQUIREMENT Specification 13-( '.-131
- 9. DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION Two (2) ASTM A354BD bolts 1 "
x 2'-9" have cracked and separated during normal handling in the field, e Bolts are supplied by Marathon Steel and used for pipe restraint anchor bolts.
e Each bolt is cracked 5 " from the end in the 9" long threaded portion.
e Examination of the crack shows light corrosion on the crack for 60-70%
thru the bolt and balance of separation was subsequent propagation resulting in complete separation.
I Q]
\\v notification
- 10. REPORT INITI ATOR i 2. Q A REXXUtERX O F D E R TO:
R. Stiens 5/14/81 1:45PM J. E. Pfunder PRO 4ENo DATE TIME J. Houchen 5/14/81 2:00PM
- 11. Q A V ALID ATION OF BLOCK 31-10 PROJ MGR DATE TIM E h12 6Y/57pf
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D. Krisha 5/14/81 1:20PM
'i ts DATE TIM E Q A SUPE RVISOR DATE TIME wo%GL L ski AMuL A>.dn
- 13. PRELIMIN ARY EV ALU ATION QN IALLY YES
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5/29/81 (B. S. Kaplan)
NO D ATE CLIENT NOTIFIED
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10CFR 50.55 (e) 10CFR21 NO O o
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l PROJ ENQ ATE PROJ MGR/DATE QA CONCURRENCE DATE
QA DATE i6. DISTRIBUTION LIST h b*
h PROJ. ENGR.
O CLIENT N-PROJ. MGR.
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'^ * * " "8302070493 830128 PDR ADOCK 05000528 PDR S
PASJtCT FILE D 4 3 3 REPORT NO-PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION q
PRO. LECT EVALUATION -
(U)
O 10-28-82 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT R EV./D ATE
,ggEg, JOE NO.10407 1
6 PREPARED BY G. C LASS UNIT REFERENCE DOCUMENTS K. M. Schechter g $ '
'9 1*2*3 Specification 13-CM-131 8
NAuE DAT:
PART 21 REPORT ABILITY: IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE CRITERI A (SEE PQPM 18.2 FOR DEFINITIONS) ARE NO THEN THE CONDITION IS NOT REPORTABLE UNDER PART 21.
- 1. DOES TH E DEFECT EXIST IN A B ASIC COMPONENTT
@ YES O ao
- 2. DOES THE DEFECT PRESENT A SUBSTANTI AL SAFETY H AZ ARDT
@ YES C NO
- 3. H AS THE COMPONENT BEEN DELIVERED OR OFFERED FOR ACCEPTANCE? @ YES Q NO PROJECT EV ALU ATION INTERIM REPORT X 50.55(e) FIN AL REPORT b PART 21 REPORT I.
DESCRIPTION CONDITION The Palo Verde Project purchases anchor studs and bolts from Marathon Steel Company, Phoenix, Arizona, who in turn uses several subtier suppliers as sources of the fasteners to them.
Four (4) A354 Grade BD 1-1/2 inch diameter steds, used as anchor studs for the
^
pipe whip restraints in the containment buildLig, cracked and separated during normal handling. One of these studs was then lab tested for chemical and mechanical properties in accordance with ASTM A354. The stud met the ASTM specification requirements for yield strength, tensile strength, reduction of area, and chemical composition, but failed to meet the 14% elongation require-(
/
ment (13% actual) and had a hardness far outside the HRC 33 to 38 range (HRC 48 on the edge of the cross section). Subsequently, a representative sample consisting of five percent (80) of the remaining A354 Grade BD bolts to be installed in Unit 3 were tested for the hardness requirement. The results showed that 29% (23 out of 80) of these bolts failed with 9 high and 14 low.
Of the 14 that tested low, only one achieved the minimum ultimate tensile strength requirement.
Hardness testing of all the accessible completed installations has shown that fasteners, with hardness values both above and below the ASTM specification 3
requirements, have been installed. Only 32% of the installed fasteners are currently planned for use; the remainder are associated with embedded plates which are not currently used.
The cause of this deficiency is attributed to inadequate heat treatment control by the various bolt manufacturers. This may be caused in part by the relatively small sampling requirement currently imposed by the ASTM Standard.
Bechtel quality assurance issued Corrective Action Requests S-81-69 and S-81-70 to obtain corrective action plans from Marathon Steel in regard to control of purchased material. As a result, corrective actions included audits and IDENTIFY CALCULATION OR OTHER DESIGN DOCUMENT WHICH WILL BE SAR IMPACT C YES NO INITIA EO OR RE ISE TO PP HIS VAL ON.
Attac ment:
ng neer ng va uat on o onconforming ASTM A354 Grade BD Studs and Bolts f
._ /V O DOCUM ENT TITLE. NUMBE R. AND REVISION AND FOREC AST COMPLETS ON D A TE NGS DATE PEM EV ALU ATION AND REPORT ABILITY RECOMMEND ATION h REPORT ABLE e
/ 2./3 bl NoT REPORT ABLE cot PEu h -
' D4TE l
6 PF* 3 9 86 (10 40 71 10/80
Report No.
81-14 Rev./Date 0 10-28-82 p-~ ;
Page 2 g
N- '
Final Report
)
re-audits of the subtier bolting material suppliers to assure that quality assurance programs were continually implemented and acceptable so that only conforming material is supplied to the project.
II.
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS This condition is evaluated as reportable under the requirements of 10CFR 50.55(e) and Part 21.
Although this extensive evaluation has determined that a safety significant condition does not currently exist, the potential for defective installations is evident. To date, only two pipe whip restraint designs require modifications as a result of nonconforming studs.
The deficiency is also reportable as a breakdown in the quality assurance program in that inadequate surveillance and control resulted in an extensive number of non-conforming fasteners being delivered to the jobsite.
III. CORRECTIVE ACTION a.
Since February 19, 1982, Bechtel Construction has implemented a program whereby all quality class Q ASTM A354 Grade BD bolting material is tested for hardness prior to installations. This will remain in effect for the remainder of the construction phase.
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b.
Bechtel Engineering has prepared the attached report, " Engineering Evaluation of Nonconforming ASTM A354 Grade BD Studs and Bolts".
This report utilizes the recommendations of Bechtel's Material and Quality Services Department and Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) to establish an acceptance criteria based upon Rockwell "C" scale hardness; additionally, these results were independently reviewed and accepted by Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories. As shqwn on page 5, the TES Recommended Acceptance Criteria with limitations specified by Bechtel, places a maximum acceptable hardness value of HRC41 and requires a down rating of design capacity for fasteners with hardness values less than HRC32.
c.
All embedded fasteners which are accessible, have been hardness tested and the results documented.
Bechtel Engineering has performed a 4
recheck of all design calculations and drawings issued prior to February 19, 1982 to verify the adequacy of the connections affected by the above criteria. All embedded studs used after February 19, 1982 shall be evaluated using the documented hardness data and observing the established acceptance criteria. A note to preclude inadvertent and improper future use of the remaining studs and studs not accessible for testing has been added to all applicable Engineering Design Drawings. Long term stress levels (i.e., initial preload) for pipe whip restraint and jet impingement barrier studs m
1
Report No.
81-14' f-'
Rev./Date 0 10-28-82
{s)
Page 3 Final Report will be controlled by either double-nut method or reduction of installation torque, d.
Of the 288 polar crane girder hold-down bolts installed in Units 1 and 2, 32 bolts, randomly selected, have been hardness tested (64 of 576 - 11%). None of the bolts have hardness exceeding HRC41. A revision to the calculations has been prepared to demonstrate that the design can accommodate down rating of all bolts (including those released for installation in Unit 3) to the allowable stresses of the " softest" installed bolt.
Bechtel quality assurance conducted a follow-up verification review c.
at Marathon on 10-8-82 to evaluate the current status of corrective actions taken to resolve subtier suppliers' deficiencies. It was concluded that Marathon's corrective actions are satisfactory and that objective evidence is on file.
f.
The following Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) will be dispositioned Use-As-Is/ Rework.
Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 C-C-2797 C-C-2825 C-C-2881 C-C-3163 C-C-2887 C-C-3743 C-C-3456 C-C-3182 C-C-3745 C-C-3592 C-C-3486 C-C-3594 C-C-3593 All studs with hardness value exceeding RRC 43 (L > 669) shall be removed by saw cutting. All studs with hardness value less than HRC 32 (L < 582) and values HRC 42 and HRC 43 (654 f L f 669) shall be-identified by installing a tag, as shown on page 6, and securing with a hand-tight nut.
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Report No.
81-14 fN Rev./Date 0
10-28-82' b
Page 4 Final Report IV.
AFFECTED MANUFACTURERS The bolting material manufacturers which have supplied this material to l
Marathon Steel are identified but not necessarily limited by the following list since according to Appendix C, Figure 1 (page C-8), 424 studs were not identifiable. These studs either had no identifying symbol or 1
the marked end was not exposed.
Supplier Identifi-Manufacturer cation Symbol Bosco Fastening Service Center B
Phoenix, AZ Custom Bolt CB Phoenix, AZ Copper State Bolt & Nut Co.
CS Phoenix, AZ
(
)
Joseph B. Dyson & Sons JBD Painesville, OH I
Sullivan Bolt S
Commerce, CA Cal Pacific Fabricating None Santa Fe Springs, CA This report satisfies the reporting requirements of 10CFR21.21(b) (3) with the exception of sub-part (vi) which requires the number and location (customers and/or facilities) of other possible defective material.
- O
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O TES RECOMMENDED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ALLOWA8LE STRESS I
IN TERMS OF % OF LOW HARDNESS ASTIA A354 GRADE BD HIGH HARDNESS NORMAL j
DESIGN CRUERIA g
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IN 97j 95 1 95 92 N
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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 l
537 543 550 556 562 569 575 582 589 M5 603 610 617 624 631 638 646 654 662 EQUOTIP-L 48Z l
to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to MARONESS SM l
542 549' 555 561 568 574 581 588 595 602 609 616 623 630 637 645 653 661 089 RANGE "g
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Report No. 81-14 Rev./Date 0 10/28/82 IDENTIFICATION TAG DETAILS Page6FinaljReport
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WARNING
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STUD USAGE AND CAPACITY SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRITEHIA ESTABUSHED =
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IN DER 81-14.
FOR HARDNESS DATA REFER TO DRAWING 13-C-ZCS-620.
DO NOT REMOVE =i g;;;;;
FOR 1" TO 11/2" STUDS : 31/2" x 6" 24 G A.S.S WITH 15l8" OI A. HOLE F0R 2" STUDS
- 5" x 71/2" 24 G A. S.S. WITH 21/8" DI A. H0 LE O
Note: Text shall not be obscured by the fastening nut.
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF NONCONFORMING ASTM A354 GRADE BD STUDS AND BOLTS PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION e vonste 14083 q
Prepared By:
M R. bM DANIEL R.
p osaka a;
Registered Civil Engineer SHIOSAKA A
State of Arizona #14083
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Reviewed By:
f[/ov *"'p ' 48 o
s K. M. Scheciiter f/,S 127 Registered Civil Engineer H KuiNETit MicilAEL q l
State of Arizona #12746 k
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R. P. Peter's Registered Civil Engineer State of California #C30767 G. R. Schinidt -
~'b Bechtel Group, Inc.
Materials & Quality Services Department Approved for Q'
use on PVNGS:
.W W. G. Bingham O
Project Engineering Manager JOB NUMBER 10407 BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION NORWALK, CALIFORNIA SEPTEMBER 1982 O
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 j
)
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CONTENTS fasi 1
.PROBLEH IDENTIFICATION 1-1
1.1 BACKGROUND
1-1 1.2 DISCOVERY OF PROBLEM 1-1 1.3 PROBLEM CONTRIBUTORS 1-1 1.3.1 EXCESSIVE HARDNESS 1-1 1.3.2 SMALL TEST SAMPLING QUANTITIES 1-1 1
1.4 IMMEDIATE ENGINEERING ACTION TAKEN 1-2 1.4.1 CONCRETE PLACEMENT STOP WORK 1-2 1.4.2 FIELD USER TEST FOR HARDNESS 1-2 1.4.3 LIFTING OF STOP WORK NOTICE 1-2 1.4.4 OTHER FASTENER MATERIALS 1-2 1.5 IDENTIFICATION OF ALL ASTM A354 GRADE BD 1-2 FASTENER APPLICATIONS 1.5.1 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT EMBEDS AND JET IMPINGEMENT 1-2 BARRIER EMBEDS (FIGURES 1 THROUGH 6) 1.5.2 COLUMN HOLD-DOWN STUDS (FIGURE 7) 1-3 1.5.3 POLAR CRANE GIRDER HOLD-DOWN BOLTS (FIGURE 8) 1-3 1.5.4 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ANCHOR STUDS (FIGURE 9) 1-3 2
DISCUSSION 2-1 2.1 INITIAL LABORATORY ANALYSIS 2-1 2.2 BECHTEL M&QS FAILURE ANALYSIS 2-1 2.3 SAMPLING OF WAREHOUSE STUDS 2-1 2.4 FURTHER TESTING OF WAREHOUSE STUDS 2-1 2.5 HARDNESS TESTING OF ALL ASTM A354 FASTENERS 2-2
()
2.5.1 INACCESSIBLE EMBEDDED STUDS 2-2 i
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
- 7. s CONTENTS ne 2.5.2 UNIT 1 AND 2 POLAR CRANE GIRDER HOLD-DOWN BOLTS 2-2 2.6 OTHER FASTENER MATERIALS 2-2 2.6.1 ASTM A194 GRADE 2H NUTS 2-2 2.6.2 ASTM AS40 NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY 2-2 SYSTEM (NSSS) SUPPORTS 2.6.3 ASTM A307, A325, AND A490 BOLTS AND 2-2 ASTM A194, A325, AND A563 GRADE C NUTS 2.6.4 TENSION INSPECTION PROGRAM 2-2 3
EVALUATION OF DATA AND RECOMMENbATIONS 3-1 3.1 RESULTS OF INITIAL LABORATORY ANALYSIS 3-1 3.2 RESULTS OF M&QS FAILURE ANALYSIS 3-1 3.3 REVIEW BY TELEDYNE 3-1 3.4 INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY BATTELLE 3-1 3.5 HARDNESS TEST DATA 3-2 4
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIGNS 4-1 4.1 EQUOTIP HARDNESS TEST VERIFICATION 4-1 4.2 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SHORT TERM LOADS 4-1 4.2.1 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIER STUDS 4-1 4.2.2 COLUMN HOLD-DOWN STUDS 4-1 4.2.3 POLAR CRANE GIRDER HOLD-DOWN BOLTS 4-1 4.2.4 TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP 4-1 ANCHOR STUDS 4.3 LONG TERM STRESS LIMITATIONS 4-2 4.3.1 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPINGEMENT 4-2 BARRIER STUDS b
1 4.3.2 OTHER ASTM A354 GRADE BD FASTENERS 4-2 ii l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. fil-14 (3
G CONTENTS Page 4.4 INACCESSIBLE AND UNUSED STUDS 4-2 4.4.1 CONTROL OF STUD USAGE PRIOR TO CUT 0FF DATE 4-2 4.4.2 EVALUATION OF STUD USAGE AFTER CUT 0FF DATE 4-2 4.5 DISPOSITION OF NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS 4-2 APPENDICES A.
Kvochak, J.J., " Failure Analysis - ASTM A354 BD Bolting for Concrete Embed Assemblies," Log Number 2351-57, Bechtel Group Inc.,
Materials and Quality Services Department, San Francisco, California, October 02, 1981.
B.
Teledyne Engineering Services, " Acceptability for Service of Low Alloy, Quenched and Tempered Support Studs and Bolts," Technical Report Number TR-5534-1, Revision 1, Teledyne Engineering Services, Waltham, Massachusetts, September 16, 1982.
C.
Bush, S.H. and Simonen, F.A., "A Review of Arizona Nuclear Power Project Bolting Failures," Contract Number 23111 20532, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington, September 22, 1982.
D.
Embed Location Figures and Stud Hardness Data.
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
(~D FIGURES Figure 1
Pipe Whip Restraint Diagram U-Bolt Type i
2 Pipe Whip Restraint Diagram Energy Absorbing Material (EAM) Type 3
Pipe Whip Restraint Diagram EAM and Frame Type 4
Pipe Whip Restraint Diagram Bumper Type 5
Jet Impingement Barrier Diagram 6
Pipe Whip Restraint Main Steamline Support Steel Diagram 7
Column 9 and Column 10 Hold-Down Stud Diagram 8
Polar Crane Girder Hold-Down Bolt Diagram 9
Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Anchor Stud Diagram 1
10 Summary of PWR/ JIB Embeds on Engineering Drawings 11 Summary of Documentation of Testing of U1 & U2 Embedded Studs 12 Summary of Documentation of Testing of U3 Embedded and Uninstalled Studs 13 Teledyne Engineering Services Recommended Acceptance Criteria 14 EQUOTIP Hardness Tester Conversion Table:
L - Rockwell C.
D 15 Unit 1 Pipe Whip Restraint / Jet Impingement Barrier Stud Hardnesces 16 Unit 2 Pipe Whip Restraint / Jet Impingement Barrier Stud Hardnesses 17 Unit 3 Pipe Whip Restraint / Jet Impingement Barrier Stud Hardnesses 18 Total Pipe Whip Restraint / Jet Impingement Barrier Stud Hardnesses 19 Column 9 and Column 10 Hold-Down Stud Hardnesses 20 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Polar Crane Girder Hold-Down Bolt Hardnesses 21 Unit 3 Polar Crane Girder Hold-Down Bolt Hardnesses 22 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Anchor Stud Hardnesses 23 Identification Tag Details T
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
' p
\\s_s 1 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 1.1-BACKGROUND Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) spacifies ASTM A354 Grade BD material for applications where high strength tLtaaded fasteners are required with diameters greater than 1-1/2 inches or with special length and threading requirements for concrete embedment.
All structural steel and bolts, as well as other materials and testing methods, are specified for PVNGS using ASTM Standards, as is the industry wide practice. ASTM A490, a widely used specification for high strength bolts for structural steel joints, specifically refers the user to A354 Grade BD for applications, such as those described above, where similar mechanical properties are desired.
4 1.2 DISCOVERY OF PROBLEM During May and June, 1981, four 1 1/2-inch diameter by 2 feet 9 inches long ASTM A354 Grade BD studs cracked and separated during normal handling in the field; all four studs cracked approximately four to six inches from one end, within the threaded portion of the studs. The studs were components of embed plate assemblies which are used to anchor pipe whip restraints to the containment internal concrete structure. At the time of the discoveries, all of the Unit I and Unit 2 studs and bolts had already been
!h installed and some of the Unit 3 studs were already installed. No sub-sequent failures of ASTM A354 Grade BD fasteners have been experienced at PVNGS.
l 1.3 PROBLEM CONTRIBUTORS 1.3.1 EXCESSIVE HARDNESS The failure mechanism of the examined studs has been established.as Stress i
Corrosion Cracking (SCC) which propagated to the point where brittle frac-ture occurred. The SCC was the result of stud hardnesses around 49 on the Rockwell C-Scale (HRC 49) which drastically exceeds the ASTM Specification requirements (HRC 33 to 38).
1.3.2 SMALL TEST SAMPLING QUANTITIES A review of material certificates has shown that proper documentation was l
provided with all of the received materials; however, it is clearly evident that nonconforming materials passed, undetected, due to the small test sampling percentage required by the ASTM Specification. Additional testing was not considered when ASTM A354 Grade BD material was specified since there was no reason to suspect that testing beyond the ASTM requirement was necessary.
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
1.4:
IMMEDIATL ENGINEERING ACTION TAKEN Upon discovery of the stud failures, the following measures were immediately
' implemented as part of the evaluation and resolution plan.
1.4.1 CONCRETE PLACEMENT STOP WORK Stop Work Notice No. 81-SW-4 was issued to stop all concrete placements which contained embedded ASTM A354 Grade BD studs.
1.4.2 FIELD USER TEST FOR HARDNESS Since hardness was the only nonconforming parameter, Work Flan Procedure /
Quality Control Instruction No. 68.0 was established to perform a field user's test for hardness on all ASTM A354 Grade BD fasteners prior to their installation. Bechtel purchased an EQUOTIP hardness tester to perform the tests at PVNGS. Only those fasteners with hardness values within a tenta-tive acceptance range were painted white on the end and released for use in Unit 3; unacceptable fasteners were painted red on the end and have been j
placed in warehouse quarantine.
1.4.3 LIFTING OF STOP WORK NOTICE Stop Work Notice No. 81-SW-4 was lifted when the user's test program for measuring hardness of all ASTM A354 Grade BD fasteners was implemented.
j This permitted containment internal concrete construction to resume using
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3 only fasteners with hardness within the tentative acceptance range.
1.4.4 OTHER FASTENER MATERIALS Investigations into samples of ASTM A194, A540, A307, A325, A490, and A563 fasteners received at the jobsite were made and no nonconformances were discovered.
1.5 IDENTIFICATION OF ALL ASTM A354 GRADE BD FASTENER APPLICATIONS The Engineering Drawings have been reviewed to locate all ASTM A354 Grade BD fasteners. The applications fall into four categories. These are depicted in figures 1 through 9 and described below.
1.5.1 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT EMBEDS AND JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIER EMBEDS (FIGURES 1 THROUGH 6)
The majority of the studs are used to anchor embed plate assemblies to the walls and slabs of the containment internal concrete structure. These ecbed. plates are used to anchor pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers. These embed plates were added to the drawings at an early stage of the project when the exact number and locations of postulated high-energy line breaks had not yet been finalized. Consequently, only about 25% of the embeds are to be utilized for pipe whip restraint and jet impingement barrier attachments. The utilized embedded studs sustain only attachment dead loads during the normal operating condition.
j 1-2
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14' A
1.5.2 COLUMN HOLD-DOWN STUDS (FIGURE 7)
Two of the structural steel columns in each containment building utilize ASTM A354 Grade BD anchor studs to secure the column base to the top of a concrete wall. These columns are approximately four feet long and the studs are designed to resist uplift loads during postulated accident pressure conditions. During normal operating conditions the studs are subjected to only their initial preload.
1.5.3 POLAR CRANE GIRDER HOLD-DOWN BOLTS (FIGURE 8)
The containment building is equipped with a polar crane which travels on a circular rail supported by 36 equal chord girders. The girders are supported by embedded brackets which cantilever inward fr.om the containment shell. The hold-down bolts maintain girder alignment f >r normal operation and resist overturning and uplift during a seismic event. One end of the girders is bolted snug tight with slotted holes to allow for thermal expansion.
1.5.4 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ANCHOR STUDS (FIGURE 9)
The only application of ASTM A354 Grade BD studs outside of the containment building is to secure the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump in the basement of the main steam support structure. The critical load conditions for these studs are accident or SSE.
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 4
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2 DISCUSSION s-2.1 INITIAL LABORATORY ANALYSIS The first stud which cracked and separated was discarded by the crafts.
The second stud which cracked and separated and three additional randomly selected studs of the same type were sent to Engineering Testing Labora-tories, Phoenix, Arizona, for chemical and mechanical analyses. The three randomly selected studs were found to be within the Specification requirements for yield strength, tensile strength, chemical content, and hardness.
2.2 BECHTEL M&QS FAILURE ANALYSIS The second stud, described above, and the third and fourth studs which cracked and separated were taken to Bechtel, San Francisco, Materials and Quality Services (M&QS) Department for extensive testing: The examination procedures included visual and liquid penetrant examination, mechanical testing, emission spectrographic and electron microscopic analyses, and heat treatment study.
2.3 SAMPLING OF WAREHOUSE STUDS A sampling of eighty studs representing five different diameters was es\\
released from the jobsite warehouse for hardness testing. This represented approximately 5% of the remaining studs required for Unit 3 installations.
g The results showed that a significant number of studs had a hardness above and below the ASTM specified limits.
It was recognized at this point that the investigation'into the hardness problem should include all sizes of ASTM A354 Grade BD fasteners.
I J
2.4 FURTHER TESTING OF WAREHOUSE STUDS The same sample of eighty stud specimens underwent further testing initiated by Bechtel as follows:
A.
Thirteen of the studs with low hardness were destructively tested to measure yield and tensile strength. Twelve of the thirteen studs failed to achieve the minimum specified tensile strength.
B.
Sixty-three studs were EQUOTIP hardness tested in order to develop a correlation curve to convert EQUOTIP L-value to a HRC value. The limits of ASTM A354 Grade BD (HRC 33 minimum to HRC 38 maximum) corresponded to EQUOTIP L-value of 570 to 620 respectively based upon a least squares straight line fit for the sixty-three data points. This tentative acceptance criteria was used to establish the Work Plan Procedure described in para-3 graph 1.4.2, and to rescind the Stop Work Notice as explained in paragraph 1.4.3.
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 OV 2.5 HARDNESS TESTING OF ALL ASTM A354 FASTENERS l
All installed ASTM A354 Grade BD fasteners, approximately 4500 fasteners, have been EQUOTIP hardness tested with the. exceptions listed below..The data has been recorded in a field data log and the nonconforming fasteners identified on Nonconformance Reports (NCR's). See figures 10,.11, and 12.
2.5.1 INACCESSIBLE EMBEDDED STUDS l
Eighty fasteners are inaccessible for testing due to mechanical, electrical, or other installations which obstruct surface preparation or the EQUOTIP j
impact device. None of these studs are presently being used.
2.5.2 UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 POLAR CRANE GIRDER HOLD-DOWN BOLTS Of the two hundred eighty-eight bolts installed in each unit, thirty-two bolts, randomly selected, have been tested.
2.6 OTHER FASTENER MATERIALS In addition to ASTM A354 Grade BD, Bechtel has investigated the fastener materials listed below to verify that the codes and standards are being met.
Bechtel has not discovered any other fastener material where deficiencies have surfaced.
2.6.1 ASTM A194 GRADE 2H NUTS Fifty nuts taken from the embed plate assemblies have been tested for j
hardness and/or proof load tests. All fifty nuts, covering five different i
diameters, met the Specification requirements.
2.6.2 ASTM A540 NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) SUPPORTS Most of the ASTM AS40 bolts have been installed in all three units.
In one instance thirty-two reactor coolant pump lateral support studs were shortened by saw cutting due to excessive projection. Thirty of these 3-inch diameter specimens were tested for hardness and all thirty met the Specification requirements.
2.6.3 ASTM A307, A325, AND A490 BOLTS AND ASTM A194, A325, AND A563 GRADE C NUTS Samples of each available lot of fasteners from Marathon's sub-tier supplier were laboratory tested and all were found to be within the limits of their respective Specifications.
2.6.4 TENSION INSPECTION PROGRAM i
An inspection program which follows the intent of Subsection 6(d)5 of the 7
AISC Specification for Structural Joints Using ASTM A325 or A490 Bolts, dated April 26, 1978, has been implemented for all such bolted connections.
A minimum of one bolt per connection is being tested.
2-2
. ~..
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION !!EPORT NO. 81-14
.i D
\\
3 EVALUATION OF DATA AND' RECOMMENDATIONS I
3.1 RESULTS OF INITIAL LABORATORY ANALYSIS The second fractured stud (the first one to be tested) met the Specification requirements for yield strength, tensile strength, ri. duction of area, and chemical composition, but failed to meet the 14% elongation requirement (13% actual) and had a hardness far outside the HRC 33 to 38 range (HRC 48 on the edge of the cross section).
3.2 RESULTS OF M&QS FAILURE ANALYSIS A copy of the Bechtel M&QS analysis report, " Failure Analysis - ASTM A354 BD Bolting For Concrete Embed Assemblies," dated October 2,1981, is included in appendix A of this evaluation. The report concludes that the failure was a result of progressive stress corrosion cracking, caused by improper heat treatment of the stud material, which ultimately led to overload failure. M&QS recommends that A354 Grade BD fasteners with a surface hardness in excess of HRC 41 be disallowed.
3.3 REVIEW BY TELEDYNE Teledyne Engineering Services (TES), Waltham, Massachusetts, has reviewed all of the data which was compiled as of their contract date of January 5, 1982. A copy of their report, " Acceptability for Service of Low
[.\\
Alloy, Quenched and Tempered Support Studs and Bolts," dated September 16,
\\
1982, is included in appendix B of this evaluation. There are two basic conclusions in their report. They are jointly summarized in figure 13 and described as follows:
A.
Guidelines are given for short term and long term stress allow-ables for fasteners with hardness outside the Specification limits.
B.
TES verifies that EQUOTIP is an acceptable hardness testing method and that a valid correlation between EQUOTIP L-value and Rockwell C-Scale can be made. Rockwell standard calibration blocks were used to demonstrate that the EQUOTIP " Conversion Table for Steel and Cast Steel" is appropriate for ASTM A354 Grade BD.
3.4 INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY BATTELLE Due to the potential severity of the problem and the related safety implications, it was felt that an additional independent review to substantiate the Bechtel and TES positions would be prudent.
This independent evaluation of the data and the TES report has been conducted by Dr. S. H. Bush and Dr. F. A. Simonen of Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (Battelle Northwest, BNW), Richland, Washington.
BNW's evaluation is actually based upon Revision 0 of the TES report
{
dated September 1, 1982. However the changes incorporated in Revision 1 p
of the TES report are of an editorial nature only. A copy of their 1 yi report, "A Review of Arizona Nuclear Power Project Bolting Failures,"
dated September 22, 1982 is included in appendix C of this evaluation.
4 BNW is in agreement with TES in the concepts of establishing an upper 3-1 l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 Om bound cutoff for acceptability of "hard" fasteners due to their suscepti-bility to stress corrosion cracking and/or brittle fracture, and down rating of " soft" fasteners due to their decrease in strength. They also agree that limitations on preload (long term stress) would minimize the susceptibility to inter granular stress corrosion cracking.
3.5 HARDNESS TEST DATA Hardness test data for the embedded ASTM A354 Grade BD fasteners, including those tests performed after the initiation of the M&QS, TES,.and BNW studies, are compiled in appendix D of this evaluation. Also included in appendix D are figures D-1 through figure D-19 which uniquely locate and identify all embedded stud assemblies.
r r
3-2
s DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT No. 81-14 1
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4
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS 1
4.1 EQUOTIP HARDNESS TEST VERIFICATION Based upon TES verification and recommendations, the conversion table for 2
N/mm )" published in the "EQUOTIP
" Steel and Cast Steel (E-modul 210000 Hardness Tester Conversion Tables" shall be used.
See figure 14.
The EQUOTIP table converts to HRC values approximately HRC 1.7 lower than the data fit curve described in paragraph 2.4 item B.
4.2 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SHORT TERM LOADS The TES criteria for allowable stresses for short term loads shall be adopted for PVNGS; however, a more conservative upper bound cutoff value of HRC 41 will be chosen, per recommendations by BNW and Bechtel M&QS.
4.2.1 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIER STUDS 64% of the installed studs are within the ASTM specification limits.
Per M&QS, TES, and BNW recommendations to accept hardnesses of HRC 32, 39, 40, and 41 without reductions, the total is increased to 84% acceptable.
Only 2% of the installed studs are rejectable due to hardness greater than HRC 41.
12% of the installed studs require a down rating in strength due to hardness below HRC 32. The remaining 2% are inaccessible for testing and -shall not be used without further engineering assessment.
See
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figures 15 through 18.
4.2.2 COLUMN HOLD-DOWN STUDS Hardness test results are shown in figure 19.
These studs are acceptable since all of the studs tested in Unit I an/. Unit 2 and those released for installation in Unit 3 have hardness ler. than HRC 41.
A revision to the calculations has been prepared to demonstrate that the design for short term loads can accommodate the down rating of installed " soft" studs.
4.2.3 POLAR CRANE GIRDER HOLD-DOWN BOLTS The 11% sample (32 of 288 per unit) tested in Unit I and Unit 2 shall be used as a basis for acceptance of these bolts. None of the bolts have hardness greater than HRC 41.
All 445 bolts in stock for Unit 3 have been tested and none have hardness greater than HRC 41.
See figures 20 and 21.
A revision to the calculations has been prepared to demonstrate that the design for short term loads can accommodate down rating of all bolts to the allowable stresses of the " softest" installed bolt.
4.2.4 TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP ANCHOR STUDS Three studs are inaccessible in Unit I due to interference with the installed pump. The other eleven studs in Unit 1 as well as fourteen studs in Unit 2 and Unit 3 have been tested. None of the studs have hardness f'
greater than HRC 41 nor less than HRC 33 therefore the design is not (3) affected and the studs are acceptable.
See figure 22.
l i
l 4-1 i
- ~ - -
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 l
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4.3 LONG TERM STRESS LIMITATIONS 4.3.1 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIER STUDS PVNGS shall adopt long term stress allowable limits much more conservative than the TES recommendations for high hardness studs used for restraint attachments as described in paragraph 1.5.1.
Thes2 studs shall be either; (A) double nutted with the first nut snug tight and held in place with a wrench while the second nut is tightened to 25 foot pounds; or, (B) torqued to produce tensile stress less than 12 ksi which corresponds to approximately 11% of the normal criteria. Normal criteria for initial preload of high strength bolts is 70% of the minimum specified tensile strength, which is 105 ksi in this case.
4.3.2 OTHER ASTM A354 GRADE BD FASTENERS For the already installed column hold-down studs, polar crane girder hold-down bolts, and auxiliary feedwater pump studs described in paragraphs 1.5.2, 1.5.3, and 1.5.4, the normal criteria shall be used since none of the tested fasteners have hardness hi her than HRC 41.
t 4.4 INACCESSIBLE AND UNUSED STUDS For the remainder of the embedded pipe whip restraint and jet impingement barrier studs described in paragraph 1.5.1 which are not currently being 7~-
/
J used, the following action has been taken.
V 4.4.1 CONTROL OF STUD USAGE PRIOR TO CUT 0FF DATE The following note has been added to all applicable Engireering Design Drawings:
"Use of embeds detailed on drawing 13-C-ZCS-619 is restricted to pipe whip restraints issued prior to February 19, 1982. Any subsequent use must comply with the final evaluation of DER 81-14."
All of the calculations and drawings issued prior to this date have been checked using the acceptance criteria established herein and found to be satisfactory with no modifications required.
4.4.2 EVALUATION OF STUD USAGE AFTER CUT 0FF DATE The data compiled in Appendix D serves as a permanent record of the as-installed locations and EQUOTIP hardness measurements of the studs.
This data shall be used to evaluate acceptability and capacity of studs issued for use after February 19, 1982.
4.5 DISPOSITION OF NONCONFORMANCE REPORTS All applicable NCR's involving installed fasteners shall be disposition 0d "Use g--
As Is/ Rework." Based upon the summary and conclusions of this DER No. 81-14, the structural integrity of components which utilize ASTM A354 Grade BD
( j 4-2
-~
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
(
\\_ -
fasteners, issued prior to February 19, 1982, has not been impaired. All studs with hardness value exceeding HRC 43 (L > 669) shall be removed by saw cutting. All studs with hardness value less than HRC 32 (L < 582) and values HRC 42 and HRC 43 (654 5 L $ 669) shall be identified by.
installing a tag, as shown in figure 23, and securing with a hand-tight nut. Engineering shall perform a review of all design calculations utilizing these fasteners issued after February 19, 1982, in light of the established acceptance criteria, and issue revisions to Engineering Calculations and Design Drawings as required. A1) such revisions to Engineering Design Drawings shall be issued through aesign Change Packages.
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OF PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIER EMBEDS SHOWN ON ENGINEERING DRAWINGS APPENDIX DETAIL DN DWG.13-C-ZCS-619 U.N.D.
D 1
TOTAL FIG. D-1 2
3 4
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9 12 13 14 485 EM8EDS 1
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STUDS 6
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T0TAL 618 448 64 168 72 426 96 64 64 16 8
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FIGORE 10
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O 2nd Draft
SUMMARY
OF DOCUMENTATION OF TESTING OF UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 EMBEDDED STUDS UNIT 1 UNIT 2 NON CONFORMANCE REPORTS NON CONFORMANCE REPORTS EMBED STUDS EMBED STUDS N.
I NCR NO.
QTY.
TESTED OTHER NCR NO.
QTY TESTED OTHER CCESS y
ACCESS C-C-2797 1~76 75 516 2
0 C-C-2825 1~76 75 518 0
0 C-C-2887 77-81 5
30 0
0 C-C-3163 77-322 239 )
1474(2) 36 24(3)
C-C-3182 82-322 234(2) 1472(2) 32 0
I2 1
TOTAL 314(2) 1990(2) 38 24 TOTAL 314(2) 2020(2) 32 0
TOTAL 2052(2)
TOTAL 2052 )
I2 NOTES:
(1) EMBED PLATE IDENT. NO.'S 30,90,234,235,236,237,238,239 NOT USED.
(2) INCLUD ES EMBED NO.'S 321,322 COLUMN HOLD-DOWN STUDS (8 STUDS).
(3) EMBED NO.'S 121,122,123,124 NOT INSTALLED IN UNIT 1 (24 STUDS).
FIGURE 11 1
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2nd Draft
SUMMARY
OF DOCUMENTATION OF TESTING OF UNIT 3 EMBEDDED AND UNINSTALLED STUDS UNIT 3 OTHER NON CONFORMANCE REPORTS NON CONFORMANCE REPORTS EMBED STUDS UNINSTALLED STUDS NCR NO.
NO.
QTY TESTED INACCESS OTHER NCR NO.
TESTED C C-2724 '
(4) 54'.II) 342'.(1) 2'(2)
C-C-2734 441 C-C-2802,
188,189 2
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C-C-2774 1677 C-C-2881 25-36 11 74 0
0 C-C-2802 8
i C-C-3743 (5) 50 324 10 0
C-C-2803 98 I3I TOTAL 61 398 10 0
TOTAL 2224 I
TOTAL 408 (1)
EMBEb8 WERE IN THE FORRIS, READY FOR CONCRETE PLACEMENT:
NON CONFORedlNG STUDS WERE REPLACED.
(2) 2 STU0S WERE NOT YET INSTALLED PENDING REBAR RELOCATION t
I TO MESOLVE INTERFERENCE (3) 746 0F THESE STUDS HAVE BEEN QUARANTINED;14e4 HAVE BEEN l
APPROVED FOR USE IN UNIT 3.
1 (4)
N0s. 21-24, t is-12s.127,143-i st. isa, ter-ie4, iss-2es, zie. 2s7-282,287-27s, 273-200.
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O O
O 2nd Draft TES RECOMMENDED ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ALLOWABLE STRESS IN TERMS OF % OF LOW HARDNESS ASTM A354 GRADE BD HIGH HARDNESS NORMAL
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OESIGN CRITERIA 100 100 100 100 100 97 l
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to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to to HARDNESS 542 549 555 561 568 574 581 588 595 602 609 616 623 630 637 645 ; 653 661 669 RANGE j
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i
O O
O UNIT 1 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIER STUDS EMBED
.E TOTAL DETAIL NUMBER OF STUDS
!!!8 STUDS 1
6 1
1 3
9 34 42 53 62 104 119 80 51 11 1
1 16 594 2
1 7
.14 18 30 44 61 56 53 47 39 34 23 6
3 12 448 3
1 2
2 4
3 15 17 13 7
64 4
4 5
36 40 27 22 4
12 8
7 3
168 5
5 1
1 1
1 3
3 5
13 8
18 9
3 1
72 6
2 3
2 4
2 4
5 11 22 32 63 77 94 62 23 9
1 10 426 9
1 3
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2 9
6 7
13 21 20 6
1 96 12 4
9 9
6 1
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6 4
5 5
6 1
64 13 3
3 7
10 7
4 5
6 3
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64 14 4
4 4
4 16 1
2 2
1 1
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8 Eg STU S 13 2
2 10 18 65 81 108 157 222 257 230 229 188 184 131 58 19 5
2 1
38 2020
< 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
- > 44 S ALE I
BECHTEL
- REFERS TO DWG.13-C-ZCS-619 U.N.O.
FIGURE 15 4
CUT-OFF
O O
O 2nd Drsft UNIT 2 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPlNGEMENT BARRIER STUDS l
l EMBED
.E TOTAL l
DETAll NUMBER OF STUDS E8 STUDS l
1 1
1 1
6 8
8 24 42 57 91 94 107 84 44 17 9
3 3
18 618 l
2 40 1
3 4
9 13 21 39 51 56 46 45 40 27 27 11 9
6 448 3
3 7
5 19 15 6
3 2
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64 4
1 3
8 15 24 32 29 27 18 7
3 1
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15 1
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5 7
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1 72 6
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6 13 15 31 37 40 53 67 54 42 30 13 3
11 8
426 9
1 1
3 17 23 26 7
8 4
3 2
1 96 12 1
5 7
10 15 21 3
1 1
64 I
13 1
5 3
11 15 16 8
5 64 g
1 2
1 2
1 3
1 2
1 1
1 16
'I d
1 3
3 1
g STU S 58 2
2 5
16 26 36 80 119 137 194 223 268 258 196 138 103 69 43 16 23 32 2044
< 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
> 44 S ALE 4
BECHTEL
- REFERS TO DWG.13-C-ZCS-619 U.N.0.
FIGURE 16 4
CUT-O FF
O O
O UNIT 3 PIPE WHIP RESTRAINT AND JET IMPINGEMENT BARRIER STUDS EM8ED
.E TOTAL DETAll NUM8ER OF STUDS E 3 STUDS 11 1
3 3
3 2
1 3
2 1
18 2
1 4
7 16 20 14 24 22 12 8
3 4
1 136 3
7 12 10 3
32 4
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7 7
1 1
24 5
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4 24 6
1 4
9 14 20 22 19 24 21 16 7
5 2
5 5
174 9
12 13 14 TOTAL 6
3 3
5 2
6 18 30 53 62 48 56 44 28 15 8
6 5
10 408 STUDS
< 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
> 44 S ALE i
- REFERS TO DWG.13-C-ZCS-619 U.N.O.
FIGURE 17 CUT-OF F 4
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O 2nd Draft UNIT 3 POLAR CRANE GIRDER HOLD-DOWN BOLTS 120 116 107 100
- TOTAL 445 BOLTS TESTED
- PRIOR TO INSTALL ATION*
- REF NCR'S NO.
BECHTEL
- C-C-2918 30 80LTS CUT OFF---)
C-C-2941415 B0LTS 80 l
l i
ONLY 288 0F THE 368
_ ACCEPTED BOLTS ARE REQ'O U
^
65 o*
~
60 1
E z
i 40 1
20 s
~
8 1
4 3
4 3
'3 i 1 1
1
< 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 l
- 77 NON CONFORMING BOLTS PLACED IN QUARANTINE; HRC 368 BOLTS APPROVED FOR USE FIGURE 21
- l
O O
O l
2nd Draft i
TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP l
ANCHOR STUDS 10 10 9
1 8
7 7
6 5
4 4
4 4" -
3 3
~
2 2
2 1
TOTAL 42 STUDS 1
E 4
1 h3 2
8 2
UNIT 314 STUDS j
j g
1 REF NCR NO. C-C-3594 E
m BECHTEL CUT-OFF 6
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 UNIT 214 STUDS j
j 1
REF NCR NO. C-C-3593 3
l 3
3 3
~
2 2
UNIT 114 STUDS j
REF NCR NO. C-C-3592 1
1 1
l I
I I
I 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 INACCESSIBLE HRC FIGURE 22 i
IDENTIFICATION TAG DETAILS O
t O
WARNING -
= :?
STUD USAGE AND CAPACITY SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CRITERIA ESTABLISHED g;;gy IN DER 81-14.
FOR HARDNESS DATA REFER TO DRAWING 13-C-ZCS-620.
DO NOT REMOVE =i
= ;;
- !::N#s"~'"' : %';d::'::::'i:l?"la:: l :"St O
FIGURE 23
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
Bechtel Group, Inc.
Interoffice Memorandum D. S. Parker o,i.
cto k 28, M81 5""'"'
Failure Analysis - ASTM A-354 BD Bolting for Concrete Embed Assemblies h '"
Palo Verde Nuclea'r Generating G. R. Schmidt (CRS-101-01)
Station - Job 10407-002 R&E/M&QS copesi R. A. Manley/B. D. Hackney WC/1/A4 930-2408 B. N. Woodruff /J. J. Kvochak W. B. Keyser (6)
K. Schechter DCC 235157 BLN 0681-2 Failure Analysis File Transmitted with this IOM are six copies of a failure analysis report covering our examination of three concrete embed assembly bolting failures. This report incorporates the infccmation contained in " Failure Analysis of One ASTM A-354 Belt," dated July 15, 1981, transmitted by IOM CRS-061-23.
G. R. Schmidt CRS/JJK/lb Attachments l
A-1
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA October 2, 1981 I
Project Number /Name:
10407-002 - PALO VERDE
Title:
Failure Analysis - ASTM A-354 BD Bolting for Concrete Embed Assemblies Prepared for:
D. S. Parker By:
k J. W.'Kvochak l
Approved by:
G. R. Schmidt Metallurgical Engineering and Laboratory Services Group Manager t
Approved by:
YMMd
. D. Hack W
[/
Assistant Manager t
i t
i t
I l
MATERIALS AND QUALITY SERVICES DEPARTMENT RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING I
' O Log Number - 2351-57 BLN Number - 0681-2 A-2 l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
\\
TABLE OF CONTENTS Section M
INDEX OF ILLUSTRATIONS l'a TABLES.........................
11 ABSTRACT..................................................
111 I.
INTRODUCTION..............................................
1 II.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS...................................
I 1
III.
RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................
2 4
IV.
MATERIALS.................................................
2 V.
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES....................................
2 i
l VI.
DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES AND RESULT 3......................
3 1
I i
a I
l l
^
i l
l l
i t
' l r
i s
I I
i I
f A-3 t
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
,-m V) i INDEX OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES TABLE PAGE 1
Bolting Identification, Failure Circumstances and Location, and Me thod s o f E xamina tion.....................................
5 2
Hardness Test Results for ASTM A-354 Bolting...................
6 3
Chemical Analysis of Bolt 2 and Chemical Requirement >, of ASTM A-354 and AISI 4140.......................................
7 4
Mechanical Properties of Bolt 2 and Mechanical Requirements of ASTM A-354 (Grade BD).......................................
8 5
Effect of Thermal Treatment on Hardness of ASTM A-354 Bolting..
9 FIGURE
'la Schematic Drawing of QM-6 Concrete Embed Assembly.............., 10 lb Detail Drawing of Nut-Plate-Nut Configuration.................. 10 2
Macrograph of Fracture Surface...........................
15 s
3a SEM Fractograph of Fracture Transition......................... 12 3b SEM Fractograph of Intergranular Fracture Region............... 13 3c SEM Fractograph of Dimpled Rupture Fracture Region............. 13 4
Micrograph of Crack Propagation Below Fracture Surface......... 14 5
Micrograph of Crack Branching at the Fracture Surface.......... 14 6
Micrograph of the As-received Microstructure................... 15 7a Micrograph of the As quenched Microstructure................... 15 7b Micrograph of the Quench and Tempered (900F) Microstructure.... 16 1
A-4
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 1
l l
ABSTRACT An investigation to study the preservice failures of four bolts in concrete embed assemblies was conducted. This report describes the failure analysis program, the results, and the recommendations based on this investigation. This report incorporates the information of a prior study of a single bolt failure documented in GRS-061-23.
l
-111-A-5
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT No. 81-14
. i'~
1.
INTRODUCTION
\\s_
Four concrete embed assembly anchor bolts have failed prior to service at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Figure la). Specifications require high strength, low alloy, quenched and tempered steel in accordance with ASTM A-354. Three bolts failed during installation preparation in the Unit 3 containment area. The fourth bolt was found fractured in the plant laydown area. All failures occurred locally within the nuts or anchor plates (Figure Ib). Three bolts were submitted to M&QS for analysis. Bolt identifi-cation, failure circumstances and methods of examination are summarized in Table 1.
A preliminary investigation (see GRS-061-23) of Bolt 2 revealed material hardness and strength to exceed specification requirements. It was concluded that the cause of the failure was improper heat treatment, resulting in high yield strength and hardness. Further study was recommended to determine failure mechanism, fracture mode, and the effect of heat treatment on material properties.
II.
SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSIONS Failure of the anchor bolts was by progressive stress corrosion cracking originating in the thread root and advancing to 30 or 40 percent of the cross section, followed by final overload failure. Contributing factors to the stress corrosion cracking were: 1) high yield strength and suspected residual tensile stresses caused by improper heat treatment, 2) localized pitting and corrosion caused by thread root environmental conditions, and 3) stresses caused by tightening of the nuts. Contributing factors to final overload failure were:
- 1) a sharp notch and reduced cross section caused by stress corrosion cracking
)
and 2) low resistance to brittle fracture caused by high yield strength.
J The primary cause of failure was improper heat treatment of the bolting material.
Material hardness and strength far exceeds specification requirements. ASTM standard A-354 (Grade BD) requires the hardness not to exceed Rockwell C=38.
Minimum hardness for all three bolts was Rockwell C=48 (Table 2).
It was determined by hardness testing, a heat treatment study, and microstructural analysis that the bolting material was in the as quenched state. Upon quenching a residual state of tension at the surface was produced. These stresses in combination with the stresses from the torquing of Jam nuts were significant enough to initiate the stress corrosion failure. The specification requires delivery of the assemblies with the nuts hand tightened; however, impact wrenches were required for nut removal and it is suspected that torquing did occur.
The threshold for stress corrosion cracking in high strength low alloy steels is 200,000 psi tensile strength (Teledyne Engineering Services Technical Report TR-3887-2, Rev. 1, Acceptability for Service of Midland RPV Anchor Studs, May 20, 1980). Bolt 2 had a tensile strength of 277,000 psi and hardness of Rockwell C = 49.
Bolts 3 and 4 had near identical hardness and it can be assumed that tensile strength of the bolts are similar.
A contributing cause of failure was exposure of the embed assemblies while in storage to an alternating dry and moist environment. Moisture accumulated in the thread root beneath the anchor plate and nuts causing pitting corrosion.
Pits acted as initiation sites for stress corrosion cracking. Corrosion at the thread root will produce variation in the pH and local galvanic potential.
This variation produces the necessary environment for stress corrosion cracking.
n V A-6
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 m)
(
The fractures occurred transverse to the bolting axis in a macroscopically brittle mode (Figure 2).
Scanning electron microscopy revealed the fracture en have initiated and propagated by intergranular fracture (brittle mode) before final fracture occurred by dimpled rupture (ductile mode) (Figure 3a, 3b, and 3c).
Chemical analysis determined the bolting material to be nominally AISI 4140 in accordance with ASTM standard A-354 (C,rade BD)(Table 3).
High strength low alloy steels are susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement.
Hydrogen embrittlement is a mechanical-environmental failure process that results from the adsorption of atomic hydrogen into the microstructure. The combination of lower ductility from the adsorbed hydrogen in conjunction with residual or applied stresses leads to cracking. It is often difficult to distinguish between hydrogen embrittlement and stress corrosion cracking failures. However, it is our opinion that hydrogen embrittlement was not operable because of the presence of corrosion products and secondary crack branching which are characteristic of stress corrosion cracking. A hydrogen embrittled fracture surface is relatively clean and exhibits little or no crack branching.
III. RECOMMENDATION A hardness survey of accessible bolting has been undertaken by project to determine the extent of the bolt problem. M&QS recommends disposition be based on a maximum surface hardness of Rockwell C=41 which reflects on approximate tensile strength of 188,000 psi. Stress corrosion cracking becomes operable in high strength, low alloy steels of 200,000 psi tensile strengths and greater.
(O)
IV.
MATERIALS v
The bolti.g material was specified to be ASTM standard A-354 Grade BD quenched and tempered alloy steel. The alloy additions made in accordance with ASTM standard A-354 qualified the material to AISI 4140. Chemical and mechanical requirements and analysis are given in Table 3 and 4 V.
EXAMINATION PROCEDURES 1.
Visual examination including low power magnification examination.
2.
Mechanical testing including hardness testing and tensile testing.
3.
Chemical analysis by quantitative emission spectrographic analysis.
4.
Liquid penetrant examination.
5.
Surface analysis using Electron Spectrography for Chemical Analysis (ESCA).
6.
Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM).
7.
Heat treatment study. s.
A-7
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 (mI
'd VI.
DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES AND RESULTS Three bolting failures were submitted to the laboratory for failure analysis.
Due to heavy oxidation and mechanical damage, only the fracture surface of, bolt 4 was adequate for visual examination and scanning electron microscop'y.
However, enough fracture surface detail was present on bolts 2, 3 and 4,'
to conclude that all three bolts had failed by a similar fracture modej The analysis proceeded on this basis.
/
l vs 1.
Visual Examination - All three fractures were transverse to the bolt aris.
3 On bolt 4 approximately 1/3 of the surface was lightly oxidized,Ahe remaining
}
2/3 of the fracture surface was final fresh fracture (Figure 2)4 The lightly oxidized area exhibited fracture propagation lines which appe p to initiate 0
at bolts edge, converge, and run radially inward. An elevation step is present 11 at the oxidized fracture to final fracture transition.
J Pitting corrosion appears in the first and second threads away from the N
fracture surface (Figure 3).
It is believed moisture c6ndensed at the thread E
root providing the environment for pitting corrosion./ Cracks initiated D
at the pits and propagated in the presence of the liduid phase at the h
thread root. Considerable machining tears are present in the threads and q
are the result of improper machining techniques during thread cutting.
4 Machining tears did not have a direct effect on failure other than to act f
as sites for pitting corrosion.
O 2.
Mechanical Testing - Hardness testing was performed on all three 2
bolts (Table 2).
A hardness scan was performed at two locations for each h#
[
bolt. One scan was performed one bolt diameter away from quenched end O
V (ASTM A-370 requirement) and one scan adjacent to the fracture surface, hg Little variation in the through thickness hardness was detected. However, d
it is surface properties that control resistance to stress corrosion k
cracking and, therefore, surface hardness testing is critical, gg W
Tensile testing was performed on only bolt 2, but similar hardnesses p
would indicate mechanical properties of all bolting to be similar. Results O
d are shown in Table 4.
g
'?
W 3.
Chemical Analysis - Quantitative emission spectrographic analysis 0
indicates the material corresponds to ANSI 4140 high strength, low alloy U
steel in accordance with ASTM standard A-354.
4.
Non Destructive Examination - A liquid penetrant examination along the full bolting length was performed on bolt 4 to determine if surface cracking was present. No relevant indication were found.
5.
Surface Analysis - Electron Spectroscopy for Chemical Analysis (ESCA) was employed to determine the chemical formula of the oxide present and to determine if contaminants were present on the fracture surface. The oxide was determined to be primarily Fe 0; a second constituent was present (either Fe 0 or Fe0), but due to the oxidizing characteristic of ESCA it could not be determined specifically. Fe O is a low temperature oxide, and most probably formed during crack propogation. Therefore, the fracture was not initiated during quenching as a high temperature oxide would have been the primary oxide constituent if a quench crack had initiated failure. No contaminants, l
ofher than handling contaminants were present.
v l A-8 l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
Bechtel Group, Inc.
Interoffice Memorandum to R. A. Keidel F* No subact Document Page Reissue D**
December 10, 1981 Failure Analysis - ASTM A-352 BD
' Bolting for Concrete Embed Assemblies
o"'
G. R. Schmidt (GRS-121-05)
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Job 10407-002 0'
R&E/M&QS
^'
WC/1/A4 Ed 930-2408 cop sio R. A. Manley/B. D. Hackney B. N. Woodruff /J. J. Kvochak W. B. Keyser (6)
K. Schechter DCC 235157 BLN 0681-2 Failure Analysis File
Reference:
GRS 101-01, IOM to D. S. Parker, October 28, 1981.
Page 3 of report " Failure Analysis - ASTM A354 BD Bolting for Concrete d
Embed Assemblies Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station" has been revised.
The proper subscripts have been added to the chemical formulas in Section 5, lines 4, 5 and 6.
Transmitted with this IOM are six copies of the reissued page. Please discard the old page 3 and insert the attached page.
G. R. Schmidt GRS/JJ) /lh Attachments O
A-9 i
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 N
Bechtel Group, Inc.
Interoffice Memorandum -
to R. A. Keid21 Fa No 08' December 10, 1981 sdect Document Page Reissue Failure Analysis - ASTM A-352 BD ho'"
G. R. Schmidt (GRS-121-05)
Bolting for Concrete Embed Assemblies Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - Job 10407-002 0'
R&E/M&QS
^'
WC/1/A4 E st 930-2408 cwesio R. A. Manley/B. D. Hackney B. N. Woodruff /J. J. Kvochak W. B. Keyser (6)
K. Schechter DCC 235157 BLN 0681-2 Failure Analysis File
Reference:
GRS 101-01, IOM to D. S. Parker, October 28, 1981.
/\\
Pige 3 of report " Failure Analysis - ASTM A354 BD Bolting for Concrete (s,)
Eabed Assemblies Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station" has been revised.
The proper subscripts have been added to the chemical formulas in Section 5, lines 4. 5 and 6.
Transmitted with this IOM are six copies of the reissued page. Please discard the old page 3 and insert the attached page, h
G. R. Schmidt 1
GRS/JJK/lh Attachments 4
A-9
r DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 i
.pd VI.
DISCUSSION OF PP.0CEDURES AND RESULTS l
Three bolting failures were submitted to the laboratory for failure analysis.
Due to heavy oxidation and mechanical damage, only the fracture surface of bolt 4 was adequate for visual examination and scanning electron microscopy.
However, enough fracture surface detail was present on bolts 2,~ 3 and 4 to conclude that all three bolts had failed by a similar fracture mode.
l The analysis proceeded on this basis.
i l.
Visual Examination - All three fractures were transverse to the bolt axis.
on bolt 4 approximately 1/3 of the surface was lightly oxidized, the remaining 2/3 of the fracture surface was final fresh fracture (Figure 2). The lightly oxidized area exhibited fracture propagation lines which appear to initiate at bolts edge, converge, and run radially inward. An elevation step is present i
at the oxidized fracture to final fracture transition.
Pittin's corrosian appears in the first and second threads away ftom the fracture surfaue (Figure 3). It is believed moisture condensed at the thread a
root providing the environment for pitting corrosion. Cracks initiated at the pits and propagated in the presence of the liquid phase at the '
I i
thread root. Considerable machining tears are present in the threads and l
l are the result of improper machining techniques during thread cutting.
[
]
Machining tears did not have a direct effect on failure other than to act -
as sites for pitting corrosion.
2.
Mechanical Testina -. Hardness testing was performed on all three
~
i bolts (Table 2).
A hardness scan was performed at two locations for each bolt. One scan was performed one bolt diameter away from quenched end (ASTM A-370 requirement) and one scan adjacent to the fracture surface..
i Little variation in the through thickness hardness was detected. However, it.is surface properties that control resistance to stress corrosion cracking and, therefore, surface hardness testing is critical.
I
]
Tensile testing was performed on only bolt 2, but similar hardnesses would indicate mechanical properties of all bolting to be similar. Results i
are shown in Table 4.
l 3.
Chemical Analysis - Quantitative emission spectrographic analysis j
indicates the material corresponds to ANSI 4140 high strength, low alloy 1
steel in accordance with ASTM standard A-354 i
i 5
j 4.
Non Destructive Examination - A liquid penetrant examination along the full bolting length was performed on bolt 4 to determine if surface cracking i
I was present. No relevant indication were found.
i 5.
Sutface Analysis - Electron Spectroscopy for Chemical Analysis (ESCA) was employed to determine the chemical formula of the oxide present and to determine if contaminants were present on the fracture surface. The oxide i
was determined to be primarily Fe:Os. A second constituent was present (either j.
Fe 0 or Fe0), but due'to the oxidizinE characteristic of ESCA it could not
[
a4 i
be determined specifically.
Fe 0 1s a low temperature oxide, and most probably 3
i formed during crack propogation. Therefore, the fracture was not initiated l
l during quenching as a high temperature oxide would have been the primary
[
oxide constituent if a quench crack had initiated failure. No contaminants, j
other than handling contaminants were present.
j
,i s
i i t
A-10 l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 s ~s kNs 6.
Scanning Electron Microscopy - Two microstructurally distinctive areas were present corresponding to the two visually distinctive areas of bolt 4.
The lightly oxidized region was characteristically intergranular fracture, which is characteristic of stress corrosion cracking. The non-oxidized final fracture region failed by dimpled rupture (Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c). Dimpled rupture is characteristic of an overload failure in the ductile mode.
7.
Metallographic Examination - Bolt 3 and 4 were sectioned for microstructural analysis with sections prepared through the fracture transition from the intergranular to dimpled rupture. Continued crack propagation was revealed below the fracture surface (Figure 4). Minor branching was present both along the crack line as well as from the fracture surface (Figure 5). The microstructure was clearly identified as martensite (Figure 6).
8.
Heat Treatment Study - Varying heat treatments were performed on each of seven samples cut from a bolt 4 to determine the degree of tempering incurred by the bolting material (Table 4).
The results indicate the bolting material was either in the as quenched or quenched and tempered state with tempering temperature below minimum specified. A microstructural comparison of the as received, quenched, and quench and tempered specimens was made (Figures 6, 7a, 7b).
\\~ - A-11
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
)
Table 1.
Bolt Identification Failure Circumstances, i
and Methods of Examination
[
J
]
1
[ Bolt -]
Failure Location / Circumstances
]
Examination Methods
]
[
]
1
]
I
]
I 1
[
l J
Failed within anchor plate'when j None - discarded by crafts
]
[
]
ironworker pulled on bolt
]
}
[
]
]
]
[
]
]
]
[
2
)
Failed within the lower jam nut
] Mechanical testing, chemical ]
[
]
when ironworker was removing nut ] testing, optical microscopy }
l
]
]
}
[
]
]
}
[
3 J
Failed within anchor plate.
] Mechanical testing, liquid
}
4
[
]
Circumstances are unknown.
] penetrant examination, j
[
]
] optical microscopy
}
[
]
]
}
I
]
]
]
[
4
)
Failed within anchor plate when
] Mechanical testing, scanning ]
[-
)
ironworker was removing nut
] electron microscopy, ESCA, j
[
]
] optical microscopy, heat
}
[
]
] treatment study
}
h i
1 1
1 i
j J
i 4 i l
A-12
t I
l DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
~'
Table 2.
Hardness Test Results for ASTM A-354 (crade BD) Bolting. Notes 1,2,3 J
l I
]
[
[
Hardness (Rockwell C)
]
I
[
]
l'
[
Bolt / Location
[ Center [
[
[
[ Surface ]
{
[
[
0
[ 1/4 R [ 1/2 R [ 3/4 R [
'R-
]
[
[
l l
I I
]
[
[
[
[.
[
]
[ 2 / Fracture
[ 48.5 [ 48.5 [ 49.0 [ 49.0 [ 49.5 ]
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ 2 / Quenched End
[ 49.0 [ 48.5 [ 49.0 [ 49.0 [ 50.0 ]
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ 3 / Fracture
[. 48.0 [ 48.0 [ 49.5 [ 48.5 [ 50.0 )
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ 3 / Quenched End
[ 48.5 [ 48.0 [ _48.5
[ 50.0 [ 50.5 ]
[
[
l
[
[
[
]
[ 4 / Fracture
[ 48.0 [ 48.5 [ 48.0 [ 49.0 [ 48.5 ]
3
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
j
[ 4 / Quenched End
[ 48.0 [ 49.0 [ 48.5 [ 50.0 [ 49.5 ]
l
[
I I
I I
I I
l Note 1 Two hardness scans per bolt one scan adjacent to fracture surface; one scan at one bolt diameter away from the quenched end.
Note 2 Hardness measurements at center, 1/4 radius,1/2 radius, 3/4 radius, and surface.
Note 3 ASTM A-354 (Grade BD) requires hardness for 1-1/2 inch I
diameter bolts to be Rockwell C = 33 to 38.
l
[
L 3 i r
i A-13
~
~....
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
Table 3.
Chemical Analysis of Bolt 2 and Chemical Requirements of ASTM A-354 and AISI 4140.
[
[
]
[
[
Alloying Additions
]
[
[
]
[
Element
[
[
[
]
[
[ ASTM A-354
[
AISI 4140
[
Bolt 2
]
[
[
[
[
]
[
[
[
[
]
[ Carbon
[
.28
.55
[
.38
.43
[
.40
)
[
[
[
[
]
[ Chromium
[
[
.80 - 1.10
[
1.04
)
[
[
[
[
]
[ Columbium
[
[
[
.01
)
[
[
[
[
]
[ Copper
[
[
[
.08
)
[
[
[
[
]
[
[
.75 - 1.00
[
.93
]
I
[
[
[
]
[ Molybdenua
[
[
.15
.25
[
.20
]
[
[
[
[
]
[ Nickel
[
[
[
.07
)
[
[
[
[
]
[
.035 max.
[
.035 max.
[
.017
]
[
[
[
[
]
[ Silicon
[
[
.20
.35
[
.27
)
[
[
[
[
]
[ Sulfur
[
.04 max.
[
.04 max.
[
.02
]
[
[
[
[
]
[ Tantalum
[
[
[
.01
]
[
[
[
[
]
[ Titanium
[
[
[
.005
)
d
[
[
[
[
]
[ Vanadium
[
[
[
.008
)
[
[
[
[
]
r
.I
% A-14
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 Table 4.
Mechanical Properties of Bolt 2 and Mcchanical j
Requirements of ASTM A-354 (Grade BD)
[
[
[
]
[
[
ASTM A-354
[
Bolt #2
]
I i
[
]
[
[
[
l
[ Tensile Strength, psi
[
150,000 - 190,000
[
277,000
]
I l
I
'l
[ Yield Strength, psi
[
130,000 min.
[
239,000
]
I I
1
[ Elongation, %
[
14 min.
[
10
]
I I
I 1
[ Reduction in Area,1
[
40 min.
[
43.6'
]
[
[
[
]
[ liardness, Rockwell C
[
33 - 38
[
49
)
I I
I 1
I I
f
]
l I
i i
1 i
l 1
'" 1
~
A-15
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 Table 5.
':ffects of Thermal Treatments on Hardness V
of ASTM A-354 (Grade BD). Notes 1,2,3
[
[
]
[
[
Hardness (Rockwell C)
]
I
[
]
[
Thermal Treatment
[ Center [
[
[
[ Surface]
l
[
[
0
[ 1/4 R [ 1/2 R [ 3/4 R [
R
]
[
[
f I
I I
]
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ As received
[ 48.0 [ 49.0 [ 48.5 [
50 [ 49.5 )
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ Normalize (1600F)/ Oil quench
[ 48.0 [
48 [
49 [
50 [
52 ]
[
I
[
[
[
[
]
[ Normalize (1600F)/0il quench / Temper (900F) [ 37.0 [ 39.5 [
40 [ 39.8 [
40 )
I
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ As received / Temper (900F)
[ 34.5 [ 34.5 [ 36.0 [ 37.0 [ 37.5 ]
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ Normalize 1600F/0il quench / Temper (1000F) [ 29.5 [
31 [
31 [
3: [
30 )
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ As received / Temper (1000F)
[
30 [ 31.5 [ 33.5 [ 33.5 [ 33.5 )
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ Normalize (1600F)/011 quench / Temper (1100F)[ 23.2 [ 24.2 [ 25.5 [ 25.3 [ 24.5 )
[
[
[
[
[
[
]
[ As received / Temper (1100F)
[
25 [
25 [
26 [ 25.5 [ 26.5 ]
p i
i I
I I
I
]
()
Note 1 Hardness measurements at center,1/4 radius,1/2 radius, 3/4 radius, and surface.
Note 2 ASTM A-354 (Grade BD) requires hardness for 1-1/2 inch diameter fasteners to be Rockwell C = 33 to 38.
Note 3 Samples were cut f rom Bolt #4. A-16
.e
,e
.---,,-r-
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 s
b Anchor Plate Jam Mut
\\__
elleavy Jam Nut E_
l'i ;ure 1. (a) Scher.atic Drawing of Q1-6 Concrete Embed Assembly All fractures occured locally beneath the nut or anchor plate.
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's N
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s, N
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/
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//
/,,', ://,.',/,/,,
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'/ /
/
Bolt
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/.,-
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/-
., /, ',,/ f _.
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i /.
,,, /
,/, ' ',
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- f'
/,' ^ /,Y l
/p,//.f,./ ','. '), /,' /
, s.,'.,' / '
/
/
1 Figure 1.(b) Detail Drawing of Nut " late-Nut Configuration.
All factures nere transverse to the bolting axis.
A typical fracture path is shown.
O A-17
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 a
~
l t
{
h,.
s f
\\
'r.
l a
~
i 4
i I
a I
(unctched 2X) i Figure 2.
Macrograph of Fracture Surface.
I A Iight oxidation layer was present on approximately i
40'. of the fracture surface (Area A). Final fresh fracture was present on the remainder of the surface (Area B).
Detail Ar'a C as shown in Figure 3(a).
l l
l l
i l
l
. l l
t A-18 l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
~~
w --
. p',
es~
~
~:q
's
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4
rA
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i-Q L,
,4..
a
" ^
l' g, ;.s e
t
- +
, 9-
- t. _ :
(Unetched, 40X)
Figure 3.(a) SEM Fractograph of Fracture Transition.
Fracture surface location is Detail Area C of Figure 2.
Fracture transition is from Area A (intergranular mode, Figure 3.(b))
to Area B (dimpled rupture mode, Figure 3.(c)) pitting corrosion is evident in the threads (Area C).
l
, A-19 l
1
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
,5 i
$$hdd (unctched, 950X)
Figure 3.(b) SD1 Fractograph of Intergranular Fracture Region.
Detail of Area A of Figure 3. (a).
O f,,
se
- g M h'nm
- gg{[{-
j k
k,
.4 ',
sunetched, 950X)
Figure 3.(c) SDI Fractograph of Dimpled Rupture Fracture Region.
Detail of Area B of Figure 3(a). A-20
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
A 8^
(unctched, 100X)
Figure 4 Micrograph of Crack Propagation Below Fracure Surfaces.
Final fracture occured along line A.
Continued intergranular attack accored along line B.
O
?
E (unctched, 250X)
Figure 5.
Micrograph of Crack Branching Along Crack Propagation line, i,
1 A-21
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 s p (,.
3*%
g.. 'j.,,
' ' y e
,4 s
-p.-
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,gn
..r 4 P.
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1 fh{}.
$$h,b bY.f-
- 3. 0 ' ^ r.-
y
.e (Nital-Picral,1500X)
Figurs 7(a) Micrograph of As-quenched Microstructure.
l A-22
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
p4g, * *. x.a.
w
s
,,'R I'
?
- <'e. g,
/Aia ;.. - s
$f
1.;
7))
(Nital Picral,1500X)
Figure 7(b) Micrograph of Quenched G Tempered (900F) Microstructure.
O O A-23
l DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT No. 81-14 O
l Y
E ENGINEERNG SERVICES i
TECHNICAL REPORT TELEDYNE ENGNEERING SERYlCES CONTROLLED TECilNICAL REPORT TR-5534-1 DOCUMENT REVISION 1 TES PROJ. NO. (TS3V DATE 9 21.81 "ACCEPTABILTrY FOR SERVICE OF LOW ALLOY, QUENCHED AND TEMPERED SUPPORT STUDS AND BOL'IS" PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ANPP SEPTEMBER 16, 1982 1
B-1
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION 12400 EAST IMPERIAL HIGHWAY NORWALK, CALIFORNIA 90650 TECHNICAL REPORT TR-5534-1 REVISION 1
" ACCEPTABILITY FOR SERVICE OF LOW ALLOY, QUENCHED AND TEMPERED SUPPORT STUDS AND BOLTS" PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION ANPP O
SEPTEMBER 16, 1982 Y
WTELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES 130 SECOND AVENUE O
WAllHAM, MASSACHUSETTS 02254 617-8 % 3350 B-2
i DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 C
- man.
Technical Report 6M TR-5534-1, Revision 1 ACCEPTABILITY FOR SERVICE OF LOW ALLOY. QUENCHED AND TEMPERED SUPPORT STUDS AND BOLTS TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 1.0 SCOPE 1
2.0 INTRODUCTION
1 21 Stress Corrosion and Fracture Toughness of Bolting Materials 2
O 3.0 MATERIAL HARDNESS 3
3.1 Specified Hardness 3
3.2 Statistical Data 4
4.0 EFFECT OF LOAD DURATION, HIGH HARDNESS BOLTS S
4.1 Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics 5
4.2 Application 6
5.0 INTERPRETATION OF HARDNESS DATA 8
6.0 LOW HARDNESS BOLTS 8
7.0 RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES 8
7.1 High Hardness Bolts 9
7.2 Low Hardness Bolts 10
8.0 REFERENCES
11 FIGURES 12-17 APPENDIX 1 O
B-3
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
/9 N) ion 1 N
ACCEPTABILITY FOR SERVICE OF LOW ALLOY, GUENCHED AND TEMPERED SUPPORT STUDS AND BOLTS 1.0 SCOPE The purpose of this document is to provide guidance regarding acceptance for continued service of ASTM A354 low alloy steel quenched and tempered support studs and bolts, which have hardnesses outside of the specification range. It is assumeu that the material is otherwise in full conformance with specification requirements. Surf ace or near-surf ace hardness is the only property which can be measured in situ and correlated with the properties of signit scance to service n
acceptance. High surf ace hardness is particularly significant since it indicates possible suseptibility to stress corrosion cracking. Conversely, low surface hardness indicates possible low material strength.
In addition to hardness, applied stress level must be considered with a distinction made betreen long-term
,s and short-term periods of stress application.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
Teledyne Engineering Services (TES) under contract to Bechtel Power Corp.
(BPC) has studied the Bechtel analysis of the pre-service f ailure of four ASTM A35a BD bolts at the Arizona Nuclear Power Project. It was established that '.he anchor bolt f ailures resulted from stress corrosion cracking which propagated to the point that the studs failed by brittle fracture. The stress corrosion cracking
/\\
is the result of bolts with excessive surf ace hardness in the range of 49 hRC.
M Materials with hardness exceeding 49 HRC have drastically reduced resistance to SCC.
Subsequent field hardness measurements of approximately 4400 bolts by BPC aisclosed that the bolts were of uniform hardness, that additional bolts had hardnesses higher than the specification permitted but considerably lower than the f ailed bolts, and that some bolts were below the specified hardness range.
OO B-4
DEFICIENCY EVALllATION REPORT NO. 81-14 73 Technical Report gg TR-5534-1, Revision 1 TES has conducted a review of the available stress corrosion and strength vs. hardness literature for high strength quenched and tempered materials. That investigation indicated that bolting materials purchased to ASTM A354 specification requirements may fail as a result of stress corrosion cracking when used in a normal application. This situation is a result of lower than expected stress corrosion resistance and fracture toughness due to higher hardness outside specified limits: a consequence of the ASTM requirement for very small samples fer harnness testing for a large lot of bolts, and no requirement for field user's test to improve that sampling percentage.
2.1 Stress Corrosion and Fracture Toughness of Bolting Materials Un<ier Generic Activity A-12, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established guidelhes for loading of high strength bolting materials susceptible to stress corrosion using a fracture mechanics approach (1-3).
This criterion L'
is shown in Figure 1.
Subsequently, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) performed a literature review on Kiscc for bolting materials. The result of this review confirmed that the NRC lower bound was generally appropriate for the materials and environment of concern here. However, the review also showed that above yield strengtFs of 220 ksi (46 HRC) there is no change in Kgscc with increasing strength. The LLNL report suggests that 10 ksi /iii is an appropriate lower limit for KIscc.
TES's review of the same data suggests 8 ksi 6 as a more conservatne limit. Using this limit the NRC criterion would be modified to include the dashed line shown in Figure 1.
Fracture toughness is also a material property which may be limiting on bolt loading. TES's review of available literature resulted in the curve for K!c at room temperature as a function of material hardness at room temperature also showq in Figure 1.
It is on these two curves that further analysis is based.
ID V
B-5
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
\\
)
R-
,R ion 1 3.0 MATERIAL HARDNESS The bolts in question were purchased to ASTM A-354 Grade 80, which specifies a hardness range of 33-38 HRC. Several materials may meet the A-354 specification, but AISI 4140 and 4340 are most commonly used in nuclear application.
For the Palo Verde Project, how much of the variation in hardness above the specification is the result of normal variation in material properties? To answer this question, TES reviewed two sources for guidelines. Both indicated that a maximum surf ace hardness of 41 HRC is consistent with a one-quarter diameter maximum value of 38 HRC.
3.1 _Specified Hardness p
Based upon specific sampling procedures, ASTM A354 establishes a maximum
(
acceptable hardness level. A-354 does not define the location of the hardness measurement, but refers to A-370, Methods and Definitions for Mechanical Testing h of Steel Products.
A-370-74 Supplement III covers steel fasteners.
510.2 describes the purpose of Supplement III as "to facilitate production control testing and acceptance testing with certain more precise tests to be used for arbitration in case of disagreement over test results." S13.1 covers hardness testing for bolts, and it does provide for a "more precise test" as follows:
"For final arbitratien the hardness shall be taken on a traverse section through the threaded section of the bolt at a point one-quarter of the nominal diameter from the axis of the bolt. This section shall be taken at a distance from the end of the bolt which is equivalent to the diameter of the bolt."
Therefore, for the subject bolts, the maximum permissible hardness measured at mid-radius one-diameter away from a quenched end is 38 HRC.
In actuality BPC measured the hardness at the mid-radius on the end of the bolts, which would be expected to be harder than the mid-radius one diameter from the end. Therefore, the results should be conservative.
[
t/
B-6
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
/
Q,)
Technical Report WM TR-5534-1, Revision 1 Even if maximum hardenability of these studs is assumed, some hardness gradient would be expected in larger diameter bolts.
Since it is the surface property which controls resistance to stress corrosion crack initiation, the surface hardness is more important to service behavior than is the as-specified mid-radius hardness.
There not being a materials specification requirement on surf ace hardness, TES considered the requirements of component support standards which address surf ce hardness. Specifically with respect to support bolting of the c. lass of materials of intcrest, including 4140 and 4340, footnote (3) to ASME Section III Table I-13.3 and footnote (6) to Table 4 of Code Case N-71 (1644) read as follows:
"The maximum tensile strength shall not exceed the minimum spec-ified tensile strength by nace than 40 ksi. Where the specification does not limit hardness, the maximum surf ace hardness shall not o
exceed the hardness values corresponding to the maximum tensile strength, as determined from the applicable Tables in SA370."
For the material of interest ( ASIM A-354 Grade BD), the specified minimum tensile strength is 150 ksi.
Applying the footnote procedure, the maximum permissible surf ace hardness would be 41.3 HRC.
Therefore, based on rounding to integer values in accordance with SA-370, TES concludes that a maximum surface hardness of 41 HRC is consistent with a specified maximum mid-radius hardness of 38 HRC, and that 41 HRC would be the proper value for surface hardness specification.
3.2 Statistical Data What is the nature of ine ' hardness variation which would be expected to result if a large number of stads were heat treated with the objective of meeting a specific hardness? Data have not been found for the spec;fic materials of interest, but are available on a large number (8935) of 1/2" diameter AISI I
1038 holts (6). Because of this small diameter, the higher hardenability of the l
41XX or 43XX materials is not required to obtain essentially unifonn hardness.
fhU B-7
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 p-Technical Report gg TR-5534-1, Revision 1 MM lhe carbon content 0.38% is sufficient to represent the type of data one would expect from the materials of interest. Approximately 1000 bolts were heat treated to each of 8 levels of nominal hardness. The results shown in Figure 2 may be summarized as follows:
HARDNESS, HRC Max. Variation Nominal Minimum Maximum Range Minus Plus 20 14 23 9
6 3
22.5 19 27 8
3.5 4.5 25 21 29 8
4 4
30 25 32 7
5 2
3?.5 26 35 9
6.5 2.5 (N
35 33 38 8
5 3
O 37.5 33 41 8
4.5 3.5 40 38 44 6
2 4
The average value of the range is 7.875, and the average plus variation is 3.312.
Based on these data, it is reasonable to expect that material which has a nominal hardness based on limiting sampling in accordance with a specification of some value would have a maximum hardness 3 HRC higher if it were more extensively sampled. For example, uniformly hard material with a nominal hardness of 38 HRC would be found to have a maximum hardness of 41 HRC if a large numoer of samples were measured.
4.0 EFFECT OF LOAD DURATION, HIGH HARDNESS BOLTS 4.1 Application of Linear Elastic Fracture Mechanics A calculated quantity termed the " stress intensity factor" is used to evaluate the propensity for crack initiation or propogation in materials such as those here considered. The " stress intersity factor" used here is designated by the symbol K1 and is computed with an equation of the form:
v 1
B-8
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 7
)
ENG2EERNG SEMCES Technical Report TR-5534-1, Revision 1 K g = CS 6 where:
Kg = stress intensity factor, ksi G C = a f actor dependent upon the geceetry of the structure of the crack and the distribution of the nominal stress 5 = the nominal stress, the stress which would be present in the absence of the crack, ksi a = a characteristic crack dimension; in particular, the depth of the crack for a surface crack, inches The calculated or applied stress intensity factor is compared with a measured mat. rial property, the property being determined for this material with l
a crack present,.<ith the appropriate loading and in an appropriate environment.
Of specific interest on this application are two such material properties:
p) l.U Kgc
= the plane strain fracture toughness K!cscc = the minimum value at which stress corrosion cracks propogate In each instance, the applied stress intensity f actor is compared with the material property; usually with an appropriate f actor of safety to obtain an allowable value, if the applied value is less than or equal to the allowable value, the design is consiCtrad *.o be acceptable.
4.2 Application A distinction between allowable stresses for long-term and sncrt-term service conditions is made in order to recognize the f act that the total duration of many of the higher service loadings is very short when compared to the total life nf the plant.
If l ong-tenn stress corrosion cracking is prevented, extraordinary defects will not be present so as to cause f ailure when the short-tenn service load is applied. Therefore, the long-term allowable stress has been selected so as to minim ue stress corrosion cracking. The short-term allowable stress has been decreased as a function of hardness because the short-tenn (no t,,Q corecsion) toughness decreases with increased hardness.
The objective is to B-9
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPGRT NO. 81-14 Y
ENGNERNGSBMCES Technical Report TR-5534-1, Revision 1 assure that the hard studs with surf ace hardness somewhat above 38 HRC are as resistant to f ailure as are studs which comply with specified material properties.
It is suggested that the dividing line between short-term and long-term service conditions be placed at one hour, unless a longer time can be justified on the basis of crack growth rate calculations.
The user of these criteria must recognize that such use may require design and installation procedures which are different than those commonly used.
The design and installation procedures for bolted joints commonly result in a bolt preload which is equal to the maximum service load which would exist on the bolt.
Tnen, at least in the ideal situation when the bolts are flexible compared to the f) remaining memurs of the bolted assenbly, the stress experienced by the bolt is s%
not dependent on wr ations in service loads. With the suggested criteria, the long-tenn allowable stress may be considerably lower than the short-term allowable stress.
Since the controlling design condition for most such bolts is the result of plant Emergency or Faulted Conditions which are of short time duration, the short-term allowables are intended to apply to such loadings. The long-term allowables are intended to apply to the stress levels which exist in the bolts during plant Normal and Upset Conditions including the as-relaxed preload.
Normally the controlling stress level during such conditions is the preload value which exists in the bolt following initial relaxation. The minimum prelo3d value is generally assumed to be two-thirds of the actual yield strength of the material, and this value may be considered to represent "100% of the normal criteria" for long-term allowables unless other values are indicated by applicabh data. The value which represents "100% of the normal criteria" for short-term allowables shall be taken
(
as the allowable stress value used with the initial design criteria for plant l
Emergency and Faulted Conditions.
O e
a kj l
l B-10
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 l
i
.m
(
)
U' TM ENGDEERNG SOMCES Technical Report TR-5534-1. Revision 1 5.0 INTERPRETATION OF HARONESS DATA The allowable stress limits are related to the " maximum hardness".
This tenn is intended to me' n the surf ace or near surf ace hardness as determined by a
conventional hardness testing such as Rockwell B, Rockwell C, or Brinnell testing.
Since hardness measurements may be performed in the field, suitable standard Rockwell or Brinnell hardness testers may not be available or practical, alter-native non conventional hardness testers may be used provided a relation can be shown between the hardness scale used and the Rockwell or Brinnell scales. For the Equo-Tip portable hardness tester used by BPC for the Arizona Nuclear Power Project, Aoperidix I shows such a correlation between Rockwell and the Equo-Tip "L" scales with data from Equo-Tip hardness tests on Rockwell calibration blocks l
(d spotted in (7).
Therefore, the Equo-Tip is an acceptable alternative hardness tester and the "L" value to Rockwell C correlation provided in the Equo-Tip Users Manual can be used directly.
6.0 LOW HARDNESS BOLTS Since low hardness bolts are not susceptible to stress corrosion, and generally have toughness at least equal to the toughness of the specified material, driy reduClion in allowable stress would be based only on reductions in ultimate strength which are caused by insufficient hardness. No distinction is reauired between long-term and short-term loading. Figure 3 shows ultimate strength as a function of hardness (8).
7.0 RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES Based upon the study reported in this document, TES has developed guidelines for acceptance for continued service of low alloy quenched and tempered support I
l bolting in terms of the material hardness.
g3 B-11
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
\\_ _./
Technical Report yg TR-5534-1, Revision 1 7.1 High Hardness Bolts TES recommends that such bolting be considered as acceptable for con-tinued service if: (1) they have not been preloaded to and will not be subjected to long-term direct tension stress levels in excess of those indicated in the following tables; and (2) the maximum calculated direct tension stress under any anticipated or pcstulated short-term service condition will not exceed the values indicated in the following tables for the applicable materials.
FOR ALL LOW ALLOY, QIIENCHED AND TEMPERED MATERIALS Maximum Stress Limits Hardness
(% Nomal Criteria)
(5'R C )
Long-term
.Short-term 38-41 100 100 42 80 90 43 50 90 greater than 43 Not Permitted at this time pending resolution of prop, erties at higher hardnesses Bolting which has been subjected to stress levels in excess of those recomenaed for long-term loadings may contain stress corrosion cracks.
The acceptability of such materials for continued service must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
The determination of the stress limits is shown gear.hically in figure 4 for long-term loadings and Figure 5 for short-term loadings. The long-term loading is based on the criteria established by the NRC and modified by the 8 Asi /Iii lower bound as discussed in 2.1 of this report.
OV B-12
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
T 55 3 1,
ision 1 YME M
7.2 Low Hardness Bolts TES recommends that such bolting be acceptable for service provided any anticipated or postulated service condition will not exceed the values indicated in the following table:
QR_ALLLOWALLOY,QUENCHEDANDTEMPEREDMATERIALS Maximum Stress Limits Hardness
(% Normal Criteria)
(HRC) 32 100 31 97 30 95 29 92 28 90 27 88 26 86 25 84 These figures are based on Figure 3 which shows ultimate strength as a f unction of hardness. The determination of the stress limits are shown graphically in Figure 6.
O B-13
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 p
Technical Report TR-5534-1, Revision 1 NM
8.0 REFERENCES
1.
R.P. Snalder, J.M. Hodge, H.A. Levin, and J.J. Zudans, " Potential for Low Fracture Toughness and Lamellar Tearing on PWR Steam Generator and Reactor Coolant Pump Supports," NUREG-0577, For Comment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1979.
2.
R.P. Snaider, R.M. Gamble, J.M. Hodge, H.A. Levin, P.N. Randall, C.D.
Sellers, and J.J. Zudans, " Potential for Low Fracture Toughness and Lamellar Tearing on Component Supports," NUREG-0577 Draf t 10/80, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1980.
3.
Memorandums dated May 19, 1980 and May 20, 1980 from the Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory V
Commission sent to nuclear reactor plants pertaining to References 1 and 2.
4.
A. Goldberg, MC. Juhas, " Low-Bound KIscc Values for Bolting Materials
- a Literature Survey," NUREG/CR-2467, UCRL-53035, February 1982.
5.
C.S. Carter, " Stress Corrosion Cracking and Corrosion Fatigue of Medium-Strength and High-Strength Steels," Chapter prepared for ARPA Handbook on Stress Corrosion Cracking and Corrosion Fatigue. To be published.
6.
Metals Handbook, Volume 1, 9th Edition, Page 281.
7 TES letter 5534-3 from W.G. Dobson to W. G. Bingham (BPC) dated 6/15/82.
8.
Metals Handbook, Volume 2, 8th Edition, Page 427.
O B-14
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
Technical Report TR-5534-1, Revision 1 SPTF15 f1(E ENG4EERNG SERVICES
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
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B-20
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 TN ENGNERNGSEMCES Technical Report TR-5534-1, Revision 1 i
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
I A Review of Arizona Nuclear Power Project Bolting Failures i
S. H. Bush F. A. Simonen 1
i September 1982 Prepared for Bechtel Power Corporation 12400 East Imperial Highway Norwalk, California 90650 under Contract 2311120532 OBa4elle Pacific t '"hwest Laboratories o
l c-1
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i DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 f
1 4
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i
-3 A REVIEW OF ARIZONA NUCLEAR 4
POWER PROJECT BOLTING FAILURES li 4
1 S. H. Bush 1
2 F. A. Simonen i
l i
September 1982 t
i Prepared for Bechtel Power Corporation i
12400 East Imperial Highway Norwalk, California 90650 under Contract 23111 20532
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Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories Richland, Washington 99352 i
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l C-2 t
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SU E RY 1
i THE PROBLEM 3
THE MIDLAND P.00BLEM.
6 TELEDYNE REPORT ON ANPP 7
THE ANPP PROBLEM AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS C
RESIDUAL STRESS 14 FLAW SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS.
16 EXAMINATION OF INSTALLED BOLTING DURING SITE VISIT 18 CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 20 QUALITY ASSURANCE 22 REFERENCES 23 l
lii C-3
u DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
FIGURES 1
Bolting Not Meeting ASTM Standards A 354 Grade BD by Vendor.
4 2
Comparison of Installed Bolting Not Meeting ASTM A 354 5
Grade BD Hardness Standards 3
Status of Installed Bolting in ANPP Units 1, 2, 3..
11 4
Examples of Stress Corrosion Cracking Failures as Function 12 of (a) Yield Strength and (b) Environment Typical of ANPP TABLES i
1 General Comments Relevant to High-Strength, Low Alloy 9
Steels Such as AISI 4140 and 4340 2
A Compe;ison of Conditional Acceptance Crite.*ia Contained 20 in This Report and TES TR-5534-1 O
f O
tv C-4
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 (D
V A REVIEW OF ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT BOLTING FAILURES BECHTEL POWER CORPORATION S. H. Bush F. A. Simonen EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
We have reviewed the data pertaining to Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP) Bolting, including failures in the context of Teledyne Engineering Ser-vice reports on bolting failures at the Midland Nuclear Plant and conclude that the Teledyne Midland studies of f ailures at higher pratension stresses / hardness levels are no more than marginally applicable to ANPP. In the range of hard-n,ess of concern to ANPP, namely RC 40 to 41 a..a greater, the acceptability cri-teria for bolting are believed to be opciaistic. Delayed stress corrosion
(.-
failures of bolting having hardness values RC >40 would not be surprising if exposed to certain environments.
We have received the Teledyne Engineering Services report relevant to ANPP, " Acceptability for Service of Low Alloy, Quenched and Tempered Support Studs and Bolts." We consider it an excellent report and believe that some of the suggestions included are worth implementing. We find their criteria for l
controlled decreases in stress limits for bolting in the hardness range, RC 42 to 43 acceptable if accompanied by case-by-case evaluation of the specific installations of bolting in this hardness range. It is our understanding that Bechtel has decided to remove bolting of hardness greater than RC 41.
In our opinion, this decision essentially resolves the bolting problem and eliminates the need for case-by-case analysis.
l While stress corrosion failures may occur over an extended time period, the safety signific&nce of such bolting failures in the locations and installa-tions within ANPP are considered to be minimal even under accident conditions.
O 1
V C-5
=.
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 A walk-through of the plant performed as part of Battelle's study con-firmed the virtual absence of long term loads except for torque-levels on bolt-ing;-we understand these will be maintained at minimal levels. Most critical assemblies are required to sustain loads only in the remote instance of major pipe failure.
A sequential sampling program to check hardness levels is suggested for future batches of bolting to minimize the possibility of installing unaccept-able bolting.
O 4
1 1
)
b i
lO 2
C-6
. ~.
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 Qb THE PROBLEM During 1981, four ASTM A 354 Grade BD anchor bolts purchased for the ANPP 4
failed during installation. Examination of three of the bolts revealed that the three tested bolts exceeded ASTM A 354 Grade BD hardness and tensile limits, e.g., RC -50.
Hardness testing of similar anchor bolts in the unin-stalled and installed condition revealed that a substantial percentage of the bolts fell outside ASTM permissible limits on both the high and the low side of the acceptable hardness range. ASTM A 354 Grade BD in sizes 1/4 to 2-1/2 inches requires the following properties.
Hardness 311-352 BHN or 33-38 Rockwell C Tensile (machined) 150,000 psi min.
Yield 130,000 psi min.
Percent Elongation 14% min.
R.A.
40% min.
The bolts were fabricated by several sources, and the percentage of unac-V ceptable bolts varied markedly with source as noted in Figure 1.
These data represent an extensive but not complete sampling.
Extensive testing of installed bolting in Units 1, 2, 3 revealed that 5 to 8 percent were below minimum hardness values and 13 to 15 percent were above maximum hardness values. A majority of the out-of-standard bolting were 1 to 2 points Rockwell C too high or too low. Figure 2 illustrates both the total percenta,a of bolts just outside ASTM hardness limits and the percentage of bolts at various levels of out-of-tolerance. The L values cited in Fig-ure 2 are direct readings from the Equotip hardness tester.
The problem, therefore, is the acceptability criteria of some bolting mar-ginally outside the specified hardness range. Basically the following ground rules are considered to be appropriate.
Everything meeting ASTM A 354 Grade BD is acceptable.
e Hardness values above RC 41 generally are unaccutable; however, they e
are subject to case-by-case analysis.
3 i
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 iV Ybfl//$//////M////$///////$$/hA WMf/M/////M////M//$/Mf////184
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Population 2118 (441 repeat in containment 3 analysis).
e Hardness values of RC 39 to 41 are conditionally acceptable; however, they need further assessment; 1 to 3 percent of the installed bolting appears to fall in this range.
e Hardness and strengths below some value (e.g., RC <31) are unaccept-able or require down rating of allowable loads.
Our examination has concentrated on the material exceeding the upper level ASTM val'ues (RC >38).
We reviewed the projected inservice performance in the conte <t of previons Teledyne studies relevant to-the Midland nuclear plants as well as in the context of susceptibility to stress corrosion as functions of 4
C-8
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
/%
L = EQUOTIP HARDNESS VALUES BOLTS TOO SOFT L (560-569) RC 31-32
'/// L ( 550-559) RC 30-31 TOO SOFT
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Compariscr. of Installed Bolting Not Meeting ASTM A 354 Grade 80 Hardness Standards 5
O C-9
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 i
n hardness, strength, loading and environment for quenched and tempereo AISI 4140 and 4340 steels which typically are the composition used for ASTM A 354 Grade 80 bolting in the sizes of interest.
We have considered acceptability in the context of the safety and economic consequences of such failures for the specific installations of concern, recog-nizing the percentage of bolting having both high tensile and low tensile prop-erties and the overall load bearing capabilities of the typical bolting layouts.
THE MIDLAND PROBLEM Three failures occurred in ASTM A 354 Grade BD studs, 2.5 inches 6 during 1979 and 1980 at the Midland Nuclear Project. These studs were embedded ver-tically in concrete to bolt the reactor pressure vessel skirt to the floor.
All failures were attributed to stre,s corrosion cracking resulting from the very high hardness, RC 46 to 48, of these studs.
Two Teledyne documents (TR-3887-1 Rev. 1, TR-3887-1 Addendum 1)(1,2) dealt with the examination of the failed bolts plus an assessment of the hardness of the other studs. A third report (TR-3887-2 Rev. 1), titleo " Acceptability for Service of Midland RPV Anchor Studs" provided a justification that some studs could continue in use based on available information, including an assessment of the relevant literature on stress corrosion cracking. We will critically analyze the Teledyne document and references specific to stress cor-rosion to establish their relevance to the ANPP bolting problem.
The Midland Unit 1 studs were found to be of very high hardness (RC 46 to48). Since our discussions with Bechtel personnel indicates that there appears to be no intent to accept material of this hardness at ANPP, the con-clusions in the Teledyne report on Unit 1 are irrelevant.
In Midland Unit 2, the RPV studs were generally within hardness specifi-cations, with only a few of hardness RC 38 to 41. The situation in fact was very similar to that at ANPP. Teledyne presents data to show that a few bolts in a large sarple will typically be in this hardness range. The lot of bolts nevertheless could have been accepted as meeting ASTM specifications. The 6
bd 1
C-10
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 V}
f available data and fracture mechanics calculations indicate that RC = 41 is a marginal situation relative to IGSCC. Our position is that one can accept a small fraction of potential failures of a single bolt in a multiple bolt installation. The alternative at ANPP is removal and repair of the instal-lation. Since concrete failure usually limits the strength of such installa-tions, the integrity of a reworked installation must be considered since one may actually gain little and possibly lose strength in replacing an installation.
Generally, we feel that the Teledyne report TR-3887-2 Rev. 1, " Accept-ability for Service of Midland RPV Anchor Studs,"I } May 20, 1980, tends to be somewhat optimistic with regard to 200,000 pst ultimate (uts) being an acceptable dividing line for failure by stress corrosion cracking.
TELEDYNE REPORT ON ANPP We have reviewed the Teledyne Engineering Services report, " Acceptability for Service of Low Alloy, Quenched and Tempered Support Studs and Bolts." Gen-erally, it is an excellent report. We find some of the positions advanced in O
the report acceptable; however, we disagree with others. Acceptable items are:
e conditional acceptance of low hardness bolting e surf ace hardness measured with tne Equotip reads on the high side so a reported RC 41 is essentially in compliance with ASTM A 354 Grade BD when measured on the bolt radius the short-term /long-term load approach e
e the K design curve.
ISCC Values of RC <41 pose no problems. In lieu of breaking concrete, we believe case-by-case analysis is appropriate, particularly where derating one or two bolts in a mount which exceed RC 41 by a few points is an option. For higher hardness values we disagree with the Teledyne acceptance criteria, other than taking no credit for given bolts in a systems analysis. In the above con-text we do not accept the " trend curve factor" cited in their report because it does not handle residual stresses and stress concentrations present in 7
O C-11
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
bolting. In this respect, only partial credit can be taken for reductions in long-term preload because an adverse residual stress pattern may continue to exist.
One basic lack in the Teledyne report is failure to address the specific functions of the bolting in question such as multiple bolts in each installa-tion, probability of short-term loads, absence of long-term loads other than bolting torque. We touch on some of these items later in the report by compar-ing their and our approach.
THE ANPP PROBLEM AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Appendix A of Teledyne's report TR-3887-2 Rev.1, " Acceptability for Service of Midland RPV Anchor Studs"I ) uses as its source the chapter by Clive S. Carter for the as yet unpublished ARPA Handbook on Stress Corrosion Cracking and Corrosion Fatigue entitled, " Stress Corrosion Cracking and Corro-sion Fatigue of Medium-Strength and High-Strength Steels..(5)
An examination of the same document by us illustrates how two groups approaching a collection of data from somewhat different view points can differ
/
in their conclusions. For example, a metallurgist working in the field of stress corrosion approaches a problem from a different perspective than that
- t an engineering mechanics expert. The following Table 1 abstracts portions of Carter's chapter deemed specifically relevant to bolting materials from ASTM A 354 Grade BD (e.g., AISI 4140 and 4340).
As can be seen from the emphasis given in Table 1, we feel that selection of 200 ksi as an ultimate tensile strength cutoff for bolting is somewhat high.
A value neaice 180 ksi should be substantially less susceptible to cracking of bolting, particularly where trace contaminants in the concrete or other envi-ronmental factors may play a critical role.
One proviso may be app' lied to make the higher strength (to 200 ksi uts) bolting conditionally acceptable for specific installations such as at ANPP.
Based on hardness distributions such as those in Figure 2, the hardness values of specific interest are RC <31, RC - 40 to 41 RC >41.
The very soft and the very hard bolts represent 1 to 2 percent each of the installed bolting. On the 8
- O C-12
1 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
'v)
TABLE 1.
General Coments Relevant to High-Strength, Low Alloy Steels Such as AISI 4140 and 4340 Smooth specimens in high purity water have critical hardness / strength e
thresholds -RC 42 (-185 ksi oy, -200 to 220 e l-u I"
Sharp notches (Kg. 101 reduce critical level to 170 to 180 ksi eu e
the same environment.
Precracked specimens further reduce threshold to -140 ksi ou (threshold e
load stress 10 to 20% uts) above in aerated distilled water.
Contaminants such as chlorides reduce time to failure markedly.
e pH is an important factor; acid (low pH) enhances SCC; basic (high pH) e reduces SCC.
Coatings such as zinc may markedly increase susceptibility as well as e
reducing critical stress threshold.
Increases in applied stress > SCC rate.
e There can be lengthy incubation periods depending on alloy content and e
microstructure.
5'eload prior to exposure to SCC environment may >KISCC*
e Exposure to SCC environment prior to preload may <KISCC-e Operations such as grinding, if not controlled, may form untempered
/]
e martensite leading to cracking and SCC.
' Q System Failures Wires of 4140, etc., when drawn have f ailed in concrete; contaminants e
to increase setting), sulfides, sulfates, such as chlorides (from CaCl2 etc., increase or initiate such failures.
Galvanized bolting with values as low as RC 38 (150 ksi uts) have f ailed e
in culvert structures. Overtorquing contributed to these failures, Bolting of high-strength alloy steel (170 to 185 ksi uts) have failed in e
bridge structures due to SCC.
Control of the following factors helps minimize SCC; lack of control may result in SCC.
Minimize regions of high stress with appropriate design, e
Minimize the buildup ur presence of high residual stresses.
o Prevent formation of.untempered martensite by controlling macnining or e
grinding operations, If possible, shot peen to form compressive surface stresses e
Control and minimize trace contaminants that accelerate SCC.
e Minimize overstress on torquing.
e 9
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
\\
basis of the overdesign factors in component attachments, one can conclude that the isolated failure of one bolt in an attachment consisting of six or more bolts will have little or no safety consequence. Because of the statistical nature of SCC we would anticipate a fairly large spread in failure times. In the case of ANPP, the hardness's of installed bolting have been recorded and it is possible to determine all locations where one or more bolts f all into the three cited categories of hardness outside ASTM standards; namely, low strength (RC <31), very high !trength and susceptible to SCC (RC >41), and high strength (RC 39 to 40), but less susceptible to SCC.
A review of hardness values of the installed bolting at ANPP reveals a non-random distribution, indicating bolts from a given vendor were removed as a batch for installation. The biasing is evident in two major aspects. On a random basis one would expect no more than two bolts out of tolerance in most mounts, and the numbers of bolts high and low out of tolerance should be dis-tributed. Neither is true as can be seen in Figure 3.
There are too many mounts with four, five and six bolts exceeding the standards; furthermore, when this occurs, they are biased toward all high or all low from the standard, rather than a mixture of high and low. The statistical probability of such mixes from a random universe is extremely low.
Of possible safety significance is the bias apparent in the very low or very high hardness bolts in a given mount. Those cases characterized by one or two asterisks in Figure 3 represent marginal or unacceptable installations in our estimation.
Speidel(0) at the Firminy Conference reviewed available data on indus-l trial failures and correlated these failures with yield strength. Figure 4 presents his comparisons, indicating a threshold for service failures of bolts as about 160 ksi yield strength for quenched and tempered alloys. These values NI are comparable to those of Okada at the same conference who cited delayed failures of 4140 bolting in sea air and sea water both coated (Zn, Cd) and uncoated. Bolts with 185 to 190 ksi UTS were found to fail within 1 to 2 years in some instances, depending on environment and preload.
We believe there is some probability of further cracking of the higher hardness bolts, particularly if there are environmental factors such as trace 10 l
v C-14
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 f%.
k
)
v NUMBER OF BOLTS OuTSIDE STANDARDS IN SET OF Six
- HH - HlCH HARDNESS >41 RC 20 -
H - MicH HARONESS 38-4i RC L - LOW H ARDNESS 31-33 RC 54 LL - LOW HARDNESS <31 RC E
i is w
3 313 o
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- 2'5 7
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7 H L HL H L HL H L HL H L HL H L HL H L HL ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX NUMBER OF BOLTS PER SET OuTSIDE STANDARD FIGURE 3.
Status of Installed Bolting in ANPP dnits 1, 2, 3.
Six bolts per mount.
contaminants present in the concrete. Nevertheless, we conclude that an indi-vidual failure in a multiple bolt installation should have limited safety sig-nificance even under faulted conditions.
Finally, it is necessary to place certain classes of failures in perspec-tive. With piping systems bolting is used to attach hangers, Snubbers, sup-ports, etc. Under some classes of faulted loads such as severe water hammer, 11 v
C-15
'u d 2 50 -
1600,
1 SERVICE 220 -
~ F AILURES OF 210 -
wlRES 200 -
1400 -
Hy0 AND NOTCHES 1400 -
(OR CORROSION)
I"
~
> SUFFICE FOR SCC SERVICE F AILURE:
COLD DRAWN TO OCCUR
\\
STEEL 180 1200 -
170 3200
- 4
=
x 160 M
SER VICE M
M
~ F AILURES OF O
150
/
BOLTS g
.000
/
iOOO - '/
g
/
nN
=
/
I 130 E1 SCC SERVICE FAtLURES
/
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) OBSERVED UNDER QUENCHED h
e 120 I
SEVERE CONDITIONS 800 STEEL AND TEMPERED 110 y
y 2
w
/
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[
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W 600
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- E
~
~ FAILURES OF 70 EYEBARS h
- o d
400 g
O 50 IMMUNE TO SCC 40 NO SCC SERVICE
> IN SERVICE g
l FAILURES OBSERVED CARBON STEEL 15 LN LN (al SCHEMATIC CORRELATION BETWEEN YlELD (b) SCC FAILURES OF BRIDGES; STEELS AND STRENGTH LEVELS INVOLVED.
STRENGTH AND PROPENSITY TO SCC SERVICE F AILURES IN LOW ALLOY STEELS.
Examples of Stress Corrosion Cracking Failures as function Of (a) Yield Strength FIGURE 4.
and (b) Environment Typical of ANPP (from Speidel).
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 l
I all piping supports on sections of piping exceeding 100 feet in length in at least two nuclear plants, possibly more, have been pulled from the wall without f ailitig the pipir.g. Therefore, one must consider the significance of anchor
-l bolt crackinn, both individual bolt f ailures, and of collective f ailures in the context of sifety implications.
O s
i j
I 1
i 13
!O C-17
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
RESIDUAL STRESS The Midland study does not consider residual stresses and, their impact on bolt failure by IGSCC. In the report dated Cctober 2,1981, on the ANPP bolt f ailures, the residual stresses were said to be tension at the outer surface.
However, no specific data or supporting evidence were presented. If required, such residual stresses could readily be measured on samples of ANPP bolting at commercial laboratories with X-ray diffraction equipment. Based on specific questions it was established that no such resioual stress measurements have been made.
An attempt was made to locate relevant residual stress data on quenched and tempered 4140 steels. Extensive data on residual stresses are given in the Handbook of Experimental Stress Analysis,( } although none of the data are really quite relevant to the present problem. Bars of other steels in the 1-1/2 inch diameter range exhibit compressive OD stresses after heat treatment.
However, the mechanism of residual stress formation is a result of competing f actors, namely, thermal contraction during quench and a volume expansion due O
to phase change. In high carbon and highly alloyed steels, the transformation stresses are said to domi-ite and produce OD tension.
One data point for 4130 steel was cited which showed a 50 ksi tensile OD residual stress. However, the product was oil quenched aircraft tubing (0.034 inch wall) and the results cannot be applied to the bolting problem.
It is expected that an additional literature search would locate similar data for solid bar configurations.
Data given in the HandbookIO) show the effect of tempering temperature on reducing quench induced residual stresses. In a high carbon steel (0.50 per-cent) the longitudinal stress was about 70 ksi without tempering. At the nomi-nal tempering temperature of about 900*F for the ANPP bolting, the OD residual stress was reduced to about 30 ksi.
We recognize the problems inherent in locating applicable residual stress data as well as the difficulties in obtaining such data experimentally. Seasi-tivity studies where various residual stress levels are assumed could be of 14 O
V l
C-18 l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
\\
l
(
value in situations where two or more high hardness bolts are located in the same mount and analysis is preferred to breaking concrete. Since residual stresses become a critical input at high hardnesses, e.g., RC >45 not at RC 41, such studies would be of value only at these higher hardnesses.
l I
4 j
1 15 i
1 I
C-19 i
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 0
l V FLAW SENSITIVITY CALCULATIONS Some fracture mechanics calculations were performed to gain insight into the effect of hardness on potential for stress corrosion cracking of bolting, in these calculations high stresses were assumed to exist at the root of the thread profile, both from pretension and as residual stresses. Accordingly, the calculations considered the threshold for growth of small IGSCC flaws into a stress field at the yield strength of the bolting material. The yield strength and value of threshold K were taken as a functiva of hardness IGSCC from plots in the Teledyne/ Midland report.
Two limiting initial flaw shapes were considered, namely, a long surface flaw and a half-penny surface flaw. Stress intensity factors are given by:
K = 1.12 o, 6, long flaw K - 0.7 o G, half-penny flaw y
For the lower bound K values of the Teledyne report, the following critical ISCC Q
flaw depths were estimated.
Lower Bound Critical Depth, inch K
Hardness ISCC y
Half-Penny RC ksi /ihBi k_s i, Long Flaw Flaw 36 43 150 0.021 0.054 38 38 160 0.014 0.036 40 31 165 0.009 0.023 42 22 175 0.004 0.010 44 14 185 0.0015 0.004 46 9
200 0.0005 0.001 48 8
215 0.0003 0.001 Studies of the behavior of small flaws indicates that reasonable estimates of inherent material defect sizes are in the range of 0.010 inch and less. The implication is that one must assume that flaws of this size are always present, 16 O
C-20
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
due for example to inclusion content, surf ace finish, etc. On this basis, a critical flaw size of 0.010 inch corresponds to a critical hardness range of RC 40 to 42. The conclusion is that under worst case conditions (high local 3
stresses and lower bound threshold Kggg), bolting material of RC 40 to 42 has essentially no tolerance for very small flaws. Under these conditions a very small initial crack or. initiated crack will tend to grow. This hardness range seems consistent with service experience cited above which showed failures in the presence of notches and H O environment.
2 O
17 O
C-21
~.. -..
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
i O EXAMINATION OF INSTALLED BOLTING DURING SITE VISIT On May 4 the ANPP site was visited tc examine the installations containing bolting in question. There were some surprising features not apparent from the various reports. Some of these features are cited as " bullet" iteme with fur-ther expansion, In excess of 75 percent of the bolting under question is installed e
but is not expected to be used. This was done in anticipation of pipe whip restraints in many more locations than will actually be used. Therefore, f ailures of any of these bolts are of no consequence.
The major use of the remaining bolting is to attach pipe whip e
restraints to the wall adjtcent to the pipes in question. Again, these are never load bearing except in the remote case of a major pipe break, either double-ended or utal split. We observed such installations on shutdown cooling lines, blowdown lines, and the safety injection system. These restraints may also go on steam lines and feedwater lines, or if not, certainly another type of restraint V
will be employed.
The third, and quite limited application, is in attaching vertical e
columns to adjacent walls. Apparently the bolting is loaded when the columns are subjected to overturning moments. The primary loads on the columns are compressive when used as floor braces. In other applications there is an elaborate trusswork built up to protect against pipe whip in steam lines. In thi; instance the bolting appears to provide some load bearing function in the event of a pipe
- break, The fourth and distinctly different bolt application is to hold down e
segments of the polar crane track support structure. Segments of th,e beam structure rest on large embedded brackets with braces between segment and containment wall. Vertical bolts provide a hold down function. The bolts are there to handle vertical uplift and 18 m
C-22
.~
. DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 i
O horizontal' overturning forces.in the event of a seismic event and to retain the beam segments in their specific locations. Uplift forces-are not expected to be large.
Based on the lack of information concerning properties of the hold down bolts on the Unit 1 and 2 polar cranes, we suggest that a sequential sampling I
threshold be applied to measure the hardness of installed bolts. ' Typically, a l
6 percent sample should detect statistical outliers. If none exist, no further sampling would be required. The interest would be in bolts above RC'41 in hardness. If outliers exist, the sample size should be increased.
It is of interest that most bolts, where installations exist, bear loads only during 0 or faulted conditions. This means they need not be torqued beyond nominal values capable of retaining bolt (and nut) in place. Since stress corrosion is a time, stress, environment phenomenon, dropping stress levels on higher strength bolts should virtually eliminate'failur in the range e
i RC 40 to 42.
i One final item was not checked out. The Equotip hardness tester deter-mines Rockwell C by inference. The correlation used by Bechtel may be conser-V vative in that it is about lo higher than the " official" correlation curve.
This corresponds to about 2 points Rockwell C.
The 8echtel curves would pre-i dict RC 41 while the " official" would be RC 39. Thus the number of bolts in the critical high hardness range may be substantially less than reported here.
l l
4 4
o C-23 i
i
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 r '\\
CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA We have developed our accept / reject criteria for bolting throughout this report. In this section the various criteria are pulled together to permit an assessment of the various factors. In addition, the similar factors cited in the Teledyne ANPP reportI4) are included to permit a comparison. These cri-teria are presented in a tabular format (Table 2) to simplify the comparison.
TABLE 2.
A Comparison of Conditional Acceptance Criteria Contained in This Report and TES TR-5534-1 Factor BNW Position TES Position Bolting hardness is We agree with TES than an acceptable approach is to below standard levels derate on basis of assumed tensile strength.
Bolting hardness is above standard levels RC 39 to 41 We and TES both accept for continued service.
RC >41 Generally unacceptable; Conditionally accept-O however, we find selec-able as bases of tive derating of each selective derating of installation acceptable, loads to RC-43.
providing the remaining bolts have acceptable hardness levels. Some credit possible in range RC 42 to 44, none above RC 45 for individual bolts.
Correction factor for If validated, we feel TES cites and accepts.
"high" reading of credit should be take1; Equotip e.g., RC 41 may become RC 39 to 40.
Reduce torque loads We agree with TES that this is a viable approach; for long-term to however, we have reservations concerning full credit reduce IGSCC because of residual stresses and stress concentra-tion factors.
C-24
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 iV TABLE 2.
(continued)
Factor BNW Position TES Position Systems approach to We suggest a step-by-None advanced by TES.
acceptance / rejection /
step approach consider-derating ing each installation rather than individual bolts as noted in Figure 3.
e Correct Equotip i
values to lower RC.
e Assess installations noted in Figure 3.
Give various weight-ing factors to those with 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 bolts exceeding standards, e Derate bolts in low hardness range using TES criterion.
e Consider partial derating of bolts with corrected RC values in range of O
39 to 41.
e Derate all bolts with corrected RC values
>41 to zero stress in most instances. Con-sider partial credit on case-by-case basis. Zero credit if RC >45.
e Use weighting factors to evaluate each questionable instal-lation, providing the installation is to be used.
e Limit repair to those installations to be used and only if their derated instal-lation capacity is below the anticipated faulted (D) load.
21 l Q
! \\s-)
C-25
i DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 v
QUALITY ASSURANCE It is unfortunate that bolting (or similar items) usually are decermined to be out of specification during installation when f ailures occur rather than when received. In some instances detection may be delayed until failures occur during operation. In either case there may be a large number of bolts installed, and these bolts may be relatively inaccessible and replaceable only with great difficulty. This is expensive in time and plant outage. It also points up weaknesses in the quality assurance organization.
A possibility to minimize future incidents at ANPP and other construction sites would be to use a statistical sampling scheme. A sequential sampling with a 6 percent sample should be suf ficient to detect obvious cases of out-of-spec material such as exist at ANPP.
A simple device such as the Equotip tester could test 10-20 bolts in a few minutes without special preparation. If bolt hardness values were acceptable, the batch could be accepted. If not acceptable, further analyses could be made to provide cheap insurance against the situation that presently exists at AKPP.
A quality assurance or quality control organization could handle such testing.
O C-26
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 REFERENCES 1.
Teledyne Engineering Services. 1980. Investigation of Preservice Failure of Midland RPV Anchor Studs. TR-3887-1, Rev.1 Teledyne Engineering Services, Waltham, Massachusetts.
2.
Teledyne Engineering Services. 1980. Investigation of Preservice Failure of Midland RPV Anchor Studs. TR-3887-1, Addendum 1, Teledyne Engineering Services, Waltham, Massachusetts.
3.
Teledyne Engineering Services. 1980. Acceptability for Service of Mid-land RPV Anchor Studs. TR-3887-2, Rev.1, Teledyne Engineering Services, Waltham, Massachusetts.
4.
Teledyne Engineering Services. September 1982. Acceptability for Service of Low Alloy. Quenched and Tempered Support Studs and Bolts. TR-5534-1 Teledyne Engineering Services, Waltham, Massachusetts.
5.
Carter, C. S.
" Stress-Corrosion Cracking and Corrosion f atigue of Medium-Strength and High-Strength Steals." ARPA Handbook. Boeing Company Airplane Company, Seattle, Washington.
6.
Speidel, M. O. and P. M. Fourt. 1973. " Stress Corrosion Cracking and Hydrogen Embrittlement in Industrial Circumstances-Session Evaluation."
m Stress Corrosion Cracking and Hydrogen Embrittlement of Iron Base Allg.
Unieux-Firminy, France.
7.
Okada, H.
1973. " Stress Corrosion Cracking and Hydrogen Cracking of Structural Steels." Stress Corrosion Cracking and Hydrogen Embrittlement of Iron Base Alloys. Unieux-Firminy, France..
8.
Hetenyi, M.
1950. Handbook of Experimental Stress Analysis. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, New York, 23 p
V C-27
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 APPENDIX D The purpose of appendix D is to provide permanent record of the extensive EQUOTIP hardness measurements taken for all containment building ASTM A354 Grade BD embedded studs.
(See figures D-1 through D-19.)
Figures D-1 through D-18 are diagrams which uniquely identify and label all embeds shown on the Engineering Design Drawings which utilize ASTM A354 Grade BD studs. There are 312 embed assemblies, containing a total of 2044 studs, in each unit. Of these, 61 embeds (434 studs) are utilized for pipe whip restraints (PWR) and jet impingement barriers (JIB).
Figure D-19 is a means of locating an embed of a particular identification number:
it directs the user to the appropriate figure D-1 through D-18 upon which that embed number is shown.
Pages D-2 through D-34 tabulate the EQUOTIP L-value for every embedded stud. They also identify which studs are utilized for PWR's and JIB's and which studs are inaccessible for hardness testing.
This appendix, used in conjunction with the acceptance criteria established in the Engineering Evaluation of Nonconforming ASTM A354 Grade BD Studs and Bolts, provides the user with information required to determine embed capacities for design.
a mU 1
D-1
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
(-k EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER DET5.
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
/
578 57 7 57 7 574 594 60' 583 512 USED FoR l
E.
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&of GIT btB
&ZZ 616 PW d. No; 904 3
/
607
&*3 599 602 510 b'&
(* I 2 607 USE D foR 2
f 2
516 664
& ll 622 hos 606 626 4t/
P.W. R. No 90b 3
/
T12 688 567 ST37 593 516 USED FOR.
3 1
2 5&1 sfo svo S6 5 74 aol e.W. R. u. 902.
3 l
SBC STI S?Z 570 SC8 S8l USED for k
l 2
561 54 o
$6'l Shi S14 Sit P W.R. No.90I 3
l Su u S78 Ss 0 522 58:
5 70 C71 S70 5
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
(
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFicATIOAl REMARKS NUMBER DETL.
No.
A B
C D
E F
G H
(o 3 5s7 s&& sm 610 usGO ron I
517 s
II 2
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I 607 Goz
$97 6/7 ff/
E97 UsED Fos.
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER DETL.
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
l GoS fo IS coo co la te loco Gok to g 3 G I4 USED VOR Al 9
2
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< 666 bolo 691 frof 6 06 P.W. R. Ho 807 3
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 m)
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, EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFicATION REMARKS NUMBER DCTI..
Not A
B C
D E
F G
H I
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boo 596 Sf6 S11 576 tot 1 r,w.g. Ho. ot2.
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1 594 685 Ses S95 Gof 601 39 4
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D-5
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
EOLiOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFICATIOAl REMARKS NUMBER Dt.TL. No.
A B
C D
E F
G H
I SSI S*14 581 s16 584 GTO USED FOR AI 4
2 f7(o S&te 65 66(e 61/
6bG Rw.n. N:; 847 3
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4 Q
51'l 514 Sie
/>tf S13 691 Fw.n He.BG7 1
3
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2 518 51'l 561 565 510 ' S13 RW. A. No. 069 3
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2 595 S44 San 5sG SM Sac.
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3 i
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2 574 S11 403 C11 S10 Git 3
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2 614 So&
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D-6
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
N/
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDEhlTIFicATIOAl REMARKS l
NUMBER MTi..
N O.
A B
C D
E F
G H
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2 57o say Sja gge Seo Syr
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2 59 5 606 S8'l S96 593 sel 3
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D-7
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
,7
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d EOUOTip HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDEAITIFicATION REMARKS NUMBER MTi..
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
/
579 561 573 5 71 6-,o 569 5 67 Slo f" USED oN (o s IL 2
4/9 634 & $4 bid 62/o 62/
621 624 n5 C 1cs] Sto 3
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D-8
l DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 f-3
(
)
l w)
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDEh/TIFICATIOAl REMARKS NUMBER DETi..
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
l footo 906 bolo 62.9 42fs
&BG G3G 404 USED O_N
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
,c\\
EOLIOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFicATION REMARKS NUMBER DCTI.. No.
A B
C D
E F'
G H
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 l(
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-V4LUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFicATION REMARKS NUMBER MTE..
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
l Oto 604 Oc5 Gol Oz1 513 98
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DEH CIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 l
g~-
O EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNff BOLT IDENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER MTL.
N O.
A B
C O' E F
G H
I Gots 003 wt 597 sat s' $
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D-12
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT No. 81-14 O,
, EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDEAITIFicATIOAI REMARKS NUMBER DETi..
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
I GiB GL1 GL7 GLL G I4 42/
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER MTL.
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
I l2I I
2 Gol 6?D 406 G09 401 611 3
1 122 1
2 513 bos 62o 0 01 bos sto J
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l D-14
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 7\\v)
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFicATION REMARKS NUMBER MTL.
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H-I Gos cooo CBG 6 04 co n s C'9 I3l I
2 6/6 Sfo 451 599 600 597
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D-15
.I
i DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFICATION REMARKG NUMBER DETL.
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G H
I G06 04l 930 to45 bst g 19 0 29 uti 141 2.
2 659 bl7 630 425 SW 4x4 SV/
632.
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D-16
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
)
r3O
, EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFICATIOAl REMARKS NUMBER MTi..
N o.
A B
C D
E F
G lH I
Sto6 S61 S9L S9/
Sf3 5 70
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 0
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER MTL.
No.
A B
C' O
E f~
G H
I S15 56 9 S19 581 6&z S75 16l j
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l l
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 l
l V
l EOUOTIP HARCNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT B LT IDENTIFICATION REMARK 5 NUMBER MTL.
No.
A B
C D
E F~
G H
I 572 593 uos 590 S47 s8co lTl 4
2 Gil bl4 402 408 bog boo 3
Got is/0 Sols
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uoG 422 001 otJs 517
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
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EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER MTI..
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D-20
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 7_-
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EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT fDENTIF'ICATION REMARKS NUMBER MTI..
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT SOLT.*MNTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER MTi N o.
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
/3 (v)
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFicATIOM REMARKS NUMBER MTl-.
No, A
B C
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F G
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
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D-24
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
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EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENYlFICATION REMARKS NUMBER Dt.Ti..
NO A
B C
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
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, EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTiricATION REMARKS NUMBER DCTI NCL A
B C
D E
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D-26
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT No. 81-14
(~
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, EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFicATION REMARKS NUMBER MTI..
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A B
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 I
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, EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFlCATION REMARKS NUMBER MTI NCL A
B C
D E
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D-28
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
%J EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT lOENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER ttTL.
14 0.
A B
C D
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT SC4.T SOCNTHricATION REMARKS NUMBER DETi..
N O.
A' B
C D
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D-30
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
EOLJOTIP HARDNESS L-V4LUE PLATE UNIT
.SOLT IDENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER DETE..
N o.
A B
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G H
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
i EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFICATION G REMARKS NUMBER DETL. Na A
B C
D E
F G
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D-32
DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT ICdNTIFicATION REMARKS NUMBER DETL. Na A
B C
D E
F G
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14 O
EOUOTIP HARDNESS L-VALUE PLATE UNIT BOLT IDENTIFICATION REMARKS NUMBER MTi Iw1 A
B lC D
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DEFICIENCY EVALUATION REPORT NO. 81-14
-s FIGURES Figure D-1 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-300 D-2 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-301 D-3 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-378 D-4 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-405 D-5 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-405 D-6 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No.13-C-ZCS-406 D-7 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-406 D-8 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-407 D-9 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-408 D-10 Embed Location Diagram Refer 2nce Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-409
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D-11 Eated Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-410 D-12 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-410 D-13 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-411 D-14 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-411 D-15 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-412 D-16 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-412 D-17 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No. 13-C-ZCS-413 D-18 Embed Location Diagram Reference Drawing No.13-C-ZCS-414 D-19 Key to Locate Embeds on Figures D-1 through D-18 l
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KEY TO LOCATE EMBEDS ON FIGURES D-1 THROUGH D-18 EMOEDS NO.
EMOEDS NO.
EMOEDS NO.
ERA 0EDS NO.
001-800 100 100 200 200 300 320 00'S X
7 5
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EXARIPLE: EllBED SO'S X
18 18 18 18 2
NO. 289 CAN BE 5
9 2
2 2
2 2
LOCATED 0N "8""'"^#
INSTRUCTIONS:
LOCATE EMBE0 NO. IN APPROPRIATE " HUNDREDS" COLUMN; LOCATE EMBED NO. IN APPROPRIATE " TENS" R0W:
TYMCAL "0NES" NURIBERING BLOCK l
LOCATE EMBED NO. IN APPROPRIATE "0NES" POSITION WITHIN 0
1 2
3 4
THE BLOCK, ENTRY IS THE FIGURE NUMBER IN APPENDlX D.
5 6
7 8
s FIGURE D-19
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