ML20028F986
| ML20028F986 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1983 |
| From: | Bouchey G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| GO3-83-105, NUDOCS 8302070276 | |
| Download: ML20028F986 (99) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:Washington Public Power Supply System Box 1223 Elma, Washington 98541 (206)482-4428 Docket No. 50-508 February 3, 1983 G03-83-105 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. G. W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT 3 RESPONSES TO NRC ACCEPTANCE REVIEW QUESTIONS (January 1983)
References:
a) Letter D. G. Eisenhut to R. L. Ferguson, dated 08/20/82 b) Letter #G03-82-830 G. D. Bouchey to H. R. Denton, date 08/20/82 c) Letter #G03-82-1085 G. D. Bouchey to J. D. Kerrigan, dated 11/22/82 Reference a) transmitted a set of questions generated during the NRC's acceptance review of the WNP-3 Operating License Application (reference b). Reference c) represents the initial Supply System response to these questions and provided a schedule for those cases where our evaluations were not yet complete. This letter transmits those responses scheduled to be provided for NRC re-view in January. In those cases where it is considered necessary or desir-able to amend the FSAR due to our responses, we have provided marked up FSAR pages which show the changes which will be included in a subsequent amendment. 8302070276 830203 l PDR ADOCK 05000508 A PDR k
/
Mr. G. W. Knighton Page 2 February 3, 1983 G03-83-105 RESPONSES TO NRC ACCEPTANCE REVIEW QUESTIONS If you require additional information or clarification, the Supply System point of contact for this matter is Mr. K. W. Cook, Licensing Project Man-ager (206/482-4428 ext. 5436). Sincerely, / M eo< G. D. Bouchey, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Programs AJM/ss Attachments: 1. NRC Question 241.6
- 2. NRC Question 270.2
- 3. NRC Question 281.4
- 4. NRC Question 410.2
- 5. NRC Question 410.3
- 6. NRC question 410.4
/. NRC Question 410.12
- 8. NRC Question 421.1
- 9. Request for Additional Information enclosure 4 (item 1)
Environmental Qualification of Safety Related Equipment cc: D. J. Chin - Ebasco NYO N. S. Reynolds - D&L L. F. Beckett - NPI J. A. Adams - NESCO D. Smithpeter - BPA A. Vietti - NRC Ehasco - Elma WNP-J files - Richland AA Tuzes - Comb. Engr. I
Q . .
. 3 Attachment 1 Question No.
- 241.6 (2.5.5.1)
Your bases for selecting the critical cross sections for slope stability analyses of natural as well as man-made slopes are not adequately justi-fled. Provide sufficient details of your reasons for the selection of crit-ical slopes for the staff's independent evaluation.
Response
As committed to in letter G03-82-1085, dated October 22, 1982, please find attached the revised FSAR Subsection 2.5.5 which verifies the results of the stability analysis for natural and man-made slopes using the 14.0 ksf common mat loading. The results indicate that the natural and man-made slopes are stable under both static and dynamic loading conditions. The FSAR will be revised as shown to reflect this response. i s t 4 f 1 i t
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i i I 0836W-1 WNP-3 FSAR NNl b 2.5.5 STABILITY OF SLOPES ~. The plant grade is established at EL. 310 through a cut and fill operation; see Subsection 2.5.4.5.1. As shown in the excavation profiles presented on Figure 2.5-97, there are natural slopes in the north-south direction and man made excavation slopes in the east-west direction. To analyze the static and dynamic stability of natural and man made slopes, the following procedure was utilized: a) Select representative slope at the plant location. 4
\ b) Select applicable material properties.
%e c) Examine available analytical methods f or static stability and select eene.
methog d) Analyze the static stability of all slopes by the selected method and identify the slope 5with smallest factor of safety.
-e.) L '
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'_:1 j q . :1__. 0 h.e eM Examine available methods f or dynamic stability and select ame methods.
hA4 Analy:e the dynamic stability of all slopes by the selected method and identif y slope 5with smallest f actor of saf ety. 44 8- _1j M.,. J;r_- - ' : : - - Lil' y d - L .-1_,_ '
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2.5.5.1 Slope Characteristics e 2.5.5.1.1 Selection of Slopes Natural Slopes - To select profiles f or natural slope stability analysis, the creas north and south of plant location below the plant grade (EL. 390) were considered. Below this elevation, materials generally underlying the slopes to y the north are Helm Creek Deposit, residual soil, weathered sandstone and fresh sandstone. Generally, the materials underlying the slopes to the south are residual soil, weathered sandstone and fresh sandstone. On both slopes the
, thickness of residual soil below EL. 390 is relatively small (( 10 f t) and would not affect the Category I structures; theref ore, it is not considered in stability analysis. The Helm Creek Deposit was more than 100 f t. away from the L. edge of the excavation, and its dynanic properties were not ascertained /or' ru 1_
m 7.- 7 e ., . _ _- consideredikanalysis. Thus, the slopes y selected for stability analysis were those bounded by the interpreted surf ace of the weathered sandstone. This surf ace, interpreted f rom the borings at the plant location, is shown on Figure 2.5-100 Contours on Figure 2.5-100 refer to l1 2.5-175 Amendment No. 1, (10/82) l . _ . . ,. .
i =
.U836W-2 wyp.3 g,ap.6 FSAR p alsvations at the top of weathered sandstone. Profiles were chosen for stability analysis in the WNP-3 and WNP-5 areas, based S2 the proximity to the q Category. I structures and the steepness of the weathered sandstone surf ace.
Tha slope of the weathered sandstone surf ace was calculated to vary between 180 and 430 Based on these values, f our profiles, designated as Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A, were selected f or analysis. Subsurf ace conditions along Profiles 1, 2, 3, and 3A are shown on Figure 2.5-98 and 2-5-99. This inf ormation is intepreted f rom boring and trench logs ( Appendix 2.5A), material index properties ( Appendix 2.5A and 2.5B), grophysical measurements (Subsection 2.5.1.2.11 and Appendix 2.5D), groundwater level measurements (Appendix 2.5A), surf ace geolc; ic mapping (Subsection 2.5.1.2), and the three subsurf ace profiles DD, EE, and FF (shown on Figures 2.5-71, 2.5-73 and 2.5.74 respectively). Properties of the underlying materials are discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.1.2. As described in Subsection 2.5.1.2, the sandstone under the plant location is basically l1 massive without continuous joints, seams, or layers of weaker material. Thsrefore, the only boundaries identified on the profiles are those between ths underlying materials: Helm Creek Deposit, residual soil, weathered candstone, and f resh sandstone. Man-Made Slopes - Figure 2.5-117 shows the extent of man made cuts around the < southwest and southeast quadrants of the plant island which were required to establish grade at EL. +390.0 MSL. As di-cussed in detail in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.2, the final cut lines extend w :11 into sandstone. Only in three relatively small areas, residual soils un ferlie the final slope cut lines. e These areas are south and west of Unit 5 :nd east of Unit 3 as shown on Figure 2.5-1 17. A t.otal of five profiles were ivestigated in tw > of these three b-creas of residual . oil cover. Profiles and 5A were taken through the slope ndareshownonFigures@.5-ll2)and(2.5-11A Profiles 7, 7a
*^
east end 7bofwere Unitta[ ken through the slope sc.tth of Unit 5 where the extent of residual soil cover is deepest and arr shown n Figures 2.5-196, 2.5-l'96 and 2.5-196. Profile locations are shown on Figure 2.5-97. W H+
'd
- 24-m Subsection 2.5.5.2.3 discusses in detail the stability analysis of the slopes on the five profiles discussed above. The discussion includes a description of subsurf ace conditions f or the profiles, soil strength properties ass 1 8ned to the residual soigor analysis purposes and the details of the analyses pegf ormed f or stotim ~-E ___ i M ; a i dynamic conditions.
/F.
2.5.5.1.2 Properties of Matericla Underlying the Slopen 2.5.5.1.2.1 General For defining engineering properties, f our underlying materials are recognized in the Astoria formation: residual soil, weathered sandstone, fresh sandston*e end tuff. Differentiation between residual soil and weathered sandstone is bzsed on coreability and standard penetration resistance, N = 100 bl/f t. The cetual boundary between residual soil and weathered sandstone is gradational, and changes in index properties and strength are gradual. Therefore, this boundary does not constitute a potential slip surf ace. Weathered sandstone . and fresh sandstone are differentiated on the basis of color enange. Although this change occurs along a sharp boundar, there is no significant change in
] f strength or other material properties across the houndary. Therefore, this boundary does not constitute a potential slip surr ace. Tuf f beds are dif f erentiated on the basis of color, hardness and miuralogy. The strength 2.5 M 6' Amendment No. 1, (10/82)
'0836W 5 WNP-3 % l, [,
FSAR 3 selection of soil strength parameter f or use in the analysis of the man made slopes is discussed in detail in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.3. The values of elastic I are selected based on laboratory test modulus Ei and Poisson's ratio results presented in Appendix 2.5B and sum 2arized in Table 2.5-14 Ths cyclic strength is graphically expressed in terms of the variation of cyclic strength versus the number of cycles to cause 5 x 10-2 strain. This curve is btsed on laboratory results discussed in Appendix 2.5C and presented on Figures 2.5-101, 2.5-102, and 2. 5-103. Values of dynamic shear modulus are graphically expressed in terms of the variation of shear modulus versus shear strain. This curve is based on field measurements and laboratory test results discussed in i Appendix 2.5C and presented on Figure 2.5-104 The damping ratio A versus chear strain curve based on laboratory test results described in Appendix 2.5C in presented on Figure 2.5C 13. 2.5.5.2.1.2 Weathered Sandstone The properties of weathered sandstone were selected based on field and laboratory tests. A total of 40 index property tests were made on specimens f rom tha plant area. The results of these tests are discussed in Appendix 2.5B and presented in Tables 2.5B-1 and 2.5B-2. Based on these results, a saturated . unit weight of 130 lb/f t3 and a submerged unit weight of 68 lb/f t3 were eclected. m Static strength parameters were selected based on results of 13 uniaxial compression tests on saturated specimens taken from borings in the plant area. These results are discussed in Appendix 2.5B and presented in Table 2.5B.2. Based on these results, the ultimate strength of the weathered sandstone varies 2 and 115 betwgen325lb/in.2 and 800 lb/in.2 (i.e. , between 46.8 k/f t The grain size, nature of cementation, and the f racture pattern in k/f t ). uniaxial compression tests indicate that the weathered sandstone is a C-9 material. If 0 = 0, the above range of ultimate strengths could be interpreted to correspond to cohesion ranging between C - 23.4 k/f t2 to 57.6 k/f t2 Fracture planes in the uniaxial compression tests indicate inclinations between 550 and 700 to the horizontal. Based on these inclinations, the sandstone could be interpreted to have an angle of internal friction 9 ranging between approx. 200 and 500 This range of angle of internal f riction 0 is in agreement with published data f or sandstone (e.g., 2 Stagg and Zienkiewicz 1969). Based un these values, a cohesion of 23 k/f t cnd an angle of internal f riction 9 = 4WIere selected f or analysis oL g the natural slopes. Analysis of man-madplopes that could have intluence on the Category I structures were perf gormed using i--_ Z cA =:r - a.ef cohesion equal to 23 k/f t 2 and internal friction 6 - 00 All of the above values are conservative since both the C and 9 selected represent the minimum values interpreted f rom the test data. In addition, the range of the tested strength values is very similar to the strength range f or f resh sandstone. Dynamic properties of the weathered sandstone were selected based on field chear-wave velocity measurements. Below EL. 390 (i.e., below the plant grade) the weathered sandstone has a shear-wave velocity greater than 3000 f t/sec; see
- Appendix 2.5D. Above EL. 390 the shear-wave velocity varies between 3000 f t/sec l end 2300 f t/sec. Hence, below EL. 390 the shear modulus, damping ratio, and L variation of shear modulus and damping ratio with shear strain are considered to be such as to produce no site-dependent effects. Above EL. 390 the shear moduli 2.5-179 Amendment No.
1,'(10/82)
- 003W-6 WNP-3 Q)Al.6 FSAR j e .,
cre selected based on field shear-wave velocity measurements. The variation in shear modulus and damping ratio with. strain is conservatively considered to - J be similar to that f or re sidual soil. 2.5.5.2.1.3 Fresh Sandstone The properties of fresh sandstone were selected based on field measurements cnd laboratory test s. A total of 49 index groperty tests were made on cpecimens of fresh sandstone from the plant area. The results of these tests are discusred in Appendix 2.5B and presented in Tables 2.53-3 and 2.53-4. Based on these results, a saturated unit weight of 130 lb/f t3 and a
- submerged unit weight of 68 lb/f t3 were selectea. j Static strength parameters were selected based on results of 22 uniaxial compression tests on saturated specimens taken from the plant area. These results are presented in Appendix 2.5B and summarized in Table 2.5B-4. The ultimate strength given in Table 2.5B-4 vary in the range 300 lb/in.2 to 800 lb/in. 2 This range is very similar to the strength range f or weathered candstone although the average value is somewhat highar. The grain size and fracture pattern are also similar to those f or weathered sandstone.
Therefore, the same shear parameters were selected for fresh sands. cone as for the weathered sandstone (i.e. , C = 23 k/f t2, 0 = # Tor natural
^ " ' ' - '
olope s and -^ man-made slopes)hg Dynamic properties were selected based on field shear-wave velocity l measurements and laboratory tests. .
) l l
The shear-wave velocity measurements in borings in the Category I structure crea are discussed in Appendix 2.5D and su=marized on Figure 2.5D-9 and l 2.5D-10. The maximum shear modulus at dif ferent levels was calculated from l the corresponding shear-vave velocitie s. The damping ratio and variation of . chear modulus and damping ratio with strain are based on informatien presented in Appendix 2.5C. 2.5.5.2.1.4 Tuff Material properties for tuff are selected based on field measurements and laboratory tests. A total of eight index property tests and three strength tests were made on specimens taken from borings in the plant area. The results of these tests are discussed in Appendix 2.58 and presented in Table 2.5B-5. These results indicate that the engineering properties of the tuff do not dif fer significantly from those of the sandstone. Therefore, at any given lecation, the same material properties were assigned to the tuff as the cdjacent sandstone. 2.5.5.2.1.5 Helm Creek Deposit Because the Helm Creek Deposit is not considered in the analysis, no values are required. 2.5.5.2.2 Natural Slope Stability Analysis , 2.5.5.2.2.1 General Considerations Profiles 1, 2, 3, and 3A were analyzed. The analyses were based on the following considerations: , 2.5-180
0836W-7 WNP-3 g g l . (,,
'
- FSAR 5 1
^
. a) The slope geometry was defined based on the information derived from l c adjacent borings, eurface geologic mapping, and grading '
and excavation ' plans. - j b) Properties of underlying materials are selected based on field and laboratory tests (see Subsection 2.5.5.2.1). c) T% groundwater elevation is selected as EL. 320. This elevations g correIs'pondQo the normal groundwater eleva,tiopfter-th'e"c"oEpYetion of excavation anFinqllation of d.gp4aageFsystems. This is conservative because a higher eleEtio:t,T"o#guld result in lower driving forces or
~
moments. Because46Eislopes ars%eare.the top of the ridge and surf ace water,would"67 handled by drainage syste'mDgroundwat.gr
- flow through t.he" profiles is considered negligible. 1 L
d) of slope adjacent to the Category 1 strm_e"m a hon mar, will be su , o two - . a norizontal force of 160 k due to Joseri" L --> at-rest earth - 1 en EL. 390 (plant grade) and EL. 326 (fou a mat level), and a YePeteeLhtdQt]11gf t.) due to the
- e ght of the Category I structures.
o e) The weight of shearing resistance of the Helm Creek Deposit is not considered. 2.5.5.2.2.2 Static Stability Analysis r-
.5.2.2.2.1 Modified Swedish Method M+
- s. r The s tic stability of Profiles 1, 2, 3, and 3A was analyzed using thg modifie wedish Method, Finite Slice Procedure, suggested by the Uf. Army Corps of ineers (EM 1110-2-1902, April 1970) . An example of thh use of the procedure 1:2 esented on Figure 2.5-105 for Profiln 1. Figured.5-105 shows the slip surfac nalyzed, the slices, materia) properties usfe'd, forces determined, and th. actor of safety obtained. A total [15 slip surfaces was analyzed for Pro e 1, and three each for Profil , 3, and 3A. Figure faces analyzed for Profil , and Figure 2.5-107
-) p 2.5,.106 shows the. slip , and 3A., The minimum shows the slip surfaces an ' zed for Profiles 2, factors of safety obtained fo ach profile ar.' summarized below:
o Minimum Static Profile Factor of Safety 1 10 ( 13 l 3 0, 3A The above table sh that the smallest factors of safety the modified j -106 and Swedish Method obtained in Profile 1, 3 and 3A. Figures 2.5-107 indi e that the distance from the excavation for the Catqgory I structure n a common mat to the top of the slope is smallest in th case of f, ~ Profil , and the slip surf ace with the smallest factor of safety ici rofile 1e ra the largest area under the Category I structures on a common ma L' erefore, Profile 1 was selected for further analyses. l
~
. ~2.5'-181
~
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' ' GLAsil.&
0 l Ir.s ert 1 c) The f actors of safety are determined using two dif ferent groundwater conditions. Elevation 310 is selected since it corresponds to the 1 normal groundwater elevation following completion of the drainage a systems. In addition, the stability of the natural slopes sea checked usingfa groundwater elevation of 365. This elevation corresponds to the maximum hydrostatic pressure design value selected for design of the RAB-3. Because the slopes are near the top of the ridge and surface water is handled by drainage systems, groundwater flow through the p'rofiles is considered negligible. Insert 2 d) Areas of slope adjacent to the Category I structures on a common mat are subjected to a vertical force (14 k/lin f t.) due to the weight of the Category I structure. Areas of slope adjacent to the turbine building are subjected to a vertics1 force of 6.4 k/lin ft. due to N the weight of the 99dbine and pedestal, and 2.6 k/lin ft. around the remainder of the turbine building. . 9
hl
- Insert 3 2.5.5.2.2.2.1 Simplified Eishop Mathod The static stability of Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A vere analy=ed using a compute: program which employs the Simplified Bishop Method of Slices (Whitman and Bailey,1967) slip circle enalysis. Figure 2.5-105 -
illustrates the use of this procedure. The Simplified Bishop computer program is designed to perform stability analyses of arbitrary slopes by the method of slices. The failure sur-faces are assumed to be arcs of circles. Thia computer program locates the radius and center having the minimum factor of safety by starting c t a specified trial center and using a random search technique. Figures 2.5-107, 2.5-108, 2.5-109 and 2.5-110 show representative slip - surfaces analyzed, material properties used and factors of safety obtaire for Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A. The minimum allowable factor of safety will be 1.5 for static analysis. The minimum factors of safety are sum =arized below: Profile Minimum Static Factor of Safen GkT +320 GWT +365 1 3.4 3.3 2 11.6 13.9 3 4.0 3.9 3A 5.8 5.5 The above table shows that the smallest factor of safety is obtained for Profile 1.
. , , l
. . 1 0'83 6W-8 l
" -3 FSAR sul.G
. .2.2.2.2 I. owe's and Taylor's Methods f ~
-)
The modif1,. ' Swedish Method suggested by the Corps of Eng,i,pe .s (1970) consid.cs that he direction of forces between the stices remains constant ' throughou: the fore nolygon. To ascertain the ect of change in the directic of these force the slip surfa ith the smallest f actor of safety in Profile 1 was analyzed us - me proposed by Iowe (1967) in which the forces ween the slices are e ed to be in the same direction as the average che-d. For the si ce analyze , factor of safety showed only an insignif_ it change . instead of 10) . The tas.q,, slip surf ace was also analyzed u;'.ng
- Friction Circle method (Taylor 19 e analysis gave a somewhat -
r factor of safety (9.2 instead of 10) but does itgroduce a i' sign cant change in the results. The procedure utilized in love hod Taylor's method is shown on Figure 2.5--108. A 2.5.5.2.2.2. Wedge Method 2. The ste ,ility of Profile 1 was analyzed. For this purpose wedges bound dg the surf ace of the weathered sandstone, the excavation surface an p anar slip su # ace were considered. Three planar slip surf ace selected based
- y4 on proxi tity to the Category I structures on a co 00, 60 and 120 mat wf th inclinations of
--.7 to the horizontal; see F yi_M109. All planar -
surfaces i- ersect the interpreted heted rock surface; thus the wedges defined by hem do not ene - passive resistance on the downslope side. This is cc ervat d" .cause inclusion of a passivr resistance in analysis would iner he f actor of safety. Results of the analysis shows that there . is an ;I factor of safety (FS) with respect to wedge failure (FS = 16.7 to .
}
. L.
' .5.5.2.2.. 4 Sensitivity Analysis To de aine the effect of variation in slope geometry and material properti,e/
/
on stat c ope stability, a sensitivity analysis was made on Profile 1 , Calcul : ions sed on the contours given on Figure 2.5-100 indicate,mt the slope of the san ne surface varies from 190 to 43 . he int ete d slope cf Profile 1 1 O . For sensitivity analysis, Prof was readjusted to a surface s of 450 In the a'ove c analyses, the shearing rength weathered sandstone and fresh sandstone .as defined by a cohesion C = ft2 (minimum laboratory value
. for 9 = 0) and an angle of internal ction = 160 (minimum value l1 based on Tracture pattern). Fo ensitivity ana , a cohesion C = 23 k/ft and a angle interna iction 9 - 00 were sele d.
The prr file was a yzed using both modified Swedish Method an e wedge method. Rest of the analyses are shown on Figure 2.5-110. Base the modified " edish Method, the smallest factor of safety is 6. Based on ved r.alysis, the smallest factor of safety is 8.5; i.e. , in both cases re ; ample factor of safety. Q 2.5.5.2.2.3 Dynamic Slope Stability Analysis 2.5.5.2.2.a.1 General Considerations , v
)
e f y g Profiles 1, 2, 3, and 3A were analyzed. The ~ dynam,tn_mlysee-were- based-om~. the same gera g necuocrtrans as tYeTt'atic analyses (given in Subsection J W except for the magnitude of the lateral force applied to t;he wall ' p 2.5-182
.Cm ndment No. 1, (10/82)
.' o d2d'//.ba Incart 5 10 2.3.5.2.2.3 Dynamic Slope Stability Analysis 2.5.5.2.2.3.1 General Considerations Profiles 1, 2; 3 and 3A vere analyzed. The dynamic analyses were based on the sage general considerations and precedures given in Subsection 2.5.5.2.2.2.1 and 2.5.5.2.2.2.2 except seismic effects were considered by specifying the SSE ground accelerations in the X and Y directions.
Both methods compute seismic forces by multiplying the weight of each slice by the acceleration in each direction and adjusting the driving moments accordingly. In addition, the resisting momente are adjusted for modified effective slice weight due to vertical acceleration. The horizontal acceleration is always considered to contribute to failure. The minimum allowable factor of safety will be 1.10 for dynamic analysis. I
.' l .
G At}l.b . Insert 4 2.5.5.2.2.2.2 Wedge Method ! i The static stability of Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A were also analyzed using i the sliding wedge analysis procedure as recoc: mended by the U.S. Army Corps i l, of Engineers (EM-1110-2-1902, April 1970). Figure 2.5-106 tilustrates the use of this procedure. . Figures 2.5-107, 2.5-108, 2.5-109 and 2.5-110 show representative slip surfaces analyzed, material properties and t factors of safety obtained for Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A. The minimum allowable factor of safety will be 1.5 for static analysis. The minimum factors of safety are summarized below: Profile Minimum Static' Factor of Safety GWT +320 CVr +365 1 7.3 9.1 1 2 10.2 13.3 .' 3 7.2 9.9 3A 7.6 10.9 The above table shows that the smallest factor of safety is obtained for - Profiles 1 and 3. t
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r ..a: t. . ~ . .. .n: .... . . _ _...... .. .. j p..w * ~ . . . . . .
Q } L)f, b ll l Incart 5 (Cont'd) 2.5.5.2.2.3.2 Sieplified Bishop Method The dynamic stability of Profiles 1, 2. 3 and 3A were analyzed using the ettp circle analysis, Simplified Bishop Method of Slices (Whit =an and Bailey, 1967). Figure 2.5 - 105 illustrates the use of this procedure. To each slice, a horizontal seismic force of 0.32 g was applied in a direction out of the slope. In addition, a vertical seismic force of 0.22g was also
\ applied. These seismic forces represent the SSE.
i The minimum allowable factor of safety for dynamic analysis will be 1.1. Figures 2.5-107, 2.5-108, 2.5-109 and 2.5-110 show representative slip surfaces, material properties and factors of safety obtained for Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A. The minimum factors of safety obtained on Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A resulting from the SSE a are summarized below: Profile Minimum Dynamic Factor of Safety CWT + 320 GWT + 365 1 1.4 - 1.4 2 4.3 4.6 3 1.8 1.8 3A 2.0 2.0 The above table shows that the smallest factor of safety is obtained for Profile 1. l t i
0 2 nil. G r 1-I,tggrt 5 (C:nt'd) 2.5.5.2.2.3.3 k' edge Method The dynamic stability of Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A were also analyzed using the sliding wedge analysis procedure as recommended by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (EM-nks-2-1902. April 1970). Figure 2.5-106 illustrates the use of this procedure. To.each wedge, a horizontal seismic force of 0.32g was applied in a direction out of the slope. In addition, a vertical seismic force of 0.22g was also applied. These seismic forces represent the SSE. Figures 2.5-107, 2.5-108, 2.5-109 and 2.5-110 show representative slip surfaces analyzed, material properties and factors of safety obtained for profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A. The minimum allowable factor of safety for dynamic analysis will be 1.1. The minimum factors of safety obtained on Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A resulting from the SSE are summarized below: Profile Minimum Dynamic Factor of Safety GWT + 320 GWT + 365 e 1 2.6 2.8 2 4.2 4.7 3 2.5 2.8 3A 2.6 2.9 The above table shows that the smallest factor of safety is obtained for Profile 3.
, .....,, .s . * *
- 0htll b WNP- 3 0836W-9 FSAR ')
of the excavation. Where applicable, the lateral f orce is a c'yaamit -force AL - generated by the relative motion of thi & >;m & .a ucture s on a common mat. Its magnitude i s n%er uy a soil-structure interaction analysis nio n 3.7.2.4. In the analysis the force is considered to stributed uniformly over the vertical f ace of the excavation. 5.5.2.2.3.2 Modified Newark Method The m On each hodofileproposed by Newark slip surfaces with(1965) was applied the minimum statictofactors Profiles of1, 2, 3, safety and were3A.[ e analyzed. an example, Figure 2.5-111 shows the forces considered and th/
\ procedure us for slip surface on Profile 3A. The force NW is the for applied throug he center of gravity of the slip surf ace. For a m131 um value of N. the f e NW is oriented in a direction perpendicular ( the line joining the center o the slip surf ace with the center of gravi . If the static and dynamic she ng resistance are selected approxima,t,4 y equal, the apgroximate minimum valu f N for a circular slip surf ace ps given by
= (FS - 1) sin g I where:
FS = static f actor of safety p - angle between vertical and N = a coef ficient when multiplie er us to the center of gravity the weight of the sliding mass l1 ( glves the total dynamic f o qd ed to cause movement. C The minimum values of N were calcu d and comp ed with the resultant value o f N f or S SE (N = 0.3 9) . Mini =um lues of N were etermined f or Profiles 2, 3, and 4. The Newmar k me thod , not be directly app d to Profile 1 because of the lateral dynamic force at is a function of N. Minimum Static Pro file Factor of Safety Value otNoef ficient N 10 NA 16 1.8 3 10 3.3 3A 9 2.5 As c3 be seen from the above table, the value of N rcquired to cause movement % i indrofiles 2, 3 and 3A is greater than the value of E for SSE. g$ere is an ample factor of safety. Therefore,
\
.5.2.2.3.3 Pseudo-Static Analysis p The dynamic Lty of Profile s 1, 2, 3 an s also calculated by making pseudo-s tatic analyst
- he s ame urf aces. The procedure utilized is illustrated on Figure 2.5- rqQsurf ace for Profile 3A. The procedure is su y the U.S. Corps 6f4ag1 peers (EM-ll10-2-1902, April 1970). slice the horizontel seismic foiEe%sirupQed in a direction the slope, and the vertical seismic f orce was applied'iD<Me-F mv i 2.5-183 a-aamon e No. 1. (10/82)
0,3,4 l . l. WNP-3
, 0836W-10 FSAR q
d away from the slope. In the ease of Profile 1, a lateral dynamic f orcejr$ 1540 k was applied at mid-teight of the excavation. The magnitude o,fahis ) f orce is obtained from the soil-structure interaction analysis.aMa in Subsection 3.7.2.4. To check the ef fec t of direction of ve,st'fcal seismic force, its direction was reversed in selected cases. T cbtained on slip surfaces hav? ng minimum static fa of 28s,hd'f safety actors of safety on Profiles 1, 2, 3 and 3A are sum =arized below: Profile Factor of Safety 1 3 6 3 4.8 3A 4.4 The o-static analysis indicates that the natural slopes have an ample or of safety. 2.5. '
.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis 8 To study the effec lope geome try and material j pope the slip surf ace f or Profile 1 with
'nimu::. f agtj:wcw'OT safety was ana}yzed f or a readjusted slope surf ace of 450 an t C q rameters C = 23 k/ft and 9 - O by the pseudo-static meth A . s cas, repet a very conservative interpr e tation e geometry and ci sterial propert. Calculations ~~
indica a ) Profile *sloggis%2.0. a
,T efore, the the factor profile hasofansafety ample of f .hetor readjusted of safety. %
=
=
)
~-
l 2.5-184
t . . gg3,7g_g WNP-3 f$1 kdI. b FSAR f $" ! l m v' ' l 2.5.5.2.2.3.) Conclusion y 4 , 1 l The natural slopas are s table under s tatic and dynamic loading. 2.5.5.2.3 Man-Made Slopes 2.5.5.2.3.1 ceneral Figure 2.5-117 is a grading plan that shows details of the man-made cuts and fills necessary to establish plant grade. As can be seen on this figure, ' substantial cutting was required around the southwest quadrant of the plant island and moderate cutting was required around the southeas t quadrant. The head end of a natursi ravine on the south edge of the plant island and between the two areas of cut were filled with compacted Class-B fill material. In general, all cut and fill slopes are three horisontal to one vertical. Berms for maintenance and the control of surface water runof f are located vertically overy 25 f eet on the slopes. The man made cut alopes lie primarily in sendstone and only partially in residual soil. The stability of these slopes where they lie in residual soil has been analyzed under both static and
. dynamic conditions. Details cf dais analysis are presented in enis section. .
2.5.5.2.3.2 Extent of Residual Soil Cover on Cut Slopea ' The various borings that are available around the south side o f the plant island in the area of the cut slopes are shown on Figure 2.5-117. Using the top of sandstone elevations f ound in these borings, the top of rock contours indicated on the figure were established. Superimposing these rock contours
,, on the actual configurations of the final cut slopes permits the delineation of those areas of the slopes which were cut in rock and those that were cut in residual soil. Areas cf residual soil and sandstone cut are indicated on Fi gure 2.5-117. As shown on this figure, over the major part of the man-made cut slopes, all residual soil were removed and the final cut lines extend well into the underlying sandstone. Only in three relatively small areas residual soils underlie the final slope cut lines. These are south and wes t of unit 5 and east of Unit 3. Two of these areas were selected f or detailed s tability entlyses of the residual soil where a total of five profiles (5, 5A, 7, 7A and 7B) were investigated. Profile locations are shown on Figure 2.5-97.
Profiles are discussed in detail in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.4. 2.5.5.2.3.3 Residual Soil Strength Properties S2venteen unconsolidated undrained triaxial tests, six consolidated-undrained triaxial tests with pore pressure measurements and three unconfined compression tests were performed on undisturbed samples of residual soil recovered from various depths within the formation from borings B1 and 53. Figure 2.5-118 shows a composite plot of the Hohr total s tres s circles for those various tests. Also shown on the figure is the high average and low interpretation of the s trength envelope. Safety factors agains t static and drasak
- - - _ _ s lip circ le type f ailures and ;- - ' s tatices liding wedge type failures were determined for each of the five profiles using all enree jnd dyeMu-combinations of soil properties shown on Figure 2.5-116. These s trength ,
_ , parameters based on testing of the actual material are considered to be conservative and most representative of tne residual soils around tne plant
, island area.
l 2.5-185 I l
, o n3 7W-2 WNP-3 G M I.G FSAR #b
~.
To further substantiste and support the test results and s trength interpretations shown .a Figure 2.5-118, a statistical analysis of standard
)
penetration test blow counts in residual soils was made. There cre approximately 35 borings around the plant island and on the slopes to be cut, ; which pass through so=a extent of residual soil. The blow counts within this material were studied statistically to establish 'a mean value and a standard deviation. Based upon 283 standard penetration tests, the mean blow count is 31 blows / foot with a standard deviation of 17 blovs/ foot. The mean minus one standard deviation is 14 blows /f oot which is also equal to the average of the laves t blow counts found in each of the 35 borings. Fourteca blows / foot in a esterial which is basically silty-sand in nature correlates well with the
. rage and low combinations of properties shown on Figure 2.5-118 and further
\ .licates that the lab test results are representative of the residual soils onsite.
2.5.5.2.3.4 Slope Profiles Investigated sis #F Figure 2.5-97 indicates the locations of the five profiles (5, SA, 7, 7A, 7B) on which the stability of the residual. soil was investigated. Profiles 5 and 5ffare shown on Figures 2,5 l' and 2.5 Profiles 7, 7a and 7b ara shown on Fi gure s 2.5-P%, 2.5-Hs and 2. 5-Mt. 113 184 IIS The subsurface conditions along profiles 5 and Sa are based on borings D6, D8 and D9 and subsurf ace profile JJ shown on Figure 2.5-72. The groundwater cchie was located at the top of rock. The subsurf ace conditions along profiles 7, 7a and 7b are based on borings Bil, D10, Dil (all three of which are on profile 7) and on the to p of rock /~~ ) contours shown on Figure 2.5-117. g,,/ The location of the groundwa. I table shown on the profiles is based on readings taken in the borings. Profile 7 shows the thickest extent of residual soil underlying a cut slope. However, this thicknes s reduces quite rapidly towards the west as can be seen from the rock ccntours on Figure 2.5-117 and on profiles 7a and 7b.
. k na 5 - .
S ta t t e an d poemew=o* essa sir.p e trele and analyses were performed on each of the five profiles using the procedures described in Subsec'tions 2.5.5.2.3.5 cnd 2.5.5.2.3.6 and using each of the three combinations of soil properties
" discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.3. The locations of the worst s tatic and na mec Fem _ _ . _::::: circles are shown on the profiles along with a table indicating )
the corresponding minimum factors of safety found. b yndMc
-?- -
- _:_. sliding wedge analyses were per ormed on each profile using the procedures described in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3. and using each of the three l combinations of soil properties discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.3. Du e to l the highly variable thickness of 7b in a short distance, the ;, n,the residual
- :: :22:ic soilwedge sliding between profiles analysis was7,performed 7a and by using the average of the driving forces and the resisting forces found on coch of the three profiles for the wedge under consideration. D1is is considered reasonable and representative for tne unsymmetric three dimensional condition in this localized residual soil that actually exists. The locations of the worst sliding wedges are indicated on profiles 5, Sa and 7 along with a tchle indicating the corresponding minimum factors of safety found. ,
4
? .
l 2.5-186 1 I
- a. . . a ..w .
I
GMI.G
. 0837W-3 8/
C, dynamie (, Profile 7 shows the thickest extent of, residual cnd the lowest saf ety f actors against a 7 >'fsoil underlying a cut slope n.^.k slip circle type f ailure.) For, these reasons,. this pr7 file was ,shbjected ato a 4ynamiS4.sM[y
~
/c'igelftypeanalysisasdescribedinSubsection,72552.J.d .3,'u d theYiverage sp'ipstfeng(h pr,ofertfes de'scrf y ' agWEti'o^n, . / .2.3;f3 The loc'atio[ of
.the worst /< t ren JM
((7.AgerW~~E5-114), fwi th the minimud f actor of sa'f ety,/is shown on' profile 7) Further evidence that the residual soil slopes will remain stable during and s,f ter the SSE can be seen by reviewing the residual strength of the residual soil materials. Figure 2.5-119 is a composite plot showing material shear strength under undrained conditions [( a 1- a3)/2] versus axial strain f or the various unconsolidated undrained triaxial compression tests that were perf orned on the material (see Figures 2.5B-15 through 2.5B-18). These curves generally show a peak strength at small strain levels f ollowed by a subsequent leveling off or decrease in resistance until a more or less constant undrained residual strength is reached. Also shown on this figure is the average static shear stress induced along the slip circle sliding surf ace for profile 7 having the lowest f actor of saf ety under static conditions. (Figure 2.5-Sekg circle "c" + = 260 e = 750 psf ir = sf.). Comparing the induced shear stress against the material residua shear strength indicates that the 1 residual shear strength is higher l than the induced stress with a factor of safety of M . \ ' 2.S. 7 o,7g
~
Therefore, the material has adequate undrained strength to resist sliding
" g during the SSE as shown in previous paragraphs of this section, as well as adequate residual strength to resist sliding f ollowing the seismic event.
s 2.5.5.2.3.5 Static Slip Circle Analysis The static stability of the permanent man made slopes against a slip circle type f ailure was determined using the BenedBASEhi computer program which ' employs the Boeiheedes slip circle method. 1,.phd GW Me.Nd (witman and Suleyy I27tSc 1 s a subsystem of ICES designed to perform stability analyses of arbitrary s ope , od of slices. The f ailure surf aces are assumed to be arcs of circles. This comput/Wocates the radius and center having and using thea minimum random search f actor of safety by startlYg"*Kr. m .mihiedsAgiagater technique. =~ f The static stability analysis was perf ormed on each of the five profiles discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.4 using each of the three sets of residual soil strength parameters discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.3.. 5 men 8;5% Input data to the EtesseWE program included the f ollowing: (a) properties l of the soil, including submerged weights, emap=peemesse, cohesion, angle of internal f riction, etc., (b) water level data; (c) total weight of the overlying mass of soil and/or water [. - The f actor of safety f or the static analyses is defined as the ratio of the _. e eeet of the available shearing f orces on the trial f ailure surface to the nat wuenemenehe driving f orce. The minimum allowable saf ety f actor is 1.5 ! etatic. 2.5-187 . Amendment No. 1, (10/82)
' ~
0837W-4
- WNP-3 2.5-02 FSAR til
, C2 Results[of the static slip circle analysis are shown on Figures 2.5-tat and fnsed pr.5-ll33 ofiles 7,for 7a profiles and 7bg.ind 5 and 5a and on be s w.n<nuiaed Figures
\oe 2.5-bte,Tis 2.5-125 and 2.5 'pE for M
(s ? m ) 2.5.5.2.3.6 c9 n&.e
~
N- , _N Slip Circle Analysis
'"he SJngl.fi-d B. sher Me+ hod (wa mm .a nd hiey, s94.<7)
GC3pungsam was also used f or this analysis. he seismic option of LEASE-1 was used to add in the effects of seismic forces through seismic commands. Dese commands provide for the direct addition of horizontal and vertical seismic forces to each trial circle analysis. he thehorizontal seismic vertical seismic force force was was appliedinina a. irdirection out of t ,e,,,gua., mm applied making the resultant of these forgeJ rom the slope, we conservative adverse earthquake load combinations. FuYYe'rified by reversing the direction of the earthqua. a es on ng results. the failure plane with the minimum factor of safety and A The as thevalues of the acceleration base ground horizontal and of thevertical SSE. seismic coefficients used were taken as the ratio of the _ The factor of safety is defined ZMavailable shearing forces on the trial surf ace to the ne t ---- w ' -"
- driving f orces. We input data was the same as the acceleration of 0.32 g horizontal and 0.22 g vertical due to the SSE applied as a static load.
.p===hsamanume.>- He minimm allowable safety factorsp will be 1.10.
far dynaWc. cInahsis The computer program locates the center and radius of the circle having the n minimum factor of safety by starting at a specified trial center and using a nse r-4 random search technique. } r/ > C s 2.5.5.2.3.$F F h/ndm?c L i i Sliding Wedge Analysis sed 8 esta' safety factors for a pseudo-static sliding wedge type failure were ' ' Manual hed using the Army Corps of Engineers method of planes (Army Co f
? 4110-2-1902, April 1970). He applicability of this type analysis, h ver, is somewhat in doubt since it was derived for . smooth surface having 11 defined interfaces between distinctly dif ent materials. At th physically exist.
lant location a residual soil-sandato neerf ace does not h ocation of a contact surface b een the two materials was therefore based on a rbitrary selection of b count alone; and in reality, the interface is a de, undulating zo of gradual gradation change from weathered rock to highly w thered roc or what is called residual soil. Appendix 2.5B demonntrates ual index property change of the Astoria sandstone formation with p .hile Figure 2.5-100 demonstrates the i rough, undulating nature of th ne whic as been classified as the interpretive transition be n residual soi .d weathered rock.
- With these reservat a in mind, residual soil and A.ithered rock interfaces were selected i properties a e profiles and sliding wedge analysMegrf ormed . The input pseudo-s- seismic coefficients were identical to thoseQ d for the c slip circle analysis discussed in Subsection 2.$> ' 2.3.6. he factor sum thesafety ir defined static and dynamic asdriving the ratio of available resisting fTgs to the forces.
.ety will be 1.10. The minimum allowable Pgtor of We results of these analyses are presented on Figure 4 l
+
n
j QMik i 19 ! Insert 6 i Profile Minimum Static l Factor of Cafety C = 750 psf C = 1000 psf C = 1000 .. G = 26' G = Jo
- G = 40' _
5 3.4 4.2 5.2 SA 5.4 8.0 8.3 7 2.8 3.4 4< 7A 2.8 3.4 4.4 7B 3.8 4.9 5.4 t l e .
. , , , , . ,, ,, .~- - - ' - "
@ A'll. (.
Ao , Insert 7 TS minimum factors of safety obtained on Profiles 5, 5A, 7, 7A and 7B resulting from the SSE are presented on Figures 2.5-111, 2.5-112, 2.5-113. 2.5-114 and 2.5-115 and are summarized below: Prc-ile Minimum Dynamic Factec of Safety q C = 750 psf C = 1000 psf C= 1000 psf G = 26' G = 30' G- 40' 5 1.5 1.8 2.2 5A 2.3 2.4 2.8 7 1.2 1.5 $ 7 1.2 1.5 1.9 l 7 1.9 2.5 2.7 i i g .. . .
=,.-,.-e,,
. : a wn.o A]
Insert 8 2.5.5.2.3.7 Wedge Method The static stability of the permanent man-made slopes against a wedge type failure was determined using the sliding wedge analysis procedure as recommended by the U.S. Army Corps of Enginacrs (EM-1110-2. April 1970). The applicability of this type of analysis, however, is sceewhat in a doubt since it was derived for a smooth surface having well defined inter-
\
faces between distinctly different materials. At the plant location a residual soil-sandstone interface does not physically exist. The location of a contact surface between the two materials was therefore based on an arbitrary selection of blow count alone; and in reality, the interface is a wide, undulating zone of gradual gradation change from weathered rock to highly weathered rock, or what in called residual soil. Appendix 2.5B demonstrates the gradual index property change of the Astoria sandstone formation with depth, while Figure 2.5-100 demonstrates the rough, undulating nature of the zone which has been classified as the interpretive transition between residual soil and weathered rock. a With these reservations in mind, the static stability of the residual soil and weathered rock interfaces shown on Profiles 5, 5A, 7, 7A and 7B Figures 2.5-111, 2.5-112, 2.5-113, 2.5-114 and 2.5-115, were determined using each of the three sets of residual soil strength parameters discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.3. The minimum allowable factor of safety, will be 1 5 for static analysis. The minimum factors of safety are presented on the above figures and are I summarized below: Profile Minimum Static Factor of Safety ~ C - 750 psf C - 1000 psf C - 1000 pnf 9 - 26' G - 30' 9 - 40' 5 3.1 3.8 4.7 l 5A 5.5 6.9 9.0 7 2.5 3.1 3.7 7A 2.6 3.3 4.L 78 3.3 4'.1 4.7
1 I a
.- . 0 A'fl. Y AA insert 8 (Cont'd) 2.5.5.2.3.8 Dynamic Sliding Wedge Analysis The dynamic stability of Profiles 5, SA, 7, 7A and 7B were also analyzed using the sliding wedge analysis procedure as recommended by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (EM-1110-2-1902, April 1970). Figure 2.5 - 107 illustrates the use of this procedure.
To each wedge, a horizontal seismic force of 0.32g was applied in a direction out of the slope. In addition, a vertical seismic force of 0.22g was also applied. These seismic forces represent the SSE. The factor of safety is defined as the ratio of available resisting forces tothesumofthestaticanddynamicdrivingforceg b minimum allowable factor of safety is 1.10. The results of these analyses are presented on Figures 2.5-111, 2.5-112, 2.5-113, 2.5-114 and 2.5-115 where the critical sliding wedges are shown along with the corresponding minimum factors of safety for each of the three combinations of soil strength properties discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.3 and are summarized below: Profile Minimum Dynamic Factor of Safety C = 750 psf C = 1000 psf C = 1000 psf G = 25' G = 30' @ = 40' S 1.4 1.7 2.1 5A
- 2.0 2.2 2.7 7 1.1 1.4 1.6 7A 1.2 1.5 1.8 7B 1.7 2.1 2.3 e a
S 3*}l. b 0837W-5 WNP- 3 A > FSAR
. a% -. - -e.=4m -+.u - - w ----
p ,, . . . m %. a ,m , -
', ,'.5-112, 2.5-113 and 2.5-114 where.the cri tical s liding wedges are shown a l..- w .w 4. ", q; m .m s.. v th the corresponding minimum factors of saf ety f or each of the three co binations of soil s treng th propert ies discussed. in Subsection 2.5.5.2., .3.
2.5.5 2.3.8 Dynamic Analysis The dyn- ic analysis utilizes the amplified acceleration obtained f r the
; dyna =ic r ponse studie s as described below and applie s this acceledtion to the cri ticas' sliding surf ace a s determined by the LEASE-1 program // This .,
method approh*=ates the response of the underlying caterials to gje induced y earthquake stability. mo The on'ynamic and uses maximum shear s trengthe quivalent accelerations of the materials wa s es t o/ablished evaluatefrom , cyclic trianial t sts perf ormed on the underlyics materials:/j'ee Appendix 2.5C.[
- d I
sed f or. the dynamic stabilit y analys.g so f the permanent h l The dynamic respons e slopes during the pos. leted ESE motion was computed usig the dynamic finite * (olement method of analy 's. An amplified artificial ti ,'e history with
, re sponse spectr a matchin. that of NRC Regulatory Guid .60 was input at the
, curf ace of the residual so and deconvoluted throug the site soil column to
( yield a 0.32g peak accelera, on and corresponding m tion at the top of the l fresh sandstone. This deconv 'uted motion was the i npu t into the finite 3 element model f or the dynamic sgability analysis.
\
In order to have s train-compatiblegshear modul and damping value s, an iteration procedure was incorporate into the/a nalysis. The initial s hear i modulus and damping value s were esti te d a[r the response computed. The n f computed value of average strain was t land damping using the relations shown onngflgure vaed sto2.5-104 choose and new 2.5C-13 values ofand modulu(" in f4s cccord ance with Su bsection Thigprocess was continued until a train-co=patible solutio n wa2.5C.4.4. s obtained _ I each cycle of the iterations, th) analysis is a linear elastic type anafysis. Once the s train-compatible soil pro erties were etermined , the maximum a quivalent accelerations were c uted a s f ollow - ; 1
- N 7
. N (m A i. hT)hg+ (m A +F)I M) =
h i=1 i=1
-h ,
,where: M = total drivin moment in the prescribed slip a, etion due to both j j i static an$ dynamic f orce s at jth time station i
)
n = total me s tations, each .01 a f or a length of a ificial , l accel,ek o gram , l N =t al number of mass points in the prescribed slip see on i h mi mass of ith node b A = the horizonts1 component response acceleration f or { ith node and jth time station -
- =- :=-
w 2.5-189 ,
,. 0837W-6 WNP-3 G M/. 6 FSAR 'g A =
the vertical component response acceleration for ' ' i,j ) ith node and jth time station ,"/ , I i , i Th= the horizontal component of the total static force f' Fy = the vertical component of the total static force h3= the vertical distance from the ith node point o the center f the slip circle li= tht hori:ontal distance from the ith node oint to the cen r of the slip circle T te maximum driving mo nt (M* eax) for the prescribed. ip section is the cnximum of the Hj for 1, 2,... n. Maar " ( sax nce the time station, say , which produces thej aximum driving moment in t yescribed slip section is qccelerations in the prescribund, the maximum equivalent response slip section affe computed using: I
/
h h A y b 1-1 i A
,j 0
A max 7
- al e,
1
-1 p , b
~
(*1 A g,3) U A
] m**
N g 9. fE i=1 g h v re A = the ace ri:ontal component of the maximum eq valent response eration in the prescribed slip action. wh re A* =
*** e vertical component of the maximum equivale t response cceleration in the prescribed slip action.
Th',d, were theslip e ticalse ions used for the evaluation of maximum equivalent gecelerati cibele a circles obtained on profile 7 from the pseudo- stic sli$ y ysis discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.6. I
, f Th'fav age soil strength properties as discussed in Subsection 2.5.
vete sed for the analysis. 2.3.k def' ed as the ratio of the available resisting moments on the trial f aThe factor o su . ace to the moment of the driving force. The minimum allowable safetufe i f etor vill be 1.1. iqure 2.5-114. ~ The results of these analyses for profile 7 are shovnlon ..
=%_-- f T 2.5-190
(. . CLMI. h 0837W-7 WNP-3 a.f FSAR
- 2.5.5.2.3.9 Summary and Conclusions Figure 2.5-117 clearly indicates that th'e major portion of the man-made cut slopes around the southern periphery of the plant island are in sandstone.
Residual soils underlie man-eade cut slope s only in three areas all of which i cre of limited extent. The potential f or slope instability under static and l . dynamic conditions is therefore confined also to these three areas. Detailed i stability analyses were carried out on the particularly on profile 7 (Figure 2.5O)"f wnich ut slopes in residual has the soil, of deepest extent re sidual soil underlying the final cut slope. Slip circle and sliding wedge type analyses were perf ormed under static and dynamic conditions and adequate f actors of safety against each type of instability were f ound. Cri tical f ailir e surf aces and safety f actor s found are shown on Figure s(2.5-ll2;" ,* 2.5 113, 2.5-114'.12.5-115. seu H ussest. For the five profiles studied in performing these stability analyses, three combinations of soil strength parameters were investigated f or the residual soil as discussed in Subsection 2.5.5.2.3.3. These thre e combinations of s trength parameter s are based on the re sults of laboratory tests on samples of the ac:ual material. They conservatively represent the strength range of the material in the immediate plant area. This is also shown by reviewing the numerous standard spoon blow counts recorded in the material in borings around the plant island. The results of these analyses show that the man-made cut slopes are stable under ctatic and dynamic conditions. 2.5.5.2.3.10 Field Monitoring Program F The rsn-made cut slope s were mapped following excavation to verif y the conditions s hown on Figure 2.5-117 and stratigraphy assumed f or stability
' enalysis. The geologic mapping for the Category I excavation and cut slopes that f ace those excavations is presented in Subsection 2.5.1.2.2.3 Ins trumentation installed to monitor the cut slope in the area around profiles 7, 7a and 7b, as shown on Figure 2.5-9 7, consisted of three slope indicators, cight concrete survey monuments and two tellurometer stations. Concret e
- survey monuments were set in residual soil and slope indicators were extended through the residual soil to t.he sandstone.
Early data collected from the slope indicators was erratic due to drif t caused by probe malfunctions and readout units out of calibration. Readings takan from December 1978 through September 1979 are believed to be valid and indicate that the slopes are stable. Six of the eight monuments monitored , from June 1979 through September 1979 also indicate stable conditions. The other two monuments showed erratic readings and no trend showing movement in any one direction was ascertained. 2.5.5.3 logs of Borings The logs of all borings drilled within the plant erea are presented in , Appendix 2.5A, Figure s 2.5A-14 through 2.5A-7 8x. Figure s 2.5-64 and 2. 5-78. show the locations of these boreholes in relation to the various Category I cnd non-Category I s tructure s. Borrow material wa s taken from plant oxcavation. Complete details of the subsurf ace investigation program are
^
presented in Subsections 2.5.4.3 and 2.5.4.4. w., 2.5-191
m WNP-3/5 Q Aill. (, FSAR 3 (, Whetten, J.T. and Cart =an, R.E. (1979) " Late Cretaceous Thrusting of i Jurassic Ophiolite, Northwest Washington" Geological Society of A= erica, Abstracts with Programs, 9 p 135 Whetten, J.T. , Jones, D.L. ; Cowan, D.S. , and Zartman, R.E. (1978) " Ages of . Mesozoic Terranes in the San Juan Islands, Washington" in Mesozoic ; Paleogeography of the Western United States. D.C. Howell and K. A. p McDougall (eds), Pacific Section, Society of Economic Paleontologists and Mineralogists, Pacific Coast Paleogeography, . Symposiu: 2, pp 117-132 . White, W.H. (1956) " Tectonic Map of the Western Cordillera, British L 6
, Columbia and Neighboring Parts of the United States" Canadian '
( Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, Special Volume No. 8, j Figure 10-1, scale 1: 2,534,400 i, i D I Wickens, A.J. and Hodgson, J.H. (1967) " Computer Re-evaluation of [ Earthquake Mechanism Solutions, 1922-1962" Dominion Observatory, Ottawa, Publications 33,:1, 560 p ' Wilcox, R.E. (1959) "Some Ef fects of Recent Volcanic Ash Falls with j Especial Reference to Alaska" Geological Society of A= erica Bulletin, 1028-N, pp 409-476 Wilcox, R.E. (1965) " Volcanic As.- Chronology" in The Quaternary of the United States, H.E. Wrigt ; and D.C. Frey (eds), Princeton University Press, Prince in! NJ, pp 807-816 % Wilkinson, W.D., 1.owry, W.D., ar ~) Baldwin, E.M. (1946) " Geology of the St. Helens Quadrangle, Oregt
- Oregon Department of Geology and Mining l P
Industry, Bulletin 31, 41 p - k Willia =s, H. (1941) Crater Lan e, University of California Press, Berkeley, " CA ' j? Williams, H. (1950) " Volcanoes of the Paricutin Region, Mexico" US " Geological Survey, Bulletin 965-B, pp 165-275
- Williams, H. and Coles, ';. (1968) " Volume of the Mazama Ash-f all and the .
i Origin of the Crater Lake Caldera" Oregon Department of Geology
\
and Mineral Industries, E lletin 62, pp 37-41 i Williams, H. and McBirney, A.R. (1979) volcanology, Freeman, Cooper and j Company, San Francisco, 'M. 397 p y Williams, I.A. (1916) "The Colu=bia River Gorge, its Geologic History 1 Interpreted from the solumbia River Righway" Oregon Bureau of l Mines and Geology, 2_:3,130 p i I
\
Williass, J.H. (1912) The Gua fians of the Columbia, (privately l published), Tacoma, WA
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.I Attachment 2 I Question No.
270.2 (3.11.1) Figures 3.11-14 and 3.11-15 have not been submitted. Provide a schedule for submitting these figures.
Response
Figure 3.11-14 " Environmental Area Map - Dry Cooling Tower Control Building Plan and Sections" is provided. Figure 3.11-15 " Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Rooms" is deleted. There is no HVAC system for the D.G. Fuel Oil Tank Rooms. They are open to outside conditions. FSAR Section 3.11 will be amended to reflect this.
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;.. 3.11 ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN OF MECRANICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT QS~
The environmental design criteria for mechanical, instrumentation and electrical safety-related equipment to ensure acceptable performance in all environments are based on equipment location ~ and function. As far is practical, equipment for these systems is located outside the containment or other areas where high radioactivity levels or other adverse environmental conditions could exist.
~
The mechanical, instrumentation and electrical safety-related equipment are capable of performing their intended functions under the following specified a environmental service conditions and conform to CE interface requirements as
\ described in CESSAR-F Subsections 5.1.4.Q.1, 9.3.4.6.G.1 and 9.3.4.6.Q.1.
a) Normal operating requirements and expected extremes in operating requirements. b) All safety-related equipment required to accomplish safety functions in response to a design basis event will be capable of completing their function under the specific environmental service conditions related to the design basis event. The environmental service conditions associated with a design basis event are specified to include normal operating conditions before the event, conditions produced by the event, and conditions existing subsequent to the event for such time as is required for safety-related functions to be carried to completion. c) For the most degraded conditions resulting from the long-term ' w environment to which the equipment is normally exposed. 3.11 1 EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS Environmental service condition's for the various plant areas are classified in the following environmental design categories: DESIGNATION ENVIRONMENT Containment Environment: Loss-of-Coolant or Steam Line Break Containment Environment: Normal Environment Auxiliary Building Environment: Normal Environment Auxiliary Building Environment: Loss-of-Coolant Accident Auxiliary Building Environment: Steam Line Break (Outside I Containment) CCWS Dry Cooling Tower Electrical Equipment Rooms: All Plant Conditions D.C. Fuel Oil Storage Tank Rooms: All Plant Conditions Diesel Generator Areas: Diesels Running The specified conditions for each category are listed in Figures 3.11-1 through 3.11 conditions. Q Equipment is rated for operation for these, and more severe g l 3.11-1
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- Attachment 3
! Question No. l l 281.4 (10.4.8.1) i Subsection 10.4.8.1-e discusses the blowdown demineralizer systems removal of impurities from the blowdown and references Subsection 10.4.11. Subsec-tion 10.4.11 states this system has been deleted from WNP-3. If this is
' correct, the referencing paragraph should also be deleted from the FSAR.
Response
! The steam generator blowdown demineralizer system was. deleted from the WNP-3 . design prior to filing of the FSAR. As indicated in our original response to this question, this decision has been reconsidered. The Supply System now intends to include a steam generator blowdown demineralizer system in the WNP-3 design. The FSAR will be updated upon completion of detailed design and engineering work, i i i l 6 x
Attachment 4 Question No. 410.2 (3.5.1.1) Table 3.5.1-1 has several columns that have "under investigation" listed in-stead of the necessary data. Provide this data or a schedule for providing it.
Response
The WNP-3 responses to question number 410.3 and 410.4 will adequately address this question.
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l Attachment 5 ' Question No. 410.3 (3.5.1.1) Provide or reference the following as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.70: A tabulation showing the safety related structures, systems and components outside containment required for safe shutdown of the reactor under all con-ditions of plant operation should be provided and as a minimum should in-clude the following:
- 1. Locations of the structures, systems or components.
- 2. Applicable seismic category and quality group classifications (may be referenced from Section 3.2).
- 3. Sections in the SAR where descriptions of the items may be found.
- 4. Reference drawings or piping and instrumentation diagrams where applic-able (may be referenced from other sections of the SAR).
- 5. Identification of missiles to be protected against, their source and the b ses for selection.
- 6. Missile protection provided.
The ability of the structures, systems and components to withstand the ef-fects of selected internally generated missiles should be evaluated.
Response
A tabulation showing the safety rel:ted structures, systems and components outside containment required for sate shutdown of the reactor including the locations of the structures, systems and components and the applicable seis-mic category and quality group classification are provided in Section 3.2. The bases for selection of potential missiles due to failure of pressurized and rotating components outside containment are described in subsections 3.5.1.1.1 and 3.5.1.1.2, respectively. A tabulation of all potential mis-siles based on this selection criteria including their sources and missile protection provided will be submitted in a future amendment containing reference to FSAR sections and drawings which contain descriptions of the items or piping and instrument diagrams where applicable.
Attachment 6 Question No. 410.4 (3.5.1.2) Provide or reference the following as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.70: A tabulation showing safety related structures, systems and components in-side containment required for safe shutdown of the reactor under all condi-tions of the plant operation including operational transients and postulated accident Conditions should be provided and as a minimum should irclude the following:
- 1. Location of the structure, system or component.
- 2. Identification of missiles to be protected against, their source and the bases for selection.
- 3. Missile protection provided.
i The ability of the structures, systems and components to withstand the ef-fects of selected internally generated missiles should be evaluated.
Response
A tabulation showing the safety related structures, systems and components inside containment required for safe shutdown of the reactor under all con-ditions of the plant operationi iricluding operational transients and postu-lated accident conditions including their location are provided in Section 3.2. < The bases for selection of potential missiles due to failure of pressurized i and rotating components inside containment are described in subsection 3.5.1.1 and 3.5.1.2, respectively. A Labulation of all potential missiles, based on this criteria, their source and the missile protection provided will be supplied in a subsequent amendment to the FSAR.
Attachment 7 l Question No. 410.12 (9.4.7) ; Subsection 9.4.7 states that the CCWS dry cooling towers' electrical equip-ment room ventilation systems design is conceptual only. Confirm the date by which you intend to supply this information.
Response
Attached is the description of the final design for the CCWS dry cooling towers' electrical equipment room ventilation system. FSAR Subsection 9.4.7 will be amended as shown to reflect this response. i 1
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. 9.4.7 -T CCWS SYSTEM DRY C001. LNG TOWERS ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ROOMS VENTILATION The CCWS ry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation System design is onceptual.at this time. This section will be ammended when the Ultimate He t Sink (UHS) design (Subsection 9.2.5) is finalized. .
9.4.7.1 sign Bases The CCWS Dry Cooh ng Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation System is designed to satis the following requirements: a) Maintain an o erating environment with space temperature inside each electrical equ ment room at a range of 60F to 90F during normal and design basis acc dent conditions. b) Redundant cooling ' ystem Trains A and B are pcwered by separate safety buses so that a fai ure of a single active component in one train
- cannot result in a 1 ss of cooling for both electric.1 equipment room spaces served by inde endent system trains.
c) Meet seismic Category I requirements to assure the system remains f unctional during and af er a safe shutdown earthquake. All electrical components shall meet IEE -323. d) Provide protection f rom ext rnal missiles, design basis tornado and volcanic ashf all considerati ns. e) Include the capability to remo e smoke from affected space served by the system. f) Design inlet temperature cor. side recirculation of the dry cooling tower exhaust, 9.4.7.2 Systec Description The CCWS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equip nt Rooms System is shown on Fi gu re 9. 4. 7-1. Each room is served by a 100 ercent capac'ty packaged air conditioning unit located in separate HVAC Equ ment Rooms at EL. 438.00 feet. Each air conditioning unit draws outside ir through separate missile protected openiras provided with negative tornado ressure protection valves. The entering air then passes through a self-cleani a inertial type ash dust louvre air cleaner before it enters the packaged ai conditioning unit. Each packaged unit consists of, in the direction of fl w, and located in the lower deck, an inlet damper, mixing box high efficiency ag type filters, ref rigerant cooling coil followed by a centrifugal fan c nected to supply distribution duct work. The return / exhaust air ductwork i connected to the packaged unit upper deck above the centrifugal supply fan. Return air flows through the compressor section, then across the refrigerant ondenser coil,
^ through a centrifugal condenser far. to a discha rge plenum pro ided with an exhaust air damper and a return air damper. When air is exhau ed from the g plenue, i t passes through a torn *do protection valve and missile protected opening to the atmosphere. When air is returned it enters the mi ing box a t the lower deck downstream from the inlet damper.
9.4-100 Amendmer. No. 1, (;a/82)
, - = - _ - - -
l wgy.3 l1626W-2 . FSAR qglg {l 3 C R GPLAc E totTH ATAc.HMGNT I , E h package air conditioning unit has a capacity to cool outside air from a ) tam reture of 101.5F to 65F leaving the cooling coil to maintain each N h oisc N ical equipment room at less than 90F and the HVAC quipment room at less E , then 1 F. Each air conditioning unit refrigeration compressor is controlled y frca on l65Fthatutdoor j perature air temperature sensor willsensor. lockout When outdoor air the compressor tote=perature prevent its f alls to k E l sparation. The system wx11 revert to 100 percent outside air ventilation with @ total system ' rflow once through the unit. When the outside temperature y risos above 6 the compressor will start operating again. When outside air j' temperature fal s to 40F the system will automatically shutdown and any nscossary heatin is provided by Electric l' nit liesters located in each room to (( h maintain 60F room operature. [ 9.4.7.3 Safety E luation il 0 The CGS Dry Cooling Tow s Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation System is required to operate during ormal and accident conditinns. All conponents of f[j th2 system except for the n safety electric unit heaters are designed to [ Quality Class I and seismic egory I requirements. De Electric Unit u
}kstars do not perform any safe function; however, they are designed to E asintain eneir structural integr y in the event of a saf e shutdown y earthquake. Should temperatures d p below 40F for one hour the unit will il initiete shutdown. Each safety-rela ed redundant system train is powered f rom 9 cafety buses A or B to assure that a ingle active component failure will not prevent the system from cool.ng one of he two CGS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms to mitigate t e consequences of & design basis I cccident or prevent a safe shutdown of th plant. A failure modes nd ef fects ]g
.nalysis it, provided in Ta ble 9.4.7-1. W The outside air intake and exhaust air openin s are protected from externally-generated or tornado missiles by mi ile grating. Tornado protection valves located in the intake and exha st openings close against a g sudden tornado pressure differential and prevent ollapse of safety-related y ductwork or damage to the system components. lj z
z System equipment trains are located in separate equip ent rooms to assure !! complete separation of systems. He 'A' train ductwor is routed through a y three hour fire rated duct-shaf t penetratinE through th 'B' Train Electrical [ Equipmant Room to the 'A** room located at the lowest floo . Dere are no p connactions between system train ductwork which precludes e possibility of E spread of a fire. ij n Each system train is pruvided with a dust louvre to separate pa iculate from cutside air during a design basis ashfall to reduce the ef fect of lugging the filters of the air conditioning unit. ; E. In the event of an accident coincident wit' a loss of offsite power t system [j will be automatically started af ter an SIA5 signal from emergency powe l1 0 received at safety buses from the diesel generators. [ L L rx ; c 9.4-101 Amendment No. 1, (10/82)
l WNF-3 1606W-3 FSAR ggg e) fg, [ 2. gsPLAc.E w TH A7rAC.HA4 6NT ( 3 h 7.4 l Inspection end Te stine Recuirements w Each compone.
- s inspected prior to installation. Component of each system train are accessib 'or periodic inspection and maintenance. A system air balance test and adjustm
- to the design conditions are conducted in the course of plant preoperations ting program. Ins truments are calibrated and automatic controls are tested o etivation at the proper setpoints.
Alarm functions are checked for operabili d limits during preoperational t es t ing . The system is operated and tested init. 'iv vith regard to flow capacity, flow path and mechanl:a1 operability and duc - is leak tested during installation. p 1 9.4-102 ,
162 M-1 ' W e 7.- FSAR , T ABt.E 1.4.7-1 CrvS CRY C00t.1pC towtt El.ECTalCAL EQUlFMENT torMS TENTit.Afl04 SYSTEM FAltxRE MODES AMD EFFECTS ANf.YSLS i I be t t er_ Reeerbe identiflestion Fettere Mode _ Ef f ect en Systee Method of Detectlee_ . Ca tone t.e e s of eig p l y o r e n- Class IE valee indice- CRI 100 percent redondant systee Tarsedo Freteett Talve (4) toad vertently closes ting lights to avellente havet air flow he s y s t n t o IM M- Gase It ben NH- O! bgne in IM penW n-Outelde latene & 'theuet Fette to gen dondant system are avaltable able tion indlesting Llahte Dampers (4) CSI Ash Laevre f an in 100 percent One sy s t en t o t anp e r- Close IE flee settch redundant systes to avettable b A:h teatre Fane (2) elle to stort et f ee 4f eeherge af ter ecetdent evers- able (I) glee deley activates fti%onneleding Ash etere
't 5 Il Claes It flee settch CRI 100 percent redundsat system No ogply alt, noe Segply Att rene (2) Falle to eter et f an discharge, is evettable system to inopetable settvet.e alare efter stee delay Clees IE ren Indicating CRI 300 percent capacitF compresent Compressor f atte tees of Itag in Rstrigeretton Ceepressors (2) one systre Itshts avgt table in redondant systee
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to etert Class It flow evitch C21 100 percent redendent erstes Cadenser gubeset Fame (2) Fette to etset No enhavet er rete to avellebte s t r f low t o one et f an discharge. givetes stare af ter S systeg tio elay d Cat 100 percent redendent systee (3 Active Ctreelt Ref rigerent Fette to f onettes Forttat er felt lose SafetF est t stope
- to evellebte J.
refrigeretton Campinente (4) of cooling in one systes pressor g Cet 100 percent redendent syetes @ Fette te operate Fitters eles to re- Class it differenttet D Sag Filters (2) Sanke eelt te redeced pressure settch across to evettette
-g e.gply air flow filter settvetee alors One ef et ee t o t aap e r- Class It denper post- CEI Q percent redendent systee 82 tern Air Denpers (2) Falle to cpes oe is d itable tien indteattra lights rectreutettee eyele able Normat and of f ette Cat Syeree to e eeted to two taas None Worest and Of f ette Power power f attere todt- 100 percent certs ty redendant estion dieset genersters
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b s y l l Co.pn+ bhaq LO*r Spw . 9.4.7' 4 DRY COOLING 7th'ERS ELECTRICAL EQU1PMENT 20(MS VENTIIATION SYSTEM , The CCWS Dry Cooling Tcuers Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation Systea { maintains the temperature range inside the Dry Cooling Towers Electrical j Equipment Rooms satisfactory to assure continuous operation of the dry cooling towers when required to operate during normal and accident : I conditions. l 9.4.7.1 Design Bases . I The CCWS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation System is designed to satisfy the following requirements: .
- a. Maintain an operating environment with space temperature inside each Electrical Equipment Room at a range of 60'T minic.ua in {
vinter and a range of 70'F to 120*F in summer during the respective ! dry cooling towe'r operation. .
- b. Redundant Cooling System Trains A and B are posared by separate asfety buses so that a single active component failure in one ,
train cannot result in a loss of cooling for,both Electrical Room ! 6
. spaces served by independent system trains. j
- c. Meet Seismic Category I requirements to assure the system remains functional during and after a safe Shutdown Earthquake. All j electrical components except electric heaters' meet IEEE-323 requirements.
- d. Provide protection from external missiles and Design Basis Tornado. i
- e. Include the capability to remove smoke from affected space served ,
by the system. 1
- f. Design inlet temperature considers recirculatie of the Dry Cooling Tower Electrical Equipment Room exhaust air.
- g. Include the capability to remove volcanic ash particulate, by + j operator action to start ash removal fan, to assure system remains ;
functional during design basis ashfall event. , l s
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m 1- g 410.1 L 6' 9.4.7.2 Systee Description l The CCWS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Room System
- is shown on Figure 9.4.7-1. Each train of equipment rooms is served ,
by a 100 percent capacity, air handling unit, electrically interlocked to operate with a return / exhaust air fan which assures positive ventilation and cooling of the rooms. The major safety-related come ponents, associated ductwork and accessories comprise a once-through system which utilizes outdoor air or a mixture of outdoor and exhaust air for cooling. , Each ' sir handling unit draws outside air thrhgh separate missile-protected openings, through an air shaft and negative tornado pressure protection valves TFV-200A or TFV-2003 to the inlet damper D-200A or D-200B of the unit. Each air handling unit, 3V-4A-SA or BV-43-55, . consists.of, in the direction of flow. Metdamper,mixingbox, self-cleaning inertial-type ash dust louvre air cleaner, automatic roll filter, and a high-efficiency bag-type filter followed by a centrifugal
. supply fan which discharges cooling air through supply seismic category I ductwork to the MCC Room and Wansformer Room.
A return / exhaust fan, E-11A-SA or E-11B-SB, draws air from the Transformer Room which includes air transferred from the MCC Room. The return / exhaust fan either discharges all the air through a gravity damper, GD-200A Or GD-2008, and negative tornado pressure protection valve, TFV-201A or TFV-2015,
' through the air shaft and missile protected exhaust air outlet to the atmosphere; or some of the air is returned to the mixing box of the twkrtz ee air handling unit through thepreturn air damper D-201A.or D-2015.
. Mixiet of two airstreams is accomplished by modulating cutdoor and return sir dampers, D-200 and D-201.
Each ash dust louvre air cleaner includes a dust collection header connected to a centrifugal fan which will discharge the dust through a negative tornado pressure protection valve. TFV-202A or TFV-202E,
~
air shaf t and missile protected exhaust outlet to the atmosphere ; during an ashfall event. Fan EVE-4A is manually started and stopped from the Control Room. f
..s be.-Ventilation System will operate when outdoor air exceeds 70,F f I l
I and the room temperatures 'will be maximum when the outdoor air ambient reaches its maximum temperature. k Udon Y dt, i doded, dr (ced. .e ,
- .-- . . . . - . . . . . . . . . .. ....w........_..._............... .
s- Q4IO \L .,41+ "de ' 7 When outside te=perature falls to 40 F, the system will be manually shut down and any necessary heating is provided by KNS electric unit heaters located in each room to maintain 60*F room temperature. 9.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation The CCWS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Room Ventilation System is required to operate during normal and accident conditions. l All components of the system except for nonsafety electric unit heaters and +w as% are designed to Quality Class I and Seismic Category I requirements. au foi
\ The electric unit heaters do not perform any safety function; however, they are designed to maintain their structural integrity in the event of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake, should temperatures drop below 40*F.
the operator will manually shut down the system. Each safety-related Redundant System trait. is powered from safety Buses A or B to assure i that a single active ecmponent failure v'111 not prevent the systes ! from coo ing one of the CCWS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms to mitigate consequences of a Design Basis Acciden: or prevent a safe shutdown of the plant. A failure mode and affects analysis is provided in Tab 1'e 9.4.7-1. I l The outside air intake and, exhaust air openings are protected from l externally generated or tornado missiles by missile grating. Tornado protection valves located in the intake and exhaust ducts close against ' a sudden tornado pressure differential and prevent collapse of safety - l I related ductwork or damage to the system components. Sys.em equipment trains are located in separate Equipment Rooms to assure complete separation of systems. Each syster train air handling unit is provided with a dust louvre to separate ashfall particulate matter from outside air during a Design Basis ashfall to reduce the
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effect of cic;;ging the filters of the air handling unit. M rne eveY6fa. less d eHsde Pmoer, Mew cm be. a.olo=.dically skaded , {w. E ccwespdhg s.icly bos whick rece.ives c"*7e*<f Pc - b L . die.sel p l bars. - 9.4.7.4 Inspection and Testing Recuirer,e s ,
+ ! Each component is inspected prior to installation. Components of each system train are accessible for periodic inspection and maintenance.
evt O M GC$.ECt (Q s nL$ W heQ O* %. f cWJC f', l h L-- qs % en se es,mJ:Q l. R ~ L . e n er p % : . ene ~ k,.s. r u -
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A system air balance test and adjustment to the design conditions are conducted in the course of plant preoperational testing program. l Instruments are calibrated and automatic controls r.re tested for activation at the proper set points. Alarm functions are checkad for operabil:ty and limits during preoperational testing. The system is operated and tested initially with regard to flow capacity, flow path and mechanical operability, and ductwork is leak tested during installation. r , O e 9 6 O O O I f e e e 4 e O O e O k l
m . y.____.... Insta 9.4.7-1 . . CCUS Def CDDL184 TOWE7 B12CTRICAL EgiftyMrirf Itxsts Vtirft1ATTOIt STFTWI - FA11DPE_Popts Ale EFFECTS AIIALYSit Fettere pende street es_Statesi gelmed of Deteettee 'lesetter # Mr._ks. C_"tonent a Identificettes Claes la vetoe indtesties Cat 100 percent redendent system Tornado Footeetten velves (6) landvertently etenee 14ee of espply er enhovet to evettable. ottflow Igghts TFV-200 SA, 33 TFV-201 SA, St TFV-202 SA, 33 Claes II I % r Peettlee CR1 Deepere to 100 percent Osteue Intehe & Pihevet Felle to eres Deeper la ese system le redendent eyeteu are ovelleble. inoperable. indlesting lights Deripere 6) D-200 BA, 89 p-201 RA, 55 Class 1R flow evitch et Cat Ash Iaevre fee in 100 percent Ash lasere Fene 't) Fette to stort for One system to insposeble. redundant system to evelleblo. ocetdent operettee fon discherse ef ter time NYt-4A, 43 deley activates eters. f actedtog Ashfe11 close IR flow evitch et r' 100 percent s.t S:t erstem 3 mply Air Fene (2) Fette to etert see supply att, one systes to evellebte. to inopereble, fan dieeterse, setivates trV-4 A-SA store ef ter time deley, HV 48-55 Class it flow evitch et Ca1 100 percent redendest erotes tuhaust Fene (2) Feite te etert sto eht er reture air. fem discharge, activotes to evellette. flow to one system
- E-11A*SA store efter ties deley.
E-113-se ~ Filter to oes system Class 1E differwettel Ct1 100 percent redwedent systes ' Aetematie asil Air F11 tere (1) Filter Nedte to elogged. pressure evitch seroes to evetlebte. - Motor fette to etert, filter activates eiere. Class 18 differeettet Cat 100 pereest redesident system Sep Filters (2) Beelte Feito to operate Filterc eles to reewit le preseere evitch across to evellebte, redeced espply ateflee. filter activates eters. . Class it damper poetties Cat 100 poteset redendest system Feite to eyes se See syst'en le 1eoperable. Gravity Deepere (1) tedicattog Itghts la egellable. CDe200 (BA), (SS) enhavet cyclee Norwel end off-ette power Cat protes to eeonected to two 1mes lhoes 100 Fercent espeetty redendest Isernal and Off-stte Peoer fettere tedtesties dieset goeerstere. e
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') WASHINGTON PUBLIC l POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM CCWS DRY COOLING TOWER , l ELECTRICAL EQUtPMENT ROOM 9.4.7-1 l Nuclear Projects 3 & 5 VENTILATION SYSTEM FINAL SAFETY AN ALYSIS REPORT g
U i Attachment 8 I 1 Question No. 421.1 ! (7.3) Table 7.3.20 is shown as "to be supplied later". Provide either the table or a date by which it will be supplied. ! Response: The design for the dry cooling towers' electrical equipment rooms ventila- < tion system has been finalized. The attachments give .the description of the system. FSAR Chapter 7 will be amended as shown to reflect the response to this question. i f f 6 l
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( - Ie{, Ib . { v. Th3 cnntrol logic associated with .the Diesel Generator Area RVAC Syster. and f typical control wiring diagra=s are provided in Subsection 7.3.1.3. p c I ! Byp,sses p Conponents of the Diesel Cener:t'or Areas EVA0 System are monitored
- esntinuously for bypassed or inoperable cond.tions and their status is p it.'icated on both a system and a component basis on the Bypassed looperable {
Status Panels in the Control Room. System status is alarmed in the Main ;- Control Board (CB-1) . Sea Subsection 7.5.1.8 f or a complete discussion of the L Bypassed-Inoperal_e Status Panels and conformance to Kagulatory Cbide 1.97.
. t Radundancy t-Each diasal generatur arum has it.a own air handling unit EV2A(3). Upon .
failure of the operating Diesel Csnarator Area HVAC System, an alars to counded it t.14 Main Couttc". Roca., .
. {g
. s y Sequencing , , t
- M Th2 Diesel Cenarator Areas EVAC System is automatically loaded onto Load Block f/
V of its asscciated ' diesel generator followini a loss of offsite power. See I S3ction 6.3 tor discussion of the dies.sl geocrator load sequencina. h Tha non-safety electrical reheat coils have normal 120V ac power supply only - cnd are not utilized f olloving LOOSP. _ f Suoporting Systems . The f c11owing systems eupport the Diesel Generator Areas MVAC Systra:
- 1) Emergency AO Diesel Generators
- 2) Esactor Auxiliary Builcing Main Yentilation S/stan
- 3) 480V AC System .
- 4) Vital AC System 7.3.1.1.4.8 CNS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms BVAC
" - ~ 7
= , _p_ __ _
I Upon completion of the design, tue description of the system will be given 2 including initiating circuits, logic, bypasses, inter'scks, sequescing. Qecundancy, divers:ty and
,- actuated devices. __
- - _ ~ - = j-j 7.3.1.1.4.9 Component Cooling Water Systes i
The Component Cooling Water Syster. (CWS) rencves heat fron reactor auxiliary systems and the reactor. coolant system during normal operation, normsl g shutdown and post-accident conditions. The CNS is diviced into essential and f JajuM .Y ?
.pdde.i'T
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*,af T i ti 7.3 39 Azer.dr.er.t No. 2, (12/82) -
z. Question 421.1 Attachment A Insert I 7.3.1.1.4.8 CCWS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation Systems The CCWS dry cooling tower electrical equipment rooms' ventilation systems are designed to maintain 100% of the cooling requirements for each of the dry cooling towers (DCT) electrical control buildings udner normal and acci-dent conditions. Each tower is servieid by an independent system, train A and B, for DCT A (SA) and DCT B (SB) cieciric control buildings respectively. Refer to Subsection 9.4.7 for a complete description of th CCWS dry cooling tower electrical equipment rooms ventilation system. The CCWS DCT electri-cal equipment rooms' ventilation system is monitored and controlled from the main control room. Safety related display instrumentation associated with the CCWS DCT Electri-cal rooms ventilation system, which provides data sufficient for the opera-tor to monitor and perform the required safety functions are described in Subsection 7.5.1.4.11. Initiating Circuits, Logic, Actuated Devices } The CCWS DCT electrical equipment rooms' ventilation system is placed into service during normal operation by manual initiation from a control switch in the control room. During normal operation, a space temperature controller located in the re-turn air duct, modulates the outside air damper D-200SA (0-20058) and return air damper D-20lSA (D-2015B) in order to maintain a set space temperature. Individual non-safety room thermostat located in the transformer room and MCC room maintain the minimum indoor temperature by cycling the electric unit heaters EUH-200A & B, EUH-201 A & B, ECH-200A & B. A differential pressure conroller automatically advances the roll filter on a pressure drop i greate than 1/2 in. WG. A category alarm in the control room alerts the operator to a failure of the automatic roll filter or either the prefilter or afterfilter. The inertial separator exhaust fan HVE-4A (B) has its own control switch in the main control room. In case of a volcanic ash fallout the separator is l manually operated.
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- Insert I (Cont'd)
Smoke detectors in the supply and return air ducts provide an alarm in the main control room. The operator can then manually initiate the smoke vent
- mode which opens the outside air damper D-200SA (SB) to fully open position and closes the return air damper D-201SA (58).
Interlocks Electrical interlocks are designed into the DCT electrical equipment rooms to initiate air handling unit HV-4A-SA (HV-4B-SB) on the dry cooling towers start and simultaneously actuate the following equipment: Return Fan E-llA-SA (E-llB-SB) Start Outside Air Damper D-200SA (58) Controllable mode Return Air Damper D-201SA (SB) Controllable mode The return fan E-11A-SA (E-llB-SB) and the unit HV-4A-SA (HV-48-SE) are also equipped with low flow alarms triggered by a low flow condition present 10 sec. after fan starts.
- HV-4A-SA (HV-48-SB) is equipped with a high temperataure alarm on the return air duct and a high differential pressure alarm across the filters. The control logic associated with the CCWS DCT electrical equipment room venti-
, lation and the arrangement drawings for the related instrumentation are pro-vided in Subsection 7.3.1.3. Bypasses Components of the CCWS dry cooling towers electrical equipment rooms system are monitored continuously for bypassed or inoperable conditions and their status is indicated on both a system and a component basis on the bypassed inoperable status panel in the control rocom. System status is alarmed in the main control board (CB-1). See Subsection 7.5.1.8 for a complete dis-cussion of the bypassed inoperable status panels and conformance to Regula-tory Guide 1.47. Redundancy The CCWS dry cooling towers electrical equipment roo;'s system consists of two 100% capacity independent and identical trains of instrumentation and controls serving their related train equipment rooms such that no single activity or passive failure can prevent performance of both CCWS DCT elect-rical equipment rooms ventilation system. Sequencing The CCWS dry cooling towers electrical equipment rooms ventilation system is automatifcally loaded onto load block V of its associated diesel generator following a loss of off-site power. See Section 8.3 for discussion of the diesel gen d rator load sequencing.
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Supporting Systems The following systems support the CCWS dry cooling towers electrical equip-ment rooms systems.
- 1) 480 AC system
- 2) Vital AC system
m 275tP-5 kb. } 7[~ i73 7.3.1.3.17 Safety-Related 125 Volt DO Systes e' 2-:. Refer to Chapter C.
' d* f typical control Wiring Diagrams (CWD) f or system equipnent' and/or componente are *
;5olenoid Valve Fi gure No.
, Air Opera:ed Ys.lve 7.3 4h ~
g Motor Operated Valve 7.3-87 ! 7.3-88 Punp or Fan ( > 100 Horsepowe-) 7.3-89 Pu=p or Fan ( < 100 Horsepower) 7.3-90 19 Final E'sta= Drevinga w apircion of the design, the final system drawings including Instrument 2 acies
- n. and Control kgic Diagrams and instrument Arrangement Drawings will k (*4f % 1
-Amet.E 7:
7.3-53 Amendte:t Ee, 2 (12 /E2)
(p Question 421.1 Attachment A Insert II 7.3.1.3.1 CCWS Dry Cooling Towers Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation Systems a) L&S Figure No. Sh. No.
- 1) Dry cooling tower control bldg A & B 7.3-93 359A
- 2) Dry cooling tower control bldg A & B 7.3-94 3598 b) ILA
- 1) Dry cooling tower 7.3-95 G6104
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TAME 7.*J--20 ,,,.* MS DRY COOT.ING 'IUWER FI.ECTRI_CA1. FQtTIINENT ROUN VEttf1LATION SYSTFM_ Fall.URE HODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS Inherent [ Coeponent Cononent Failure Effect on Detection Compensating [. Identification Function Mode Cause Sys teri System Provision Remarks 3 0 CCWS DCI Ilcetr Rus Vent Sys - Supply Fan NY-4A, Ret Fan E-11 A, Dnepers D-200SA, D-20lSA ~ >1 Contacts Castrol Contacts close Fall Broken contacts; ITV-4A, K-11A and 1. Indication Redundant CB switch (CB only) to start HV-4A Open jnswed sicchantem DCT RVAC system lights train operntion [ fail to stert 2.Tempernture ;i, Indicction
.). Periodic .' s test .'
3 2 Supply Fan Energized to Fn11s Breaker trip, HV-4A & E-11 A 1. Indication Redundant Overland j ptarter start sug ply Open overload trip, fans fati to lights train trip fan llV-4 A, control fuse start; Dempers 2. Bypass bypanned return fan R-11 A blown, 1 ens of D-200A & D-201A Inop. by STAS ' and air dag ern 120VAC power, .FAI (reverse Indication ; D-2OOA.D-201A loss of 480 VAC action) wisen 3. Temper a tiere Power, failure Mode Selector Indication - of control Switch in the 4. Periodic test . transformer normal position - and D-200A full open, D-201A full clone when Mode Selector Switch ' in Smoke ponition -* 3 3 Rr turn fan Mr.crgized to Fatin Brenker trip, E-11 fails to 1.Indiention 3tedundant Overlond starter start return Open overlond trip, start lights train trip fan E-11A control fuse 2.Rypnns hypnan.d blown, loss of Inop. by SIAS 120VAC power, andtentton loss of 480 VAC 3. Periodic Power, influre of control test bQ A 2 ' trans former gh RV-4 A fail s to
- L cs start ,
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. - Inherent Creponent Component Talluro Effeet on h,..t::ctica Compen= ting -
lo . Identificction Function Hoda Caum System' Synten Provfoton Remet ko ' l.4 120V AC Control Power Powern devpers Loss of Brenker trip, Dampers fail 1. Indicating RcJ:*ndant power open wires in position lir.h ts train .
- 2. Bypass Inop.
indication . 3.Periodf-test and calibrat-ica
}.5 Process 4-20 mA to Signal Transmitter or Instrument 1.Sr"rious Redundant Neneurtwent mn+ late fails Controller l' allure or no train Signal D-200A and low tre,uble fuse indication reverse-ai. ting blown 2. Periodic D-201 A dareper Signal Component Instrumment test & cal.
fails failure Failure 1. Spurious Redimdent high or no train indication
, 2. Periodic test of calibrat-fon 3.6 120V AC process powers Loss of Breaker trip, Tantrament 1. Spurious Redundant power transmitters pot.c r open wires -
Fa11 ore or no train controllets indication
- 2. Periodic test &
calibration b, a J
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- W P-3 dijll \- f rsan j 10 ;
e 7.5.1.4.8 Tornado Protection Valves . 1 During tornado conditions, the tornado protection valves close automatically to isolate and protect syster alenents from the affect of reversa flow or cxesssiva flow caused by the uncompenested pressure deficit in the vortex of a tornado. Tho operator ha.t available to him in the Control Room instrumentation for the tornado protection valves in the f orm of status lights for each valve which is lioted in Table 7.5-17 7.5.1.4.9 170 Volt Vital AC Power System ; Tha 120 Vcit Vital AC Power System is a safety-related system which supplies cc power to the plant protection system. The operator has~ available to him in the Control Roos alaru annunciatin; 120 , valt vital ac power system trouble. Tripped feeder breaker, feeder ground. 1 l transf ormer trouble, bus undervoltage and control power f ailure alarm status , j light are provided on the vital ac power penal. ( 7.5.1.4.10 Safety-Ralated 125 Volt DC System
. . I his system consists of two electrically independent and separate 125 volt de j loed Croups. The two 125 volt de distribution systems supplies power to the octety-ralated de loads of Divisions 1 and 2. bese two dis tribution systems f I
cleo f urnish power to the plant protection systet. Channel A and B. ( ( . he operator has available to him the following instrumentation in the (batrol j Roomt a) Voltage indicators od both terminals of all the batteries refetanced to ground as wall as the voltage st..wes the terminals b) Current indicators f or all the batteries c) Alarus f or all hatteries annunciatingt battery charger trouble . batte:y ground, bus undervoltage he dispisy instru: ents are listed in hble 7.5-18. Also shown are the typas cf components and their location. 7.5.1.5 CEA Position Indication CEA position indication is discussed in CESSAR-y Subsection 7.5.1.1.4 A/ fM L t L5-17 1, (10/62) Aend:entKo.__ _
II Question 421.1 Attachment A Insert 111 7.5.1.4.11 CCWS Dry Cooling Tower Electrical Equipment Rooms Ventilation Systems This system consists of two trains of equipment servicing their respective train electric rooms. The operator has available to him the following in-strumentation in the control room. a) Return air temperature from rooms b) Status indication of valves, dampers and fans c) Alarms for fan low flow, high return air temperature, high filter differential pressure. The display instruments are listed in Table 7.5-24. Also shown are the types of components and their location. t
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)$ l l Attachment 9 , REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION - ENCLOSURE 4
- 1) ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENf Commission Memorandum and Order of May 23, 1980 defines the current staff requirements for qualification of this equipment. Additional guidance on this matter was provided in a subsequent NRR order date November 26, 1980 (conconcerning record requirements), Supplements 2 and 3 dated September 30, 1980 and October 24, 1980, respectively to IE Bulletin No.
70-01B and a generic letter dated October 1,1980 to all holder of CP's and OL's.
Response
In our original response to this question, the Supply System promised addi-tional information concerning record requirements. The Supply System has not identified any exceptions to the guidance provided in the NRR Order dated 11/26/80 and subsequent documents as referenced above. 1
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