ML20028F465
| ML20028F465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 01/21/1983 |
| From: | Dixon O SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028F467 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8302010374 | |
| Download: ML20028F465 (3) | |
Text
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O SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY POST OFFICE 7e4 CoLuusIA. SOUTH CAROLINA 29218 Q
O. W. OtxON, JR.
VICE PREt- QENT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS tJa'tuary 21, 1983 E q E$' M p ;
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director ;O U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .-
Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street, N.W. ro Atlanta, Georgia 30303
SUBJECT:
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station -
Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 Thirty Day Written Report LER 82-065
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Please find attached Licensee Event Report #82-065 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This Thirty Day Report is required by Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.(b) as a result of entry into Action Statements of the following Technical Specifications:
3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3.3.8, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3.3.9, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3.4.6.1, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systens on December 22, 1982.
If you have any questions, please call us at your convenience.
Ver tr ly yours, O. W. Dixon, Jr.
HCF:OWD:dwf Attachment cc: V. C. Summer A. R. Koon T. C. Nichols, Jr. G. D. Moffatt l E. C. Roberts Site QA O. W. Dixon, Jr. C. L. Ligon (NSRC)
H. N. Cyrus G. J. Braddick H. T. Babb J. L. Skolds D. A. Nauman J. B. Knotts, Jr.
M. B. Whitaker, Jr. B. A. Bursey W. n. Williams, Jr.
- I&E (Washington)
O. S. Bradham Document Management Branch R. B. Clary INPO Records Center M. N. Browne NPCF File ,
B302010374 830121 ,,_,,,CIAL OFFI COFY PDR ADOCK 05000395 PDR g
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f,. *T Mr. James P. O'Reilly ,-
LER No.82-065 ,
Page Twa '
January 21, 1983' OETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
) At approximately 1930 hours0.0223 days <br />0.536 hours <br />0.00319 weeks <br />7.34365e-4 months <br /> on December- 22, 1982, with.the' Plant in Mode 2, the electrical power supply.was' lost to the-
, Train "A" Radiation Monitoring System (RMS). The' event occurred while maintenance was being performed on RM-A14, Reactor Building Purge Exhaust High Range Radiation Monitor.
At approximately 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br />, upon troubleshooting the cause for the Train "A" RMS loss of power, maintenance personnel inadvertently created a short in the Train "B" RMS power.
supply. This caused a Train "B" RMS loss of power simultaneously with the Train "A" loss of power.
At approximately 2043 and 2140 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.1427e-4 months <br />, the Train " A"'and Train I "B" Radiation Monitoring Systems were restored'tn operable
~
status respectively.
For this event, the following Technical Specifications apply:
3.3.3.1, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3.3.8, Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 3.3.3.9, Radioactive Gaseous Effluent Monitoring I Instrumentation 3.4.6.1, Reactor Coolant System Leakage-Detection Systems PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES There were no adverse consequences resulting from this event as the applicable action statements of the previously identified Technical Specifications were' met in all cases.
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Mr. James P. O'Reilly LER No.82-065 Page Three January 21, 1983 i
CAUSE(S) OF THE OCCURRENCE While performing maintenance, a test fixture was plugged into Radiation Monitor RM-A14. Believing that the test fixture required a power source, maintenance personnel connected a 120 VAC power supply to the test fixture.. In fact, the radiation monitor supplied power to the test fixture. This. created a short circuit and caused a loss of power to the Train "A" Radiation Monitoring System.
i In investigating the loss of power for the Train "A" RMS, a
' technician accidently short circuited his test lead on-the Train "B" RMS power supply. This occurred as the test lead' short circuited the AC power filter to the chasis causing the power fuses to blow.
The power for the Train "A" RMS was restored approximately.
thirteen (13) minutes after the loss of power for the Train "B" RMS occurred.
IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN The applicable Technical Specifications were identified and. ,
i corrective action was initiatedAlso, to fulfill the associated' investigaticn was l'
action statement requirements.
initiated to determine the mode of'the power failure for.the monitors. The power was restored as soon as possible to the.
i entire RMS.
Since the cause of failure on both trains was known and l
recognizing that replacing the power fuses would~ restore the
! equipment to operable status, an unusual event was not'
, declared. The unit remained stable in Mode 2 throughout-the ,
event.
All channels were promptly " source checked" once power was-restored and determined to be " operable".
ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE Technicians involved with the event were counseled-(l) to be i
sure they were familiar with the test equipment that they.were j
working with and (2) to ensure that when maintenance is being performed on one train of equipment, the operability of the remaining train is not jeopardized. The licensee considers j
thin event to be a learning experience and~ plans no further ,
actions.
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