ML20028F196
| ML20028F196 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1982 |
| From: | Fitzgerald J, Matakas R, Shepherd R NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028F192 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-272-1-82-070, 50-272-1-82-70, NUDOCS 8301310250 | |
| Download: ML20028F196 (31) | |
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US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS DOCUMENT C0VER SHEET 4.
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The attached document / report has not been reviewed
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pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 6 2.790(a) exemptions nor has any exempt material been deleted.
Do not disseminate' nor discuss its contents outside NRC.- Treat as "0FFICIAL USE ONLY".
ursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.790(a), the attached docu-yment/ report has been reviewed and all exempt material except proprietary has been deleted. This document /re-port is suitable for dissemination to licensee, vendor, etc., for a proprietary review.
The attached documert/ report is in PDR fom.
3 DATE:
NOV 1 S 1982 8301310250 830118 PDR ADOCK 05000272 O
e NOV t 81997 0FFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS -.
DATE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION -
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TIT'LE:
Salem Unit 1 Nuclear Generating Station Mispositioning of AC Output Breaker Switch SUPPLEMENTAL:
DN 50-272 CASE NUMBER:
1-82-070 CONTROL 0FFICE:
Philadelphia STATUS:
Closed REPORTING 0FFICE:
Philadelphia STATUS:
Closed PERIOD OF INVESTIGATION:
August 9 ' September 14, 1982 M
REPORTING INVESTIGATOR:
R. A. Matakas, Investigator Philadelphia Field Office PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL:
R. E. Shepherd, Acting Director Philadelphia Field Office Daniel Murphy', Investigator Atlanta Field Office T. L. DiGaloma, Investigator OI:HQ Gregory C. Smith, Physical Security Inspector NRC Region I J. M. Dunlap, Physical Security Inspector NRC Region I
[./QC2 nMhav REVIEWED BY:
pa Jt. E. Shepherd, Acting' Director s
t Philadelphia Field Office, OI d
APPROVED BY:
/A.j, A
Jamss A. Fitzgerjld, Acting Director Office of Investigations
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SUMMARY
This investigation was initiated to determine the circ sta es surrounding 4 2. loss of 115V control power to the Number 11 Steam Generator Feed Pump at the Sale,m, Unit 1 Nuclear Generating Station on August 9, 1982.
Licensee response'to the problem determined that the AC output breaker switch on the Number 12 Essential Control Inverter, located in the Unit 1 Relay Room, was in the "off" position and had caused the loss of power. The loss of power resulted in the Control Room manually scramming the unit which, at the time, g
was operating at 100% power. Subsequent licensee overload testing of the
.2:' 1 breaker determined that the breaker was functional and correctly positioned j
itself in the open, " trip", position when overloaded, thus indicating that on 1
August 9,1982, the breaker had been manually opened in the "off" position, causing loss of power.
Access to the Unit 1 Relay Room is controlled by personnel key card readers which document (recording security computer clock time) a computerized history of personnel entering the room.
However, no record is made of when personnel o
depart the room.
Personnel interviews and a review of personnel access histories identified five individuals (two fire watches, two maintenance personnel and one security guard) as being in the Relay Room within apprax-imately five minutes of the opening of the breaker.
Three of the five individuals (the security guard and the two maintenance personnel) had both entered and exited the room within this approximate five minute time period and reported that no one had " tailgated" them into the room upon their entrance / departure.
Personal card access histor7es of the two fire watches document both of tiiem as entering the Relay Room approximately twenty-two minutes preceding the event and either one or both of the fire watches verified both the entrance and departure of the three aforementioned individuals.
The fire watches departed the Relay Room together, after the departure of the above three individuals.
Four of the five aforementioned individuals provided sworn statements denying knowledge and/or culpability regardicg the mispositioning of the AC output breaker.
The remaining individual 6 denied knowledge and/or culpability; however, he declined to execute a sworn statement or be further intervio ed regarding the incident. This @ m a employment at the Salem Nuclear station was subsequently terminated due to an unrelated ir.cident p q m ; x,:, = :
G 25 The Q % % M voluntarily terminated employment on August 30, 1982, ror unknown reasons.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Camden, New Jersey office, participated in the initial screening interviews conducted during this investigation and has been apprised of the information contained in this report.
This investigation is submitted " closed" due to a lack of investigative leads; however, if new substantive information should surface, the FBI will be immediately notified and the investigation reopened.
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F II.
DETAILS A.
Purpose of Investigation w.y The purpose of this investigation was to first determine if the AC output bre'aker was mispositioned due to mechanical failure or to determine if it was manually mispositioned.
Second, if the breaker was manually mispositioned, to determine culpability.
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B.
Background
On August 9, 1982, the NRC, Region I, was notified by the Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) that the Salem Nuclear Generating
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Station, Unit 1, had been manually tripped at approximately 1600 as a 7~
respit of a loss of power to the Number 11 Steam Generator Feed Pump.
The licensee indicated that the event may have been a result of
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deliberate tampering with a circuit breaker.
Accordingly, NRC Security Inspector, G. C. Smith, was dispatched to the site.
The NRC, Region I, Director, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs, T. T. Martin, 38, was notified and also responded to the site.
On the morning of August 10, 1982, at the NRC Region I office, T. T.
Martin, supra, briefed the reporting investigator and the Acting Director, Office of Investigations, Philadelphia Field Office, R. E.
Shepherd, of the event, stating essentially the following: The event appeared to have been caused by an unidentified individual (s) manually mispositioning the AC output breaker on the Number 12 Essential Control
)
Inverter (located in the Unit 1 Relay Room) to the "off" position.
The breaker was overload tested subsequent to the incident, and was found to be functional, opening in the " trip" position.
Both contractor and PSE&G personnel had key card access to the Relay Room and Inspector G. C,
Smith, supra, was still at the site and could provide Relay Room access..,
information.
The licensee had notified the FBI, Camden, New Jersey -
office, of the event and they would also be responding to the site on this date.
At approximately 1030, August 10, 1982, the reporting investigator met with inspector Smith at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station.
Smith advised that the Unit 1 Relay Room has two access doors (#41 and #133) where each authorized person entering must use his assigned key card to gain entrance.
He said this security system can be breached if an-individual, who does not have a key card or fails to use his key card, enters through one of the access doors immediately behind an individual who gains access by using his key card.
He said the key card releases the locking mechanism on the security door for approximately twenty seconds (before a security alarm sounds) which would allow other in-dividuals to " tailgate" in. He said a security computer records (by time) those individuals entering the room using their assigned key cards.
He said a key card is not used when exiting the room and no recorded computer time is maintained on individuals exiting the room.
He said that card access histories for Dcors #41 and #133 identified twenty nine individuals who used their key cards to enter the Unit 1 Relay Room between 1400 and the time of the incident (approximately 1600).
He said computer histories run on each individual eliminated twenty of the twenty nine individuals as being in the Relay Room at the time of the event.
He said these twenty individuals were eliminated when a review of their individual access histories recorded them as entering into another key
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card area (other than the Unit 1 Relay Room) prior to the time of the event.
He identified the remaining nine individuals as follows: EUCEP]I 4
Y~3 ty [n,itR 21:;6 % u w f LM 5d? Q }=Qf.m :k gn+,y.p;M W @G xy sy3v'nv%.sw r-y. Jcym :1
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E]D la On August 10, 1982, screening interviews of the nine aforementioned individuals were conducted by reporting investigator, Investigator R. E.
Shepherd, Security Inspector J. M. Dunlap, and FBI Agents Tom Tierney, John Camera and John Sharp.
These interviews did not identify any definite suspects; however, the interviews indicated that N 6ATsaw d r.v _ m c n + % ;c.; departed the Relay Room prior to the mispositioning of tne circuit breaker.
Subsequent detailed interviews g
25 with the five remaining individuals (reported infra), verified that the four aforementioned individuals were not in the Relay Room after 1555.
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Recorded Time AC Output Breaker was Mispositioned u ;.=;;r.x:wwy.:L:. ;a. ;:-121.= _9 A = = = = =*= "
Qgy.4w ro.m. v.w w m a w s y_was_ interviewed by the reporting investigator on August 13, 1982.T5ss2L7 stated that the Prodac 250 computer (data logger for Unit 1) recorded the time of the event
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(opening of the breaker) as 15:59:09.~ He said the AC output breaker on the' Number 12 Essential Controls Inverter provides power to the Number 12 Miscellaneous AC Panel in the Control P:sm.
He said when the output breaker is opened, it causes a loss of Il5V control power to the Number 11 Steam Generator Feed Pump. He said the 15:59:09 time that was 3
recorded on the Control Room Prodac 250 computer was recorded instantaneously with the mispositioning of the AC output breaker. He said that on the night of the event (August 9, 1982) he was telephonically requested to provide the official Control Room time of the event. Accordingly, he reported the time as 15:59.
A copy of the Prodac 250 printout, recording the time of the event as well as other pertinent events that will be referred to later, is Exhibit 1.
d to th night of August 9,1982, NRC Inspector G. C. Smith requested a time check to record the difference (if any) between the security computer time and.
s the Control Room time.
Accordingly,(lllE)saidhecontactedtheCentral
?T a.-
Alarm Station (CAS) and requested that they contact the Shift Supervisor ggps===en-dj a71d document the difference in times between the Control Rcem computer clock and the securiyt computer clock. dEf!E)said the difference in times was documented to the nearest minute with the security computer time being tw'o minutes faster than the Control Room computer time.
(INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
Since the security clock only reads to the nearest minute, in actuality it could have been anywhere from 01:01 to 02:59 faster than the Control Room' clock which recorded the exact time of the incident to the second. Accordingly, the security clock, which recbrds times of personnel access into vital areas, could have been reading anywhere from 16:'00 to 16:02 at the time of the incident.
Security clock time to the second would have been between 16:00:10 and 16:02:08.
Since personnel access times are based on security computer time, all times referred to hereinaf ter in this report will reflect security computer time unless stated otherwise. Accordingly, the time of the event will be referred to as having occurred between 16:00-02.)
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D.
Examination of Unit 1 Relay Room The Unit Number 1 Relay Room was examined by the reporting investigator on August 10, 1982.
The Relay Room measures approximately 56' x 60' with
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control panels (about 8' high) running east and west.
They are separated
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by,two main aisles running north and south and seven main aisles running east and west.
The Relay Room is located in the Auxiliary Building and has three battery rooms located on the west side of room which are accessible only through entrance doors inside the Relay Room. The Relay Room itself has two entrance / exit doors.
Door #41 is a security key card d
door located on the east side of the room, at the 100' elevation. Door' 22
- 133 is located directly above Door #41 and is on the 113' elevation.
Door #133 is also a security key card door.
The 113' elevation consists of a small catwalk inside Door #133 with a staircase leading down to the 100' elevation.
The AC output breaker switch on the Number 12 Essential Control Inverter is located in the southwest corner of the Relay Room.
The breaker cannot be observed from either Door #41 or Door #133.
Photographs of the AC output breaker switch located on the Number 12 Essential Control Inverter were taken by the reporting investigator and.
are contained in Exhibit 2.
A diagram depicting the Unit 1 Relay Room is Exhibit 3.
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E.
Licensee Response to the Event Cf~zMrwq%a_:.w.: 5w;.we+o.w m was interviewed by the reporting investigator on August 13, 1982.
stated that he took
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over his duties as the Control Room Senior Shif Supervisor at about 1515 on 4.ugust 9, 1982.
He,said that at about 1600, Mr.rFFT%+rmE1, (EsWQQEXJgg;;.3 mentioned to him that indications on' the steain generator feea pump were erratic.
He said about 1-1 minutes later he ordered the reactor " tripped" as a result of the problem.
(Exhibit 1, the printout from the Control Rocm Prodac 250 Computer documented the c
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time of the mispositioning of the breaker switch as 15:59:09 and further recorded the time of the reactor trip as 16:01:08).
He said that shortly thereaf ter, he sent Mr.weww;uwm%m---$
down to the Relay Room to obtain alternate power to the Unit. Q advised that (QBM took Mr. Vf?:CQ &'@i$fnuysgsvgj5%
M, aiong with him to the Relay Room.
Njsala tnatE515GITosequently called him and informed him that he and M J a had found the AC output breaker on the Number 12 Essentia'i Control Inverter in the "off" position. @ said that between the time of the event and the time that alternate power was restored, there was no indication that the breaker was put back in the "on" position.
He said if it would have been.,
put back into the "on" position, Control Room indicators would have '_ T '
indicated that it had.
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.PW. advised that on the 140' elevation (roof) of the Auxiliary Buil ing ---
(wherein the Relay Room is located) there are three steam generator power operated relief valves which would have released steam shortly after the reactor was manually tripped (16:01:08 Prodac Computer time).
N said that after the event had taken place, he subsequently learned That Mr. N was the first individual who observed the A-36 Overhead Annunciator in the Control Room give indication that there was a problem in the Relay Room and that after making the observation, M i
responded to the Relay Room. @ said he subsequently asked ILt94lFER if he W@ had touched the breaker and that @ responded that he had not touched anything. @ indicated that his reason for the question was to determine if the breaker had overloaded and opened in the " trip" position and he thought that M may have instinctively positioned the breaker in the "off" position when he discovered it.
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Mr.@gsisimpQiw9sagggg: Mig. i was interviewed by the reporting investigator on Y E, W 62. Mr.EI M 7d3 advised that on August 9, 1932 he worked in the Unit 1 Control Room ai the Shift Technical Advisor from approximately 1515 until 2315.
He said that at approximately
- 0e00 someone in the Control Room (whose identity he could not recall).
rentioned that indications on the steam generator feed pump were errat_ic.
He Q ? g D said he mentioned this fact to both Mr. O and Mr. F @ Prodae said that just prior to the reactor being manually tripped (16:01:08 computer time), he told Mr. Q y that he g y g was coing down to the.
Relay Room and check the vital instrument bus inverters. COLrM said'that it took him about one minute to get down to the Unit 1 Relay Room f. rom the Control Room.
He said he entered the Relay Room via Door #133 (the card access history for Door #133 indicates thatsaar-ass:E? entered the Relay Room
. He said his first thoughts werc'that someone may have accidently at 16:04).
shut off a' breaker so he looked around +he Relay Room and the adjoining battery rooms, but did not see anyone.
ne.said he briefly looked at the row of inverters, including the Number 12 Ins rter, concentrating his attention 'on the gauges.
He said that all the gauges appeared to be reading normal.
He said he then exited the Relay Room via Door #41 and got on the elevator which is located next to Door #41 (see Exhibit 3). 'He said.a heavyset white male wearing a T-shirt and a yellow fire watch hat was already. on the elevator.
He said he took the elevator down to the 84' elevation and entered 'the switch ~ T~
. He said,he neither t'ouched nor gear room looking for tripped breakers.
noticed the pnsition of any of the breaker swi.tches in the Unit 1 Relay Room. -
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Mr. GMw&Is-32ffgpli;&2.::.wwwwA4;g was interviewed on A; gust 13, 1982 by the reporting investigator. #27W. reported that on August 9,1982, he worked as the Salem Unit 1 Control Room Shift Supervisor from about 1500 until about 2300.
He said that at approximately 1600 on August 9, 4982,' Mr. p6?wcmq came into his of fice and informed him tha.t there was
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an inverter prooiem witn Unit 1.
E3;Iq said thatt,;feId74Q told him that he Q23Q was going down to the Relay Room to " check things out". (yd
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said that about ten minutes after the Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped, he, along with E;.s:sthmM3 and an8E9FMr+.v6;FdKn?.D,VJfD, went down to the Unit 1 Relay Room to' attempt to oetermine wnat tne problem was and to obtain alternate power. M said that after entering the Relay Room, Q
.2 N found the AC output breaker cn the Humber 12 Essential Control Inverter in the "off" position. M said that when Mtold him about the breaker switch, he w w ssi verified that the breaker was in'the "of f" position and not in the " trip" position.
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Mr. 0:wMg,2ffhiSFt.GWiiWiAWgisiX5r%%.3p:pg was interviewed on 12, 1982 by tne reporting investigator. G9M M advised that on ~~
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He said that at about August August 9, 1982, he worked from 0700 until midnight.tified by the Control Room that U
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..1600, his maintenance of fice was no reactor had been " tripped" and that the Unit had an inverter problem.
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W res% $ said that he proceeded to the Control Room where Mr. m g.t e;2af3 (d$$4223"5E) told him that one of the essential inverters had tripped.
said that CffE R5*]then sent him, vmsrggfg and an operator
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(whose toentity he could not recall) down to the Relay Room to restore alter-He said O.ey entered the Unit 1 Relay Room via Door #41 at 1614.
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He said that when he entered the Relay Room he noticed that three individuals nate power.
were inside standing near the door. R y g Joentified the individuals as
@3rIsm!!ah@ut could not provide their pnysical descriptions (key card s
access histories identify 9tm,9,;q,7qf).g,W"h3 as reentering the Relay Room at 1606 and ".:pMTz'@ hic?mmlfL1 as reentering th Room at 1613). M ' M-Number 12 Essential Control Inverter and noticed that the breaker swi He said he did not attempt to place the appeared to be in the "off" positiori. switch in the "on" position because.h with one of the other components that the inverter supplies power to.
@ emphasized that the breaker switch was definitely in the "off" He position and not in the " trip" position when he initially observed it.
provided a drawing, Exhibit 4, depicting the three positions.of the breaker...;
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switch.
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' concluded by stating that after the discovery of the breaker s
' EQ and the operator went down to the 84' elevation cf the Auxiliary Building and energized the alternate power supply.
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F.
Licensee Testing of the Mispositioned Breaker Switch
.-...,_..m 12, 1982, during the interview with Mr.NYem.:-cH(see..
On August page 11) he provided the following information regarding the functional overload testing that he performed on the Number 12 Essential Control uc -.
-Inverter AC output breaker. M reported that on the night of Xugust 9, 1982, he removed the aforementioned breaker from its control panel and ran a total of about four or five " trip tests".
He said that the purpose of the tests was to determine the physical position that the breaker switch would taks when overloaded and to further determine if the breaker was " functional".
He said the tests were completed between about
.a 1730 and 1745.
He said that the tests determined that the breaker was functional and that it opened in the " trip" position when overloaded.
He said that at no time did the switch open in the "off" position as shown in his drawing (Exhibit 4). He said that after completing the tests, he reinstalled the breaker into the Number 12 Inverter and ran an inverter alignment check.
He said that his check determined that the inverter was
" balanced within its normal operating range".
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Interviews with the Five Individuals Identified as being in the Unit G.
Relay Room Within Five Minutes of the Mispositioning of the AC Output Breaker Exhibit 5 is a graph depicting the time of the event in relationship to
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the.following five individuals who had access to the Relay Room within Access times were determined by personnel five minutes of the event.
interviews and a review of card access histories applicable to the Unit 1 Relay Room access Doors #41 and #133.
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Mr. uwmK?w2qqrgsice_w E@ at the Salem Nuclear Gene- ] ting Station, was interviewed by the reporting investigator on August 16 and 17, 1982. LarrsM1said that he entered the Unit 1 Relay Room at 1556 while conduE~ ting'his routine security rounds.
He said two fire watches
. m (whose names he did not know) were already inside the room when he
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c entered.
He said that he did not observe anyone else inside th'e room.
He 's' aid that he stayed inside the room for about two or three minutes before departing via Door #41 on the 100' elevation.
He said the two fire watches remained inside the Relay Room after his departure. He said he then went up to the 113' elevation and conducted a routine key card check on Door #133 Mkey card access history shows that he 2-'
inserted his card into the Door #133 key card reader at 1600).
He said he did not enter the room on this occasion.
He said he got back on the elevator (which is located right next to Door #133) and proceeded back down to the 100' elevation. He said that ce this elevation the elevator is located next to Door #41 (see Exhibit 3) and when the elevator opened, the two fire watches whom he had observed in the Relay Room got on the elevator ana indicated that they were going up to the roof of the q
Auxiliary Building on the 140' elevation. lllllgg said he get off tha elevator en the 122' elevation and continued his key card reader check M key card access history shows that he key carded Doors #45 and
- 12 at 1601). GEggq[Qldenied any knowledge of the mispositioning of the AC output breaker switch.
A copy of his sworn statement setting forth additional details is Exhibit 6.
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Mr.{Aw?pgE?A2A.Q2FfEIFiM'ELEYN%gy, was interviewed by the reporting investigator on August 1,
!G2 in tne presence of un-ueza
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tij;;qm=L M,Trgg' 6xgj3 stated that he entered Unit 1_ Relay Room at 1559 on August 9, 1982, along with g.w w c c a g sc.- w w g.
.y
' ri, He said that after about a minute or a minute and one nalf, they realized
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that, they were in the wrong Relay Room and departed.
He said that he did not' recall seeing anyone inside the Unit 1 Relay Room.
He said that after departing the Unit 1 Relay Room, he and R e m w ent to the Unit 2 Relay Room which was their original intent when they mistakenly entered the Unit 1 Relay Room.
(Both gf;.pyfus.;asemy key card access history show them as entering the Unit 2 Relay Room at 1603), 6
.M denied any knowledge of the mispositioning of the AC output breaker switch.
A copy of his sworn statement' setting forth additional details is Exhibit 7.
g:rcpggp3 (INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: Mr.g
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- ECym.gadmim--.=.x,JeFm New Jersey.
He said that his firm has been retained by the 1.B.t.W. uni n at_ the Salem Nuclear Generat.ing Station, which referred his firm to P N - - d -
,g.pgregardingthismatter.
Regarding the interviews wit
@dgpfy$LWhaziasaid he would be representing the interests of i/
h2Mid h and he was not representing the interests of the union.); -
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Mr. ter. arm 4rwAT,pewsganza.,Wa was interviewed by the-reporting investigator on August ~ 17, 1982 in the presence of M
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n.;ng.cr.m 74 ; M.h M rovided essentially the same infor-
~1$1/$ $ $ (previously reported).
A copy of M mation as did sworn statement is Exhibit 8.
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i Mr. (grLWZEfts.ziesagry6mdemployed at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station by LPL lecnnical Services, was interviewed by the-
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reporting investigator and participating investigator Murphy on August stated that he entered the Unit 1 Relay Room along 12, 1982. qq with WN+p#Dehw21 at 1538 on August 9,1982. _He said eir2he left th'et sometime just prior to leaving the Relay Room withr gpMalone near Door #41 while' he cuess made his N rounds He said that during in the Relay Room and the adjoining battery rooms.
this time he did not observe anyone else in the Relay Room or the battery
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rooms. gdenied any knowledge of the mispositioning of the AC
- -T output breaker switch. A copy of his sworn statement setting forth additional details is Exhibit 9.
(INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
On August 31, 1982 the licensee informed the erminated his employment on August reporting investigator that @)
30, 1982 for unknown reasons.
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O Mr. figy 50Mede:%p vr+: 3 employed at the Salem Nuclear x-Generating Station by LPL Technical Services, was interviewed by pcrticipating investigator Murphy and the reporting investigator on August 12, 1982. pg;tated that he entered the Unit 1 Relay Room
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rN along with imur#d4@&-wmn-im at 1538 on August 9,1982.
Mw confirmed the entrance and exit from the Relay Room of M
.QQ and EQ prior to his departure withMS He denied any knowTedge of the mispositioning of the AC output breaker switch.
(INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE: @ appeared to be extremely nervous and upset during the interview.
He was reluctant to execute a sworn statement and agreed to meet again with the interviewing investigators on the following day for the purpose of executing a sworn statement.)
On August 13, 1982, the interviewing investigators again met with M 2'?1 who told the investigators that he did not want to talk with them anymore and he declined to execute a sworn statement.
Based on the information thatWhad provided to the interviewing investigators on August 12, 1982, partic.ipating investigator Murphy had prepared a sworn statement 4
for M review and signature.
This unsigned statement is Exhibit 10.
(INVESTIGATOR'S NOTE:
The licensee subsequently advised that M employment at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station was terminated during the week of August 15, 1982, as a result of an unrelated incident g l
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H.
Interviews with the ( Ttf?/tz-f:.w EsTReT E T W 3 -Eid.,u2cg O m 6 x i Mr. EQ%fgf9'jj{ij. hgggggggi m gs was interviewed by the reporting investigator on August 16, 1982.
M stated that he is both Qgg.jpgtETgg?USFL: pus } nowever, he saf d he y
@, $ w. was ori auty on August 9, 1982. He said that on this date QQ$}),,he Auxiliary Building, to include the Unit 1 Rela as assigned as ps-jr l*a?5 Mon Dost #3 which covers the Unit 1 side or t He saidfrmwas assigned c.t.w.: d6)on Post #4 which covers the Unit 2 side of the Auxiliary Building. He said tha required to make rounds of their respective posts once each nour, in-He said if M finishes his rounds before the one hour time period, he is supposed to stay somewhere in the area; however, he does not have to stay on his post.
He said that he has not had any disciplinary problems with in the past but '
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@ did not provide any a ditiona pertinent information.
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Mr.EizK8TCmaamq gmwrg a.wxT-;w~ m@ was interviewed by the reporting investigator on August 16, 1982. N said that he supervises both worked for him on the 0800 pgwgw.mengand that both individuals 1630 shift on Augu'st 9, 1982. He said that s
e'. both individuals are relatively new PSE&G hires and neither ind_ividual is very, familiar with the Salem Plant lavout.
He said that LWMAtarted -
working in the PSE&G maintenance department on April 16, 1982 andwww
(@ NDlc%M Mi_lM&M."/ REM %7%'s e @ h '"*1 He cescribed botn lnoiviouais as " good workers" adding that he has not had
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any disciplinary problems with either individual.
.:.-r U@@i8 QwhoMidentified as a first class electrician.,said that on August Q
He said that0EEPH4 had previously run some cable from the Unit 2 Relay Room to the Unit 2 Control Room and that on August 9EGEEZP3 asked 8PN%Mto provide him with the " cable tag" from the job. Of35. Maid that at about J530Nsent CWito retrieve the cable tag.
He said that p2m3 askedW to gfwith him and they mistakenly went to the wrong 5
Relay loom.
He explained that he mainly assigns both @ and @
to jobs in the Auxiliary Building Turbine Room because they are not knowledgeable enough to do work on their own in the Relay Rooms. He said that to his knowledge, both w p +2,-
.+Mes-have only been in either Relay Room on, at the most, three or tour occasions and in these instances they were working with either a first or second class electrician. g did not provide any additional pertinent information.
e k
e 20
4 -
5 M E eT3.at the Salem Nuclear..__
@ T gg m er sm-rtM or 2
~
Generating Station, was interviewed by t,he_ reporting investigator on August 11, 1982. wa.wGsaid that he is(Bryant's direct Supervisor and on
~
1400 - 2200 shift. M said August 9,1982, he andMM worked the that on August 9 ( L M was assigned to Post Number 6 which included the He said that part of @ responsibilities would
,1) nit 1 Relay Room.'have been to make both nuclear and non-nuclear vital door c He said he has never had any aisciolinary problems with@ @ did not provide any additional pertinent information
.a 9
h i
l l
f 21
I.
Contact with the Federal Bureau of Investication (FBI):.m,y2m _..
Special Agent John Camera, FBI Office, Camden, New Jersey, has been kept- - --
apprised of information contained in this report and he requested that a copy of this report be provided to his office.
By separate
^
correspondence to the NRC dated September 14, 1982, Special Agent Camera advised that his office did not anticipate further FBI investigative effort regarding the mispositioning of the Salem Unit 1 AC output breaker switch.
2 e
O f
e e
9 22
III.
STATUS OF INVESTIGATION
--. - -. _. _. j.,...,,.
This investigation is submitted " closed" due to the lack of logical E~ iavestigative leads; however, if new. substantive information should surface, the F.Bb will be immediately notified and this investigation reopened.
i 4
I i
a
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l i
I 2
l 4
4 3
J 23
F IV.
EXHIBITS 1.
Prodac-250 Printout /8-9-82.-
__c ry -
2.
2 Photos of AC Output Breaker /8-10-82
,v 3.
Sketch of Unit 1 Relay Room /9-14-82 4.
Sketch Depicting Positions of AC Breaker Switch /8-12-82
.:a.
5.
Unit 1 Relay Room Personnel Access Graph /9-14-82 6.
Sworn Statement 8L6'8-31-82 7.
Sworn Statement - M/8-31-82 8.
Sworn Statement -N8-31-82 j
9.
Sworn Statement - W /8-12-82 10.
Statement - g (unsigned)/8-13-82
~
e e
24
1549 8/09 SALEM :
RESTORE IGNORED DEVICE IN SERVICE 1550 o 14 RCL LO TAVG PRT 1RP F0460D=
1, SET 1350 G/09 SALEM i b
cT5 TW T RE N;. ;10928 ADDED e1lc a p 60 c.
1550 8/09 LEM i TW TREND,00929 ADDED
.a iSSO 8/09 SALEM i TW TREND,00930 ADDED 1: '.i 1551 8/09 SALEM i g
TW TREND,UU931 ADDED 9
Y2614D=
0,N1 HI 1559 C 11 SGFP TURBINE I,NB BRG VIB 1559 C 1 SGFP TURBJ.NE ouT BRG EXCENTY - Y2620D= ~~0, NT' Itf -%
g N
ll TW E W 5 em A-<
(m t 1
s T6 F p.
SED OF EVENTS AT 5:59:09 0000* Y26090=1 12'bbF TURBINE HRH STOP VA CLOSED - -
w LO4200=
1, SET 12 STM GEN LO L VL 3 PRT TRP 1600
- LO420D=
1, SET 12 STM GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP 1600 C SED OF EVENTS AT 16:00:2a GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET 0000* LO4200=1 12 SIN GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET 0244* LO4200=1 12 GTM 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET 0601* LO441D=1 4 PR1 TRP SET 12 STM GEN LO LVL 0609* LO421D=1 12 STN GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET u
06607 LO421D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SE1 0672* LO441D=1 12 STN GEN LO' LVL 4 PRT TRP SET 0707* LO421D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT 1RP SET 0714* LO441D=1 TRP SET 13 STN GEN Lo LUL 3 PRT 0746* LO4400=1 0756* LO4410=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT 1RP SET 0790* LO421D=1 12 STN GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET 0061* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PR1 TRP SET 0890* LO441D=1 id STN GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET TRP SET 12 ST M GEN LO.LVL 4 PRT 0937* LO421D=1 TRP SET 13 STN GEN Lo LVL 3 PRT 0937* LO440D=1 1004* LO421D=1 12 Sin GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET 13 STN GEN LO LVL 3 PRI TRP SET 1271* LO440D=1 1275* LO441D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRI 1RP SET Nd4 JUG = 1 14 STN GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET EXHIBIT 1
1-I r; SEO OF EVENTS AT 16:00:23
. I 0000* LO420D=1 12 STP. GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET 0244* LO420D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET
[;
()
0601* LO441D=1 13 STM GEN LO LUL 4 PRT TRP SET Af d 0409* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PR1 TRP SET 1{'
0660* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET Q$
()
0672* LO441D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SE1 T-0707* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET if 0714* LO441D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT 1RP SET
[i
() = 1.,
0746m LO4400=1 13 STM GEN Lo LVL 3 PRT TRP SET 0756* LO441D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET
]{
07'9'0* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET
.)) '
(;
0861* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET g[
0890* LO441D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET y$PE
.-)
,F 0937* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET
(}
0937* LO440D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 5 PRT TRP SET
%F 1004* LO421D=1 12 STM GEN LO LUL 4 PRT TRP SET
)[
1271* LO440D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET B3
(;-
1275* LO441D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PR1 TRP SET 1200* LO461D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET
, i)t '
t (j
1600
- 1. SET, if L; -
$b f-
$h,j SEQ OF EVENTS AT 16:00:46 P
0000* LO461D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PR1 TRP SET lgs ei 0027* LO4610=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET Q%
(;.
0070* LO401D=1 11 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PR1 TRP SET
,{
0101* LO461D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT IRP SET 7.] (;
0237* LO401D=1 11 STM GEN LO'LVL 4 PRT 1RP SET A-0295* LO461D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET 73 ]
0338* LO461D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET
') (;,
0342* LO401D=1 11 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET 8
0379* LO440D=1 13 STM GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET 0379* LO461D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET j
0424* LO401D=1 11 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET
- j (' -
0460* 'LO401D=1 11 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP S'ET
_q
"~ 0490* E040IDel 11-STMW C0 EVt 4 PRT TRF11T ~~ '
~ - "
~
N@
0516* LO4610=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT TRP SET 0540* t0461D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT 1RP SET 0504* LO4010=1 11 STM GEN L0 LVL 4 PRT TRP SET
,MO 633* LO401D=1 11 STM GEN LO LVL 4 PRT 1RP SE1
- 2. 7LO
-O sr I
1600
1, SET
_jfC 0755* LO460D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET J
.-OC{}
t%'
Ed C)
ih i
SEQ OF EVENTS A 16:00:59 Fi 0000* LO400D=1 11 Sin GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET ST
()
0114* LO460D=1 14 STM GEN LO LVL 3 PRT TRP SET
0150* LO4000=1 11 STM GEN L0 LVL 3 PRT IRP SET 0439* LO424D=
i2 OTM C 3 L^ L^ L '
" T TRTP 4P SET gw Q
I 0550* Y20040=. n BINE TRIP CONS 01F 0551* Y2003D=1 lVRBINE 1 RIP 1 RIP O
554* Y200SD=1 TURBINE REh0TE ErlERG TRIP TRIP OS60T.LO4240=1 12 STM GEN LO LO L 3 PRT 1RP SET 0563* YO390D=1 REACTOR TURBINE TRIP +P7 TRIP (3
0565C YO393D=1 TURBINE STOP VA 13 CLOSED
L-
. mi INIP inAP 0554* 12005D=1 1UR31NE REMOTE ENERG TRIP TRIP
'0360x L D 4 :l4 D = 1 12 STM ' EN LO L O L 3 PRT 1RP SE1 G
05630 V03?QD=1 REACTOR TURBINE TRIP OP7 TRIP
()
0565C YO393D=1 TURBINC STOP VA 13 CLOSED 0567C YO391D=1 TURBINE STOP VA 11 CLOSED 0569C YO394D=1 TURBINE STOP VA 14 CLOSED
()
0S73* Y0006D=0 REACTOR MAIN TRIP BKR A TRIP 0573*
Y00070=0 REACTOR MAIN TRIP BMR P. TRIP 0573* F0426D=1 12 STM LNE HI F 1 SI PRT TRP SET
()
l 0573* F0427D=1 12 STM LNE HI F 2 SI PRT TRP SET i
0573* F0446D=1 13 STM LNE HI F 1 SI PRT TRP SET C573* F04470=1 13 STM LNE HI F 2 SI PRT 1RP SET
()
0573* F.04660=1 14 STM LNE HI F 1 SI PRT TRP SET 0574* F0407D=1 11 STM LNE HI F 2 SI PRT TRP SET 7
u.
.O SEQ OF EVENTS AT 16:01:08 i
1601 OR 1 RIP 0000* h 4Dn-1-+ FbTM LNE HI l
F 2 SI PRT TRP SET g) 0000C YO3920=1 TURBINE STOP VA 12 CLOSED 0013* Y9031D=1 PWR RNG CHAN HI Q RATE REACTOR 1 RIP 0013* Y90320=1 PWR RNG CHAN 1 HI Q RATE PRT TRP SET y
i 0013* Y9033D=1 PWR RNG CHAN 2 HI Q RATE PRT 1RP SET 0013* Y9034D=1 PWR RNG CHAN 3 HI Q RATE PRT TRP SET 00135 Y9035D=1 PWR RNG CHAN 4 HI Q RATE PRT TRP SET.
)
0020* LO426D=1 12 STM GEN LO LO L REACTOR TRIP 0020* LO423D=1 12 STM GEN LO Lo L 1 PRI 1RP SET 0022* LO425D=1 12 STM GEN LO LO L 4 PRT TRP SET 3
0022* LO443D=1 13 STM GEN LO LO L 1 PRT TRP SET 0025C Y2605D=1 11 AUX FW PUMP START /
0025C Y26060=1 12-AUX-Fr PUMP-START j,j -',
)
0034* F0426D=1 12 STM LNE HI F 1 SI PRT TRP SET 0037* F0466D=1 14 STM LNE HI F 1 SI PRT TRP SET 0038* F04670=1 14 STM LNE HI F 2 SI PRT TRP SET
)
0040* F0446D=1 13 STM LNE HI F 1 SI PRT 1RP SET 0040* F04470=1 13 STN LNE.HI F 2 SI PRT TRP SET 0040* F04660=1 14 STM LNE HI F1 SI PRT 1RP SET 0040* F04670=1 14 STN LNE HI F2SI PRT TRP SET 0042* F0426D=1 12 STM LNE HI F1 SI PR1 TRP SET 0043* F04070=1 11 6TN LNE HI F 2 SI PRT TRP SET 0043* F0427D=1 12 STM LNE HI F 2 SI PRT TRP SET
.0044* F04660=1 14 STM LNE HI F 1 SI PRT TRP SET 0045* LO405D=1 11 STM GEN LO LO L 4 PRT 1RP SET 1601 C 14 STM GEN LO F 1 PRT TRP F0464D=
0, RESET s'
SER OF EVENTS AT 16:01:17 l
0000* LO4060=1 11 STM GEN LO LO L REACTOR TRIP 0000* LO446D=1 13 STM GEN LO LO L REACTOR 1 RIP ir 0000* LO4660=1 14 STN GEN LO LO L REACTOR TRIP
' hl 0000C N0020D=0 INTERM RNGE 1 HI O REACTOR HT TRP kh//
I
'f),h 0000C N0021D=0 INTERN RNGE 2 HI O REAC TOR NT TRP h
0000* NOO11D=0 PUR RNG 1 P10 PRT PRM RESET 0000* NOO120=0 PWR RNG 2 P10 PRT PRM RESET 0000* N0013D=0 PWR RNG 3 P10 PRI PRM RESET 0000M N00140=0 PWR RNG 4 P10 PRT PRM RESET 0000M F0495D=0 PUR RNG 1 PC PR1 PRM RESET 0000i' : 04960=0 PUR RNG 2 PG PRT PRn RESET 0000* FMo
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. 51 ART-RUN 5 WITCH RUN EXHIBIT 2 O
~ ~ ~
/
BATTER)
N" BITTERY R00,
- ~~/
BATTERY R00'i
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D0OR f41 ELEVATOR f
i
- j s'
UNIT 1 RELAY ROOM LNOT TO SCALE)
LOCATION OF PANALS ARE APPR0XIMATE
' ~-
~ - -
Q
{ 7,[a DOOR #133 IS LOCATED DIRECTLY AB0VE D00R #41
,k l i
4 EXHIBIT 3
c r4 H\\9Fti O oD, f
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POSITION OF BREAXER SWITCH WHEN DISCOVERED BYM
/
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EXHIBIT 4 i
i 1
UillT 1 RELAY ROOM PERS0itlEL ACCESS
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4..
D Time period wherein breaker switch was mispositioned.
g--
Represents initial entry into Relay Room #1 as recorded by Security Computer..
clock.
a Represents departure from Relay Room #1 as.detennined by interviews with- -..s' the five individuals.
\\
f */ } V NOTE: All times are Security Computer Clock times..
1 e
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4 EX!ilBIT 5 i