ML20028E114
| ML20028E114 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 01/19/1983 |
| From: | Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| ALAB-708, NUDOCS 8301200359 | |
| Download: ML20028E114 (13) | |
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UCS 1/19/83 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00CKETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION US E BEFORETHEATOMICSAFETYANDLICENSINGAPPEALBOA@ 9 P4 31 In the Matter of )
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289
) (Restart)
(Three Mlle Island Nuclear )
Station, Unit. No. 1) )
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS' RESPONSE TO ALAB-708 AND REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF SCHEDULE Request for Modification of Schedule On December 29, 1982, the Appeal Board issued ALAB-708, in which it concluded that the record does not support findings that either natural circulation or feed and bleed constitute reliable means of decay heat removal for THI-1. The Board reopened the record and ordered the Staff and the Licensee to present evidence on a variety of issues by January 26, 1983 UCS is
- permitted to present evidence. No discovery is provided. The- hearings are scheduled to begin on February 8, 1983.1#
l This is an extremely tight schedule andihe Board has posed' some very complex questions, including those that require analyses of the B&W computer '
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- code (questions 4.5,6,7) and of the RELAPS computer code (questions 10 & 11).
, 1/ This pleading was essentially completed before UCS received word by l telephone that Licensee's request for extension has been granted by the Appeal Board. Testimony is now due by February 16, 1983, and the hearing is presently scheduled to begin on March 1, 1983 r ..
8301200359 C, U O3
- . UCS is not familiar with the RELAPS code, which the Staff now apparently relies on and which the Board is willing to accept as confirmation of the viability of feed and bleed. ALAB-708, Sl. op. at 42. Nor have we reviewed the B&W Appendix K code in any detail. No opportunity for discovery has been provided. We will not know the position of the Licensee and the Staff nor the technical basis for these positions until January 26. Under these circumstances, it is simply unreasonable to expect UCS to be able to present direct testimony without knowing what these positions are and the asserted basis therefore.5# UCS therefore requests that the Board provide an opportuni.ty for UCS to file written testimony after the Staff and Licensee.
While we understand the Board's desire to move this case quickly, we remind the Board that the inadequacy in the record, and the need for reopening, is attributable to the Staff and Licensee. UCS has argued all along that the viability of feed and bleed and the boiler-condenser mode have not been demonstrated. The Staff and Licensee argued otherwise. Furthermore, it was UCS
,that drew this Board's attention to the safety implications of the Semiscale tests. ALAB-708 represents in large part a vindication of our position. The Board has now, in effect, told Licensee what it must prove on the second round in order to prevail. We are surely entitled to the opportunity to participate fully in the reopened proceeding, which is designed to give the Staff and_the .g.
2] UCS a5so has had other pre-existing obligations, a h as providing comments to the Commission on the safety implications of the lack of seismic qualification of the THI-1 EFW system, due January 7, 1983 This filing, which was served on the Appeal Board, required substantial research and required all of UCS's attention during the first week of January. ,
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Licensee yet another try at proving their cases.2 This is simply not possible on the schedule proposed by the Appeal Board. We therefore move that UCS be permitted to file direct te=timony after the Staff and the Licensee on March 16, 1983, and that the hearing sessions and deadline for proposed findings be established by the Board to follow that date.
Substantive Comments on ALAB-708
- 1. A Break in One Steam Generator Could Lead to Total loss of Feedwater.
The Board discusses on pages 13-15 of ALAB-708 the point made by UCS with respect to the safety implications of the fact that there is only one emergency feed water flow control valve for each steam generator. UCS stated that "[I]n the event of a break in one steam generator, which causes isolation of that steam generator, a single failure of the other flow control valve would cause total loss of feedwater." UCS Response to Appeal Board Memorandum and Order of November 5, 1982 " November 22, 1982, p. 2. The Board disagreed, citing the provisions for manual control of these valves. ALAB-708, S1. op. at 14 We i believe that the shorthand imprecision in our language may have misled the Board. 'lhe scenario which we had in mind is as follows:
- a. A main steam line break inside containment requires isolation of all feedwater to the affectr) steam generator to preven.t overpressurization of containment. s H. Hukill to J. Stoli.
August 2, 1982 Attachment 1, p. 1. . (This was incorporated into the Licensee's Response to Appeal Board Order of July 14, N. 1982 at 20.)
}/ The Board was not compelled to order this case to be reopened. It could have simply ruled tha' Licensee had not prevailed and that, on the record, restart should not be authorized. It would then be up to the Licensee to provide good cause why the record should be reopened.
In all other litigation of which we are aware, a party with the burden of proof who fails to prevail loses his case. The peculiarity of NRC practice is that the utilities always get another chance. This third or fourth chance certainly should not be at the prejudice of the prevailing party.
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- b. The Main Steam Line Rupture De tection System (MSLRDS) automatically isolates main feedwater to the affected steam generator as designed and isolates main feedwater to the other steam generator because of a failure in the non-safety grade MSLRDS.
- c. The operatcr ' manually isolates emergency feedwater to the affected steam generator within 20 minutes,
- d. There renlains only one flow path for emergency feedwater to the intact steam generator. A failure of the EFW flow centrol valve for that steam generator results in total loss of feedwater to both steam generators. (Note that even this failure is not the " single failure" because the flow control valve is not fully safety grade. Thus, under NRC practice, another failure could be postulated in this scenario.)
UCS believes this is a very serious safety problem. In addition, we reiterate that this precludes considering the EFW flow control capability as either safety grade or as sufficiently reliable for restart.
- 2. The Combination of Plant Procedures and Design Preclude Establishment of the Boiler-Condenser Mode and Insure that the Plant Will Enter the Feed and .
Bleed Mode.
At note 53 on page 26 of ALAB-708, the Board notes the accuracy of UCS's point that the plant procedures, which direct the operators to refill the primary system via HPI after a LOCA, will preclude the establishment of a .
condensing surface for boiler-condenser cooling.
However, the Board finds that this is insignificant because "if the primary system can be kept full, the boiler-conde.nser mode would not be needed." This observation is not dispositive of the quesAlon.
Continued operation of HPI, as demanded by the plant procedures, will raise I
primary system pressure to the safety valve setpoint, putting the system in feed and bleed. This, of course, presents the potential for a net inventory loss as demonstrated in the Semiscale tests. It may be that the Appeal Board assumes
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that a substantial loss of inventory is acceptable because the boiler-condenser l 1
mode will somehow become established. It is, however, not demonstrated on this record that, in a situation where the HPI pumps cannot make up for loss of inventory through the safety valves, the plant can safely move from feed and bleed cooling to the boiler-condenser mode. Furthermore, it is quite clear that while the operators are mandated to leave the HPI pumps running, thus initiating the sequence described above, they have not been trained on what to do from that point on.
The Appeal Board noted that, "[a]s UCS correctly points out, significant questions remain regarding the adequacy of operation training and emergency procedures for use of the high point vents." ALAB-708, Sl. op. at 21-22.
Similar questions remain concerning operator training for the circumstances just discussed. We believe that the Board should add an additional issue reflecting this concern to the eleven contained on pages 43 and 44 of ALAB-708.
3 The Existence of High Head HPI Pumps at THI-1 Does Not Remove the Concern for a Feasible Feed and Bleed Pressure Band .
On pages 37-39 or ALAB-708, the Board expressed its agreement with the Licensee that the existence of high head HPI pumps at TMI-1 eppears to remove
> the concern for a feasible feed and bleed pressure band. The Board may have-overlooked the fact that the capability to raise reactor coolant system pressure to the sa fety valves' setpoint does not alleviate the concern. "An upper pressure bound to the steady-state operating pressure band is defined by a balance between the PORY [or safety valves] average coolant removal rate and the HPIS coolant injection rate." P. North, EG&G, to R.E. Tiller, DOE, August 6, 1982, p. 2. (This was an attachment to BN-82-93.) As we noted in our original
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discussion of the Semiscale test r?;ults, there has as yet been no demonstration that the setpoint of the safety valves is less than the theoretical upper bound of the plant-specific feed and bleed pressure band for THI-1. UCS Response to Board Notification BN-82-93. . . . October 7, 1982, p. 7-8. Such a demonstration is clearly necessary.
4 The Two Conditions Set By the Board For Adequate Demonstration of Feed and Bleed Are Not Sufficient The Board stated at page 42 of ALAB-708:
We would be prepared to conclude that feed and bleed has been adequately demonstrated for THI-1, if (1) the re-analysis of the S-SR-2 test demonstrates the capabil-ity of the RELAPS computer code to predict the feed and bleed phenomenon, and (2) the code predicts that feed and bleed will successfully provide core cooling using actual THI-1 plant parameters.
UCS submits that while proof of these two propositions may be necessary preconditions for demonstrating the viability of feed and bleed, they are not sufficient. In addition, it must be proven that RELAP5, a new factor in this proceeding, is a sufficiently accurate predictor of, the behavior of THI-1. In this connection, it should be noted that the EG&G analysis indicates that there are some plant parameters that are so uncertain that the code may predict adequate cooling where, in reality, there will not be. For example, EG&G found as follows:
It is evident that plausible variations and uncertainties
' in these parameters (i.e., ECCS flow, safety valve and/or l
PORV flow, and decay heat] can lead to the elimination of I a steady-state operating pressure range.
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The inability to maintain system inventory once the PORV (or safety valves) mass flow rate dropped to reflect steam flow is subject to experimental uncertainties.
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. -g-Uncertainties exist in the actual PORV ori fice characteristics, HPIS injection rate and the measurement thereof, system heat loss, and fluid leakage.
P. North, EG&G. to R.E. Tiller, DOE, August 6, 1982,
- p. 7-8, emphasis added, footnote omitted. (This was an attachment to BN-82-93.)
Thus, the uncertainties in the actual value of critical parameters, such as heat loss, mass injection or feed rate, and mass Icss or bleed rate, are within experimental uncertainties. Furthermore, these parmaters vary with time as a function of RCS tumperature and pressure and/or steam quality of the bleed flow through the PORV, safety valves, and the small break. Therefore, a computer code may predict successful core cooling even though, in reality, adequate core ccoling may not be achieved.
Finally, it must also be proven that the RELAPS code does not suffer frcm the same deficiency as the B&W code, i.e., lack of "model verification against experimental data from a facility geometrically similar to the B&W" nuclear steam supply system used at THI-1. D.G. Eisenhut, NRC, to J.J. Mattimoe, B&W Owners Group March 25, 1982, p. 1.
l S. The Scope of this Proceeding Does Include the Question of Whether the tmergency Feedwater System is Adequately Reliable The Board stated the following at note 5 on page 7 of ALAB-708:
l The scope of this proceeding does not include seismic qualification of the EFW system. This information (BN-82-118 and BN-82-118A] does raise the possibility.
l however, that reliance may have to be placed on other plant systems to provide adequate core cooling. We do not address seismic qualification of the EFW system in this memorandum and order. That matter will be considered by the NRC Staff and the Commission outside the adjudicatory process.
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UCS is unsure of the meaning of the quoted language, and very troubled by the u .. ;on that the scope of this proceeding does not include the seismic qualification of the EFW system. The observation that the inability of the EFW system to survive an earthquake "does raise the possibility...that reliance may have to be placed on other plant systems to provide core cooling" indicates to us that the Board recognizes that the lack of reliability of the EFW system attributable to its lack of seismic qualification is clearly relevant to the question of whether adequate core cooling is provided at THI-1. Thus, UCS maintains that the lack of seismic qualification is within the scope of this proceeding. The fact that the Comtamission has received a briefing on the subject does not affect its relevance to the issues before the Appeal Board.
Indeed, its relevance to this proceeding would seem to be conceded by the Staff by the act of sending BN-82-118 to the Appeal Board.
There can be little question but that the seismic qualification of the EFW l system was a relevant factor in the reliability analysis of EFW, and was a f consideration in t 1e testimony of both the Staff and the Licensee. UCS provided l
l five examples of the relationship between this issue and the restart proceeding l
at pages 21-23 of the "Ur. ion of Concerned Scientists' Comments on the Commission's Ex Parte Meeting of December 17, 1982 and Statement of Continuing
- Objection to Ex Parte Communication," January 7, 1983 This filing'was sent to l
! the Appeal Board and the specific points will therefore not be reiterated herein. UCS will take the position that this is relevant evidence under question 9: "Whether and under what circumstances reliance on feed and bleed is I necessary at THI-1," and question 8: " Clarification of the apparent inconsistencies and confusion concerning the safety-grade status of components in the EFW system."
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- 6. The Board has Misstated the Scope of its Authcrity in this Proceeding In a discussion on pages 20 and 21 of ALAB-708, the Appeal Board opiaes that the timetables set by the Staff or Commission cannot be altered by the Board. The most troubling comments are as follows:
The Commission, for example, has decided on a timetable for the installation of high point vents as a means of removing noncondensible gases; such vents may be installed no later than the first refueling outage after restart. In such circumstances, we may not require, as a condition of restart, that the removal of noncondensible gases by means of high point vents be available.
ALAD-708, Sl .op. at n. 35, p. 21.
UCS believes that the Appeal Board is wrong. The mandate of the ASLB was to determine whether the short and long term actions recommended by the Director of NRR "are necessary and sufficient" to provide reasonable assurance that TMI-1 can be operated without endangering public health and safety. CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141, 148 (1979), emphasis added. The sufficiency of the short-term measures was, in fact, the crux of the disputed icsues. It was open to parties to argue that plant modifications which the NRC had categorized as "long-term" were, in fact, necessary prior to restart in order to ensure public safety. Neither the i
Daard nor any party disputed this. See, Tr. 331-332 and the discussion of UCS Contention 15, rejected on other grounds, LBP-79-34, 10 NRC 828, 837-838 (1979).
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This is precisely what we did in the case of the high point vents. UCS Brief on -
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Exceptions 5 ano 14, pp. 13-15.
! , The Commission may have directed the Appeal Board not to inquire into l
whether deadlines unrelated to the issues adjudicated in this case have been
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met. Presumably, those issues are "outside the adjudicatory process."
ALAB-708, p. 21. However, when a party has fairly raised a question that goes to the safety of the plant and, thus, to the sufficiency of the short-term items (the heart of this proceeding after all), that issue cannot be resolved simply
by observing that the Staff or Conmission proposes to allow restart while addressing the problem in the long term. If that were the case, this entire proceeding would be a nullity, its outcome predetermined by the Director of Nuclear Regulation's 1979 recommendations concerning the measures required in the short-term.
Moreover, the Board appears to misunderstand its role. If this record supports a finding that a safety problem exists, this Board is bound to find and only bound to find that the short-term measures are not sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of safety. This Board is net bound to find or to direct any specific solution to that problem. It is up to the Licensee to propose a solution. Thus, to use the example discussed by the Board, if the potential for noncondensible gases to interrupt natural circulation is a safety concern which prevents a finding of reasonable assurance of the safety of THI-1, the Board must rule that the short-term measures are insufficient.
Conclusien For the reasons given above, UCS moves the Appeal Board to:
- 1. Modify the schedule so as to permit UCS to file direct testimony after the Licensee and the Staff by March 16, 1983: T
- 2. Add a question directed specifically toward establishing whether adequate operator training and procedures exist for decay heat removal, including use of the boiler-condenser mode, feed and bleed, transistion between boiler-condenser and feed and bleed, and use of the high point vents; and
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. _11 3 Add a question specifically directed toward establishing whether the RELAPS code is able to accurately predict plant behavior following a loss of main feedwater or small break Joss of coolant accident at THI-1, including the adequacy of decay heat removal using the boiler-condenser mcde or feed and bleed and the effects of RCS high pctnt vent operation.
Finally. UCS urges the Appeal Doard to request that qualified witnesses from EG&G appear to discuss the relevant Semiscale tests and their interpretation of the significance of the test results. The Staff has already demonstrated that it either misunderstands the implications of these tests or, in its zeal to support restart of TMI-1, chooses to mischaracterize them. The Board should bear in mind that the Staff did not even inform the Board of the Semiscale tests at the oral argument in this case and has steadfastly maintained that they should have no bearing on the decision.
Moreover, the Staff's testimony on the Semiscale tests would at best be hearsay. While that is not a bar to admissibility of the evidence, when considered in ccmbination with the Staff's consistent mischaracterization of the importance of the Semiscale tests, it argues strongly for hearing from the EG&G personnel themselves, particularly since the issue has become a key one.
Respectfully submitted, p . h h Ellyn R. Weiss /
General Counsel for UCS Harmon & Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W.
Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 833-9070 DATED: January 19, 1983
4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION gg g7 U".FC In the Matter of ) iB3 JAN 19 P4:31
)
HETROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-289
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear )
UT(RestaEt}'}.'iL
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Station, Unit No. 1) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS' RESPONSE TO ALAB-708 AND REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION OF SCHEDULE" have been served on the following persons by deposit in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, this 19th day of January 1983.
- Nunzio Palladino, Chairman Dr. Linda W. Little U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Board Panel 5000 Hermitage Drive
- John Ahearne, Commissioner Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Professor Gary L. Milhollin 4412 Greenwich Parkway
- James Asselstine, Commissioner Washington, D.C. 20007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 *
- Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing I
- Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 l
- Thomas Roberts, Commissioner ** Judge John H. Buck U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board Panel l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
' Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Washington D.C. 20555
, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel ** Judge Reginald L. Gotchy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. Walter H. Jordan Washington D.C. 20555 i
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel ** Judge Christine N. Kohl 881 West Outer Drive Atomic Safety and Licensing Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Appeal Board Panel l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555
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. Mrs. Marjorie Aamodt Ms. Gail B. Phelps R.D. #5 245 West Philadelphia Street Coatsv111e, Pennsylvania 19320 York, Pennsylvania 17404 Robert Adler, Esq . * *
- Steven C. Sholly Assistant Attorney General Union of Concerned Scientists 505 Executive House 1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
P.O. Box 2357 Suite 1101 Harri sburg , Pennsylvania 17120 Washington, D.C. 20036 Louise Brad ford **** Joseph R. Gray Three Mlle Island Alert Office. of Executive Legal Director 325 Perfer Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis 1on Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Washin6 ton, D.C. 20555 Jordan D. Cunningham, Esq. * *
- George F. Trowbridge , Esq.
Fox, Farr & Cunningham Shaw, Pi ttman , Potts & Trowbridge 2320 North Second Street 1800 M Street, N.W.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Washington, D.C. 20036 Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud
- Docketing and Service Section Dr. Chauncey Kepford Office of the Secretary Environmental Coalition on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Power Washington, D.C. 20555 433 Orlando Avenue State Oc11ege, PA 16801
'"' William S. Jordan, III Harmon & Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W. 8 6M7 h ~
Suite 506 Washington. D.C. 20006 John A. Levin , Esq.
- Hand delivered to 1717 H Street, N.W.
Assistant Counsel Washington, D.C.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Hand delivered to 4350 East-West Hwy.,
P.O. Box 3265 Bethesda, Maryland.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 __
esa Hand delivered to indicated address.
- Hand delivered to 7735 Old Georgetown Road, Bethesda, Maryland.
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