ML20028A179
| ML20028A179 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1982 |
| From: | Markt D YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028A177 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211160539 | |
| Download: ML20028A179 (1) | |
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ATTACEMENT 3
'i YANKEE AftMIC RMCTRIC CONFANT (TAEC)
CONTROL 3D DOCIMENT REVISION TRANSMITTAL FORM
- +
- 4 DOCIMENT T173:
YANKEE EMERCENCY PLAN IMS SUBJECT 30.
V 2.2.12 RECORD TTFE N0 10.r.0(.nn i
00FT N1MBER N
CRANCE NtMBER 2
AMENDMENT NUMBER (if applicable):
ASSIGNED 50 LIER:
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OCTOBER 29, 1982 ISSUE DATE:
Attached is an authorised revision to the above listed document, for insertion into your assigned copy.
1.
Incorporate this change in the above document.
~
Sign the Yankee Atomic Flectric Company (YAEC) Controlled Document 2.
Record of Changes in the front of your document.
3.
Sign this form and return it to the address below.
Response is expected within 10 working days of the issue date.
4.
Final Response Dates NOVEMBER 12, 1982 Transmitted By: DELORES I. MARKT THE UNDER$1CNED ACKNOWLEDCES COMPLETION OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS.
1.
The receipt and incorporation of change number 2 in the above document.
2.
The review of the revised m.tterial.
3.
Assurance that those who ass the document are aware of the change.
Ths completion'of the TAEC Controlled Document Record of Changes in 4.
i the front of the document.
5.
Destruction of all superseded pages.
Dates Signature of Molder Return This Fors To:
Delores Markt Library Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road
/b' Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 8211160539 821105 PDR ADOCK 05000029 F
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(Page 8 of 8)
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r EVENT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS b
- 19. Radiation levels or airborne contamination indicating a
- 19. Verified radiation levels or airborne contamination level I-severe degradation in the control of radioactive utterial's.
reading increases greater than 1000 abovo n;rmal withic.
f.
the plant.
- 20. Loss of most or all annunciation.
20.
Loss of most or all Control Room annunciation with no j.
plant transient in progress or projected.
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2 Effective Date 10/30/82 W-w
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SITE EMERGENCY CONDITIONS / ACTION LEVELS
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(Page 1 of 6) t
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EVENT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS t-li-t 1.
Saturation monitor less than 40*F or core thermocouple 1.
Degraded core with possible loss of coolable t**Perature increas geometry.
ad Severe fuel clad failure indicated by chemistry sample i
l analysesindicatinggreaterthan51failedgelor coolant activity greater than 300 uCi/ga 1 i
l equivalent or the accident area radiation monitor l
I reading greater than or equal to 200 mR/hr but less
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than 500 R/hr and other process radiation monitors l
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alarmed.
1 i
2.
A.
Reactor trip on low pressure or rapidly decreasing 2.
Rapid failure of more than several steam generator tubes (several hundred gallons per minute leak) mata coolant pressure and coincident with loss of off-site power.
i Air ejector monitor alarm or steam line monitor alarm
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and I
No increase in containment pressure and no increase in VC drain tank level and fj
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loss of all off-site power verified by "line' alive" t;
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lights out i
and l
Lose of Z-126 and Y-177 line voltage indication.
or B.
Shif t Supervisor's opinion.
Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/82
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' i' I TABLE A.3 (Contiencd)
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8 g.. e EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL 3
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EVENT t[
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3.
Reactor trip on high neutron flux or reactor l g
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Rupture of control rod drivias mechanism causing l
small break loss-of-coolant accident, trip on low Main Coolant Systes pressure and
' Main Coolant System pressure decrease and
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Pressuriser level decrease and l
Safety injection initiation.
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4.
Main steen line break with greater than TS limit 4.
Reactor trip and safety injection initiation
- f and primary / secondary steam generator leak and indication
!6 Low steam generator level and
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of fuel damage.
l Secondary steam pressure decrease and i
I' Steam line radiation monitor increase or air l
ejector radiation monitor alara
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e and 8
Audible or observed steam break jI t
and l
Fuel damage indicated by bleedline monitor f,,
I alara or chemistry sample analysis indicating I31 f
greater than 1 uC1/gs I equivalent or greater than 100/E uC1/ga specific coolant activity equivalent.
Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/82 e
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TABLE A.3 (Continued)
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>i-EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS p.
EYENT J
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-l 5.
Loss of functions needed for energency plant cooldown 5.
Complete loss of any of the following 8
to hot shutdown condition.
systems or indications:
1 1
(7,,, greater than 2000F but less than 300*F) a.
Main coolant pressure indication
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y b.
Main coolant temperature indication g
c.
Pressurizer level indication
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j d.
Charging and Volume Control System I
e.
Feedwater System l.
f.
Chemical Shutdown System g.
Source range channels l
l h.
Steam dump and/or atmospheric steam dusp i
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1.
SC level indication i
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h 6.
Major damage to irradiated fuel in containment 6.
Visual observation of dropped fuel or damaged fuel p.
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or Spent Fuel Pit Building causing significant assembly or inability to maintain water level over d.
!j radioactivity released to the building.
fuel and
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Fuel manipulator area radiation monitor radiation level exceeding 500 mR/hr.
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7.
Fire defeating non-redundant safety-related systems 7.
Fire reported to or /.etected by the Control Room h
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or equipment or rendering redundant safety-related which compromises the functioning of non-redundant t:
systems or equipment below the minlaus required by safety-related systems or equipment or rendering
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Technical Specifications.
redundant safety-related systems or equipment below the minimum required by the Technical Spect,ications.
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2 Effective Date 10/30/82
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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS ji EVENT i,
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8.
High airborne radioactivity releases.
8.
A.
Primary vent stack monitor or steam line monitor l
[j reading resulting in projected site boundary (0.5 mile) whole body dose rates exceeding 50 mR/hr but l
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or 1
B.
Monitor response leading to' the above whole body does
'l rates (assuming adverse meteorological conditions)
'l are as follows:
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a.
VC high range monitor responses 5000 1/hr i;
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3 b.
Main steam line monitor response: 10 mR/hr
!! l c.
PVS monitor response 50 mR/hr.
j or j
a C.
Monitor response leading to EPA protective action e
guidelines (assuming 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> duration) ares a.
VC high range monitor response: 15000 R/hr b.
Main steam line monitor response 30 mR/hr c.
PVS monitor responses 150 mR/hr.
9.
Loss of physical control of the plant has occurred 9.
Emergency action levels are covered by the Yankee Rowe Security Contingency Plan.
or is imminent.
Revision No.
2 Ef fective Date 10/30/82
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1 ti TABLE A.3 (Continued)
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.a i EVENT EMERCENCY ACTION LEVELS iI i
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- 10. Plant conditions that represent major failure of 10.
A.
Loss of off-site power and loss of all diesel 6
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plant safety systems and warrant full implementation generators for approximately 15 minutes.
,!i; of the Plant Emergency Plan to include:
Applicability: Modes 1-4.
Indicates by:
p I
,j A.
Imse of off-site power with loss of all diesel 1.
Loss of line alive lights r
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i il generators and the inability to restore these and systems promptly.
2.
Zero voltage on 115 kV busses and
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5.
Loss of all vital on-site de power and the 3.
Loss of Control Room normal lighting inability to restore this systes promptly.
and
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4.
All emergency breakers open with no load for j
greater than 15 minutes.
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B.
Loss of all on-site de power for approximately 15 j
minutes (applicability: Modes 1-4).
l Panalarme S-9, S-10, S-11 I
(Battery low and critical low voltage alare) and 4
Battery volt meters (Control Room) indicating low.
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Evacuation of the Control Boos and inability to C.
Evacuation of the Control Room for whatever reason establish control of Shutdown Systes promptly.
with inability to establish control from local stations within 15 minutes.
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D.
Inability to promptly restore alarms lost during a D.
All alarms (annunciators lost for more than b
j plant transient.
apprommately 15 minutes) or plant transients initiated while alaras are inopera,b,le.
j Applicability: Modes 1-4.
Indicated by:
d 1.
Inspection or surveillance during operation.
i Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/52 i
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EvgNT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS I
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- 11. Verified loss-of-coolant accident with leakage greater 11.
A.
1.
Main coolant pressure decreasing or reactor i
than charging pumps capacity (greater than 100 spe).
trip on low pressure
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2.
Containment pressure increasing or gravity drain tank level alarm or containment radiation levels b-increasing 8
and
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3.
Steam generator pressures uniform.
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4 or
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B.
1.
Reactor trip on low pressure
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2.
Ioss of subcooling margin.
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l Transient requiring operation of the Reactor Protection
- 12. Autoestic or manual initation of the Reactor Protection I. ',
12.
l System with no scram occurring.
System with no scram occurring.
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- 13. Severe natural phenomena in progress or projected or 13.
A.
Earthquake causing, in the.51ft Supervisor's t
I projected and warrant full implementation of pla g opinion, significant damage to plant safety-related l
l emergency plan, applicable to Modes 1-4 to includes structures, systems, or components.
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A.
Earthquake causing significant damage to safety-B.
Flooding or low water causing, in the Shif t related structures, systems or components.
Supervisor's opinion, significant damage to vital equipment.
B.
Flood or low water condition, flooding of vital equipserit at low elevations.
C.
Sustained winds or tornadoes in excess of 120 mph.
f, C.
Sustained winds or tornadoes in excess of 120 mph.
L'f 14.
Other hazards in progress or projected with plant not 14.
Severe hazards with the plant not in cold shutdoem, in cold shutdown or other plant conditions that warrant or other plant conditions; activation of emergency centers and monitoring teaua for a precautionary notification to the public near A.
Severe hazard applicable Modes 1-4.
- he site.
Revision No.
2
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i CENERAL EMERGENCY CONDITIONS / ACTION LEVELS
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1.
Small or large LOCA with failure of ECCS to perform 1.
A.
1.
Reactor Ecly on low pressure p
and i
C leading to severe core degradation or meltin from h
minutes to hours.
2.
Containment pressure high or increasing or VC f
drain tank level alarm or AARM reading greater than 500 R/hr.
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B.
1.
Reactor trip on low pressure j.
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Loss of subcooling.
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and
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C.
1.
Loss of ECCS flow or backups.
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Transient initiated by loss of Feedwater 2.
Absence of steam generator level without i ti and Condensate Systems followed by failure of feedwater flow
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}l Emergency and Backup Feedwater Systems for an and
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extended period of time. Core melting will occur No ECCS or charging feed and bleed flow
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If feedwater is not restored within several hours or to the Main Coolant System.
alternate core copling methods (including primary feed and bleed) are implemented.
j' i-s Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/52 6
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4 EVENT" EMERGENCY ACTION LEVE1lS'
f 3.
Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems 3.
A.
Reactor remains critical af ter attempted scram.
with failure to scram which,results in cora damage or additional failure of Core Cooling and Makeup and I
Systems.
B.
1.
Reactor pressure greater than or equal to safety valve setpoint or 2.
Rapidly increasing containment pressure j
or 3.
Rapidly increasing containment temperature.
4.
Failure of of f-site and on-site power along 4.
Totsi loss of all off-site and on-site ac power for with total loss of emergency feedwater sakeup greater than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> capability for several hours. Core melt likely and if feedwater is not supplied within several hours.
Loss of steam driven emergency boiler feed pump.
Ultimate failure of the containment is possible if a _
core melt is not terminated prior to vessel melt
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through.
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5.
Small or large LOCA and initially successful 5.
Shif t Supervisor's judgment that a LOCA has occurred i
ECCS operation with subsequent failure of and l*
the ECCS Recirculation System over several hours.
Loss of recirculation flow
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Fossibly leading to a core melt. Ultimate and it failure of the containment is possible if core Containment temperature is excessive and still rising.
j melt is not terminated prior to vessel melt through.
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2 Effective Date 10/30/82 e
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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELd I g
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6.
Effluent monitors detect levels corresponding to 1 Rea/hr 6.
Radiation monitor levels exceed t.iose specified for l l whole body or 5 Res/hr thyroid at the site boundary Site Area Emergency Condition under actual meteorological conditions.
and Calculation on Dose Assessment Fo us indicate levels These dose rates are projected based on other plant exceeding 1 Rea/hr whole body or 5 Rem /hr thyroid at i
parameters (e.g., radiation levels in containment with the exclusion area.
leak rate appropriate for existing containment pressure
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i with some confirmation from effluent monitors) or are l
measured in the environs.
4 l
LOCAorsteamgeneratortuberuptureaccidenthas!
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7.
Ioss of 2 of 3 fission product barriers with a potential 7.
A.
1.
loss of 3rd barrier (e.g., loss of primary coolant occurred (Site Area EALa)
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l boundary, clad failure, and a high rotential for loss of and containment:
2.
Incore thermocouple temperatures greater than
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6500F or loss of subcooling margin or main A.
Failure of fuel cladding and main coolant boundary.
coolant activity greater than Site Area EAL levels l
i B.
Failure of cladding and containment integrity.
or 3.
Shift Supervisor's opinion.
h.
C.
Failure of containment integrity and main coolant boundary.
B.
1.
Incore thermocouples temperature greater than I,
6500F or loss of subcooling margin or main f;
coolant activity greater than Site Area EAL levels i
l, and 2.
Containment Isolation Systes panel indicates open CIS valve or open non-return valve or main t.
steau line break outside of coptainment upstream ij of non-return valve and Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/82 t
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TABLE A.4 (Continued)
.I (Page 4 of 4)
ENERCENCY ACTION LEVEt9 " *
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EVENT 3.
Loss of ECCS
'l or l',
4.
Shift Supervisor's opinion.
C.
Failure of containment integrity and asin coolant boundary.
1.
LOCA or steam generator tube rupture accident has occurred (Site Area EALs) and 2.
Containment Isolation Systes panel indicates open CIS valves or open non-return valves or main stema line break outside containment but upstress of non-return valve j
and 3.
Loss of ECCS or incore thermocouples temperature rising or loss of on-site or off-site ac power
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or 4.
Shift Supervisor's opinion.
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8.
Loss of physical control of the facility.
8.
Physical attack on the plant has resulted in occupation of the Control Roos by unauthorised personnel.
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1 9.
Other plant conditions exist, from whatever source, that 9.
Shift Supervisor's opinion.
I make release of large amounts of radioactivity in a short
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time period possible, e.g., any core melt situation.
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- 10. Any major internal or external events (e.g., fires, 10.
Shift Supervisor's opinion.
I earthquakes, substantially beyond design basis) which could cause massive damage to plant systems resulting in any of the above initiating conditions.
Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/82 e
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APPENDIX D.
YANKEE EMERGENCY MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PLAN O
A.
Introduction The energency preparedness, responsibilities, interface arrangements, and capabilities described in the plant emergency la'lementing p'rocedures are p
.I.
designed to insure that, following an accidental release of radioactive material from the plant, the seabers of the plant staff will be sufficient in number and training to perform or initiate the actions required to a) return the plant to a safe condition, b) assess the on-site s.nd off-site radiological impact of the accident, and c) minimize or prevent any further radiation exposure of the public.
B.
Need fot Assistance The Yankee organization has developed a cooperative arrangement between the Nuclear Services Division Engineering Office and each Yankee plant under which a radiological emergency at any Yankee plant could be met with certain support from the remainder of the Yankee organization. This
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arrangement is known as the Yankee Mutual Assistance Plan and is designed to offer direct support to the management of a plant experiencing a radiological emergency condition on an as-needed basis. Plant procedures include the necessary information to request any assistance covered in this plan.
C.
Types of Assistance The evpes of assistance available under this arrangement are as follows:
l.
Cosaunications/Information Coordination a.
General t
An Engineering Support Center has been established'st the NSD office in Framingham, Massachusetts, to (1) relieve the plant D-1 v
Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/82 b
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staff from handling activities not directly related to on-site
'~5 corrective actions, and (2) provide supplemental support to the 1
affected Yankee plant. Communication channels are available for use between the plant and this Center.
b.
Communications
~
There are sufficient telephone lines installed in the Engineering Support Center for handling both incoming and outgoing calls. To ensure the affected plant can provide situation reports and/or request necessary assistance, a minimum of two telephone lines (1-outside and 1-extension) have been reserved for this purpose. The remaining lines will be available to state and federal agencies, news media, etc., to acquire updated information on plant conditions.
c.
Information The Engineering Support Center will be activated in accordance with the event classification by the plant and the appropriate emergency response. This notification and Center activation are specified in detail in Section 9.2 of the Plan.
The Engineering Support Center personnel will serve to assist the plant personnel in disseminating information and updates on the event and plant status to state authorities, federal agencies, news media, etc., as requested.
l 2.
NSD Technical Support l
The Engineering Support Center will have technical and administrative personnel available to provide assistance to the I
affected plant, if required. (See Section 8.2.2 of the Plan).
This includes (1) consultation regarding engineering and D-2 v
Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/82 B
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radiological concerns, (2) provisions for providing supplemental
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aanpower and equipment support, and (3) meteorological support.
From the Environmental Engineering Department specific, ally, this assistance includes a Radiological Engineering Team p(epared to perform the following:
a.
Environmental dose calculations and projections; b.
Assist in the evvaluation of plant radiological conditions; c.
Meteorological evaluation support; d.
Evaluate options regarding radiological aspects of recovery operations; and Assist in backup to field environmental radiation surveillance.
e.
It includes a Radiation Protection Team prepared to assist in the n
following:
a.
Off-site radiation surveys and dose assessment; b.
In-plant re-entry surveys and dose assessment; 4
c.
Provide Health Physics liaison between plant and other New England facilities; d.
Provide liaison with Radiation Emergency Medical Treatment Center in Boston; and e.
Interface with state and federal emergency response organizations.
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It also includes an Environmental Sample Collection Team prapared A
to assist the plant collect environmental sample media.
3.
NSD Environmental Laboratory Analytical Services a.
General The Yankee Environmental Laboratory in Westboro, is equipped to provide radiochemical processing of all types of environmental media sampled as part of the ongoing off-site environmental radiation surveillance programs of the Yankee plaats. In the event of a radiological emergency at any Yankee plant, laboratory staff are available, on a 24-hour emergency call basis, to perform gamma isotopic analyses on samples taken by the plant's emergency monitoring teams and submitted to the laboratory by courier services. In addition to the availability of six gamsa spectrometers at the laboratory, a mobile van equipped to conduct field gamma spectroscopy measurements can be deployed to a plant site to evaluate the on-site and o,ff-site surface contamination and total radiation exposure levels in the event of an accidental release of radioactive material from the plant. The following sections describe the analytical capabilities the mobile laboratory has for ener'gency purposes.
j b.
Mobile Laboratory Emergency Analysis Equipment and Van Services l
The van housing the mobile laboratory equipment is an air conditioned four-wheel drive, all-terrain vehicle equipped with an independent auxiliary power supply. The _in situ (field) analysis equipment to be carried in the van during an emergency response includes a Ge(Li) detector based gamma spectroscopy system complete with computer spectrum analysis capability and a calibrated high pressure ionization chamber.
D-4 J
Revision No.
2 Effective Date 10/30/82 i
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Th3 aobilo v:n is normally Icested at th2 laboretcry in Westboro. Following a request from a plant for aid in assessing an esegency condition, the van and operating i-m personnel can be dispatched to the designated location (s) within a few hours to confirm the presence and level of surface contamination. The van, as it is equipped, is capable of providing in situ soil analysis resulting in a by~nuclide
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breakdown of the exposure rate (uR/hr) at the site. In addition, the high pressurized ionization chamber will be utilized to provide a rapid measurement of the total exposure rate (uR/hr) at the site.
c.
Mobile TLD Van Service j
The Yankee Environmental Laboratory in Westboro is also equipped with an 8' by 20' trailer designed to house two complete TLD read-out systems. The analysis equipment includes Harshaw 2271 TLD read-out units and an HP-85 computer processing system. The trailer requires a dedicated power source.
O Following a request from a plant for aid in processing personnel dosimetry, the trailer and operating personnel can be dispatched to the designated location (s) within hours.
d.
Mobile Body Burden Van Services The Yankee Environmental Laboratory will be equipped with an l
air-conditioned and heated sole-use body burden van. The van will be equipped with a modified Massi chair using an intrinsic I
GeLi detector for the lung scan and a NaI detector for the thyroid scan. These detection systems will be interfaced with computer spectrum capability using a Canberra Series 40 MCA in conjunction with an HP 9826 calculator and its associated electronics. The van will not be equipped with an' independent 1
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auxiliary power supply and, therefore, these systems required a dedicated power source. The van and operating personnel would j
q be dispatched to the designated location (s) to provide body burden processing capability for emergency workers.
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4.
Mutual Assistance Arrangement of Yankee Plants *
~~.
General a.
The assistance provided to a plant under this paragraph would i
be strictly supplementary in nature. It would serve to provide necessary monitoring aanpower support to the affected plant.
The Yankee groups forming this assistance are primarily, the Chemistry and Health Physics personnel of each Yankee plant.
The monitoring instrumentation and procedures used by the i
assistance teams are consistent with those employed in each plant's Emergency Plan. The following sections describe the training of assistance personnel and type of support.
)
b.
Training The assistance teams forming the mutual arrangement are trained in the assessment of on-site and off-site radiological conditions. They achieve this capability through the training i
associated with their particular Energency Plan. Additional training is given whereby each team will gain familiarization with other Yankee plants with specific attention on environmental characteristics pertinent to radiological i
monitoring. This is accomplished by using members of the teams as observers during emergency drills.
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2 Effective Date 10/30/82 f
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c.
Radiological Monitoring Support O
The assistance teams are available on a 24-hour emergency call basis for emergency monitoring support. Personnel and equipment will be dispatched to the energency locition.
Personnel will report to the Emergency' Coordinator'upon A
arrival.
5.
NSD Meteorological Analysis Support a.
General The Central Meteorological System (CMS) located at the NSD Framingham office, is designed, in part, to provide meteorological support for decision-making and evaluation of environmental impact during energency conditions to the Yankee Mutual Assistance Plan.
o b.
Meteorological Equipment and Service b;
Through a telecommunications link to CMS, data from on-site meteorological towers is accessed at Framingham instantaneously. Dispersion estimates and dose calculations can be performed rapidly and be transmitted from Westboro to the Emergency Operations Facility over established communications channels. Additionally, NSD meteorological i
personnel can provide real-time weather forecasting via direct communications with regional and local National Weather Service I
offices. Meteorological support is available on a 24-hour i
emergency call basis for emergency service.
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Weather Services International (WSI) System 2
Through a computer link at the NSD Framingham offides, weather forcast information can be accessed by the Meteorological D-7 s
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Services Group using the USI System. This system provides:
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(1) hourly regional National Weather Services observations; (2) radar plots of regional shower activity; (3) long-tern regional forecast capability using a computer code which analyzes area weather conditions; and (4) severe weather and mar'ine forcast capability.
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