ML20027D701
| ML20027D701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1982 |
| From: | Parsons R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| CON-NRC-18, REF-PT21-82-732-000 10CFR-50.55E, PT21-82-732, PT21-82-732-000, NUDOCS 8211080259 | |
| Download: ML20027D701 (5) | |
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. Carolina Power & Light Company 1"..-
NI5 P. O. Box 101, New Hill, N. C.
27562 2
October 29, 1982 Q
ly 40 m
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..m Mr. James P. O'Reilly NRC-18h E,S Q': S United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II w
101 Marietta Street, Northwest (Suite 3100) cr s '
Atlanta Georgia 30303 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 1985 900,000'KW - UNITS 1 & 2 WELDING ON 6.9KV SWITCHGEAR PURCHASE ORDERS NY-435112 AND NY-435113, ITEM 76
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Attached is the final 10CFR50.55(e) 'and 10CFR, Part 21, report on the subject deficiency which describes the problem and the corrective action taken to accomplish resolution. With this report, Carolina Power and Light Company considers this matter closed.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours very truly, g
- ;;2 R. M. Parsons Project General Manager Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant RMP/sh Attachment cc:
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Mr. V. Stello (NRC) 4 OFFICIAL COPY l
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8211080259 821029
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i CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Unit No. 1 i
Final Report October 29, 1982 Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)
Reportable Under 10CFR21 i
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SUBJECT:
Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant / Unit No. I 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21 Reportable Deficiency.
Welding for 6.9kV Class lE switchgear and seismically-designed 6.9kV Nonclass lE switchgear purchased under Purchase Orders NY-435112 and NY-435113 from Siemens-Allis, Inc.
ITEM:
Welding in Class IE 6.9kV switchgear and seismically-designed 6.9kV Nonclass 1E switchgear I
SUPPLIED BY:
Siemens-Allis, Inc., West Allis, Wisconsin NATURE OF DEFICIENCY:
In December 1980, the Switchgear Division of Siemens-Allis, Inc. (West Allis, Wisconsin), shipped 6.9kV switch-gear to the CP&L site on Purchase Orders NT435112, Class lE switchgear, and NY-435113, Nonclass IE Seismically -
Designed Switchgear. Welding in the switchgear was not inspected by Ebasco's Vendor Quality Assurance representative prior to shipment, as the check plan did not include mechanical inspection requirement.
On January 28, 1982, and February 1, 1982, a Siemens-Allis representative was brought on site with the vendor shop drawings so that an inspection of the welding could be performed. The inspection revealed that the weld lengths and spacing were not in conformance with the vendor shop drawings.
It was also noted that the quality of the welding was poor.
Subsequent inspection of the test prototype, which was seismically tested, revealed similar discrepancies to the vendor drawings.
Comparison of the quality of welds 'and Siemens-Allis'
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internal acceptance criteria indicated that approximately 40% of the welds did not meet the criteria.
Although'the switchgear on site and that seismically tested exhibit similar welding deficiencies, they were not similar enough to conclude that the equipment on site adequately reflected the same structural construction of the equipment seismically tested.
DATE PROBLEM OCCURRED:
Refer to section abase.
DATE PROBLEM REPORTED:
March 31, 1982 - CP&L (N. J. Chiangi) notified the NRC (C. W. Berger and C. Julian) that this item was reportable under 10CFR50.55(e) and 10CFR Part 21.
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g SCOPE OF-PROBLEM:
, The' deficiency involves the two Unit l' Class lE 6.9kV.
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switchgear buses (26' cubicle's) and five Unit 1 Nonclass IE.
seismically-designed 6.9kV switchgear buses (43 cubicles).
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SAFETY:.
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IMPLICATION:
Seismic qualification of'the Class lE switchgear-is.
required to assure that safety-related loads-are capable of being powered during a seismic event.- As the seismically-
. designed Nonclass IE switchgear is located in'the same room as Class IE equipment, qualification is. required to assure that no switchgear component will become loose and possibly damage safety-related components during a seismic event.
REASONS DEFICIENCY IS 1
REPORTABLE:
. Failure of the supplier's QA program to control the welding on the switchgear has resulted in switchgear being shipped to the site'which did not adequately reflect-the same. structural construction as that of the piece of equipment which had been seismically. tested.and whose test report had been accepted. Failure of the switchgear to be seismically constructed could result in the loss of' power supply to safety-related loads during a seismic event as a result of failure of the switchgear.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
1.
Inspection of structural construction has been added to the VQA inspection check sheet for seismically-designed,.
AC and DC distribution equipment yet to be shipped. : Any equipment on site will be inspected by Site QA.
In order to_ preclude a similar. situation, suppliers of seismically-designed AC and DC distribution equipment lhave been requested to provide a written response describing the provisions in their quality assurance program, which would assure that the drawings and/or procedures used for manufacturing / fabrication of the equipment will reflect the actual 'structura1 Land operational. characteristics of the equipment being seismically qualified.
2.
Subsequent to producing the. switchgear for Unit 1, Siemens-Allis IJ has moved their manufacturing facility from West Allis, Wisconsin, to Wendell, North Carolina.
This new facility.
is not producing any Class lE switchgear at this time, i
and therefore,- no QA program is in place for doing so.
Prior to releasing Unit 2 switchgear for fabrication, Ebasco and CP&L will assure that Siemens-Allis has a program in place which will preclude a similar occurrence.
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A tabulation of all components which make up thd cubicles t
was made by Siemens-Allis indicating the method of fastening to other components. A functional review was made of all components having arc-welding attachments to determine if
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weld failures could adversely affect the'switchgear lE operation.
In making this determination, the following
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were considated:
h a.
Whether any weld failure cocid cause'a cubib.le structural failure or, b.
Could the components affected fail and cause 1
additional failures to the equipment t
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failure, calculations were made to demonstrate that the-front side plates are actually capable of absorbing all of the seismic loading in the front-to-back direction if cyprepriate hardware is used for bolting them to the frames.
Where indicated by the Siemens-Allis resport,1/2" - 13 Grade 5 bolts were replaced by 5/8" - 11 Grade 8 bolta.
For other braces which could affect IEloperation, a rewelding program was conducted as reqdired to assure:
a.
All welds on these braces met the acceptance criteria of Siemens-Allis.
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b.
Quantity of weld o:t: connected pieces was at least the amount on'the test unit unless less weld could be shown to be acceptable.
For components which had no counterpart on the test unit, Siemenc-Allis performed an analysis to y
justify the seismic adequacy.
Thereportconcludedthattheseismicallh-des'ignedNonclasslEswitch- '
gear would maintain structural integrity'without rewelding or changing hardware. Hence, only the cubicles and superstructures associated with the Class 1E functions of the reactor coolant pump motors were reworked to meet the above requirements on the Konclass 1E r.witchgear.
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