ML20027D575
| ML20027D575 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1982 |
| From: | Foreman H, Wolfe S Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8211080088 | |
| Download: ML20027D575 (75) | |
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DOCKETED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA S"
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 82 1:0'l-3 P2:36 Before Administrative Judges:
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Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman i
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.?,;.iiiCE Dr. Walter H. Jordan 1
Dr. Harry Foreman SERVED NOV 0415E
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In the Matter of
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LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Docket No. 50-382-0L (Waterford Steam Electric Station, November 3,1982 Unit 3)
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PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION (0perating License)
Appearances Bruce W. Churchill, Esq., Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esq.,
James B. Hamlin, Esq., and Delissa A. Ridgway, Esq.,
for the Applicant Sherwin E. Turk, Esq., and Geary S. Mizuno, Esq.,
for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Brian P. Cassidy, Esq., for the Federal Emergency Management Agency Luke B. Fontana, Esq., and Gary L. Groesch for the Joint Intervenors, Save Our Wetlar.ds, Inc. and Oystershell All.iance 8211080088 821103 DR ADOCK 05000
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page OPINION 1
I.
INTRODUCTION 1
A.
Background and Scope of Decision 1
B.
Content of Opinion and Findings 3
II. UNCONTESTED ISSUES 5
A.
Unresolved Generic Safety Issues 5
1.
Shutdown Decay Heat Removal (A-45) 5 2.
Seismic Qualification of Equipment (A-46) 10 III.
CONTENTIONS 11 A.
Emergency Planning 11 1.
Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads 12 Refusal to Evacuate 13 Additional Collisions 14 Hysteria 14 Single Mode Evacuation 15 2.
Evacuation Warning System 16 a.
The Siren System 16 b.
The Emergency Messages 17 3.
Connand Decision Structure 18 4.
Evacuation Drills 20 5.
Transportation for Special Persons 21 1
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Potassium Iodide 23 B.
Synergism 25 The Radiation Hazard 26 The Environmental Pollution Hazard 28 The Multiplicative Hazard 29 IV.
CONCLUSION 32 FINDINGS OF FACT 33 I.
BACKGROUND 33 II.
ISSUES IN CONTR0VERSY 36 A.
Emergency Planning 36 1.
Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads 37 2.
Evacuation Warning System 41 a.
The Siren System 41 b.
The Emergency Messages 44 3.
Connand Decision Structure 46 4.
Evacuation Drills 50 5.
Evacuation for Special Persons 52 6.
Potassium Iodide 57 B.
Synergism 64 The Radiation Hazard 64 The Environmental Pollution Hazard 66 The Multiplicative Hazard 67 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 69 ORDER 71
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OPINION I.
INTRODUCTION A.
Background and Scope of Decision This is the first of two partial initial decisions on the application for an operating license for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
On November 14, 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had issued a permit to Louisiana Power and Light Company (Applicant) to construct the Waterford 3 nuclear generating station. This facility is located on the west bank of the Mississippi, about 24 miles west of New Orleans, Louisiana.
In September 1978, Applicant applied for an operating license. Three organizations sought intervention and a hearing:
Save Our Wetlands, Inc. and Oystershell Alliance (the Joint Intervenors), and Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc. The Louisiana Consumers' League later withdrew from the proceedings.
Sixteen contentions advanced by Joint Intervenors were approved by this Board. Of these sixteen contentions, all but two were either withdrawn or dismissed pursuant to motions for summary disposition.
The remaining two issues, Joint Intervenors' Contentions 8/9 on synergism and 17/26(1) and (2) on emergency planning, were tried in an evidentiary hearing during March, April, and May of 1982.
After the close of the hearings, we reviewed the record. With respect to Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(a), which challenged the provisions in the emergency plans for notifying residents of evacuation procedures, we found the record to be inadequate.
The emergency planning brochure that allegedly would satisfy the public
D information requirements of the NRC's emergency planning regulations (10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(7)) had not yet been drafted at the time of the hearings and was not submitted into evidence. We concluded that Applicant's bald assertion that the brochure would be drafted and would be submitted to the NRC Staff for review was not sufficient to permit us to resolve Joint Intervenors' contention.
Accordingly, in a Memorandum and Order dated August 17, 1982, we reopened the record and directed that Applicant submit as an exhibit its brochure. We also requested that the parties comment on Applicant's submittal and indicate whether further testimony and cross examination would be required. After reviewing the brochure that Applicant submitted, Staff, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Joint Intervenors submitted comments.
Joint o
Intervenors' comments, in the form of affidavits, asserted among other things that the brochure would not be readily comprehensible to a person of only average education.
Joint Intervenors requested that further evidentiary hearings be held. Applicant responded, requesting, inter alia, that it be permitted to submit a revised brochure to meet these comments.
It agreed that an evidentiary hearing would be the most expedient method of resolving this issue.
Thereafter, in a l
Memorandum and Order of October 18, 1982, we ordered further hearing on Contention 17/26(1)(a), and our decision upon the adequacy of the l
j revised brochure will be the subject of a second partial initial decision after completion of that hearing. All other contentions and matters are addressed and decided herein.
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6 B.
Content of Opinion and Findings The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are appended and are incorporated herein by reference. An Order is also appended.
In Part III of this Opinion, we discuss and resolve Joint Intervenors' contention on synergism and their contention on emergency planning, except for subpart 17/26(1)(a) which addresses provisions for notifying the public of evacuation procedures. Our underlying factual findings with respect to these controverted issues are set forth in Section II of the appended Findings of Fact.
At this, the operating license stage of the proceeding, we pass only upon these contested matters. Wnile we have the residual power to delve into any serious matter, even if no party has put it in issue, we have determined that there were no serious matters which we should raise sua sponte, and thus, the decision as to all other matters which need be considered prior to the issuance of this operating license has been the 1/
responsibility of the NRC Staff and it alone.-
However, in Part II of this Opinion, we do discuss two uncontested matters which, as required by decisions of the Appeal Board, we must consider.
In that discussion, we recommend to the Commission that an in-depth assessment of the reliability of the 1/ 10 C.F.R. 5 2.104(c), 2.760a; 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix A, VIII(b); Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188 (1976).
_4-Waterford 3 shutdown heat removal system be made by an independent laboratory.
In issuing this partial initial decision, we leave unresolved a motion by Joint Intervenors to reopen hearings and a petition by the State of Louisiana to intervene, both of which seek to raise Table S-3 issues.2/ The motion and petition were prompted by NRDC v. NRC, No. 74-1586 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 27,1982), which would invalidate Table S-3.
However, the mandate of that case has not been issued, and we have deferred our rulings on these requests. / We await guidance 3
in the form of a Commission Policy Statement.
Finally, it should be noted that all of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the parties, other than those addressing Contention 17/26(1)(a), that are not incorporated directly or inferentially in this Partial Initial Decision are rejected as unsupported in law or fact or as unnecessary to the rendering of this Partial Initial Decision.
2/ See 10 C.F.R. 51.20(e), which establishes Table S-3 as the data base to be used in evaluating the environmental effects of the uranium fuel cycle.
-3/ On September 1, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit granted a stay of mandate, and on September 27, 1982, a petition for certiorari in NRDC v. NRC was filed with the Supreme Court.
Thus, there has been no final disposition of the case.
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4 4 II. UNCONTESTED ISSUES A.
Unresolved Generic Safety Issues In its Safety Evaluation Report (Staff Ex. 2, Appendix C),
the Staff identified thirteen unresolved generic safety issues applicable to Waterford 3, in order to comply with the decision in Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear-Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978). After evaluating these t
issues in the SER and in Supplement 1 (Staff Ex. 3), the Staff concluded with respect to eleven of them that the facility could (or there is reasonable assurance that the facility could) be operated before these issues were resolved without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
We have reviewed and are satisfied with-the Staff's evaluations and conclusions with respect to these eleven issues. We were not satisfied, however, with Staff's treatment of the remaining two issues, Shutdown Decay Heat Removal (A-45) and Seismic Qualification of Equipment (A-46).
1.
Shutdown Decay Heat Removal (A-45)
In Appendix C to the SER, the Staff concluded that Water-ford 3 could be operated safely prior to resolution of the issue of whether an alternative means of decay heat removal should be required i
in plant design.
The Staff based its decision upon the capability of the steam generators to transfer heat to the main or auxiliary feed-l l
water systems, and upon the capability of the high pressure injection I
i system (HPIS) to add coolant at high pressure to the primary system while energy from heat decay is removed by releasing pressure through 4
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5 power-operated relief valves (PORVs) or safety valves. This latter method of decay heat removal is known as " feed and bleed"; however, the Waterford 3 plant design does not include PORVs, the HPIS cannot inject at the safety valve pressure, and hence Waterford 3 has no feed and bleed capability.
This Board had previously raised the need for feed and bleed capability as a sua sponte question. We withdrew the issue, not because we were convinced that the question did not represent a serious safety matter, but because we were satisfied that the need for feed and bleed capability would be explored on a generic basis by the Staff and the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguard (ACRS).
(Memorandum and Order of April 27, 1982, at 2).
In reaching that decision, we examined and found unconvincing the arguments proffered by Applicant and endorsed by the Staff that the 4/ The ACRS concern for the safety of System 80 nuclear plants manufactured by Combustion Engineering, Inc., was expressed in i
their letter, ACRS Report on Final Design Approval for Combustion Engineering, Inc., Standard Nuclear Steam Supply System (Standard Reference System 80) (Dec. 15, 1981). ACRS noted the extra importance of the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system in System 80 plants for heat removal following shutdown. They i
suggested that further consideration be given to adding pressure relief valves to allow more direct methods of decay heat removal.
. reliability of the feedwater systems obviated the need for feed and bleed capability. / Similarly, in Supplement 3 to the SER (Staff 5
Ex. 5), the Staff requested an analysis of the need for depressuriza-tion valves (Id. at 5-2) and required Applicant to provide justification for interim safe operation of the plant.
Therefore, in a Memorandum and Order of August 12, 1982, we found that the Staff's. conclusion that Waterford 3 could be operated safely pending resolution of -generic issue A-45 was without basis, because Waterford 3 has no feed and bleed capability and the SER provided no support for relying solely on the steam generator /feedwater system to remove decay heat. Accordingly, in our August 12 Memorandum and Order, we requested that the Staff provide us in affidavit form a detailed explanation justifying operation or interim operation of Waterford 3 prior to the resolution of A-45.
In accordance with our request, the Staff submitted its affidavit to us on August 27, 5_/ The Staff had submitted affidavits purporting to show that the risk of a coge meltdown due to failure to remove shutdown heat was about 5 X 10- per reactor year. Affidavit of Lobel, Sheron, and Thadani, concerning Feed and Bleed and Emergency Feedwater System Reliability (April 12,1982).
However, we had serious misgivings about Staff's rejection of Licensee Event Report data in arriving at its reliability estimates.
(Memorandum and Order of April 27, 1982, at 3-5.)
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. 1982.6/ In the affidavit, the Staff admitted that the justification provided in the SER was inapplicable to Waterford 3.
However, according to the Staff, interim operation of Waterford 3, prior to resolution of A-45, is justified because (1) the heat removal systems have been upgraded to meet post-TMI-2 requirements and (2) the Emergency Feedwater System (EFWS) is highly reliable and hence meets current NRC requirements (Staff Ex. 9, at 4). The Staff's affidavit references its earlier estimate of the probability of a core meltdown due to failure of shutdown decay heat removal capability (5 x 10-6 per reactor-year). See note 5, supra.
Nevertheless, we have seen no claim by the Staff that the Waterford 3 heat removal systems are more reliable than those of other PWRs, which have feed and bleed back-up.
Although both Applicant and Joint Intervenors were invited to comment on Staff's affidavit, only Applicant did so. Applicant's response included a copy of the justification it had supplied the Staff, a document entitled "A Review of Depressurization and Decay Removal Capabilities at Waterford 3.'
In this justification,
-6/
Affidavit of Clifford J. Anderson and Chu-Yu Liang, concerning Unresolved Generic Safety Issue A-45 (August 27,1982), admitted into evidence as Staff Ex. 9 in an Order dated October 19, 1982.
-7/ Applicant's Response of September 10, 1982, admitted into evidence as Applicant's Exhibit 11 in the Order dated October 19, 1982.
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Applicant listed five considerations.8/
These five considera-tions, however, were essentially the same as those previously supplied to ACRS by Combustion Engineering, Inc.,9/ and again stressed the reliability of the feedwater systems and steam generators.
In response to CE's previous recital of these five considerations, ACRS noted that the high reliability of the feedwater system and the integrity of the steam generators were necessary goals, but difficult to achieve. The ACRS therefore requested further evaluation, although it did not suggest a condition on the operation of 'ystem 80 plants pending s
resolution of the issue.
The bottom line of Staff's and Applicant's justification for interim operation prior to the resolution of A-45 is that the EFWS is so reliable that no other method of shutdown decay heat removal is necessary. We must review this justification in accordance with the Appeal Board's guidance in Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978).
We are prevented by that opinion from " scrutiny of the substance of 8/ The five considerations are 1) the reliability of the EFWS, 2) that Waterford 3 can achieve a cold shutdown using only safety grade systems, 3) the reliability of Waterford 3's steam generators, 4) the possibility of heat removal by depressurizing the steam generators and using the low head condensate pumps, and 5) that probabilistic analyses do not justify the addition of Reactor Coolant System valves.
-9/ See ACRS, Reliability of the Shutdown Heat Removal System on the 59 stem 80 Design (April 5, 1982).
. particular explanations." Rather, we are only to look "to see whether the generic safety issues have been taken into account in a manner that is at least plausible and that, if proven to ba of substance, would be adequate to justify operation."
_Id. at 248 n.7 (emphasis added). Our role, therefore, is similar to appellate review; we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Staff.
Therefore, we find ourselves in the uncomfortable position of being required to accept a justification of which we are personally skeptical.
However, even if we were permitted to substitute our judgment for the Staff's, we would unable to assess definitively Staff's and Applicant's justification without receiving evidence on the issue, and, because of the involvement of ACRS, we feel that an attempt on our part to obtain the evidence necessary to resolve this issue would be violative of the Commission's recent decision in Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-82-20, 16 NRC (1982).
Accordingly, with great reluctance we accept Staff's justification. However, we bring this issue to the attention of the Commission and urge that an in-depth assessment of the reliability of the Waterford 3 shutdown decay heat removal system be made by an independent laboratory, such as Sandia National Laboratory.
2.
Seismic Qualification of Equipment (A-46)
With respect to Seismic Qualification of Equipment ( A-46),
the Staff reported in the SER and its supplements (Staff Exs. 3, 4, and 5) that this issue had not yet been resolved. Therefore in our
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. Memorandum and Order of August' 12, 1982, in which we requested affidavits justifying interim operation pending the resolution of A-45, Shutdown Decay Heat Removal, we also requested an affidavit justifying interim operation pending the resolution of A-46, After our receipt of the Staff's affidavit, /
10 it became apparent that the Staff's reference to A-46 in the SER was an improvident use of boilerplate. A-46 addressed whether safety equipment in plants designed against former criteria should be backfitted to comply with current criteria.
Waterford 3, however, is being reviewed against and must meet the current criteria, and thus A-46 is inapplicable as ari unresolved generic safety issue in the instant case (Staff Ex. 10).
III. CONTENTIONS A.
Emergency Planning J0_/ Affidavit of Tsun-Yung Chang, concerning Unresolved Generic Safety Issue A-46 (August 27,1982), admitted into evidence as Staff's Exhibit 10 in the Order dated October 19, 1982.
-11/ The requisite number of copies of Staff Exhibits 9 and 10 and of Applicant's Exhibit 11 have been forwarded by the Board to the reporter for marking and filing in the record of this case, which has been reopened by us for this limited purpose.
---12/ The Joint Intervenors did not present direct evidence upon Contention 17/26(1) on evacuation, or 17/26(2) relating to potassium iodide.
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. 1.
Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads (Fdgs. 8-19)
Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(b) alleges that the roads and highways necessary for evacuation of residents within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are inadequate. As required by NRC regulation, the Applicant has conducted a computer based study which estimates the time required to evacuate the 10-mile EPZ over the presently available roads. Under favorable weather conditions, evacuation would take five hours and fif teen minutes; under unfavorable conditions, the evacuation would take seven hours and thirty minutes.
Waterford is about average with respect to other plants.
Both FEMA and the NRC Staff have reviewed the time estimates and agree that the figures are reasonable.
No contrary evidence was presented, although some of the assumptions were questioned by the Joint Intervenors.
The evacuation time estimates are for use by emergency response officials who are charged with recomending and deciding on protective actions during an emergency.
Evacuation, as a protective action, would be called for when it would result in dose savings to the population. There is no standard for judging the adequacy of the evacuation routes, nor has a minimum evacuation time been set.
Under some accident scenarios, evacuation could reduce the dose to the population; under other situations, such as sudden release of radioactivity, evacuation may not be effective. Additional roads and highways would reduce the time for evacuation, but there is no requirement that such roads be built for that reason. There are therefore no criteria for deciding whether "the roads and highways necessary for such evacuation are inadequate."
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. Although there are no criteria for the adequacy of evacuation routes, estimates are required of the amount of time needed to evacuate the entire population within the plume exposure EPZ over the presently existing roads. Since such estimates form the basis for protective action decisions, the estimates must be reasonably reliable, neither too short or too long. The Joint Intervenors have alleged that the estimates are deficient in four respects, and although such allegations are not precisely covered by the contention, they are relevant and we allowed cross-examination.13/ We therefore proceed to address those alleged deficiencies.
Refusal to Evacuate The Joint Intervenors cited an instance in which some residents refused to evacuate following a potential chemical spill and argue that the Parish plans are deficient in failing to demonstrate adequate resources to forcibly evict persons who refuse to evacuate. Absent evidence to the contrary, we are persuaded by the expert opinion of the Civil Defense Director of St. Charles Parish that only a few individuals would disregard an evacuation order following a nuclear accident, and therefore there would be no diversion of Parish resources (i.e., personnel and equipment).
~~~13/The Intervenors' Proposed Findings and Memoranda include the alleged four " omissions" under their Contention 17/26(1)(b) and Contention 17/26(1)(f).
We believe the so called omissions are only relevant to the adequacy of roads and highways and so we address them at this point.
. Additional Collisions Joint Intervenors argue that during a general evacuation there will be an increased number of vehicular accidents on the roads which will lead to clogging of the routes.
They base their arguments on the testimony of the Parish Civil Defense Directors who predicted that there would be an increase in accident rates because drivers would be in a hurry to escape. However, this was contradicted by Applicant's witness on evacuation studies who testified that the past experience i
with large scale evacuation showed that there were very few serious accidents because traffic moves slowly, and that damaged cars can be moved out of the way. We give greater weight to the evidence based on past experience that traffic accidents will not lead to clogging of the evacuation routes. Further, the plans do provide for clearing the roads of stalled cars.
We find no deficiency in the time estimate study.
Hysteria The Board recognized that excessive anxiety on the part of the public could result in an overreaction and possible disruption of 14/
the plans for protective actiont--
It would most likely take the form of spontaneous evacuation by people, inside or outside the
-14/ The Board chose the term " anxiety"; however, most of the witnesses spoke of " fears," " hysteria" and " panic".
O
. 10-mile EPZ, even though their evacuation was not called for. The emergency plans do not specifically address hysteria; nor did FEMA take hysteria into account in their evaluation of the plans. However, both FEMA's and the Staff's testimony demonstrate that the planning criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1 (Rev.1), " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" are designed to provide orderly, safe evacuation and thereby minimize hysterical reactions and potential chaos.
Furthermore, past experience has demonstrated that, although there will be some hysteria and spontaneous evacuation, these reactions will not interfere with the evacuation scheme. We conclude that public overreaction to a nuclear accident is likely to be minimized provided the guidance in NUREG-0654 is followed, and we conclude that no additional measures need be taken to cope with the public's anxiety.
Single Mode Evacuation Joint Intervenors assert that the Parish plans are defective in that they inflexibly call for " single mode evacuation" for each Parish; St. Charles Parish residents evacuate to the east, while "t. John the Baptist residents go west in the event of an accident.
They allege that, while there are good alternative routes so that St. Charles could opt to evacuate to the west and St. John could opt to evacuate to the east, this single evacuation plan was arbitrarily selected to prevent the confusion that would result from the two Parishes evacuating in the same direction and was not selected in order to effect dose savings. They complain that, under certain conditions
O
. (e.g., adverse prevailing winds), residents would be exposed to excessive radiation if they were arbitrarily required to evacuate in a single direction.
However, maps in the Parish Plans show that residents in some sectors of the two Parishes will evacuate in directions other than strictly east or west. Moreover, the plans are not fixed in concrete.
Depending upon conditions existing at the time, the Parish Civil Defense Directors could and would decide to evacuate in various directions other than strictly to the east or west.
We conclude, therefore, that Applicants' evacuation time study demonstrates a reasonable evacuation time estimate, and we reject Joint Intervenors' allegations of four deficiencies in this estimate and in the evacuation scheme.
2.
Evacuation Warning System (Fdgs. 20-40)
Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(c) alleges that the Evacuation Warning System in Applicant's Emergency Plan is inadequate.
a.
The Siren System The record reveals a well developed evacuation warning system. The primary component of the system is a network of fixed sirens designed to meet the NRC and FEMA criteria. The siren network is complemented by mobile units whose function is to warn transients in recreational wetlands in the EPZ.
In addition, the plan contains provisions for direct notification of the major industrial concerns in the area, and provisions to contact persons with hearing impairments.
Implementation of this plan is not yet complete; the sirens are not yet installed, and means for contacting particular persons or
4
. groups are still being formulated. This is not a defect in the plan.
Emergency Planning is a continuous process, and our findings are predictive. We are satisfied that, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a),
the plans are sufficiently detailed and concrete to provide us with reasonable assurances that they can and will be implemented in the event of an emergency.
In addition, the plans must be completed and fully exercised before the NRC Staff can authorize full power operation.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, F.1.b.; 10 C.F.R. 50.47.
The implementation of details, such as the completion of a list of hearing impaired individuals and specification of means to cont'act them, can properly be overseen by the Staff.
However, in line with what has been done in St. John the Baptist Parish, we do suggest that the list of major industries to be contacted in the St. Charles Parish Plan be amended to include the telephone number of each such industry.
b.
The Emergency Messages The transmission of emergency information is also part of the evacuation warning system.
The Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED) and the Parishes of St. Charles and of St. John the Baptist have drafted emergency messages for broadcast in the event of an emergency. These messages include specific evacuation instructions -- the location of reception centers, specified evacuation routes, and in'structions for meeting children evacuated directly from schools. The messages are kept on file by the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (L0EP) for broadcast over the State's Emergency Broadcast System.
Provisions have also been made for the broadcast of the messages over local radio and
cable TV stations. Joint Intervenors have not pointed out any deficiency in the evacuation scheme or in the method of disseminating the information.
Except for the absence of information upon pick-up points for persons without transportation, the emergency public information scheme complies with the applicable regulatory requirements, and there is reasonable assurance that the scheme can be implemented in a radiological emergency.
The informational deficiency noted above is dealt with in our discussion of Contention 17/26(1)(f),
infra.
3.
Comand Decision Structure (Fdgs. 41-52)
Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(d) alleges that the i
command decision structure, including appropriate guidance, is inadequate for commencing evacuation.
Any threat to safety at Waterford 3 is first recognized by the Plant's Operation Shift Supervisor. At that time, he assumes the duties of Emergency Coordinator. He alerts the Plant Superintendent Nuclear, who will become Emergency Coordinator if the situation so requires. The Emergency Coordinator assesses the emergency and notifies the State agencies, LNED and L0EP, and the two Parishes adjacent to the plant, St. Charles and St. John the Baptist.
The information transmitted to the State agencies and the Parishes via the operational hotline includes the class of the emergency, information concerning the actual or projected releases of radioactivity, and recommended protective measures.
Upon receipt of the initial notification from the utility, the Parishes implement the notification and mobilization procedures for l
. Parish personnel and resources as determined by the class of emergency.
Each Parish activates its Emergency Operations Center (E0C) and maintains continuous communications with the plant and State agencies.
LNED activates its operational headquarters and makes an indeper. dent assessment of the accident based upon information received from the plant and from the LNED field monitoring team. LNED diss-eminates information to the State E0C, activated by L0EP, and to the Parishes. LNED also make's a protective action recommendation which is forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Environmental Affairs (AS0EA), for evaluation. Upon the decision of AS0EA, LNED notifies the Parishes of the State's protective action recommendation.
Each Parish E0C is manned by a staff of responsible Parish officials and a representative of the utility.
This staff will assist the Parish chief executive in making the final decision as to protective actions. The Parish will implement protective actions based on local conditions and will take into account State and plant recommendations.
Both the NRC Staff and FEMA have reviewed the emergency plans, off-site and on-site, and have found that, but for certain i
minor deficiencies which the Applicant has committed to correct, they conform with Commission regulations and guides.
Except for the failure of 'the Parish Plans to designate by title the LP&L official at the EOF who will have the authority or responsibility to provide protective action recommendations to off-site authorities, we do not believe that these minor deficiencies have an important bearing on the adequacy of the command structure. We have reviewed all of the
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s, testimony, exhibits, and cross-exadnation and conclude that the t
command structure is adequate for commencing evacuation or other t
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suitable protective actions, ' subject to the c'esignation by title in the w
4.
s Parish Plans of the LP&L official at the EOF, who will have the authority or responsibility to provid's protective action x
recommendations to off-site authorities \\c 4.
Evacuation Drills (fdgs. 53-58) 2 G, i Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(e) alleges that emergency preparedness exercises will be inadequate, because provisions for moving individuals will not be actually tested.15/
)
10 C.F.R. Part 50, App.
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F.1 requires a peribdic fulr scale exercise which tests as muth' of the emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandator'y public participation. _
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Applicant's and the State's plans' fo~r emergency preparedness exercises are in accordance with this provision, and appear reasonably calculated to test their logistical capabilities. Applicant has, therefore, s demonstrated compliance with the resulations, and this fact ie uncontroverted by Joint Intervenors. Moreover, we believe that l_5/ In their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Joint Intervenors address an allecM traed for actual public evacuation; they do not address the a<f.:N xy of the plan to test the logistics needed for an evacuatirS 'is, whether buses, ambulances, etc.,
will be mobilized de i'r ET ercise) and did not do so during the hearings.
According.f, n 2 arpret the contention as one concerning solely thE n'ecessity for actual public evacuation durin'g an exercise., Joint Intervenors also assert in their Propossd Findings that exerciser should be unannounced.
This assertion clearly eiceeds the scope of the contention and will not be s
addressed.
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. m, 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, F.1 expressly precludes our requiring public evacuation during an exercise.
t 5.
Transportation for Special Persons (Fdgs. 59-81)
Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(f) alleges that there are inada7uate provisions made for the evacuation of persons without vehicles, school children, the aged or crippled, the sick and the hospitalized, prisoners, and transient workers.
Joint Intervenors' proposed findings of fact to a great extent addressed problems of evacuation in general, and not problems in evacuating the particular classes of persons identified in the contention.15!
The record establ'i es that the Parish Plans do address the l
special needs of classes of persons described in the contention. The plan identifies these groups, determines the number of persons in each and the resources needed to evacuate them, and, except for prisoners, establishes the actual details of evacuation. Responsibility for each portion of the plan is clearly delineated.
To date, however, the Parishes lack sufficient resources to implement the plan. There are sufficient vehicles in neighboring parishes to permit implementation of the plan; the exact number of
---16/ Joint Intervenors' Findings of Fact address four " omissions" in the plan, the f ailure to consider refusal to evacuate, additional collisions on the highways during an evacuation, hysteria, and the inadequacy of " single mode evacuation." Proposed Opinion and Findings of Fact of Joint Intervenors, 9-13 (June 19, 1982). These issues were clearly not raised by Contention 17/26(1)(f), and were not the subject of any direct testimony.
However, these issues are relevant to the adequacy of roads and highways for evacuation and are discussed, supra, with respect to Contention 17/26(1)(b).
22 -
vehicles needed has been established and all that is needed are letters of agreement with support parishes to ensure that the vehicles and drivers can and will be provided if needed.
Accordingly, we condition issuance of the operating license on completion of the letters of agreement and submittal of these letters to the NRC Staff.
In addition, we are disturbed by the lack of adequate plans for the evacuation of prisoners.
Indeed, that the Parish plans consider other protective measures, such as sheltering and protective drugs, in lieu of timely cvacuation for this special population heightens our concern.
We do not believe that these other measures should obviate plans for timely evacuation.
Therefore, we condition the issuance of the operating license on commitment and designation by the Parishes of the vehicles and personnel necessary for timely evacuation of the parish prison populations.
The Parish Plans should be amended to specify the vehicles that have been allotted to evacuate the prisoners. These vehicles should have a combined capacity to evacuate the prison population.
The Plans should also specify the personnel commitment for drivers and guards.
Finally, the Plans should clearly indicate that the personnel designated as drivers or guards will have no other emergency duties and the allotted vehicles will have no other emergency function until after prisoner evacuation is accomplished.
Finally, this Board also conditions the operating license upon inclusion of pick-up point information in the EBS evacuation message. Although Applicant testified that broadcast of this
. information is contemplated, the information is not part of the evacuation message contained in the Parish Plans. We do not believe that there can be an adequate evacuation of persons who do not have a means of transportation unless clear instructions to those persons are given at the tir.a evacuation is ordered.
The problems we have resolved above by imposing license conditions do not require a reopening of the record.
They require only a purely objective determination and are appropriate for post-hearing ministerial resolution by the Staff.
6.
Potassium Iodide (Fdgs. 82-98)
Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(2) alleges that Applicant's emergency plan failed to provide adequately for the distribution and/or storage of potassium iodide (KI) in readily accessible locations for the protection of individuals against thyroid irradiation.
Radioactive isotopes of iodine that are inhaled or ingested accumulate in the thyroid where they can lead to local radiation damage and cancers.
Iodine-131 (radioiodine) is the most significant of the radioisotopes that are released during a reactor incident. There are a variety of chemical substances that block the accumulation of radiciodine in the thyroid.
Of these, potassium iodide is purportedly the most suitable.
However, administration of KI prior to exposure of radiciodine is required to obtain maximum protection from the effects of the exposure.
. Joint Intervenors did not present direct evidence in support of this contention. Applicant, however, demonstrated that there are risks and problems associated with the predistribution and use of KI as an optional protective action for the general public.
Predistribution of KI to the general public would preclude responsible control of the time and manner of the administration of the drug.
Controlled conditions, such as temperature, moisture, and light, are required to maintain optimum potency of the drug.
Predistribution might give the public a f alse sense of security because merely the taking of the drug may not be a sufficient protective action.
In addition, Staff demonstrated that both FEMA and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) consider the decision to dispense KI to be the prerogative of the State. While it is conceivable that comprehensive Federal guidance, applicable to all operating reactors, may at some point in the future recommend the administration of KI to the general public in an emergency, there clearly is no current " accepted public health practice" providing for KI use by the general public.
After weighing factors such as the risks of adverse and allergic reactions and side effects, the logistical problems of KI administration, and the availability of other protective action options, the Board concludes that the State of Louisiana's public health policy decision not to provide KI to the general public is reasonable and is not inconsistent with the guidance provided by FEMA and the NRC.
. B.
Synergism (Fdgs.99-111)
In Contention 8/9, Joint Intervenors allege that evaluation of possible synergistic or cumulative effects between radiation and 17/
chemical carcinogens should have been considered, but were nott--
Their concern is with radioactive releases from the normal operation of the plant. They believe that the introduction of this radiation to a region through which passes a heavily contaminated river will enhance the risk of deleterious health effects, particularly cancer, to the population.
--'17/ This contention uses the term " cumulative effects." Very little of the testimony, however, discussed cumulative effects of chemical carcinocens and radiation.
(See Jt. Inters.' testimony, fol. Tr.
1342, at 5-8).
No specific deTTnition was given, and we therefore apply the term as it is normally used.
Health effects are cumulative if they increase with each added insult or injury. With respect to radiation, the health effects increase linearly.
When this definition is applied to contention 8/9, the reason for the dearth of testimony on cumulative effects becomes apparent.
If the combined impact of radiation and chemicals is additive, as defined above, then the contribution from radiation is all that must be evaluated.
The component of the combined impact that is the result of exposure to chemical carcinogens will exist whether or not Waterford 3 is operated and is therefore the background to which radiation effects must be added.
These radiation effects have been treated in the FES, Appendix I rulemaking record, and BEIR reports. Accordingly, we afford no separate treatment to cumulative effects.
. The Radiation Hazard:
In support of their contention the Joint Intervenors raised a number of points.
They claim that both the Applicant and the Staff erred in their calculations of the levels of both the liquid and gaseous radioactive effluents that will be released from the plant during normal operations and that the estimated average dose level of
.01 mrem per year to individuals living in the vicinity of the plant is much too low.
The challenge to the calculations stems from claims that inaccurate rates of release of radioactive effluents were postulated and that incorrect rates of uptakes of isotopes by soil, by plants, and by animals were used, resulting in the development of inaccurate source terms. The Joint Intervenors base their allegation on what they perceived to be large discrepancies between estimates of expected releases from Waterford and those actually experienced in operating plants. They base their claim on a table, prepared by one of their witnesses from data appearing in the published literature, of radioactive releases from five operating plants.
Further, they believe the calculated doses to the public are too low because inappropriate inhalation and ingestion exposure pathway models were used.
They claim also that current state-of-the-art dosimeters do not truly measure tissue dose. They recommend a biological dosimeter, tradescantia, as providing an accurate measure of tissue dosage, in that such dosimeters reflect' radiation effects on nucleii of individual cells.
. After full consideration of the testimony, the Board believes the skepticism of Joint Intervenors' witnesses as to accuracy and validity of the techniques employed and of the findings developed from them is not well founded.
No witness for the Joint Intervenors was f amiliar with the actual methodology _ Staff or Applicant used or with any other methodology. Absent a constructive critique of the methodologies, we must accept as valid the established models and projections of Staff and Applicant.
Joint Intervenors' skepticism is simply not sufficient to refute Staff's and Applicant's testimony.
Moreover, we discount Joint ~Intervenors' witness' table as a valid basis for his skepticism; cross-examination of the witness discredited the table's accuracy and applicability.
For example, the witness was not sure if the figures on the table were releases from single unit reactors, whether the reactors were similar to Waterford 3, or even whether the figures on the table were actual, measured releases or were mere projections.
The Board accepts the Staff's and Applicant 3 _ilculations on the levels of release of radioactive effluents from the plant and the dose calculations derived therefrom. The estimates of both parties are very close to each other. The release estimates were based on the design of Waterford 3's equipment and the characteristics of the plant site's m5terology, hydrology, and geology. Calculation of the releases demonstrates compliance with NRC's regulatory limits in Appendix I to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.
Evaluation of the doses and the effect of the releases are based on commonly accepted methodology and risk functions
e for low levels of radiation. The Board agrees that the impact will be very small.
The Environmental Pollution Hazard:
Further in support of their contention, the Joint Intervenors presented testimony to the effect that there is a larger burden of exposure to chemicals through air and drinking water to the population living along the Mississippi River corridor between Baton Rouge and New Orleans than in many other areas of the country and that this is specially true for persons occupationally exposed in plants along the river. They state that the rates of cancer for people living along the lower Mississippi River are significantly higher than the national average, particularly for respiratory, urinary tract, and pancreatic cancer, and that epidemiological studies have linked the high cancer rates to heavy chemical pollutant exposure through drinking water obtained from the Mississippi, from employment in ship building and chemical industries, and from residence near the petroleum refineries.
The Joint Intervenors point out that neither the Applicant nor the Staff had considered the contribution of chemical environment pollutants in their evaluation of the potential health hazards from siting the plant in the southern Mississippi corridor.
The view of the Board is that the Joint Intervenors are correct in their assessment that neither the Staff nor the Applicant had considered the role of chemical environmental pollutants in their consideration of the potential health hazards associated with the normal operation of the Waterford plant. The Board concurs that there
~ 29 are elevated rates for some types of cancer in southeastern Louisiana over other regions of the U.S., and it is possible that the elevation of cancer rates is caused by chemical carcinogenic environmental pollut ants. One would be hard put to refute that some of the cancer incidence in the region may be attributable to existing carcinogenic agents in environmental pollutants in the area.
However, in view of the ambiguity expressed in the literature, the Board believes-that further work is necessary to firmly establish a casual relationship between environmental pollution and cancer induction in southeastern Louisiana, as attractive as that hypothesis is for explaining the high rates of cancer there. More important though in the context of this hearing is that there is no evidence that the concentration of existing pollutants in the area, proven or suspected to be carcinogens, is sufficient to support synergism, assuming requisite levels of radioactivity will be present and that synergism in fact occurs in such a milieu.
The Multiplicative Hazard:
The Joint Intervenors' contention concerning potential deleterious health effects of radioactive releases asssociated with the normal operation of Waterford 3 is not a challenge to Appendix I, but rather is a concern about cumulative and/or synergistic effects of the radioactive releases and chemical carcinogens which already exist due to the high concentrations of industry in the immediately adjoining area.
The results of a number of studies were put into the record and demonstrated that synergism exists between certain chemicals and
t -
ionizing radiation in the induction of cancer in animals. These effects, however, were demonstrated at radiation doses and dose rates many orders of magnitude greater than background radiation. No evidence of synergism between low-level radiation (at or even approaching the very low levels of radiation to be emitted from the Waterford plant) and chemical. carcinogens was presented.
Further, none of the studies suggested a relationship for extrapolating from high radiation levels, where effects have been observed, to the extremely low levels of radiation at issue here.
Certainly there is no convincing evidence in this record to that effect, although witnesses were repeatedly asked about this by the Board.
It was largely this gap in the evidence that prevented us from accepting Joint Intervenors' witnesses' opinion that synergism would occur.
But even if we were to assume that multiplicative effects do occur at the very low doses of radiation under consideration, then the cancer incidence statistics presented must necessarily include any synergistic interactions that might have occurred between the environmental carcinogens in southeastern Louisiana and the natural background radiation levels.
It l
is estimated Waterford 3 will add an average of only about 0.01 mrem per year to the 80 mrem per year background radiation.
Such a minute addition to existing radiation levels could have only a correspondingly minute additional effect and would not measurably increase any synergistic interactions that might be already occurring in the environment.
Furthermore, the radiation released by Waterford 3 will even be smaller than the variation in natural background radiation from
o e -
place to place in the area around the plant. As a result, any additional synergistic effects caused by radiation released from Waterford 3 will be correspondingly even smaller than those induced by such local variations in natural background radiation and completely undetectable, if they occur at all.E/
The Board concludes that synergistic effects are exceedingly unlikely to occur at the very low levels of radiation calculated to result from the releases of gaseous and liquid radioactive effluents from Waterford 3 during normal plant operation.
Further, even if synergistic effects did occur, they would be so small as to be clinically undetectable.
Accordingly, the Board finds that Applicant and Staff did noterrinfailingtoassesssynergisticeffects.N Neverthe-less, the environmental statement may be deemed amended pro tanto to 20/
include our findings and conclusion.-
_18/ Although lack of detectability does not necessarily translate into no effect, the fact that naturally occuring variables alone are sufficient to mask any effect that occurs is indicative of negligible impact.
See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Electric Co.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-19, 7 NRC 989, 1026 (1976); Philadelphia Electric Company, et al. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-640, 13 NRC 487, 547 (1981) (0 pinion of Judges Buck and Johnson dissenting with respect to Part VIB).
19/ NEPA's requirement that environmental effects of a proposed agency action be described is subject to a rule.of reason. An agency need not foresee the unforeseeable.
Scientists' Institute For Public Information v. Atomic Energy Commission, 481 F.2d 10/9, 1092 (D.C.
cir.1973).
-20/ Allied Central Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separations Facility, ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975); 10 C.F.R. 51.53(b)(3).
. IV. CONCLUSION The Board concludes, on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits in the record, that subject to conditions discussed in this Opinion and imposed in the Order, infra:
- 1) the roads and highways are adequate for evacuation purposes; 2) the evacuation warning system is adequate; 3) the command decision structure is adequate; 4) the planned exercises are adequate and need not include actual evacuations; 5) the plans for evacuating special classes of persons are adequate; 6) the emergency plans are not inadequate in not providing for the storage and/or distribution of potassium iodide to the public; and 7) Applicant and Staff did not err in not assessing synergistic effects, and such effects, if they occur at all, are insignificant.
In addition, the Board concludes that the unresolved generic safety issues have been taken into account in a manner that is at least plausible and that, if proven to be of substance, would be adequate to justify operation.
However, with respect to unresolved generic safe,ty issue A-45, Shutdown Decay Heat Removal, we do so with misgivings. We commend our discussion of this issue to the Commission and urge that an in-depth assessment of the reliability of the Waterford 3 Shutdown i
Decay Heat Removal System be made by an independent laboratory.
All other matters not discussed in the Opinion other than yet-undecided Contention 17/26(1)(a), were considered and found either to be without merit or not to affect the outcome of our decision.
l
t
. FIND'yGSOFFACT I.
O ~ A idND 1.
This initial decision involves the Application filed in September 1978 by Louisiana Power and Light Company (Applicant) for a license to operate the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
Previously, on November 14, 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had issued the Construction Permit. On January 2, 1979, the NRC published a Federal Register Notice of " Receipt of Application for Facility Operating License; Availability of Applicant's Environmental Report; Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License; and Opportunity for Hearing" (44 Fed. Reg. 125).
2.
Waterford 3 is located on the west bank of the Mississippi River, in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, between the towns of Killona and Taft, about 24 miles west of New Orleans (Staff Ex. 2, p. 2-1).
This plant will utilize a nuclear steam supply system manufactured by Combustion Engineering Corp. and consisting of a pressurized water reactor (PWR), a pressurizer, two steam generators, four coolant pumps, and piping required to connect these components. The nuclear steam supply system is enclosed in a steel containment vessel and a surrounding concrete shield building.
Steam from the steam generators will drive a turbogenerator having a net output of approximately 1150 MW of electric energy (M., at 1-3,1-4).
2_1/ The latest information as of August,1982 is that fuel loading is scheduled for May,1983, and that the scheduled commercial operation date has been deferred until January, 1984.
\\
I
' 3.
This Licensing Board admitted as party-intervenors Save Our Wetlands, Inc. and Oystershell Alliance (the Joint Intervenors),
and Louisiana Consumers' League, Inc. (Order of September 13,1979).
Prior to the hearing, Louisiana Consumers' League withdrew its contentions and withdrew as a party (Order of November 13,1981).
Ultimately, two of the Joint Intervenors' contentions remained to be tried - Contention 8/9, regarding synergism, and Contentions 17/26(1) and 17/26(2), regarding emergency planning.22/
4 4.
Limited appearance statements by members of the public were taken during the initial hearing sessions. Evidentiary hearings on the synergism contention were held on March 24-26, 29-31, April 1-2, and May 10-11, 1982. The hearings on the emergency planning issues were held on May 3-7, 11-12. A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) attorney appeared and participated during the emergency planning sessions.
5.
On June 11, 1982, Applicant filed its proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and brief. The Joint Intervenors filed their 22/ Prior to the hearing, two of Joint Intervenors' contentions had been dismissed pursuant to summary disposition procedures (Memorandum and Order of September 30, 1981, and that of October 20,1981).
Joint Intervenors had also withdrawn eleven of their contentions prior to the hearing (Order of November 13,1981).
' proposed findings, conclusions of law and trial memoranda on June 19, 1982.
Staff's proposed findings and conclusions of law, and brief were submitted on July 15th. Applicant filed replies on July 26, 1982.
6.
Upon our review we found the record inadequate with respect to Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(a) which reads as follows:
Applicant has failed to adequately make provision, according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for evacuation of individuals located within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone for the Waterford 3 site in the event of a serious reactor incident, as regulations, in that:_guired by applicable NRC (a) the provisions for notifying residents of evacuation procedures are inadequate.
Applicant's brochure to satisfy the public information requirements of the Commission's emergency planning regulations (10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(7)) had not been drafted at the time of the hearing and was not offered into evidence. Accordingly, in a Memorandum and Order of August 17, 1982, the Board reopened the record, directed that Applicant submit as an exhibit its brochure, and requested that the parties comment on the brochure and indicate whether further testimony and cross-examination would be necessary.
After reviewing Applicant's submission, the Staff and FEMA furnished comments.
Joint Intervenors submitted affidavits which asserted, inter alia, that the brochure would not be readily comprehensible to a person of only average
-23/ This introductory wording of Contention 17/26(1) will not be reiterated infra with respect to subparts (b) through (f).
e
-y.
education.
Joint Intervenors requested that further evidentiary hearings be held. Applicant responded, requesting inter alia that it be permitted to submit a revised brochure to meet these comments.
Applicant agreed that a hearing would be the most expedient method of resolving the issue.
In a Memorandum and Order of October 18, 1982, we ordered a further hearing on Contention 17/26(1)(a) with respect to the adequacy of Applicants' revised brochure.
II.
ISSUES IN CONTROVERSY A.
Emergency Planning 7,
10 C.F.R. 50.47(a) on Emeroency Plans provides that no operating license will be issued unless there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
This determination, as applied to the off-site emergency plan, is based on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) review of the adequacy of the state and local emergency plans and on the existence of reasonable assurance that they can be implemented. The FEMA findings are presumed to be correct (Id.).
24/ In numerous instances the Joint Intervenors' proposed findings cited and relied upon extra-record material.
It is clear that the Board may not base a decision on factual material which has not been introduced into evidence. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A,1B, and 28) ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 352 (1978).
Further, many of those proposed findings improperly presented reargument in excepting to various rulings made by the Board during the evidentiary hearing.
-25/ Joint Intervenors did not present direct evidence upon this Contention, 17/26(1) and (2).
e a
. 1.
Evacuation Time Estimate and Adequacy of Roads Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(b) alleges:
the roads and highways necessary for such evacuation are inadequate.
8.
Section IV of Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. 50 requires that:
The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective action for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and for permanent population.
9.
The methodology for preparation of the evacuation time estimates is specified in Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1 (Rev.1),
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."
- 10. The evacuation time estimates are for use by emergency rosponse personnel charged with recommending and deciding on protective action during an emergency. The time estimates provide emergency response decision-makers with information on which to base a decision as to the feasibility of evacuation under the actual conditions (Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 2743, at 6; Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2224, at 4).
- 11. Applicant submitted an evacuation time estimate study
" Evacuation Time Estimate, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Un'it No. 3, Rev.1" (Appl's. Ex. 4).
The methodology for the study utilizes a mathematical simulation model, which predicts the flow of traffic on the roadway system around Waterford 3, and was based on population estimates for 1982 within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
The estimated time to evacuate the entire 10-mile area was five hours
O
.y-and fifteen minutes under clear weather conditions, and seven hours and thirty minutes under adverse weather conditions (Id. at Table 1).
These time estimates place Waterford 3 approximately in the middle relative to other nuclear power plants (Tr.
2780).
- 12. The NRC Staff has reviewed the Applicant's evacuation time estimate study and has concluded that it is responsive to and is in compliance with NUREG-0654 (Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 2743, at 5). The Staff has made independent calculations which agree reasonably well with the Applicant's (Id.).
FEMA officials have observed the road network in the vicinity of Waterford 3, have interviewed the Civil Defense Directors (CD) for the risk parishes, and have considered the comments of the Regional Assistance Committee member from the Federal Highway Administration as well as the Applicant's evacuation time estimate study.
They conclude that the roads are adequate for evacuation purposes (FEMA testimony, fol. Tr. 2864, at 5, 6).
- 13. The CD Directors for the risk parishes agree that the evacuation time estimates over the present roadways are reasonable
( Appl's testimony, fol. Tr. 2243, at pp.10-11; Appl's, testimony, fol. Tr. 2246, at 6). However, both Directors would like to see additional roads and lowered evacuation time (Tr. 2996; Tr. 2997).
- 14. What is meant by " adequate" evacuation routes has not been defined. Neither the Commission regulations nor NUREG-0654 require that any particular evacuation route capacity exists as part of an applicant's emergency preparedness capability (Staff testimony, fol.
Tr. 3229, at 7-8).
Neither agency has set requirements for maximum
acceptable evacuation times; nor do they require the addition or upgrading of roads and highways for evacuation (App 1's, testimony, fol.
Tr. 2224, at 3). The Civil Defense Director for St. Johns Parish is of the opinion that NUREG-0654 is deficient in failing to give guidance on evacuation time (Tr. 2996).
15.
As a consequence of a potential chemical spill that occurred in St. Charles Parish, an evacuation of an area containing nine families was required.
Three families refused to evacuate and were forcibly removed, thereby requiring security forces (Tr. 2717-21).
The foregoing situation was unusual; the residents had all evacuated on the first day and no incident occurred. Therefore, three families were reluctant to evacuate a second time.
It was the opinion of the Civil Defense Director for St. Charles Parish that few people would refuse to leave the 10-mile EPZ in the event of a nuclear incident and that there would be no diversion of Parish resources (Tr. 3035-39).
16.
Both Parish CD Directors predicted that in the event of an emergency calling for widespread evacuation there would be an increase in the number of automobile accidents (Tr. 2840). Applicant's expert witness on traffic and regional planning stated that past experience has demonstrated that the incidence of traffic accidents is reduced because people drive slowly (Tr. 2841,2843-44).
In any event, the evacuation time estimate study takes accidents into account in that stalled cars would be pushed aside and tow trucks could use inbound lanes to gain access to damaged vehicles (Tr. 2839-40). The evacuation
O
. ~
time estimate study assumed that there would be enough rescue vehicles 1
to clear the roads of accident-damaged cars (Tr. 3003).
- 17. While FEMA witnesses did not take hysteria into account in evaluating the evacuation plans, FEMA implicitly took hysteria into account in preparing planning criteria of NUREG-0654 (Tr. 2914, 2918).
The Staff confirmed that panic and anxiety were not specifically addressed in NUREG-0654, and added that the public education program and provisions therein for providing direction to the public are designed to reduce public hysteria (Tr. 3811,3797). Thus, public overreaction to a nuclear accident, such as spontaneous evacuation, would be minimized provided the guidance of NUREG-0654 is followed, (Tr. 3811, 3806 and 3819), and no additional measures would be required to cope with public panic (Tr. 3810).
Previous experience has shown that although there will be anxiety and fear in the event of an accident, they did not interfere with the ability to take protective actions (Tr. 3808).
18.
Contrary to Joint Intervenors' assertion, the Parish Plans do not call for an arbitrary and inflexible " single mode" evacuation.
Maps in the Parish Plans show that residents in some sectors of St.
John the Baptist Parish should also evacuate to the northwest and that residents in some sections of St. Charles Parish should also evacuate to the west, northwest and southeast (Appl's. Ex. 3, at 179-182, 342-44).
Further, the CD Directors for each Parish stated that their plans were not inflexible - that depending on conditions (e.g.,
prevailing winds), they could and would determine to evacuate in
. various-directions other than strictly to the. east or west (Tr. 2671-73; 2794-96).
19.
Based on the foregoing Findings, the Board finds that the roads and highways are adequate for evacuation.
2.
Evacuation Warning System Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(c) alleges:
... the evacuation warning system is inadequate.
20.
10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(5) requires:
[T]he content of initial and follow-up messages to
... the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.
21.
10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, IV. D. 3 states in part:
[E]ach nuclear power reactor licensee shall demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ....
The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public... within about 15 minutes [after licensee notifies State and local officials of an emergency].
a.
The Siren System
- 22. Criterion E and Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654 provide guidance for the establishment of an emergency notification system. Sirens must be capable of providing coverage of essentially 100% of the population within the 10-mile EPZ (M., at 3-3), at least 10 db above the average daytime ambient background noise level (M., at 3-8).
For low 2
population areas (less than 2,000 person /mi ), the estimated
. average background is 50 db(a) (Id., at 3-11). The siren signal must be a three to five minute steady signal, capable of repetition (Id., at 3-12).
- 23. The proposed primary alert system for the Waterford 3 plume EPZ consists of 38 fixed location, rotating, radio-controlled, battery-operated sirens to be located in St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 9; Appl's.
Ex. 5).
24.
The sirens to be used are rated at 125 db(c) at 100 feet and are positioned so as to provide a minimum coverage of 60 db(c) to essentially 100% of the population (Appl's testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 10; Appl's. Ex. 5).
The location of the sirens was developed by a consulting firm under contract with Applicant, Acoustics Technology, Inc., which used a computer model to verify the capabilities of the system (Appl's.
Ex. 5).
- 25. The sirens will produce a 3-5 minute steady signal
( Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 9).
- 26. The fixed siren system is supplemented by tone alert receivers, radios, mobile sirens, and mobile loud speakers (Id.).
These devices will be used to alert transients or locals who may be located in otherwise uninhabited recreational areas (Id., at 11).
- 27. Persons with hearing impairments are being identified and provisions for contacting them are being established (Appl's.
testimony, fol. Tr. 2262, at 11).
l l
_ 43 -
- 28. Major industries, at which ambient noise levels may exceed 50 db(a) in the plume EPZ, will receive direct notification via radio, tone-alert receiver, or telephone (Id., at 12). These businesses have been identified and are listed in the Parish plans (App 1's. Ex.
3 at 105-110, 268-271). The list for St. John the Baptist Parish includes the telephone number of each business, while the list for St.
Charles Parish omits the telephone numbers.
- 29. The Parish Civil Defense Director for St. John the Baptist Parish testified that an agreement exists with South Central Bell Telephone. The agreement establishes a priority list of telephones in order that, if the telephone system were to become overloaded during an emergency, ready communication through the priority lines would be preserved (Tr. 2820-21).
30.
River traffic on the Mississippi will be notified through the Port of New Orleans Coast Guard Facility and air traffic will be closed down over the Waterford area after notification of the FAA regional office in Houston ( App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2258 at 7).
31.
FEMA has made no final findings as to the adequacy of the proposed public alert / notification systems.
FEMA had made interim findings which were included in Supplement 3 to the SER, but these findings only addressed the system design criterion stated in the Parish Plans (Staff,Ex. 5, at F-35). However, FEMA officials who were called as witnesses have reviewed the warning plan. They testified that the siren system is in compliance with the appropriate criteria, but that FEMA has reserved final approval until procedures
for notifying industry and tne hearing impaired are finalized and the entire system is tested (FEMA testimony, fol. Tr. 2864, at 6-7).
32.
FEMA will field test and evaluate the entire system as per NUREG-0654, App. 3.
The NRC Staff will verify compliance with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, prior to full power authorization (Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 3229, at 10-11; 10 C.F.R. 50.47(d)).
b.
The Emergency Messages
- 33. Guidance is provided by NUREG-0654.
Criteria E.5-E.7 of NUREG-0654 provides for the establishment of an Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and pre-prepared messages specifying emergency instructions (sheltering, respiratory protection, or evacuation).
34.
Chapter 4 of the State of Louisiana Peacetime Radio-logical Response Plan (Rev. 4, Feb.,1982) (State Plan) establishes general area wide EBS messages ( App 1's. Ex. 2, at 4-3), including a sheltering message and an evacuation message for the Waterford area (I_d., at 4-7, 4-8).
The Plan also provides for the development of specific EBS messages for risk areas. All messages are kept on file by the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (L0EP) for transmission over Louisiana's EBS.
- 35. Attachment 1 to the State Plan consists of the Parish Plans l
for St.
Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes.
The Parish Plans further develop the emergency notification program.
The Parishes have drafted emergency messages for sheltering and evacuation.
The messages include the location of reception centers and specific evacuation routes (Appl's. Ex. 3, at 135-149, 302-314). Also included is a school
. evacuation message; if school is in progress, parents are told where to meet their children (Id.; See also Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 6).
36.
EBS messages fail to provide information on pick-up points for persons without transportation.
See Fdg. 63, infra.
37.
Emergency information will also be broadcast over local radio and cable TV stations (App 1's, testimony, fol. Tr. 2243, at 6-8;.
App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2246, at 4).
38.
FEMA has not made a final determination as to the adequacy of the emergency public notification program.
FEMA has, however, made interim findings that the procedures in the State Plan for notifying the public in the plume exposure pathway were incomplete, because EBS messages were yet to be developed (Staff Ex. 5, at F-9). The State Plan has since been revised and now includes EBS messages. See Fdgs. 34-35, supra.
FEMA interim findings on the Parish Plans emergency information program contained no adverse comments (Id., at F-35).
39.
FEMA witnesses testified that the emergency public notification program was adequate (FEMA testimony, fol. Tr. 2864, at 5).
40.
Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that, subject to the inclusion of pick-up point information in the evacuation messages, the evacuation warning system is adequate.
I
O
- 3.
Command Decision Structure Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(d) alleges:... there is not an adequate command decision structure, including appropriate guidance, for commencing evacuation.
- 41. The Commission regulations (10 C.F.R. 50.47) and NUREG-0654 identify the on-site and off-site organization and responsibilities in the event of an accident. At Waterford 3, the Emergency Coordinator is charged with the command and control of all accident-mitigating actions at the site.
His first action is to classify the emergency severity 6/ and notify the State of 2
Louisiana and the two Parishes adjacent to Waterford 3 of his assessment and his recommendation for protective actions. He also supplies sufficient information as to the nature of the accident, estimated releases of radioactivity, and projected dose rates at various distances and directions so that the= State and Parish officials
~
can make an independent assessment of the protective action that will best protect the public. The State recommendation for protective action is forwarded to the Parish where the final judgment is made and put into action ( Appl's. testimony, fol.
Tr. 2218, at 12-15).
42.
Section 5 of the "Waterford Steam Electric Station Emergency Plan" describes the Applicant's emergency organization (Appl's. Ex. 1).
It is the duty of the Operation Shift Supervisor to recognize when an event has occurred that has the potential to affect 26/ The emergency classifications are:
Unusual Event, Alert, Site Emergency, General Emergency. The criteria for the emergency classifications are given in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654.
_ 47 -
the safety of the plant. At that time, he assumes the duties of Emergency Coordinator, alerts the Plant Manager, declares an " Unusual Event," and notifies the State and Parish agencies.
If the accident worsens to the point where an " alert" is announced, the Plant Manager-Nuclear or the Assistant Plant Manager assumes the position of Emergency Coordinator, and all of the on-site emergency arganization and facilities are mobilized (See Table 5-1 of App 1's. Ex. 1).
Declaration of a " Site Emergency" or a " General Emergency" brings Applicant's entire emergency organization and facilities into operation, off-site as well as on-site (Id_.).
However, the Emergency Coordinator remains in command at all times. The command does not pass to the off-site organization, although the duties of coordinating with State and local officials are passed to the off-site Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Director (Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 3229, at 13).
43.
The Waterford 3 emergency plan provides that the Emergency Coordinator will notify the off-site agencies within 15 minutes of the declaration ~of an emergency. The primary means of notification is by dedicated telephone links to the risk Parishes, the Louisiana Nuclear Energy Division (LNED), and L0EP.
Back-up communication will be by radio; radio links to the Parishes and L0EP now exist.
The link to LNED is dependent on FCC approval of an application for a license (Tr.
2800, 2802, 3008, and 3010-13).
The present lack of the link does not reflect unfavorably on the command structure.
44.
When LNED and L0EP are notified of an emergency at Waterford 3, LNED will activate its operational headquarters in Baton
Rouge and dispatch a Fixed Facility Response Team (FFRT) to conduct monitoring and sampling activity within the plume EPZ. L0EF will activate the State Emergency Operations Center (E0C). LNED will make protective action recommendations (independent of the utility recommendation).
Its assessment is based on the information'on release rates provided by the facility, on data on radiological conditions supplied by utility and LNED monitoring teams, and on additional' '
f actors such as the circumstances and nature'of the accident.' The LNED '
accident assessment and recomendation will be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary, Office of Environmental Affairs (ASOEA) for evaluation.
Upon the decision of AS0EA, LNED will provide protective action recomendations to the Parishes ( App 1's. testimony, fol.
Tr. 2218, at 15-16; App 1's. Ex. 2, at 6-4).
LNED is capable of making' radiologic al dose projections in the area surrounding Waterford 3 on a 24-hour-per-day, seven-day-per-week baMs ( App 1's. Ex. 3, at 42).
s' 45.
The AS0EA will finalize-the State protective action recomendations.
In the event that the nature of the accident does not, give LNED time to make an assessment or issue protective accident recommendations, the recommendations of the facility (Waterford 3) will
-.\\
be forwarded directly to 'A50EA for a decision (April's. Ex. 2, at 6-6).
46.
When the risk Parishes receive notification from the utility, they will implement notification and mobilization procedures for Parish personnel and resources.
Each Parish will activate its Emergency Operations Center and will maintain continuous domunications with the utility and with the State agencies in order to receive
,\\
s x
.x
=
\\
N..-
- 49 updated information and the utility's and State agencies' reconnendation for response ( App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 15).
47.
Each Parish E0C has a staff of responsible Parish officials and a representative from the utility who will assist by translating technical information received from the plant. This staff will assist 4
the Parish chief executive in making the final decision to take protective actions. Each Parish will have information, data, assessments, and protective action recommendations from the Waterford 3 l
plant and from the State (Id. at 16). The Parish will implement protective action based on loci.I conditions and the State or facility recommendations (App 1's. Ex. 3, at 151 and 317).
- 48. The NRC Staff has reviewed the Applicant's Emergency Support Organization and has noted certain deficiencies that had not 1
been resolved at the time of the hearing.
Back-up canmunications were i
addressed above (See Fdg. 43, supra).
In addition, the Staff requires additional information (1) on the off-site emergency notification system; (2) via a diagram showing interfaces between certain response organizations; (3) on training for Corporate Command Center Personnel; (4) on duties of the Emergency Planning Coordinator; and (5) on t'
training of individuals responsible for the planning effort (Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 3229, at 14).
- 49. The Applicant has committed to correct these deficiencies.
The Staff does not consider the deficiencies to be important aspects of the command decision structure, since they refer to the planning aspect of the emergency preparedness program and since the personnel involved W
) [
. ~..
are not part of the command decision structure in an actual emergency (Tr. 3901; App 1's. Ex. 8).
- 50. Subject to satisf actory resolution of the above items, the NRC Staff has concluded that the Applicant's organization and provision for command decision, including guidance for commencing evacuation, meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. E, 9 IV. A, and the criteria set forth in NUREG-0654 (Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 5229, at 14).
51.
FEMA officials have reviewed the State and Parish plans for responding to an emergency at Waterford S.
They note that the Parish plans do not name by title the LP&L official at the E0F who will have the authority or responsibility to provide protective action recommendations to off-site authorities.
Otherwise, they find that the command structure is adequate (FEMA testimony, fol. Tr. 2864, at 8; Tr. 2868).
52.
Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that, subject to the condition that the Parish Plans designate by title the LP&L official at the E0F who will have the authority or responsibility to i
provide protective action recommendations to off-site authorities, the command decision structure is adequate.
l l
4.
Evacuation Drills Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(e) alleges:
the Emergency Plan fails to provide for realistic and comprehensive l
evacuation drills, in that the provisions for moving individuals are l
not actually tested.
l
e
- 53.
10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(14) requires that:
Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.
- 54. 10 C.F.R Part 50, App. E, F requires the Emergency Plan to provide for training, exercises, and drills.
Section F.1 requires a periodic " full scale exercise which tests as much as the licensee, state, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation..."
- 55. Section N of NUREG-0654 provides guidance for exercises and drills.
It does not require evacuation of the public.
- 56. Chapter 13 of the State Plan establishes a regular exercise program, to include " selected mobilization of State and Parish personnel and retources to verify the capability to respond to an accident requiring off-site response." The State Plan does not require evacuation of the public (Appl's. Ex. 2, at 13-1 to 13-2; Appl's Ex. 3, at 32).
- 57. Exercises will simulate activation of the notification system and test the decisionmaking process (App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr.
2218, at 18).
The communications systems, accident assessment, data gathering, logistical support, and protective response functions will also be tested (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2258, at 8). During the full scale exercise, school buses will be moved to simulate evacuation
( Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2243, at 12-13).
- 58. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the planned exercises are adequate and need not include actual evat.uations.
5.
Evacuation For Special Persons Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1)(f) alleges:
procedures are inadequate for-evacuating people who are:
(i) without vehicles; (ii) school children; (iii) aged or crippled; (iv) sick and hospitalized; (v) imprisoned; and (vi) transient workers 59.
10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(10) on Emergency Planning requires that "[a] range cf protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for... the public."
- 60. Criterion J.9 of NUREG-0654 provides guidance.
It states that "[e]ach State and local organization shall have a capability for implementing protective measures...." Criterion J.10.d requires the protection of persons "whose mobility may be impaired." Criterion J.10.g states that the organization's plans to implement measures for
. the plume exposure pathway shall include "means of relocation."
- 61. The Parish Plans designate a transportation officer whose responsibility it is to develop evacuation plans, effect agreements to l
obtain vehicles, maintain lists of persons needing transportation, and coordinate movement of vehicles in the event of an emergency ( Appl's.
Ex. 3, at 101, 264).
Particularized planning is required for students, institutionalized persons (hospital patients, residents of nursing
o
. homes, and prisoners), housebound invalids, and persons without means of transportation (Id. at 102,265).
- 62. The Parish Plans establish pick-up points for persons without transportation (M. at 185,347).
- 63. Applicant testified that the evacuation messages broadcast in the event of an emergency would direct persons without transportation to the pick-up points (App 1's. testimony, fol.
Tr. 2218, at 19).
The Parish Plans, however, do not include pick-up point locations and directions in their EBS messages (App 1's. Ex. 3, at 139-50,306-14).
- 64. The Parish Plans have identified the schools in the plume exposure pathway EPZ (Id. at 99-100,262-63) and have established evacuation routes and relocation centers for the school children (M.
at 146-48, 313-14). Primary responsibility for protective action has been delegated to the school superintendents (Id. at 95-98,259-61).
65.
St. Charles Parish and St. John the Baptist Parish do not have sufficient number of buses to evacuate the school population and persons without transportation. One hundred twenty-nine buses are needed for persons without transportation, and 290 buses are needed for school children (App 1's testimony, fol. Tr. 2262, at 2-4).
There is an adequate supply of vehicles in neighboring parishes; agreements with those parishes to obtain additional buses are being finalized, and the L0EP has assumed responsibility for arranging for support parish transportation resources ( M. at 4-5; Appl's. Ex. 3, at 217, 375).
. e 66.
In each Parish, the Council on Aging will maintain a roster of non-ambulatory residents ( Appl's. Ex. 3, at 200, 355).
These rosters will also be maintained by the Parish EOCs (App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 22).
The rosters will be updated semi-annually (Id.). Newspaper advertisements and self-addressed stamped postcards enclosed with the public information brochure will be used to encourage the aged and handicapped to notify the Parishes of their needs (Id.;
Tr. 2982-84).
67.
In each Parish, primary responsibility for evacuation of non-ambulatory residents, patients in hospitals, and residents of nursing homes has been delegated to a Health and Medical Officer, who will report to the Parish E0C (Appl's. Ex. 3, at 193, 354).
- 68. The public information program encourages neighbors to assist the housebound to evacuate (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 21).
69.
The Parish Plans identify two hospitals and two nursing homes in the plume exposure pathway EPZ:
St. Charles Hospital, River Parishes Medical Center, Luling Nursing Home, and Twin Oaks Nursing Home (App 1's. Ex. 3, at 195, 354-356).
70.
Medical facilities to which hospital patients and residents of nursing homes would be evacuated have been identified (Id. at 195, 356).
71.
The Parishes do not have sufficient number of vans and ambulances to evacuate the housebound, hospital patients, and residents of nursing homes (Tr. 2506-07). To evacuate the hospitals and nursing
o
, homes, 37 ambulances, 10 buses, and 3 vans are required (Appl's.
testimony, fol. Tr. 2262, at 11). To evacuate the housebound, another c4 25 vans and 25 ambulances are required (Tr. 2504,2524). The Parish Plans identify sufficient vehicles in support parishes (Appl's. Ex. 3, at 207, 365), and agreements are being negotiated for their provision (Tr. 2507; Appl's. Ex. 3, at 217, 375).
- 72. The Parish Plans identify two jails:
St. Charles Parish Courthouse Jail and St. John the Baptist Parish Jail (Appl's. Ex. 3, at 183,345). The Parish Plans delegate the primary responsibility for evacuation of prisoners to the Parish Sheriff.
He will consider the use of radioprotective drugs if evacuation cannot be immediately accomplished ([d.).
- 73. Agreements have been reached with neighboring Parishes for confinement of prisoners during an evacuation ([d. at 184,346).
74.
The average prison population in the two risk parishes is 55 persons (FEMA testimony, fol. Tr. 2864, at 16). Prisoners will be evacuated by police car or bus ( Appl's. Ex.1, App. B at 20).
75.
No evidence was submitted that sufficient vehicles were available to evacuate the prisoners in a timely fashion, or that detailed plans have been formulated which commit personnel for the evacuation of prisoners.
76.
Transient workers will either evacuate by private automobile (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 2218, at 22-23) or be directed to the pre-designated pick-up points, as are residents without transportation (Id.).
- 77. The Parish Plans provide fcr direct transmission of emergency messages to industrial centers (See Fdg. 28, supra).
- 78. FEMA, in Interim Findings, found that the implementing measures for evacuation were incomplete (Staff Ex. 5, at F-37, F-38 (comments on elements J.9 and J.10 9)).
- 79. FEMA officials testified that the absence of letters of agreement with support parishes prevented a conclusion that the evacuation plans were adequate (FEMA testimony, fol. Tr. 2864, at 9-16).
80.
NUREG-0654, J.10.c requires that State and local plans provide for the use of radioactive drugs for emergency workers and institutionalized persons within the plume exposure EPZ whose immediate evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult.
No evidence was adduced that evacuation of prisoners was either infeasible or very difficult.
81.
Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that, subject to the following conditions, the plans are adequate for evacuating special classes of persons. The conditions are:
(1) that letters of agreements with support parishes for the necessary vehicles and drivers be completed and submitted to the NRC staff; (2) that the parish plans be amended to specify vehicles allotted to evacuate the prisons (such vehicles shall have a combined capacity to evacuate the prison population) and to specify the personnel commitment for drivers and guards (the drivers, guards, and vehicles shall have no other energer.cy
function until after prisoner evacuation is completed); and (3) that pick-up point information be included in the evacuation messages.
- 6. Potassium Iodide Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26 (2) alleges that:
Applicant has failed to adequately make provision according to the Emergency Plan contained in Chapter 13.3 of the FSAR, for distribution and/or storage of potassium iodide in accordance with accepted public health practice in locations which are readily accessible to affected individuals for protection against thyroid irradiation.
- 22. The most significant gaseous radioactive isotope released during a reactor accident in terms of health effects is Iodine-131 (I-131).
Radioactive isotopes of iodine that are inhaled and ingested accumulate in the thyroid where they can lead to local radiation damage (Appl's.
testimony, fol. Tr. 3135, at 2; Appl's. Ex. 7).
The precise level of radiciodine incorporation into the thyroid that is tumorogenic is unknown. Radiation induced thyroid neoplasms are usually benign or well differentiated carcinoma with good prognoses.
Evidence from subjects exposed to relatively large amounts of diagnostic I-131 and carefully followed suggests no increase in thyroid tumor incidence in populations exposed to about 100 rads for adults or about 160 rads for persons under 20 years of age (Staff Ex. 6, Encl. B, at 1).
83.
A variety of chemical substr.nces can block the accumulation of radiciodine in the thyroid.
For a number of reasons, such as efficacy, safety and, availability, the FDA provisionally recommends potassium iodide as most suitable for this purpose (Staff Ex. 6, Encl. C, at 2).
The effectiveness of large doses of stable iodide in reducing the amount of radioactive iodine taken up by the
58 -
thyroid gland appears to be dependent on two factors:
(1) the iodide in reducing the amount of radioactive iodine taken up by the thyroid gland appears to be dependent on two factors:
(1) the proportion of radioactive iodide relative to the increased amount of stable iodide in the circulating blood is greatly reduced (dilution effect) and (2) as the levels of iodide in blood increases, there is an autoregulatory mechanism that limits the rate at which further iodide is accumulated by the gland.
The suppression of uptake of radioiodine persists for as long as the intake of stable iodide is maintained at adequate levels.
When doses approximating 130 mg of stable KI have been given prior to exposure to radioactive I-131, a 90 percent or greater reduction in peak thyroid accumulation of I-131 has been observed (Id.).
84.
EPA Protective Action Guides call for protective action when projected total accumulated thyroid doses are estimated at 5-25 rem for the general public (Staff Ex. 6, Encl. C, at 9).
FDA proposed guidelines suggest potassium iodide for thyroid blocking is considered to be a proper response in a nuclear emergency when the projected radiation dose to the thyroid is 10 rem or greater (Staff Ex. 6, Encl.
C, at 10). The 10 rem level is arbitrary.
It is based upon an assumption that on a population basis, the risk of potential adverse effects from a 10 rem radiation dose to the thyroid exceeds the risk of any adverse effects that might be encountered as a result of administering potassium iodide in daily dose of 65 mg to individuals under one year of age or 130 mg to the remainder of the population for several days.
As radiation doses decrease below 10 rem, the relative e
-r-
d
, risks of the potential adverse effects of radiation and of the drug become less clear (Id.).
85.
Notwithstanding the above recommendation, the FDA considers that it is the prerogative and responsibility of state and local public health agencies to determine the " action level" at which the general public should be administered the drug or if it should be administered at all (Id., at 14).
86.
NUREG-0654 does not require the use of KI for the general public. NUREG-0654 specifies that emergency plans are to include provisions for the use of radioprotective drugs, particularly for emergency workers and institutionalized persons in the plume EPZ, and that state and local plans are to indicate the method by which decisions on the distribution of such drugs to the general public will be made in an emergency (NUREG-0654, Criteria J.10.e and J.10.f).
FEMA's policy with regard to the use of KI for the general public is that the decision to distribute it to the general public is a matter of state public health policy (FEMA testimony, fol. Tr. 2864, at 18).
87.
The State Plan does not provide for the administration of KI to the general public. The State will not rely on KI as a protective action option for the general public, but will instead rely on other protective action options, such as sheltering or evacuation for protection of the general public in a serious radiological 3
emergency (Appl's. Ex. 2, at 7-2; Appl's. Ex. 3, at 47; Appl's. Ex. 3, Encl.1, at 154 and Encl. 2, at 320; App 1's, testimony, fol. Tr. 3135, at 3).
4 88. The State's KI policy was developed by the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs, Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, with the assistance and concurrence of the State Health Officer.
In developing its policy, the State took into consideration certain reported risks and problems associated with the pre-distribution and usage of KI as a protective action option for the general public (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 3528, at 11; Tr. 3174, 3181-87).
Those reported risks and problems are the subject of ongoing consideration by various federal agencies, including NRC.
(See,e.g.,
Staff Ex. 6; Staff Ex. 7; App 1's Ex. 9). The State's KI policy could change upon receipt of further federal guidance (Tr. 3190,3201).
- 89. Administration of KI prior to exposure to radioiodines is required to obtain maximum protection, although some protection is afforded by post-exposure administration of the drug (Tr. 3196-98; Staff Ex. 7, at 1-2; See Staff Ex. 6, Encl. C, at 13). As indicated above, there are risks and problems associated with the predistribution and use of KI as a protective action option for the general public.
Predistribution of KI to the general public would preclude responsible control of the time and manner of administration of the drug (Staff Ex.
7, at 5; Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 3135, at 5).
If the drug were predistributed and thus readily available at all times, individuals might, on the basis of rumor or a misunderstanding of plant status, take the drug without being instructed to do so, thereby exposina themselves unnecessarily to the risk of allergic and adverse reactions and side effects from the drug. Similarly, predistribution would
m e increase the chance that individuals would exceed the recommended dose (i.e_., take several doses rather than just one).
(App 1's, testimony, fol. Tr. 3135, at 5).
- 90. Predistribution of KI would also involve a danger that children and others would accidentally ingest the drug in the absence of any need for it, and quite possibly in doses exceeding the recommended dosage, thereby exposing themselves unnecessarily to risks (and, in the case of excessive doses, increased risks) of side effects and allergic and adverse reactions (Id. at 5).
91.
Predistribution of KI would preclude responsible control of the storage of the drug. KI must be stored at a controlled temperature between 59' and 86*F and is sensitive to both moisture and light (Appl's. Ex. 6, at 2). Predistribution would therefore involve the risk that the drug would be improperly stored, permitting decomposition and loss of potency (App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr. 3135, at 5).
- 92. The availability of other protective action options, including evacuation, sheltering, and respiratory protection, diminish the necessity of administration of KI (and especially its predistribution) to the general public.
In the event of a serious radiological accident involving significant releases of radiciodines, KI could be effective in thyroid protection.
However, an accident resulting in significant releases of radioiodines would also involve significant releases of noble gases and radiocesiums, which would cause whole body and lung exposures that are not mitigated by KI. A KI plan
'. for the general public might instill a false sense of security, inhibiting effective evacuation or sheltering (Staff Ex. 6, at 2; Staff Ex. 7, at 4; Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 3135, at 6).
93.
Present uncertainties as to the amount of radioiodine which might be released in a accident further support the State's policy.
Recent research comparing consequence estimates used in risk assessment with actual results of accidents and large scale experiments has indicated that the radioactivity (including I-131) actually released to the environment in an accident has been substantially overestimated (App 1's. testimony, fol Tr. 3135, at 6-7; Staff Ex. 6, at 2; Staff Ex. 7, at 4).
- 94. There is also an ongoing debate among experts as to the toxicity of radiciodine to the thyroid (App 1's, testimony, fol. Tr.
3135, at 7).
In light of the uncertainty on this subject, the American Thyroid Association has recommended that additional studies of the biological effects of radiciodice on the thyroid be sponsored to define the risk to the thyroid attendant to e.cposure to radiciodine (Staff Ex. 6, Encl. 8, at 1, 4).
95.
The multiple uncertainties associated with the KI issue are reflected in current Commission policy, pursuant to which the NRC Staff is to:
1.
Contir.ue to work with appropriate Federal agencies, i.e., FEMA, FDA and EPA, to address the uncertainties in the use of KI by the general public
4
% and possible alternative respiratory protection strategies.
2.
Press on with source term technology studies...
to a point where the Commission can adequately consider the potential impact on... alternative protective actions for public use in a nuclear plant emergency.
The Commission has expressly reserved judgment on the advisability of recommending the stockpiling of KI for the general public (Appl's.
Ex. 9, at 1).
96.
It is the opinion of the NRC Staff, and of several medical advisors consulted separately, that:
1.
The utility of distributing KI to the general public for thyroid blocking in case of a reactor accident is very questionable.
2.
There are potential side effects from KI which some medical authorities believe warrant further investigation, and may warrant limiting its use.
3.
Additional guidance from the federal government is appropriate in order to aid states in developing their policy on the use of KI for the general public.
(Staff Ex. 6, at 4; Staff Ex. 7, at 6):
- 97. While it is conceivable that comprehensive federal guidance, applicable to all operating reactors, may at some point in the future recommend the administration of KI to the general public in
4
' an emergency, there is clearly no current " accepted public health practice" providing.for KI use by the general public.
Tennessee is the only State in which KI has been distributed to the general public residing in the vicinity of a nuclear plant. Weighing factors such as the risks of adverse and allergic reactions and side effects, the logistical problems of KI administration, and the availability of other protective action options, the State of Louisiana's health policy decision not to provide KI to the general public is well founded (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 3135, at 8; Tr. 3212).
98.
Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the emergency plans need not provide for the storage and/or distribution of KI to the public.
B. Synergism Joint Intervenors' Contention 8/9 alleges:
Applicant failed to properly evaluate the cumulative and/or synergistic effects of low level radiation with environmental pollutants, known or suspected to be I
carcinogens.
l The Radiation Hazard:
99.
The low level radiation of concern to Joint Intervenors is that which will result from the releases of gaseous and liquid radioactive effluents from Waterford 3 during normal operations.
Applicant's ER and the Staff's FES demonstrate that Waterford 3's emissions during normal operation will comply with Appendix I l
permissible releases ( App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr. 461, at 4-5; Staff t
i l
Ex. 1, 5.9 and App. J).
Staff's analysis was based on site specific
6 values for releases, and on the topography, geography, meteorology at Waterford (Staff Ex. 1, 5.9).
The calculations yielded approximately 6 mrem per year as the dose for the maximally exposed individual (Id.
at J-7; Tr.1000,1010), and.01 mrem per year as an average dose to members of the population within a 10 mile radius of the plant (Appl's, testimony, fol. Tr. 461, at 4-5).
100. Staff's analysis of the releases followed the methodology established in NUREG-0017, " Calculations of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents from Pressurized Water Reactors" (PWR-GALE code) (Staff Ex. 1, at 5-3).
Applicant used the same methodology (Gale code) (Tr. 491), and the Staff and Applicant's projections agreed within narrow levels (Tr. 498).
101. Applicant reports from its ongoing monitoring program of existing natural background radiation in the area of the plant site that existing natural levels average about 80 mrem per year with considerable variations, for example, a variation of about 20 mrem per year between two points only about a mile or two apart ( Appl's.
testimony, fol. Tr. 461, at 8).
102. The effects of the radiological releases from Waterford 3 were evaluated explicitly by Applicant and by the Staff. Their evaluations, summarized by Applicant in its testimony and provided in detail by the NRC Staff in their FES and in testimony, were that the impact would be very small (See App 1's. testimony, fol. Tr. 461, at 10; Staff Ex. 1, at 5-36; Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 735, at 3-6).
Their evaluations are based on commonly accepted methodology and risk
4 functions for low levels of radiation.
(Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 766, at 5 (dose calculational models); Tr. 492 (dose calculational models);
Staff Ex.1, at J-2, 3 (indicating use of dose commitment models described in Reg. Guide 1.109); App 1's, testimony, fol. Tr. 461, at 11 (risk functions); Staff testimony, fol.
Tr. 735, at 3-9 (risk functions)).
The Environmental Pollution Hazard:
103.
In the corridor along the Mississippi River between Baton Rouge and New Orleans there is a large burden of chemical exposures through air, drinking water, and occupation--larger than in many other areas of the country (Jt. Inters. ' testimony, fol. Tr.1055, at 5).
104.
Studies were presented that purported to link high levels of environmental pollution to increased risk of cancer in southeastern Louisiana through death certificate analysis. One study revealed approximately a two-fold excess risk of lung cancer associated with certain types of industries, such as the ship building industry.
(Gottlieb, Pickle, et al., JNCI, November,1979).
Lung cancer risk was found among older men who had been employed in the petroleum industry and among male and female residents of towns where the petroleum industry was a major employer (Jt. Inters.' testimony, fol. Tr.1055, at 6-7).
A second study, also a death certificate analysis, on pancreatic cancer mortality in Louisiana (Pickle, Gottlieb, AJPH, March,1980), revealed high pancreatic cancer mortality among white males in a cluster of Louisiana parishes.
Excess risk was seen for workers in the oil refining and paper manufacturing industries and for
o b residents living near refineries.
The third Louisiana study, " Cancer and Drinking Water in Louisiana: Colon and Rectum" published in 1981 (Gottlieb, Carr, Morris, IJ of E, 1981), found a significant risk for rectal cancer associated with drinking water derived from the Mississippi River.
A multi-dimensional contingency analysis found the association between rectal cancer and surface water (Mississippi River water used for drinking water) not dependent on age, race, sex, and diet. Chlorination of the water was associated significantly with rectal cancer. Among those who used river water, the risk increased inversely with the distance from the river mouth, with greater risk downstream from the many industries which line the river (1d., at 7).
105.
Notwithstanding the positive findings, the authors of the two death certificate studies were tentative about drawing causal inferences with respect to environmental pollutants and cancer induction. They were concerned about limitations in their studies e.g., the inability to control for smoking and alcohol consumption (Tr.2066-68,2070-71).
The Multiplicative Hazard:
106.
The Joint Intervenors' witnesses defined synergism as "the capacity of two (or more) substances when combined to cause an effect not predicted by the behavior of either substance when acting alone" and "the action of two or more substances, chemicals, or agents to achieve an effect of which each is individually incapable."
(Jt.
Inters. ' testimony, fol. Tr.1055, at 3, and fol. Tr.1836, at 5) One of Applicant's witnesses defined synergism as a biological response of
e
- . one agent and an effect of the biological response of another agent which when combined are greater than the additive effects of both on the same system occurring at the same time (Tr. 3593). The Board found the sense of all these definitions to be compatible with one another.
The Board's conclusions drawn from evidence are based on the common sense of these definitions.
107.
Studies were reported demonstrating synergistic or multiplicative effects on cancer induction between certain hormones and chemical carcinogens and radiation.
The radiation dose levels and dose rates employed in these studies, namely in the one hundred and fifty to several hundreds of rads range, are many orders of magnitude (10,000 to 100,000 times) greater than the levels of radioactivity which are postulated to be released from Waterford 3 during normal operation.
No synergistic effects between radiation at the very low dose levels to be released from Waterford 3 and chemical carcinogens have ever been demonstrated (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 461, at 13-14; Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 735, at 10-15; Tr. 942-45, 987-89 and 3656-57).
108. Although it was explicitly sought by the Board from the various experts who testified, there was no existing scientific evidence presented that provided an adequate basis for extrapolating from synergistic effects shown at high doses down to small doses such as those expected from Waterford 3.
It was testified that attempts l
have been made to extrapolate down linearly from experiments showing t
synergism at high doses to low doses such as involved here, but the efforts have not been particularly useful (Tr. 716-17; 942; 3656-57).
1
o s,
109. The levels of radioactivity to be released by Waterford 3 during routine operation will result in doses that are a small fraction of the doses individuals receive from background radiation. The doses from Waterford 3 will be even less than the 20 mrem variation in the background radiation in the immediate vicinity of the Waterford plant site. Even if the synergism were to occur, the impact would be miniscule and may in fact be zero, and would be, in any event, encompassed in the impact occasioned by chemical carcinogens acting with existing natural background radiation to which the public is continually exposed (Appl's. testimony, fol. Tr. 461, at 10, 14-15; Staff testimony, fol. Tr. 735, at 3,14-15).
110. Neither Applicant nor the NRC Staff explicitly took synergism into account in its assessment of the effects which will result from Waterford 3's radioactive releases (Tr. 530; Staff Ex. I at 9-14).
111.
Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that Applicant and Staff did not err in not assessing synergistic effects.
Neverthe-less, the environmental statement may be deemed amended pro tanto to include these Findings.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Board has considered the entire record in this proceeding and concludes as follows:
1.
With respect and limited to Joint Intervenors' Contention 17/26(1) and (2), the Board concludes pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.760a
o e,
d and 50.57 that, subject to future resolution of 17/26(1)(a) and to the conditions imposed in the Order, infra:
(a) the emergency plans comply with 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47 and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, and provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency; and (b) the issuance of this license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
2.
With respect and limited to Joint Intervenors' Contention 8/9, the Board concludes pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.760a and 51.52(b)(2) that the requirements of Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
4332 (1980), have been complied with in this proceeding.
3.
With respect to the uncontested, unresolved generic safety issues, the Board concludes that these generic safety issues have been taken into account in a manner that is at least plausible and that, if proven to be of substance, would be adequate to justify operation.
(We iterate, however, our grave reservations with respect to unresolved generic safety issue A-45, Shutdown Decay Heat Removal.
See pp. 5-10, suora).
o
,.' ORDER In the event that Joint Intervenors' contention 17/26(1)(a) is resolved in favor of plant operation, the following conditions shall be met prior to issuance of an operating license:
(1) The Parish Plans shall designate by title the LP&L official at the E0F who will have the authority or responsibility to provide protective action recommendations to off-site authorities.
(2) Letters of agreement with the support parishes for vehicles and drivers necessary to implement the evacuation plans shall be completed and submitted to the NRC Staff.
(3) The Parish Plans shall be amended to specify the vehicles allotted to evacuate prisoners.
These vehicles shall have a combined capacity to evacuate the prison population. The plans shall also specify the personnel commitment for drivers and guards.
Furthermore, the plans shall clearly indicate that the personnel designated as drivers or guards will have no other emergency duties and the allotted vehicles shall have no other emergency function until after prisoner evacuation is accomplished.
(4) Pick-up point information shall be included in the EBS evacuation messages.
In acc'ordance with 10 C.F.R. 2.760, 2.762, 2.764, 2.785, and 2.786, this Partial Initial Decision shall become effective and shall constitute, with respect to matters resolved herein, the final decision of the Commission thirty (30) days after issuance hereof, subject to any review pursuant to the above cited Rules of Practice.
Exceptions to this decision may be filed within ten (10) days after 9
O '., service of this Partial Initial Decision. A brief in support of such exceptions may be filed within thirty (30) days thereafter, forty (40) days in the case of the Staff.
Within thirty (30) days after service of the brief of appellant, forty (40) days in the case of the Staff, any other party may file a brief in support of, or in opposition to such exceptions.
Judge Jordan concurs, but was unavailable to sign the instant issuance.
IT IS SO ORDERED THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 4
89 x.
.--~x r~
(
Harry Foreman Administrative Judge "a
Sheldon J. Wof Chairmhn Administrative'f,dge Ju l
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 3rd day of November, 1982.
l