05000313/LER-1982-023-03, /03L-0:on 820806,containment Isolation Valves for Instrument Air Sys Opened During Cooldown to Supply Air for Work on Control Rod Drive Mechanism Stator.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Closed & Locked

/03L-0:on 820806,containment Isolation Valves for Instrument Air Sys Opened During Cooldown to Supply Air for Work on Control Rod Drive Mechanism Stator.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Closed & Locked

ML20027B356
Person / Time
Site:	Arkansas Nuclear
Issue date:	09/08/1982
From:	Rogers P ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20027B351	List: 05000313/LER-1982-023, Forwards LER 82-023/03L-0 05000313/LER-1982-023-03, /03L-0:on 820806,containment Isolation Valves for Instrument Air Sys Opened During Cooldown to Supply Air for Work on Control Rod Drive Mechanism Stator.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Closed & Locked
References
LER-82-023-03L-01, LER-82-23-3L-1, NUDOCS 8209200307
Download: ML20027B356 (2)

LER-1982-023, /03L-0:on 820806,containment Isolation Valves for Instrument Air Sys Opened During Cooldown to Supply Air for Work on Control Rod Drive Mechanism Stator.Caused by Personnel Error.Valves Closed & Locked

Event date:
Report date:
3131982023R03 - NRC Website

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60 66 DOCK E T NUW9 E R entl 69 EVENT DATE 74 IS HE,OH I DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBADLE CONSEQUENCES h 1 On 8/6/82 during cooldown, the containment isolation valves for the in-I o 2 I strument air system were opened to supply air forwork being performed on the o 3 1 Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) stator. The CRDM stator failure was I

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o s ireported in LER-82-020.

Cooldown was in progress, Reactor Coolant System t 1(RCS) temperature was 3]l2 F. and RCS Pressure was 460 PSIA. These conditions o a lo lil I exceeded those which require containment intearity per T.S. 3.6.1. This I i occurrence is reportable per T.S. 6.12.3.2.b.

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o ATTACHMENT LER N0. 313-82-023/03L~ 0 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (Continued) after recognizing the violation, the valves'were closed and locked. We are reviewing our present administrative controls and implementation practice over manual contain-ment isolation valves to determine cause and establish final corrective action.