ML20027B001
| ML20027B001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 07/22/1982 |
| From: | Brownlee V, Holmesray P, Rogers R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20027A989 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-82-20, 50-366-82-20, NUDOCS 8209160253 | |
| Download: ML20027B001 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1982020
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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Report Nos. 50-321/82-20 and 50-366/82-20
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366
Inspection at Hatch site near Baxley, Georgia and Licensee requested management
meeting at NRC Region II Off ce, Atlanta, Georgia
Inspectors:
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7/22- 82.
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R. F. Rogers
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Date Signed
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P. Holmes-Ray ~
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Date Signed
Approved by:
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7/22/92_
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V. Jf/ Brownlee, Syffon rgrief, Division of
Da'te Signed
Project and Res1d6nt Programs
SUMMARY
Inspection on May 26 - June 21, 1982
Areas Inspected
This inspection involved 194 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Technical
Specification compliance, operator performance, overall plant operations, quality
assurance practices, station and corporate management practices, corrective and
preventive maintenance activities, site security procedures, radiation control
activities, surveillance activities, previous enforcement items, and Licensee
Event Reports.
Results
Of the 11 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in nine
areas, two violations were identified in two areas (Failure to follow procedure
- PSW valve locking, paragraph 5; Failure to follow Technical Specifications - RHR
operability, paragraph 6).
8209160253 820907
PDR ADOCK 05000321
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- H. C. Nix, Plant Manager
- T. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager
- C. T. Jones, Assistant Plant Manager
- S. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations
- C. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
mechanics, security force members and office personnel.
- Attended site exit interviews
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 9 and 21, 1982,
.with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
a.
Violations
(Closed)(366/81-23-01) Failure to notify the NRC operations center
within one hour.
The corrective actions described in the licensee's
response of November 24, 1981 have been completed. This item is
closed.
(Closed)(366/81-34-03) Failure to notify the NRC regional office
within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The corrective measures discussed in the licensees
response dated March 2,1982 have been completed. This item is closed.
(Closed)(321/81-28-01,03,06) Failure to review reports and documents
in accordance with Technical Specifications requirements. The
corrective actions described in the licensee's response dated April 22,
1982 have been implemented. These items are closed.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Plant Tours (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector conducted plant tours periodically during the inspection
interval to verify that monitoring equipment was recording as required,
equipment was properly tagged, operations personnel were aware of plant
conditions, and plant housekeeping efforts were adequate. The inspector
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also determined that appropriate radiation controls were properly estab-
lished, critical clean areas were being controlled in accordance with
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procedures, excess equipment or material is stored properly and combustible
material and debris were disposed of expeditiously. During tours the
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inspector looked for the existence of unusual fluid leaks, piping vibra-
tions, pipe hanger and seismic restraint settings, various valve and breaker
positions, equipment caution and danger tags, component positions, adequacy
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of fire fighting equipment, and instrument calibration dates. Some tours
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were conducted on backshifts.
On June 18, 1982, during an inspection at the intake structure, the
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inspector noted that the cooling water isolation valve for ID plant service
water (PSW) pump was not locked open as required by HNP-1-1200, Plant
Service Water. This valve was also required to be double verified in the
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proper position by the procedure. The required chain locking device was
laying on the process pipe next to the valve. The inspector requested that
the valve position be immediately verified by the licensee and it was found
to be partially open. A similar situation was reported in IE report
50-321/82-12 issued on April 8,1982 involving another cooling water valve.
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This failure to maintain the valve properly is a repeat violation
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(321/82-20-01).
6.
Technical Specification Compliance (Units 1 and 2)
During this reporting interval, the inspector verified compliance with
selected limiting conditions for operations (LC0's) and results of selected
surveillance tests. These verifications were accomplished by direct obser-
vation of monitoring instrumentation, valve positions, switch positions, and
review of completed logs and records. The licensee's compliance with
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selected LC0 action statements were reviewed on selected occurrences as they
happened.
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On April 19, 1982, on a control room tour, the inspector noted that the
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vertical section of panel 2H11-P601 over "A" loop Residual Heat Removal
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(RHR) was not energized as all instrumentation indicated zero. The inspec-
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tor pointed out to the operator on shift that all flow indication had been
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lost on the RHR loop which was required to be operable during fuel loading.
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The operator was not aware that the panel had been de-energized. The system
was then declared inoperable (LER 50-366/82-30 refers) and fuel loading
stopped. Further investigation by the inspector indicated that this panel
section which contains flow indication for both RHR and RHR service water had
been de-energized for approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. The licensee's failure to enter
the LC0 and suspend refueling activities in a timely manner is a violation
(366/82-20-01). The existence of this condition over three shifts without
notice or comment by licensed operators is also of concern.
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7.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector periodically during the inspection interval reviewed shift
logs and operations records, including data sheets, instrument traces, and
records of equipment malfunctions.
This review included control room logs
and auxiliary logs, operating orders, standing orders, jumper logs and
equipment tagout records. The inspector routinely observed operator alert-
ness and demeanor during plant tours. During normal events, operator
performance and response actions were observed and evaluated. The inspector
conducted random off-hours inspections during the reporting interval to
assure that operations and security remained at an acceptable level.
Shift
turnovers were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance
with approved licensee procedures.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Physical Protection (Units 1 and 2)
The inspector verified by observation and interviews during the reporting
interval that measures taken to assure the physical protection of the
facility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the organi-
zation of the security force, the establishment and maintenance of gates,
doors and isolation zones in the proper condition, that access control and
badging was proper, and procedures were followed.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Review of Nonroutine Events Reported by the Licensee (Unit 2)
The following Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential
generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective
actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were
also reviewed as they occurred to determined that Technical Specifications
were being met and that the public health and safety were of utmost con-
sideration. Asterisked reports were followed up indepth onsite.
LER No.
Date of Report
Description
50-366/81-92
10/27/81
Rod out permissive lost
50-366/81-94
10/20/81
2C D/G start failure *
50-366/81-99
10/22/81
Radiation monitor lost
50-366/81-100
11/12/81
2C D/G start failure *
50-366/81-105
12/01/81
L.P. alarms CRD hydraulic control
units
50-366/81-106
12/04/81
SBGT Train 2T46-D0018 failed to
start *
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50-366/81-107
12/01/81
Torus /RB vacuum bkr inoperable *
50-366/81-108
12/01/81
Rx pressure switch out of
calibration *
50-366/81-109
12/01/81
RB/ Torus vacuum bkr opened on high
d/p
50-366/81-110
12/01/81
RHR 2C inop/ valve 2E11-F004C
50-366/81-111
12/15/81
50-366/81-113
12/10/81
Test Procedure change not approved
by plant management
50-366/81-114
12/17/81
LPCI injection valve failed *
50-366/81-117
12/17/81
LPCI inverter failed
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50-366/81-118
12/15/81
DW temperature recorder inoperable
50-366/81-119
12/31/81
MS line rad instrument HI-HI trip
OOC
50-366/81-122
12/29/81
Pressure Control Valve 2E11-F126A
failed to operate
50-366/81-123
12/22/81
SBGT train inoperable
50-366/81-125
01/08/82
50-366/81-126
01/05/82
Hydrogen recombiner inoperable
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50-366/81-128
12/31/81
Radwaste door 2RW21 found open
50-366/81-129
01/07/82
2C D/G inoperable due to engine
failure *
50-366/81-130
01/07/82
L.P. alarms on CRD hydraulic units *
50-366/81-132
01/19/82
HPCI injection alarm inoperable
50-366/81-133
01/19/82
Rx water shroud level switch 00C
50-366/81-134
01/19/82
2C D/G tripped on attempt to sync
to bus *