ML20027A530
| ML20027A530 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1978 |
| From: | Jones Y, Valentine P SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812180309 | |
| Download: ML20027A530 (40) | |
Text
'
Okl y,
t NRC PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM i
f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h.M l
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensinc Appeal Board j
/p\\g e-t i s
coexc3 In the Matter of
)
W ""
y"'
80s123137
)
D
=
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Decket Number
- p
)
5 0, e. -s 0..u.
p<a a, r y
o g
me ' e.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Pcwer Plant )
50-323 0.L.
g Units 1 and 2
)
)
)
/
v.
Ni;s, PETITION FOR DIRECTED CERTIFICATICN FOR REVIEW OF ' RECONSIDERATION OF 3OARD'S ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 5, 197'8" RELATING TO QUALIFICATION OF SECURITY EXPERT This petition concerns continuing efforts of I.7%ervenor San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace to obtain discoveby in accord with guidelines previously established by this Appeal Board in In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canycn Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2). ALA3-410, 5 NRC 1398, Ccmmissien review declined, CLI-77-23, 6 NRC 455 (1977).
o On October 6, 1973, Intervencr petitioned for directed certification and review of the Licensing 3 card's decision of September 5, 1979, denying the cualification of David Dinsmore Comey as an expert witness for discovery purposes in this case.
Intervencr's Petition for Directed Certifica-tion was granted.
The Septenber 5, 1973 crder of the Licensing Scard was vacated, and the cause remanded.
The 7812180369E?
t Licensing Board was directed to comply with the icng-standing principle that the Board has the cbligation "to articulate in reasonable detail the basis for (their) determinations" (ALAS-5C..
- 8) so that all parties, and the Appeal Board on review, can readily apprehend the foundation for a ruling.
More specifically, ALA3-504 stated that this Intervenor was :
entitled to an explanation of whv the Licensing Board found the analysis of the staff and the applicant to be persuasive --
i.e., why Mr. Comey's prior activities in the realm of security and security plans are individually or collectively insufficient to qualify him as an expert for present purposes."
ALA3-504, p.
10.
On November 3, 1978, the Licensing Board issued a
" Reconsideration of the Scard's Order of September 5, 1978" attached Appendix
'A' (hereafter " Reconsideration";.
The " Reconsideration" does not follow either ALAB-410 or ALA3-504.
In the " Reconsideration" the Licensing Scard establishes its cwn rules for qualification of experts that are incensistent with conventional methcds under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Intervenor petitions new for directed certif cation and review of the " Reconsideration;" for the issuance of an inmediate order that Mr. Cemey is qualified to act as an expert witness for discovery purpcses in this case; and for other necessary crders.
ISSCES PRESINTED Nhether David Dinsmore Cemey, whose abundant qualifica-tions have been lodged with the Licensing Scard, may be i
e age j
l denied qualification as an expert witness either because he does not have specific academic training in nuclear power plant electronics, or because he does not have practical knowledge ficwing from working with the assembly of " nuts and bolts" of the various mechanical components of a security system.
ARGUMENT I
THIS APPEAL BOARD SHOULD EXERCISE DISCRETIONARY PCWER OF DIRECTED CERTIFICATION TO REVIEW ASL3 " RECONSIDERATION" DENYING QUALIFICATION OF DAVID DINSMORE COMEY AS AN EXPERT WITESS FOR DISCOVERY PURPOSES A.
Certification is Appropriate and Necessary in This Instance to Further Clarify the Requirements Imposed on Intervenors to cualify an Expert to Review and Testify Concerning Various Aspects of an Applicant's Security Plan and to Properly Define " Expertise".
This Appeal Board recognizes that important ques-tiens cf general applicability present apprcpriate circum-stances for exercise of its directed certification powers,
- See, e.g.,
In the Matter of Toledo Edisen Co., et al. (David-Besse Nuclear Pcwer Station), ALA3-300, 2 NRR 30,028, 27,181, 27,190 (1975), and has recognized that the issue of this i
Intervenor's right to discovery cf the security plan has l
l broad implications beyond the facts of this particular case.
t i
It has previously found it necessary en two cccasicas to i
provide guidance to the Licensing Scard with regard to I
current standards governing disclosure for disecvery purpcses i
of security plans.
I l
I
=}.
l r
l
B.
Certification is Appropriate Here Because Normal-Appellate Procedures are not Adequate and a Request to the Licensing Board to Certify Would be Futile and Act Only to Delay this Proceeding.
If the Licensing Board's " Reconsideration" order is allowed to stand, the hearings now scheduled to begin December 4, 1978, will proceed without opportunity for any Intervenor to present expert testimony regarding the adequacy of applicant's security plan.
Denying such opportunity to Intervenors is detrimental to the public interest, and is inconsistent with the result contemplated in ALAS-410.
This Appeal Board has recognized the great value to public health and safety of intervenor participation in review of the adequacy of an applicant's security plan.
In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2), ALA3-410, 2 NRR 30,197, 28,022, 28,024-5, 28,028-29 (1977); Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit 2), ALAS-197 and 197R, 7 AEC 473, 826, on review, CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 949-50, on remand, ALA3-243, 8 AEC 850, 353-54 (1974).
This Appeal Board, in a previous ruling supporting the request by this Intervenor for discovery of applicant's security plan, explicitly noted that participa-tion by an intervenor's expert in Indian Point 2 " helped...in assuring that the [ security] plan eventually adopted for the plant was adequate."
In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon, Units 1 and 2), ALA3-410, 2 NRR 30,197, 23,022, 29,024-5 (1977).
As Mr. Sal: nan stated in
. l
his additional comments to the Appeal Board's Memorandum in ALA3-410:
"[Clonsiderable benefit can be derived from the independent scrutiny of such (security] plans which litiga-tion encenders."
Id. at 28,029.
(Emphasis added. ]
C.
Recent Hearings Indicating Strong Congressional Intent that the Nuclear Ragulatory Commission do Everything Possible to Ensure Adequate Security Systems at Existing and Future Plants Further Compel Direct Certification and Review Herein.
The adequacy of domestic nuclear power plant security has been the subject of much Congressional concern and criti ism.
- See, e.g., Accuracy oi U.S.
Nuclear Regula-tory Commission Testimony: Oversight Hearing Before the Subccmmittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 9 5 th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Feb. 27, 1978); Allegations Concerning Lax Security in the Ocmestic Nuclear Industrv: Oversight Hearing Before the Subecem. on Energy and the Environment of the House Ccem. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 9 5 th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 29, 1977) [ hereinafter cited as July 29th Hearing]; Nuclear Reactor Security Against Sabotage: Oversight Hearinc 3efere, the Subcomm. on Enerev and the Environment of the House Comm. cn Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(May 5, 1977) [hereinaf ter cited as May 5th Hearing] ; Sub-ccmmittee on Energy and the Environment of Ecuse Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report on Safecuards in the Ocmesric Nuclear Industry, Ccem. Print No. 17, 94th Cong.,
_3_
i l
2d Sess. (August 1976).
In recent years, much of the con-troversy over whether nuclear plants are adequately protected against sabotage stemmed from a GAO report, released on April 7, 1977, which concluded:
"[T]he Commission has ~ not operated decisively or effectively in the security area, and as a result, security systems at perhaps all power plants would not be able to withstand sabotage attempts by threats that.are now considered minimum by the Ccmmission."
See May 5th Hearing, supra, at 1.
Chairman Udall stated in his opening remarks during the hearing held on May 5, 1977:
"[T]he consequences of sabotage of a nuclear reactor could be disastrous....
"It is because of the enormous consequences...
that we want to assure ourselves that all reason-able steps are taken to prevent the worst frcm occurring."
Id. at 1.
(Emphasis added.)
Congressional concern over particular elements of nuclear plant security systems compels the fullest possible 1
i review of an applicant's proposed security plan.
Elements i
of security systems receiving particular scrutiny by Congress cught ec receive the same high level scrutiny by the NRC, l
not only in the formulation of regulatiens, but also in the t
implementation of those regulations.
Reviewing a security l
plan is not simply a matter of measuring the plan against the regulatienc.
There is always inherent flexibility in J
implementing regulations.
Each security plan has to be adapted, within the standards set by the regulations, to the i
physical loca ica and laycut of each prcpesed nucleaf =cwer l
pian:.
l l
l
, ~ - ~. -.
.~,
In light of Congressional concern for the integrity of existing security systems and the provision for adequate security at nuclear plants, the Licensing Board should welcome the independent and critical eye of someone with Mr. Comey's background and experience.
Mr. Comey's partici-pation in the upcoming licensing hearing could only help to-minimize the possibility of overlooking weaknesses in appli-cant's security plan and to maximize the opportunity for improvement of the plan.
If the Licensing Board were less t
resistant to the idea of recognizing the' expertise of someone i
with other views, even possibly differing frem those of the applicant and staff, such exchanges as follow would perhaps not occur with such frequency:
"Mr. Gossick.
There is a belief by some that terrorists might be attracted by a light -
water reactor in terms of trying to breach it and i
cause a meltdown, with results as effective er of a similar nature.
The attractiveness to a ter-rorist is that this would not involve the prcblems i
of trying to assemble material into a weapon, which we assume can be done but is yet certainly not a simple task to do.
t "I an not trying to be flip, but if I were a terrorist...I would certainly go for other facil-i I
ities in lieu of that.
i l
f "Mr. Tsongas.
I guess it would be a disap-I pointment to you if you were wrong.
"Mr.
Gossick.
That is exactly why we are in the process of upgrading safeguard capabilities.
"Mr. Tsongas.
Let me pursue that.
I have been on this cc=mittee for 2-1/2 years, and have been -- in fact, at all of the hearings invariably
NRC comes up and has the attitude, "I am all right, Jack."
The safeguards are adequate.
Then we are told well, some of the things that Mr. Conran (a nuclear engineer with the NRC, who disagreed with Commission's official position regarding adequacy of safeguards programs) looked into are correct and we are changing our procedures and we have new regulations that will update everything a year from now.
"I, for one, really have no stomach' for going through these sessions on a semiannual basis....
It seems to me that it is in everyone's interest that NRC -- I was going to say bite the bullet, but that seems to be inappropriate, but for once and for all to agree to have adequate safeguards, to establish a criterion at a level that reasonable men will say, that is enough, and to undertake procedures to implement that once and for all."
July 29th Hearing, supra, at 31-32.
The present regulations reflect a commendable effort by the NRC to upgrade levels of safeguards at nuclear power plants, a response in large part to the criticism expressed in Congressional hearings.
However, there is no reason for the Licensing Board to take the attitude "I an all right, Jack," simply because the regulations have been recently revised, and exclude qualified experts with poten-tially different perspectives from analyzing Applicant's security plan for conformity with those regulations.
II THE " RECONSIDERATION" DOES NOT FOLLCW EITHER ALA3-504 OR ALA3-410 AND IS CONTRARY TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE A.
In Limiting the Qualification of an Expert to These Who Have "Muts and Bolts" Experience With the Actual Hardware Components of the Plan, the Board Violates Both ALAS-410 And ALA3-504 by Virtually Eliminating As Potential Experts All Those Who Have Not Worked In The Nuclear Industry.
_a_
t The essence of the Licensing Board's reasoning is that to qualify as a security expert, Mr. Comey must have worked with the " nuts and bolts" of components of security systems "at least to the extent of being able to design an overall system."
(" Reconsideration, " p. 3)
The Licensing Board has the mistaken idea that the main issue regarding I
security is whether certain equipment has been assembled properly and will function dependably.
I The real issue is much broader; namely, wnether l
the overall security plan is adequate to "... provide protec-tion with high assurance against successful industrial sabotage...."
(10 C.F.R. 573.55(a)), even if it is assumed that the hardware performs as it was designed to do.
As will be discussed infra, hardware components, such as alarm i
devices, are only one of many elements of a security plan that must be evaluated.
In fact, the hardware components are the least of the problem.
No one seriously questions l
the functioning of the mechanical components; the issue is 1
the breach of the entire system by sabotage or terrorist attack.
Mr. Comey is uniquely qualified to evaluate the adequacy of the overall plan.
The Licensing Board, in its preoccupation with the dependability of hardware, dismisses the unique combination of his qualificatiens en the basis 1
that each one of then alene dces not establish " prima facie" i
_g_
qualification
(" Reconsideration, " p.
- 7).
The "Reconsidera-tion" ignores the composite picture of Mr. Comey's knowledge and relevant experience in nuclear power plants and security, his past participation in similar proceedings, and even his "perhaps prestigious" participation in a study of Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards performed by the Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress.
The Cover, Advisory Panel and Table of Contents of this study are attached as Appendix
'D' to show the relevance of this work to the qualification of Mr. Comey.
In failing to determine what the members of the Advisory 'anel "actually do"
(" Reconsideration, " p.
10), the Board overlooks Mr. Comey's testimony before the California Energy Commission on Sabotage Considerations o[ the Proposed Sundesert Nuclear Powerplant.
This testimony, attached as Appendix
'B,'
is a part of the record in this proceeding.
Had the Licensing Board reviewed the entire Sundesert testi-I mony (rather than the one entry in footnote, p.
10 of the
" Reconside ration, ")
it would have seen the detailed discussion of the work of and concerns of this group (the " January" group), particularly with regard to threat levels, " insider" sabotage, security responses and guard qualifications (see 99 15-17, Appendix
'B').
Instead the Board takes the everly-simplistic and erreneous view that everycne without a degree in electronics and " nuts and bolts" assembly experience is just "a well-informed layman. "
(The Licensing Board did
. grudgingly concede, at page 12, that Mr. Comey "has accept-able status in his general knowledge of reactor plant layout and operation of its various components.")
Intervenor contends that a security expert is one whose broad general knowledge of the field, whose education, knowledge, and experience enable him to evaluate the overall adequacy of a security plan that by its nature includes, but is not limited to " nuts and bcits".
Mr. Comey is precisely such an expert.
He has previously' testified on security matters; he has studied security matters for years; he stays current on breaches of security; he has even discribed in his Sundesert testimony how a pressurized water reactor of the same design as Diablo Canyon may be sabotaged to result in a meltdown (App.
'B,'
- p. 11).
To rule that Mr. Comey is not qualified is contrary to ALA3-504 and ALA3-410 and is a de facto ruling that the oniv security experts are those who have previously designed or installed alarm devices, etc.,
i at the other nuclear power facilities and, hence, that the i
only " experts" are those who are, or have worked, in the nuclear industry.
3.
The " Sensitive Nature" of Security Plans has no Bearing on the Issue of Expertise, and the Licens-ing Scard's Reliance on this Irrelevant Considera-tion _s Improper and Contrary to Law.
While conceding in a footnote
(" Recons ide ra tion ",
p.
- 5) that the Licensing Scard has no reason to believe that Mr. Comey would not violate a protective order, the Scard nevertheless raises the =isleading spectre of a security 1
a f
i.
breach by dredging out of the public file resolutions of concern
(" Reconsideration," p.
3-4) about unauthorized dis-closure of the security plan.
These documents are not a part of the record in this proceeding and are irrelevant to the legal issue of what constitutes expertise.
The emotional impact of these resolutions on the Licensing Board, and of this intire secrecy issue, has led the Board to establish, without any legal authority, "somewhat more restrictive requirements for the demonstration of expertise than has
[ sic] previously existed."
(" Reconsideration, " p. 5)
The Board has, in effect and directly contrary to ALA3-504,-
adapted a different standard than exists at law under Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, for the qualification of experts in security cases.
Intervenor urges this Appeal Board to reaffirm that it is one thing to detarmine the qualifications of an expert witness; and entirely another to establish, through use of protective orders, safeguards against disclosure of a security plan by any expert so qualified.
1.
Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, raises two issues: (1) the qualification of the expert and (2) whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, Mcore's Federal Practice, Vol. II, p. VII-23 (2d Ed. 1976).
There can be no serious doubt but that Mr. Cemey's testimony would aid the Licensing Board in this l
proceeding.
Further, " Expertise for legal purposes means that a witness has sufficient specialized kncwledge, skill, experience, training or education to testify in the form of an opinion."
Forbro Desicn Co.
v.
Ra*/thecn Co.
(C.A. 5th 1976) 532 F.2d 758, 762, i
i :
i
,..---,._,,,7-
III MR. COMEY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO REVIEW APPLICANT'S SECURITY PLAN TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PLAN CONFORMS TO CURRENT REGULATIONS A.
Current Regulations.
Section 73.55, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, specifies the elements of applicant's security plan:
"(a) General Performance Recuirements.
The licensee shall establish and maintain an onsight physical protection system and security organization which will provide protection with high assurance against successful industrial sabotage by both the following:
" (1) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes...
"(i) Well-trained (including military skills)...;
" (ii) Inside assistance;
" (iii) Suitable weapons;
"(iv) Hand-carried ecuipment...
" (2) An internai threat of an insider...
"(b) Physical Security Orcanization.
" (1) The licensee shall establish a security I
organization including guards, to protect its facility against industrial sabotage...
j l l
.~
"(c)
Physical Barriers.
" (1) The licensee shall locate vital equip-ment only within a vital area..., located within a protected area...
1
"(d)
Access Recuirements.
"(1) The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access into the protected area...
"(e)
Detection Aids.
All alarms required pursuant to this part shall enunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located within the protected area.. that a single act cannot remove the capability of calling for assistance...
" ( f)
Communication Recuirements.
"(1) Each guard, watchman or armed respon-sible individual on duty shall be capable of maintaining continuous communication with an individual in each con-tinuously manned alarm station...
" (g)
Testine and Maintenance.
Each licensee shall test and maintain intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, commu-nications equipment, physical barriers and other security related devices...
\\
"(h)
Response Recuirement.
" (1)
The licensee shall establish and docu-i ment liaison with local law enforcement authorities..."
t I
i..
L
B.
Intervenors Contentions.
This Intervenor contends that applicant's security plan does not comply with 10 C.F.R.
S73.55 in these ways:
-(See Amended Security Contentions of Intervenor, filed January 18, 1978.)
1.
The plan fails to meet general performance requirements; 2.
The plan has deficiencies relative to the organization, leadership, duties and qualifications of its security force; 3.
The plan has deficiencies relative to the location of vital areas, vehicle parking restrictions, size of isolation :enes, penetration detection devices and arrange-ments, and illumination relative to physical barriers; 4.
The plan has deficiencies relating to identi-fication and search of individuals entering a protected area, search of packages and other handcarried items for things which could be used for industrial sabotage, identi-fication and authorization of packages, designation, centrol and search of vehicles, badging and escort requirements for individuals, access to vital areas, alarms, locks, and positive access control over reactor containment and other equipment in protected and vital areas; 5.
The plan has deficiencies relative :
alarm annunciation, central alarm stations, required features, types and locations of alarms; 6.
The plan has deficiencies relative to guard communications capabilities, alarm station communications capabilities, communications links to local law enforcement authorities, and independent power sources for non-portable communications equipment; 7.
The plan has deficiencies relative to testing and maintenance of security equipment; 8.
The plan has deficiencies relative to guard response to abnormal activity and security emergencies.
C.
Mr. Comev's Qualifications.
A statement of Mr. Comey's qualifications to be an expert witness for discovery purposes on security matters, as developed in the record and submitted in previous plead-ings, is attached hereto as Appendix
'C.'
Mr. Cctey pos-sesses the composite professional qualifications to analyze applicant's plan for conformity with current quidelines and regula:icns. This statement of broad qualification includes the requisite kncwledge, skill, training and experience in specific areas of greatest concern in judging the adequacy of applicant's security plan; for example:
(1)
Guard Force Recuirements.
(See App.
'3;'
i para.
8, 15, App.
'C').
(2)
Sabotace and Definitien ci Threat Level.
(See App.
'3;'
para.
4, 5, App.
C;' and Deposition of David Dins =cre Comey, Chicagc, Illincis, July 5, 1973, p.
17). ~.
---w.-g.7-
.p.
p
-,-w.-p y
.~
(3)
Orcanizational Structure, Deployment of Security Forces, Coordination with Local Law Enforcement Authorities.
(See App.'B;' and Deposition of David Dinsmore Comey, Chicago, Illinois, July 5, 1978, p. 32).
(4)
Physical Barriers, Perimeter Detection Systems.
(See paras.
9, 12, App.
'A').
D.
The Distinction Between Exclusion of Mr. Comey and the Weight to be Given to his TestfEony.
Intervenor recognizes the possibility, but does not concede, there may be subjects of inquiry into Applicant's security plan as to wr.ich Mr. Comey is not an expert.
Intervenor will not know that until the Licensing Board folicws the direction of ALAB-410 (p. 15) to permit inspec-tion of a " sanitized" version of the plan.
Such an inspec-tion would permit Intervenor to determine what portions of the plan are relevant to Intervenor's contentions, and wnat portions may be beyond Mr. Cemey's expertise.
Reasoned analysis of the regulatory requirements,
Intervenor's contentions-and Mr. Comey's qualificaticns, noted in this paragraph III, (A) through (C), supra, require the conclusion that Mr. Comey is qualified to testify on most, if not all, elements of the security plan.
Even if Mr. Comey is not qualified on the " nuts and belts" of the security system components (which Intervenor dces not con-cede), he shculd not be excluced as an expert for discovery l
of other elements of the plan as to which he is qualified.
Further, to the extent that Mr. Comey may have' a higher degree of expertise with respect to one element of the plan (e.g.,
threat levels) relative to other subjects (e.g.,
assuming arcuendo, " nuts and bolts" of components) the significance of the distinction should go to the weicht to be given to his testimony;2 not in his exclusion as an expert witness in the proceeding.
CONCLUSON For the reasons stated herein, Intervenor requests:
1.
That this Petition for Directed Certification be granted; 2.
That this Appeal Board determine that Mr. Comey is qualified to act as an expert witness on security matters for purposes of discovery; 3.
That this Appeal Scard suspend action on security issues in the Licensing Board proceeding under 10 C.F.R.
- 52. 73 5 (b) (1) and 52.711 until discovery of Applicant's security plan can be conducted by Intervenor on an expedited basis;
.4.
That this Appeal Scard issue such further orders as are necessary in the circumstances to afford Intervenor the
~2.
See, Mccre's Federal Pracrice, supra, n.
1 at VII-35. i
________--------________________a
t l
right of discovery without undue delay of the operating license proceeding.
DATED:
November 20, 1978 Respectfully submitted,
\\
e
's
(
M PAUL C. VALENTINE YALE I.
JONES Attorneys for Intervenor San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 4 -
gn 1 L?# / %
//
egM,'3 D
%7k*.,
5 Q$ngi%l ud$
==
b 4 *E /
$Z UNITED STATES OF AMERICA g.tp NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boar ' *I In the Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CO.
)
50-323 0.L.
)
LDiablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,)
Units 1 and 2
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this 20th day of November, 1978, served copies of the PETITION FOR DIRECTED CERTIFICATION FOR REVIEW OF " RECONSIDERATION OF BOARD'S ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1978" RELATING TO QUALIFICATION OF SECURITY EXPERT upon all of the parties listed below by depositing copies thereof in the United States Mail, first-class, postage prepaid.
- Mr s. Raye Fleming
- Philip A.
Cran'e, Esq.
1920 Mattie Rd.
John C. Morrissey, Esq.
Shell Beach, CA 93449 Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
77 Beale St.,
Rm 3127 Bruce Norten, Esq.
San Francisco, CA 94106 3216 N.
Third St.
Suite 202
- Janice E.
Kerr Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Lawrence Q. Garcia, Esq.
J.
Calvin Simpson, Esq.
Arthur C.
Gehr, Esq.
California Public Utilities Commission Snell & Wil=er 5246 State Bldg.
3100 Valley Center 350 McAllister Phoenix, Arizona 85073 San Francisco, CA 94102 l
(
John Phillips, Esq.
Mrs. Elizabeth Bowers Center for. Law in the Chairman Public Interest Atomic Safety and Licensing 10203 Santa Monica Dr.
Board Panel Los Angeles, CA 90067 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mrs. Sandra Silver 1792 Conejo Avenue Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.
San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Frederick Eissler Appeal Board Panel Scenic Shoreline Preservation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Conference, Inc.
Washington, D.C.
20555 4623 More Mesa Dr.
Santa Barbara, CA 93105 Mrs. Elizabeth Apfelberg 1415 Cozadero San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 James R.
Tourtellotte, Esq.
Office of the Executive Legal Director BETH 042 U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. William E. Martin Battelle Memorial Institute Columbus, Ohio 43201 Mr. Glenn Bright Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission Washingten, D.C.
20555 Docket and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co= mission Washington, D.C.
20555
. r.
i
.J t w L I ) '..l. ~t e- -
Helen J.,,Doncvan
- Without appendix
i
,.,yy"
- Tr
.- a
/usg l
-=p j
vt---
t m,/
~\\
q'E./.1.;J?.W M
. e., \\$ f.S l r c.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
/
NUCLEAR REGULA~ORY COMMISSION
'Y s
ss o
d ' V, 3efore the Atomic Saferv and Licensin2 3 card
' b i v.f,/
In the Matter of
)
)
?ACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC CCM?ANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-275 OL
)
50-323 OL (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2)
)
W g
//
9 C(,p%E RECONSIDERATION OF T'dE BOARD'S p7 ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 5.
1978
$qip@A]
py INTRODUCTION ppg +
n$
ist\\ T On Septecher 5,1978, this Licensing Board issued an Order which denied Intervenors' (San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace) petition to qualify Mr. David Cc=ey as a securi:7 plan expert witness.
The Order recited the positions of Intervenors, Applicant, and the NRC Staff.
On Septe=ber 22, and October o, 1978, the Intervenors petitioned the Acc=ic Safety and Licensing Appeal 3 card :o grant direc certifica-tion in this =acter and to issue an # mediate Order that Mr. Cccey is qualified as an exper wi: ness for discovery
[
i purposes.
On October 27, 1978,.the Appeal 3 card, in AD.5-504, deter =ined tha: the petition for direc:ed cer:ifica:icn is granced; this Board's Order of Se;.ai:er 5,1973, is I
vaca:ed.
The Order re=anded the =a::er c :his 3 card fcr I
l nPPENDIX "A"
t l
, procpt reconsideration and a full explication of the reascns 1/
underlying the result upon such reconsideration.-
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS The Board has before it the following as :uments:
Intervenors' petition of May 23, 1978; the Applicant and the Staff's respenses of June 5,1978; Mr. Cc=ey's depositten of July 5,1978; the Staff response of August 14, 1978; Inter-venors' petition for Immediate Order and Response to NRC on August 25, 1978; and Applicant's response to the original petition following deposition of August 28, 1978.
The Board has also reviewed the Appeal Board Mecorandus and Order in 2/
ALA3-410 which was issued on June 9, 1977.-
We perceive :he pertinent part of this decision concerning the criteria to be applied to determine who is an expert witness to be in para-graph (3) on pp. 1404, 1405, as follows :
"(3)
A security plan need not be revealed to a witness who lacks relevant expertise for evaluating it.
Access to the plan or portions thereof should be given only to witnesses who have been shewn to ossess_;he :echnical ecm-aetence necessary m eva '"- - the p iens of tha ptan which they may oe snown.
Any c:her ccurse would contravene che recuire=en: cha:
1/
Pacific Gas and Electric Ceccanv (Diablo Canycn Nuclear Power Pian, Units i anc 1), ALA3-5C4, 7 NRC 2/
Pacific Gas and Electric Ccecany (Diablo Canven Nuclear rower itant, Unt:s i anc
), ALA3-410, 5 NRC' 139e (19 7 7).
APPENtIX "A" (con.)
4 '. :,.
3 access be afforded only to ' persons properly and directly concerned' (10 C.F.R. 52.790(b)(6)).
See also Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702.
"In the latter connection, it is noteworthy that when an expert is challenged (as on veir dire examination), the party sponsoring the witness has the burden of demonstrating his expertise.
As Wigmore has pointed cut, it is 'univers ally conceded' that the 'cossession of the recuired cualifications_ by a particular person offered as a witness, =ust be exoressiv shewn bv the eartv offerine him. ' 2 Wi.g= ore, Evicence, $500, at e40-*1 (3d Ed.1940)(emphasis in original)." pp.
The key words here are " technical competence" and "the party sponsoring the witness has the burden of deconstrating his expertise."
Webster defines " technical" as "having special, usually practical knowledge, especially of a =echanical or scientific subject."
We believe that " technical eccpe:ence" to evtluate the cccpenents of a security plan ideally requires practical knowledge ficwing frem working with the asse=bly of i
che " nuts and bolts," etc., of the varicus components of the security system, at less:-to the exten: of beinz able to design an overall svstem.
It dces not necessarily =ean the raw =anual I
labor involved, but an inti= ate, en-the-s oot knowladze o f the fabrication mad asse=bly of each eccponen:.
We recognize tha:
l the 3 card =ust =ake a subjective determination here, but, no:ing the fact tha: :he burden is en the party spenscring :he l
l APPENDIX "A"
(cen.)
. candidate, we believe that the burden will not have been cet unless there exists evidence of actual practical knowledge or its equivalent.
We are also aware that if we recognize a candidate as technically qualified, before discovery can proceed, we =us:
also be assured that the person has signed a proper protective order and will honor it.
This could de=and extre=e care, as was illustrated prior to our in ca= era prehearing conference.
Me=bers of the Mothers for Peace excused the=selves from the hearing room before we cc==enced, saying that they were con-cerned that if they had actual knowledge of the security plan or if potential saboteurs believed they did, they feared for the safety of their heces and their persons.
Ccncern about security of the plant and the ce== unity also pro =pted the Cri=inal Justice Ad=inistrator's Association of San Luis Obispo County to pass a resolution on May 12, 1976, which received full service, asking the Board not to per=it dis-closure of the security plan due to their cencern about "the risk of unauthorized release of :he details of such plans."
The Board of Supervisors, County of San Luis Obispo passefi a si=ilar resolution en August 24, 1976, which also 6
e 9
e 9
A22ENDIX "A"
(Cen.)
- i
,e o
- l 1 received full service.
We recogni:e the concern of the Ladividuals and the organizations but i: does not persuade us that a technically ec=petent individual under a carefully.
drawn protective order will not fully honor the protec Lve order.
We believe it can be done or we would not have 3/
ad=itted the security plan contention.-
The Board does believe, however, that these expressed concerns, along with those stated by, inter alia, the Advisory Cocnittee on Reactor Safeguards and the Acc=ic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in this case, =andate the Board to quantify, insofar as possible, the requirements for establishing expertise La this field.
It is for this reason the Board has atte=pted to define " technical co=petence,"
above, and has adopted the suggested guidelines set forth in the ccenents by Drs. Jchnson and Quarles which were attached to ALA3-410.
This has led to what are perhaps sc=ewhat = ore restrictive require =ents for the de=cnstraticn of expertise than has existed previously.
3/
We have no reason to believe :ha: Mr. Cemey wculd in any way violate the res:rictions of a protective order, and this factor did not enter in:o :he Board's criginal disqualifica:icn of Mr. Cccey.
APPE:CIX "A" (con.)
6-SPECIFIC CONSIDERATION OF MR. DAVID CCMEY In general, the qualifications of an exper witness are established either through consideration of his academic training or of his relevant experience, or through sece combination of these factors.
The Board has considered these factors, and addresses chec, seriacim.
ACADO!IC BACKGROUND AND TRAINING In its original pe:ition to establish the qualifications of Mr. Cocey, Intervenors attached a " Statement of Personal Qualifications of David Dinstore Co=ey."
In this state =ent, it was revealed tha: he ".
. is a graduate of Princeton University and worked for cany years as an analys: of Soviet scientific research.
He had two one-year Ford Foundation l
rellcwships, and spent two years as an Assistant Professor at the Osteuropa Institut of the Universica: Freiburg/Schweiz.
In 1963 he becace a Research Associate at the Center for International Studies at Cornell University, and for six years he was the Director of the R'esearch Ins:itute'on Sovie S c ienc e. "
e
t,,.
7-The Board feels tha: this bare state =ent sheds li: le light on Mr. Cocey's academic qualifications.
No =ention is made of his undergraduate =ajor, nor is any infor:acion pre-sented to the Board on any relevance his studies =ight have to the question of nuclear plant security.
In his deposition, he did state that he had audited 12 graduate courses in physics at Cornell University while he was on the staff of the Univer-sity, but, again, no particular relationship between this academic training and' che various areas of expertise laid cit:
by the Appeal Board guidelines was made.
(Tr. 5-6, 51-52).
He also stated (Tr. 52-53) that he had taken courses in sy=bolic logic and sccial psychology, which he believed had some rele-vance to the securi:y problem.
He fur-her stated that he had taken no for=al course work which principally involved physical security (Tr. 6), and tha: he has no educational background in electronics.
(Tr. 60).
Based on the representations by the In ervenors and the
_ proposed witness, che Board finds no ori=a facie qualifica:icn of Mr. Cecey by virtue of acade=ic-training grounds alene has been es:ablished.
A". ( co n. )
APPENDIX
8 RELEVANT EXPERIENCE In Mr. Cc=ey's state =ent of qualifications and subsequen:
deposition a nu=ber of ite=s concerning relevant experience were presented for the Board's consideration.
After thorough review of these submissions, the Board finds them less than compelling.
The Intervenors have relied heavily on Mr. Cecey's
" experience qualifications" frcm the fact that he participated in the Zion 1 and 2 hearings in 1973, and the Donald C. Cook 1 and 2 proceedings in 1974 Mr. Comey stated he was qualified in the Zion proceeding as a "2.733 expere," and was qualified by the Chair =an of chat Board to conduct cross-examina:icn en
~
security =at:ers. (Tr. 10).
In the Cook case, he reviewed security plans and participated in negotiations of an in camera settle =en: agree =en en security =atters.
t 1
I i
Careful review of the pertinent section of Mr. Cccey's depositien (Tr. 6-14) yielded little in the way of hard facts.
~
~
It is certainly true that Mr. Cecey participa ed in these i
actions.
In the case of Cock i and 2 it appears that no for=al acceptance of Mr. Cccey's s: acus as an exper: was made, but APPENDIX "A" (cen.)
n'...
9-that he was allowed to participa:e inas=uch as the Applicant in the case did not object.
The situation during the Zion 1 and 2 hearings was somewhat more complex.
The Intervenors have not established whether Mr. Cocey actually underwent a 4/
~
voir dire examination on security matters.
The Board has no way of deter =ining what standards were adopted by the Zion Board for Mr. Cocey's qualifications as an experr.
Testi=ony on these points was secewhat inhibited by the fact that it was an in ca= era session and by Mr. Cocey's understandably less.han-eidetic =e=ory of the proceeding plus the fact that he recognires that he is still under a protective order in that proceeding.
In any event, the Board does not -believe tha Mr. Cccey is autocarically qualified as a security exper: in this case si= ply because he cight have been accepted as such by another Board in an earlier case.
The instant Board would, of ccurse, give appropriate weight to his previous qualifications.
However, the Board believes that the situation today is not parallel to that which existed some four or five years ago.
a/
The Staff was able to locate two in camera ::anscri::s and nei:her shows vcir dire on secErity.
(Tr. 11-13).
APPENDIX A" (con.)
. Until ALA3-410 was handed down the various Boards had few guidelines to follow, and lic:le in the way of quantitative standards to apply.
This Board believes that = ore defini:ive, perhaps stricter standards apply today.
We, therefore, =ust evaluate Mr. Cc=ey's qualifications in this case without presu=ption of his standing as an experr.
OTEER EXPERIENCE Mr. Cc=ey's =e=bership La the Nuclear Safeguards and Proliferation Panel of the Office of Technology Assess =ent of the U.S. Congress is indeed, perhaps, prestigious, as attested by the na=es of the other =e=bers, =os t o f whc=
are readily recognized by the Board as being elder s: aces-
=en.
What is not apparent is what they actually do.
This Board is not concerned with general findings and recc==endations which usually e= anate frc= such a group.-5/
We are concerned with 5/
The qualifications statement also included, as a =a::er to be considered by this Board, the fact that Mr. Cc=ey ".
has served, together with Willy Higinbotha=
and a staff of curside consultants frc= 3rcokhaven National Labora: cry,
~
the Defense Nu. lear Agency, and the Rand Corpora:icn, on a soecial review zrcuo on ohvsical securiev. attack on nuclear :actil: es.,,fezuards and sa agains: ter:crist tn Mr. Cccey's depcsizion, Ex.
L, Testimony cf Depenen: en Sundesert Plan
-- Sabotage Ccnsideration, p.
2, i: cen-tinues (althcugh not included in :he qualifica:icns s:a:e-
=ent), "The discussiens and =ajori:y cencensus cf :he January"grcup were never inccrpora:ed in the Panel's final report.
The Intervencrs have nc: established :he significar if any, cf these staca=ents.
Discussi:ns in :he d.epcsiticn.
(Tr. 20, 42-47) shed li :le further light.
I A2EENDIX "A"
(con.)
t 3..-
. the i=ple=entation of the philosophy, if you will, that is
, laid out in 10 CFR Part 73.
The Board is unable to find, from the evidence presented by Intervenors, any specific.
relationship between our objective and the workings of the Panel.
It is further represented that Mr. Cccey ".
. has testified on nuclear plant security satters in in camera sessions before the Advisory Cocsittee on Reactor Safeguards, and has had numerous consultations on the subject of reactor sabotage with ce=bers of the staff of the U.S. A c=ic Energy Cec =ission and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cec =ission, both at the regicnal office level and also at headquarrers in Bethesda, Md."
This type of sta:ecent is of little value to the Board in its evaluation of Mr. Cc=ey's expertise.
Unless the Inter-venors have apprised the Board of the reasons for appearance and/or participatien, plus the subjects involved, it is L:-
possible for the Board to rela:e possible exper:ise to the varicus specific cccpenents of the guidelines which :he Scard has se: forth previcusly.
An inspecticn of the depcsi:icn yields little further insight.
(Tr. li-13).
APPD; DIX "A"
(con.)
~
. The Board does agree that-Mr. Cc=ey has acceptable status in his general knowledge of reactor plant layout and operation of its various cc=ponents.
While he has not specifically inspected the Diablo Canyon installation, (Tr. 41-42), his stated fa=iliarity with so=e six pressurized water and four boiling water reactors satisfies the Board in this regard.
This faciliarity with reactor plant syste=s and laycuts'is, we =ust add, a necessary but not sufficient condition to qualify as an expert on security.
Although no specific clais was =ade in the state =ent of qualifications as to Mr. Cc=ey's knowledge of plant detection and alar = =echanis=s, this was gone into at sc=e length in his deposition.. (Tr. 30-32, 61-65).
The Board reviewed this testi=ony closely, and could only cc=e to the conclusica that, based on the infor=ation befcre us, no depth of knowledge sufficient for expert qualification was revealed.
- Rather, the general tenor of Mr. Cc=ey's stata=ent appeared to the Board to be at the level we wculd expect of a well-infor=ed lay =an.
APPFWUX "A" W
.,.i
SUMMARY
The Board has carefully reviewed the submissions which a
have been made relevant to the qualifications of Mr. Cc=ey to act as an expert witness in the recurity field.
We find that he is not qualified on the basis of his academic background alone.
After considering Mr. Cccey's relevant experience, on the br. sis of the sub=issions we have before us, the Board finds tnat Mr. Cccey is a well-infor=ed lay =an, with a broad general knowledge of the field, but does not have the re-quisite depth of :caowledge in any specific aspect identified in ALA3-410 (and adopted by this Board) to qualify as an expert.
On. recensideration, the petition of the San Luis Obf spo Mothers for Peace to establish qualificatiens 'of David Cocey is therefore DENIED.
FOR THE ATCMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING 30ARD
$ Y) /
YM-A
- u.:40een d.
Sowers, Cna:.r an
/
Dated a Bethesda, Maryland This 3rd day of Novecber 1973.
APPENDIX "A"
( On.)
J 4
STA7E CF CALIFORNIA State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission
=
In the Matter of:
Notice of Intention of SAN DIEGO CAS & ELECTRIC CCMPANY to F.*e an Apolication for Certification of Occket No. 76-NOI-2 the Sundesert Nuclear Plant together witn Transmission Lines and Necessary Appurtenances TESTIMONY CF DAVID O!N5MORE CCMEY CN SUNDESERT PLANT SASOTAGE CCNSIDERATICNS i
l i
19 July 1977 APPE':D:X "3"
l
EMINC CSE-7768 Tentimony of DAV!D O!NSMORE CCMEY for State Energy Resource:
Conservation and Cevelepment Commission of the State of Califcrnia we in the Matter of Suncesert Nuclear Plant Occket No. 76-NOI-2 Saceamento, California 19.3uly 1977 My name is Davic Dinsmore Cemey.
I am President of Citizen: for a Setter Environment, a not-for-profit corporation specialicing in envircnmental rc:earch.
We have fcur of fices in the Micwest, with a full-time rest'aren staff of 14 scientists, economists, engineers and research associate:. plus two lawyers. Our 5
main office is at 59 East Van Suren Street, Suite 2610, Chicago,1:lineis 6C605.
I have been invited to tectify as an espert witne:S on reactcr sabotage and physical security requirements by the State Energy Resources Cen crvation and Deselcoment Commission of the State of California, in connection with consiceratiens of security at the preposed Suncecert Plant of San Diego Cas &
10 Electric Company.
I am a graduate of Princeton University and worked fer many scars a: an analyst of O
Soviet :cientific researen. I had two one-year Ford Foundaticn Fellow: hip:, and spent two y ears a: an A:sistant Profesect at the Ostouropa In:titut nf the Universit3; Freiburc/Schweiz.
In 1963 I became a Re:Paren A::cciate at the 15 Center for International Stucies at Ccene!! University, anc rce sa years was the Director of the Research Institute on Soviet Science.
In 1969 I resignec to beccme Director uf the Rec.. arch Civicion of Schickel Environmental Deve!cpment Company, an enurenmental censulting firm witn headquarters in Itnaca, New York.
20 In 1970, I resigned to become Director of Envi.cnmental Re:caren at Eusiner: men fer the Putlic Intere:t (EPD. a public interest law firm !ccated in Cnicagc, I!!incis.
At EP! cne of my resocnsibilities was research en nuclear powe. plant cesign arcelems, muen of which culminatec in Iitigatien befcre the Atcmic Safety and Licensing Bearcs of the U. S. Atcmic Erlerg' Ccmmissicn (AEC).
y 25 In this connexicn. I reviewec the Safety An:!ysi: Reperts anc 5afety Evaluaticns cf aporcximately two ec:en pewer reactors !ccatad in the U. S.. nru: :n aceiticn have read several tnou:anc cafety-relatec reports r:ene.ated by the U. 5. AEC cnd its cucce::cr a4;cne:e:. I have at:o studiec in cetail more tnan four tt:uunand Acnurmal Occurrence Report: cesc.-ibing failure: of :afety equipment at tsc! car ocwer plants 30 in :ne United States.
I have cenducted cetailed, and scmetime: aset:tive nn-cit o inncaction: of the nuclear ste&m su;; ply sy:tems centrei systems ant: au=: nary pu-er sf: tem: atfcur bctiing water reacter units and six pressurtzec water.eactcr units inc!ud:ng five West;nghouse reacters.
..??END U " 3" __(con. )_
b EEN CSE-7768 In c. cf two of these We:tinghcuse reacters, I reviewed the plant security plans as well.
h
! am familiar on a first-hand basis with the physical laycut and cperaticn of the 5
above-mentioned systems at these plant:, including control rocms anc plant security centrol centers.
I have testified on nuclear plant security matters in in-camera sessions before the Adviscry Committee en Reacter Safeguarcs and have hi,d numerce: cens;1tations 10 en the sucject of reacter sabotage witn members of tne staff of the U.S. Atomic Energy Ccmmission and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commts.icn (NRC), both at the regional of fice level and also at neadquart'ers in Bethesda, f.taryland.
For the past year I have served as a member of the Nue! ear Safeguarcs and Prcliferation Panel of tne Of fice of Tecnnelogy A::es: ment of the U.S. Ccng.e:s.
15 This panel, wnien cens:sted of my:cif, Cherter Coc::cr, Wi!!:am Higirectnam, George Kistiakowsky, Hercert Scoville, i-enry DeWelf Smytn, George 5:1thakis, incoccre Taylor, Cyrus Vance, Alvin Weinberg, t.1 acon Willrich and cthers, has reviewed U.S. nuclear policy with respect to preventing nuc! car proliferation, 20 particularly to "ncn-state acversaries."
In addition, I attenced a :pecial meeting convened by OTA Janunry 5-6,1977, to discus: cafeguards against terrorist attack en nuclear facilities, whien was attended by Higinbotham, a :cecial tearn of experts from Orcokhaven National I.aboratory, the former cirector of tne Defen:e Nuc! car A.;ency, and expert: cn terrori:m frcm 25 the Rand Corpcration. The di:cu:sions and ma;c. ity consensus of tne January group were never incorporatec in the Panel's final report.
Cn the ba:i: cf my experience, I have ecme to the conclu: ion that the NRC has seriously uncerestimated reactor sacctage as a potential threat anc that steps 30 currently being taken to prevent it wi!! nct be sufficient.
~irst of all, the ecnsecuence: cf a sacotage-initiated reactor accident nave been underestimatec,5c that tne tnrest ha not been taken scricusly.
35 Secencly, tne dif ficulties as to how reacter :abetage can be planned anc implemented have been overestimated, so that almost no one believes that it can be ocne.
ag Thirdly, the NEC rescense to the prcblem ha: ceen tco cauticus and too minimal to of fer suf ficient protecticn again:t such events takinc place.
Fourtn, it has been a :umed that the mctivations of terrorists are such tnat a nuclear reactcr ~culc ce a hignty unbuely target.
i 45 I :nau acceeed fir : by t.ying to cnalienge the ennventional wi:ccm that tre e is a negligiole chance tnat reacter sacctage *cule re: ult in s qnsf: cant releases of 1
rac:cactive materials.
AFFENZX "3"
( ccr.. )
$_C SE 7G M 'T CaE-776a PART ONE: THE CCNSELUENCES OF REACTCR SA00TAGE The consecuences of sabotage of a 1C00 megawatt light water reacter have been recent!y set forth by tne Chief of the Emergency Technology Section of the Health Physics Oivisien of the Cak Ricge National Laocratcry:
5 "SA80 TACE OF A
LARGE (5G0- TO 10CO-MW(e)) LICHT-WATER REACTOR RESULTINO IN AN UNCONTAINED MELTOCWN "If a large (500- to 1000-MW(e)) light-water reacter is i:clated from all heat sinks af ter several months of operation at full power, ne heat from the fissicn-product inventcry in the core will boil away all the 10 water in the primary ! cap in a few hours anc melt the core cut of the pressure vescel.
If the centaintnent is breacned either deliberately or by pressure frcm non-concensable gase, the volatile anc :emivelatile fission products will distill cut of tne molten core in the fcrm of vapcr cc aerosol and diffuse out of :ne camaged centainment Oc be carried fer 15 many miles by Iccal wind patterns. Tne princi::a! ic:nal nacard f.cm this material is frem the radiatien dcse receivec folicwing it: inhalation and retention in the body. In the following calculaticn:, we ha.e used a source term cnd biological macel developed by Che: tor (R. O. Chester, Giolog: cal Ocse and Raciological Activity from Nuc! car Reacter er 20 Nucler.c Weapon Fission Product, USACC Report CHNL-4996, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, December 1974) which g:ves results similar to thcce of the Ra:mussen study (U. 5. Nuclear Rer;ulatcry Commission, REACTCR SAFETY STUDY (WASH-1400), Appenc:x VI-Calculation of Reactor Accident Ccnsequences, October,1975).
25 "The censequences of such a relea:e wi!! depend on tre weatner condittens at the time, the populatico cistricution cownwind, the e f f ectivene:S of attempts to restore Centainment, and the acticns of civil suthorities in evacuating cr providing exped;ent protection information to the pcpulation at r:sk. The areas in whicn the peculaticn 30 faces death cr sericus injury can te cuite !arce. Fcr a ICCC-MW(e) boiling-water reacter uncergcing an uncentained meltdown in an S-km/hr wind and neutral atmos::heric stability, per:en: breathmg at 10 liters / min withcut re:piratcry protection w !! rece:ve an innalec wncle-bccy-cese ecmmitment of 500 R cr mcre in a plume of 1-km maximum 35 wietn and extencing 30 km downwind...
"Our results are consistent with the final version of the Ra:mussen stucy, which estimated early f at:rfities from uncentnint'ri rneitdown of pressurtzed-water reactors for varica: meteorolor:: cal cend4tions."
(C. V. Che::er, " Estimates of Threat to the Publir fra n Terrcr::* Acts 40 Agam ; Nuc! car Facili tic:", NUCLCAR SAFETY, Vol. 17, No.
6, November-December 1976, pp. 659-665.)
The Rasmussen study gives the following e:tima*n for t*n enr. acc ! erg-term h
'atalities anc healtn ef f ects of :ne Categcry I re!nar.c f.cm a cressurizec ~ ate.-
reactor (a "PWR-1 release") re:ulting fecm a breacn of cercamment cecer cantec 45 oy care meltcown, as:uming worst-car.c wnnther enen.:icru enuat:ng a high-cen: sty ::cculat:en, but mitigatec Oy evacuation cf 7'.% of :ne occuistion within a few hours of tne accident:
APPE; DIX "3"
(cen.)
Si
6CSE7e?st7j CaE-776a TABLE A Early Fatalities 3,3C0 Long-Term Cancer Fatalities 45,000 inyroid Tumor Cases (10% Fatal) 200,000 Leng-Term Genetic Defects 28,500 Total Prcperty Damage
$14, 000,000,000 Decentamination Area (sq. mi.)
3,200 Reiccaticn Area (sq. mi.)
290 (U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissien, REACTCR SAFETY STUOY C// ASH-10CO),
Cetocer,1975, pp. 72-76.)
If a successful evacuation were not carried cut, the human fatalities anc injuries cculd be up to three times larger than the figures given Dy the Rasmu::en study, and if the reactor in question were sited clesce to a mojer population center than tne six artificially ccmposited sites postulated in tne Rasmus:en study, the fatalities and injuries could be censiderably higher.
In calculating the probabilities of reactor accidents, the Rasmussen study did not consicer sabotage as an initiating cause:
"The stucy concluced that, wnile there is no current metnocclegy for comprehensively estimating the prcbability of successful actc at satotage, any consequences produced by sacotal;e could nct exceed the largest precicted by the stucy and would likely be mucn smaller."
(W ASH-1400, p.172).
This conclusion misses the scint.
Assuming that the ccncecuences procuced by satotage wou!c not be greater than the consequences cescrited in :ne Rasmussen stucy, the probabilities cf the event initiating are no !cnger cepencent upon the relatively low probability of a piping rupture cecurring simultanecus witn the failure of the emergency cere cooling system as we!! a: the f ai!ure of the centainment spray system as well as the failure of the containment to isolate.
The probabilities of the initiating event change, for one is no Icnger calculating the chances of machines malfunctioning; 'one is estimatint; the picO30t!ity of human beings malfunctioning. Cne prCDably does not have te ne a psychiatrist to realize that this probability is relatively higher than the 5 = 10, value a :umed as the probabili*y of the relea:e causing the f atalitics and pecperty damage given in Tacle A accve; one need only read the newspapers.
Fce purpcses of my analysis of a sabetage ini.iated reacter accicent at a pressuriced water reacter, I as:ume as a Reference Inc: cent the acc: cent set fcrth in Tatte B.
APPESCIX "3 (con.)
6.CSEEADM CeE-776a TABLE B SA90 TACE-!NITIA TED RCFERENCE INCIDENT
)
Rasmus:en Stucy PWR Rasmussen Study Cause Assumed in Accident Descriptive Sacotage-Initiatec Sv rnbcl Phrase Refernnce Inmicent A
Intermediate to large LCCA Charge at Lccation #1 C
Failure of centainment spray Charges at Location #2 injection system D
Failure of emergency core cooling Charges at Locations #3 & 4 injection system E
Failure of emergency core cooling Charges at Locations #3 & /.1 system to function F
Failure of containment spray Charges at Locations #2 & 4 recirculation systern H
Failure of emergency core cooling Charges at Location #4 recirculation systern S
Containment failure resulting Coening containment purge from inaceouate isolation of valves containment cpenings and penetrations Note: Fct descriptien of the 9 charges at the.'. locations, see Table C.
APPENDIX "3"
(con.)
S$ _
6.WW?E"I CGE-7768 TABLE C Ty::es of charge, h
L.ccation of Equipinent Time Location No.of Sacctaged, Nature of Recuired Radiation No.
Charces Damace (Minutes)
Eiresure 1
1 15 lb. ROV /PETN 6
< 3 rem shaped charge on cc!d
(!es:. than leg or reactor coolant masimum pump suction leg
- ermissible causing 6" break quarterly in primary piping exposure)
(inside containtnent) 2 3
Oetasheets or C-4 putt, 4
Negligible on both motor-driven containment scray pumps and on single diesel-driven containment spray pump (all in one room in auxiliary building next to containment)
)
3 2
Detasheets or C-4 putty 3
Negligible on both matcr-driven safety injection pum;:s (two adjoining rooms in auxiliary building next to containment) 4 3
Octasheets or C-4 putty 5
Negligic!e on both motor-driven resicual heat removh; pumos and on single diesel-criven resicual heat refs oval pump (3 adjoini..g rooms in auxiliary" building next to c6ntainment)
Note:
At Zicn Station,Lccation I is 60 feet from bor tnrn of stairway two f!cces ccwn from ecntainment airlock. Cer;t:::ritrie nt agricc' is two ficcr3 uc from Lccation 2. Lccatico i n 'MJ fev t away from Location 2cnsame ficor.
Lncation is one fh.or crectly cown acjacent stairway from Lccation 2. ICommenwealth Ecisen Ccm;;any, Z:CN STATICN FIRE PROTECT!CN REPCH T, Un res::ense to A::::encis A of Branen Tecnnical Position ( Avuhary a: Pcwer Ccnversion Systems Granen) 9.5-1). Acril 29,1977; Crawing 2.3-3. Snect 3; Orawmg 2.3-5, Sheet 3; Crawing 2.3-9; Crawing 2.3-12, Sneet 12; Orawing 2.3-13.)
._______ _____ ____ ____ __ ________ _ _lR REID IX __ " 2 " RCL3
ECSEMGOIT CsE-776a Acccccir'g to the Rasmussen study,.the following DWR accident sequences are all Release Categcry 2 (hereinaf.ter "P'.'.'R-2"):
TABLE O h
ACCF-S ACF-3 ACEF-S AEF-3 ACHF-S AHF-3 (W ASH-1400, p.155)
PWR-2 releases are generally worse in terms of health effects than even PWR-1(the release as:cciated with a steam explosion in the reacter pres:ure ves:cl, 5
followed by a large fraction of tne core exiting at high velocity thrcugh the rcof of the centainment building).
The worst radienuclides, ranked in creer of their human healtn effects, are listed in Table E.
Except forTellurium-132, a PWR-2 release result: in larger fractions of 10 tne reacter core being released for the most dangerous ractenuc! aces than a PWR-1 relea:e doe:.
There is some reason to believe that the casualties may be greater from a sabotage-initiated reactor accident than the PWR-1 necicent analyzed. in the 15 Rasme sen stucy, for if the charges placec in the a::umed Reference Incident were cetonated via radio cetenator: sncrt!y af ter a succes:ful takeover of an operating nuclear power plant, the release of radicactive fi:eten prccuets would be almcst instsntanecus, instead of several hcurs into the accicent as a:sumed by the Ra:mus:en stucy. Less platecut of racienuclices would occur, anc esac'satien times 20 would be concideracly shorter, with a distinct cos: nt!ity that no successful evacuation cculd be carriec cut. Tnis might cause the early fata!4 ties to be nigner than the figures calculated in the Rasmussen study.
The casaalty figures set fortn in Table A snculd serve as a remincer that the magnituce cf the ecnsequences of sacotage-initiatec reactor ace: cents represent a 25 potential for hc! ding a very large pcpulation hcstage by :abeteurs wno nave rigged the plant with racto-detonatacle exclcsive charges, such as in the Reference Incident, and then make their cemands known. ( A fuller di:cussit. of this fc!!cws l
below).
The NRC's Office of Nuclear Regulatcry Rescarch recently commi::ioned Sandia 3G Laccratories to carry out a study of reacter sabotage. Tne :tucy team inc!uced "acversary teams" tnat ceveicped cetailec sanctar;c :equences in crder to empi.;cally " game" the attuations. Their conclu: tens were as fol!cws:
"The sequences ceveloced by the adversary travn: and the systematic g
presentation of plant f a: lure moces ce:cr: cec ay :he fault trees jcintly 35 cemer:trate that tnere is negligicle enance tnat acts cf wi!!ful l
de:truction would result in significant release of racicactive mhterials....
l Ap?END:X "3"
(c':n. )
/
ECEEM F E Cec-776a TABLE E Early and Released Ccntinuing Health Long-Term Percentage By '.'.'hich Radienuclide Effects Health Efbets PWR-2 Esceeds PWR-1 9
Te!!urium-132 CIcud dose, shcrt-Inhalation doses:
-25%
term ground dose; bone marrow, lung, inhalation bene mineral, testes, doses: bone other organs marrow, lung, CI, thyroid, testes Cesium-134 Inhalatien doses:
Cround cose; inhalation -
+25%
bene marrow, lung, cases: bene marrow, lung, testes bone mineral, testes, other Crgans
(
Iodine-131 Cloud ccse, shcrt-Inhalatien cases: bene
-16%
- term ground dose; marrow, lung, bone inhalation doses:
mint rol, te:tes, other bone marrow, lung, organs thyroid, testes fodine-133 Cloud dose, short-Inhalation doces: bone 416 %
- term ground de:e; marrow, lung, testes, inhalation deses:
other organs bone marrow, lung, Cl, thyroid, testes Iodine-135 C! cud dose, short-
!nhalation dose..
-16%
- term ground coce; bone marrow, lung, inhalatien doses:
testes, other crgans bene marrow, lung, Cl, thyroid, testes lodine-132 Cloud dose, shcrt-Inhalation deses:
-16%
- term grcund dose; bone marrow, lung, inhalation doses:
testes, otner organs bene marrow, lung, CI, thyroid, testes.
Cesium-137 innalation doces:
Crcund ecse; inha!atico
-25%
i bene marrow, desCs. bcrie* fnArrow, DCne testes minera!, testes, other organs h
Strontium-89 Innalation cose::
Inhalatico dese::
-20%
bene marrow, CI, Occe marrow, bene testes sniners!, te:tes, other organs i
i
- Organic fraction only; elemental iccine release :ame.
(WASH-laGO, Appencix VI, p.13-21 and 2-5.)
Appna n<
"R" (con.1
~_.
i C S E'TJp p C C
. ceE-776a 1
F "The Reictor Saf ety Study (Rasmussen stucy) cevelcped methces to preilict t h t* magnitude of t!:e radioactivity released artc the public censequences occurring from randern equipment failure and human error for varicus accicent sequences.
All sanotage cotions that have been 5
identified lead to plant failure secuences that were included in the Safety Study. Therefore, sabotage cannot create consequences greater thart those consicered by the Safety Study.... Evaluation of the probacle consequences arising from the sequences ceveloped by the adversary teams yielded values that are a _ smo!! fraction of the 10 maximum consequences considerec by the Reactor Safety Study."
(Sandia Lateratories, SAFETY AND SECURITY CF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS TO ACTS CF SA80TAGE, March 1976)
I believe that these ccnclusions are wrong.
The NRC, however, has chosen to 15 accept them and base its regulatory position both cri these ccnclusions and on their assessmerg that a nuclear reacter is very cif ficult to sabotage. I believe that this latter coriventional wiscom is also based on misperceptions of nuclear pcwer plant cesign and security measures taken to protect nuclear reactors, and the fo!!cwing i
20 section will try to show why it is mistaken.
1 9
i I
3 I
l 9
APPE" DIX "3"
(con.)
L
[- @ 6" M M 'T CGE-7768 4
PART TWO: THE O!FFILULTIES OF REACTOR SAGOTAGE Accorcing to the Sancia Lacorateries report prepared for NRC, nuclear reacters are inherently resistant to sabotage:
"The following characteristics of commercial nuclear poner plants
~
5 greatly increase tne difficulty of reles:ing racioactivity oy sat >ctage:
(1)
The " defense-in-cepth" concept of reactor plant cesign; (2)
Tne ma:sive structure of the plant, which protects critical ecmponents frem external attack; (3)
The safety cecign basis of the plant, which err phasizes 10 system reliability, flexibility, redundancy, and prctection against common mode failures; and M)
Engineered safety features, which are added to the basic system to cepe with acncema! cperations or accicents.
As an example, in a commercial light water reacter plant, fuel 15 centaining the radioactive fission precucts is enclosed in metallic cladcing and is located within a thick str'c! reacter ve::el. The reacter vessel and coolant piping are locatec within a mas:ive steel and concrete containment structure. Altncugh, in part, the purpose of these multiple containments is to provide uccessive confinernent of 20 ractotcxic fission products, the centninments may also serve as ef fective phy:ical carriers against external tnreats.....
"Nuc' car power reacters appear far less susceptib!c In cabotage tnan ma:t otner civil or incu:tric! targets.
The tect nical requirements, planning, and nece::ary manpower and ce;uipment are much g. cater fcr 25 a crecible sametage attempt en a nuclear scwar reacter than are requ:ree fcr an attack cn other potential industrial cr ci.il targets. The probat>Ie ccnsequences of successful sabotace of a power rea:ter are compa.able to tne censequences that eculc be precucec Oy sanctage of many other targets.
The lower suscept;aility to sabotage ettack of 30 nuclear reactors reduces the likelihocc of crec:bic att acks being mounted by unec;:nisticated elements."
(Sanci-Lancrateries. SAFETY AND SECURITY CF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS TO ACTS CF SASOTAGE, March 1976).
The:e Sandia conclusiens, acceted by t! e NRC a: their rer;u!ntarv cefen:e against 35 sacetage, crea:e an erroneous impression that it in kry mfficult to satetage a Accercing to the Sanc:a rescrt. a sucre-eful v.uct.q" of a scuer reacter reactor.
is comparatie in it: ecnsecuences to ";.e con:cquences tnat ccule ce precuced by satetage of many cther targets."
h it is hard to imagine other targets in cur.nductria!irnd rnci"ty that, via the 40 cetenation of a total of les: tnan J.0 scunes of convont;cna! es::!cs se: at le:s tnan 10 Iccations c!csely acjacent to one annther, ccuic peccuee te release of racicactive fissien ::recucts equivalent :n cuantit y to inesc crecucec ::y the cetonation of several nuncrec Hiresnima-:izec weabcns.
10 AppE m "p" (cen.)
h CSEW:K0in COE-7768 The Sandia eenclu:icns also Icave the impre sion that the design cf a nuclear plant makes it very dif ficult to sacetage it.
In a trivial sense it coes, but in tre mest important sense it coes not.
Tne vi:a! equictnent of a ruclea. pc.ver plant is designed for access curing cperation so as :: perform the tests recuired by the Tec~nical Scecifica:icns of the plant's operatinq licenr.e (issuec by the NRC).
5 In come case:, the safety ecu.pment is testec caily, in etners acek!v er mentnly cr at the time of refuelling. Only in a Oci!!ng water reactor, whern tne centainment is usually inerted witn nitrogen, and where the radiation ie.e!s at :ne reci. cuistien loops are en the creer of 25 R per hcur, is acce:: limitec curing reacter operation.
10 Virtually all cther systems are not only accessible but specifica!!y cesigned so tnat people acrking on them will not te expcsec to radia*ico at levels that will cause them to exceed the maximum permissible quarterly radiation dcsc of J rems.
Because of the:c de:ign consideraticns, a saboteur enganed in placing explosive charges en tne key systems in a nuclear plant is exposing himself to very li:tle risk 15 cf contamination witn racicactivity. Even if ne put en a re:cirator and goes into a BV.'R containment to place a snaped charge en cne of the rec;rcuhtten !cc; pi::e:,
if ne can place the charge in le:s tnan 7 minutes, he will not reces.e an exposure in exce:s cf the maximum permissible cuarterly case. fr. a PV.'R conta:nment, where radiation fielc: at the pump cuction leg run appruxirnate'. 5 R per heur, he wil1 20 receive an exposure censicerably less than the maxirnum permis ible quarterly dcse.
There have been frequent statement: to the effect that torrnrist would be much more likely to utilize bic!cgical cr chemical toxini to elfeet wica pread damage to the puolic (:ee for example Bernard Conen, "Tnn i)ctnntialt:ic of Terrcristn",
25 SULLET!N CF THE ATCM:C SCIEN 7:S 75, June 19 76, pp. 3 -35). It is arguec that this ef fers censscerably less risk than sabotaging a reactor woutc.
I think this is a mistaken hypcthesi:. Anyone messinc arcond witn toxins or even p!utonium oxide is much mere likely to centaminate himself than if he plants explosives insice a nue! ear plant, both t:ecause of the very ces;gn censiderations 30 cutlined above, and al:o because ractat:cn levels can es:;ilf be detected instantanecusly nith hand-he!c Cciger * 'U!!er ecunters, ancreas toxins are not in:tantly measurn0!e in any convenient nay.
The Sancia rescrt also makes much of the planning recuirement for an effective reactor sa0ctage. I would suamit that thanks to a!! of the infctmation thet is 35 publicly availaD!e, planning the sabotage of a reactor is far ea ier than that of any comparable f acility, inclucing piponing a bank rechery. Fir:: of a!!, in crder to figure cut precisely which systems, if ladad, prcduce the maimum damage, the potential saccteur need cniv con:u!t W ASH 'OCO (the Rasmus:en study' and its accencices. Other relevant safety-crtented dccument: peccucec cy AEC and NRC
.0 can be cedered from the Naticna! Tecnnical in" motion $e. vice ;t.T!S), but are harcly crucial.
Secencly, the :cecific piping and ;nst.umentation Crawarg: for any c: ant are in the NRC's Public Occument O ccm at 1717 m Street m.":inninct. or at 3 put;ic.icra. v rear the ;, ant. Anctne. relev ant cncument :.m:i.ir!. a.ad w :: ':'e reccrt eacn
'5 plant f ded in trply 'c A;por.cix A o f u 7i> Ai)C2 ').% !. : Al rd M77. :See ine Nct
- rt the f act cf Tacle C',.
This five-Fch tmei
- m. w : :: a w*.:ne reac ~aD 7
all of the sy st ems, electr:ca!.
'" ' r aulic,
- cct-ric cro echanica, t9at if camagec, wn! Iccc tu a ccre meltdown.
AP E DIX "3"
(Cen.}
11
F.CEEMKGT cec-7768 The only cocument not available 'in the Public Occument Roorns is the plant security plan. Even if it were obtsmed by a saboteur, however, it would te!! him little that a few cays' worth of cbservation of the plant extertor wculd not infert-him of regarcing security guard routines, intrusion alarm !ccations, c!csec-circuit g
5 television cameras, etc. As I will cascuss at arrater lenath in Part Three be!cw, the fixec safeguards anc plant security forces are such inat entry into the p! ant by a well-artned group of intrucers is highly likely. If they u:e diversionary tactics and stealth, they may even get into the plant 'withcut be:ng cetected, or at lea:t simultaneous with their presence being detected.
10 Cnce inside the plant, it wou!J require only a few minutes to take over the control rocm and st nd a srnall party to the auxiliary building to Oct explo ive char ;es and radio detonators on the key safety systems. If one chose to place charges so as to knock out the emergency care cooling system and containtnent spray system pumps, as,in:tne Reference Incident, plus place a rac:o-detonatable charge en the reacter c15 ccclant pipag so as to initiate the loss of coolant accident, the whcle procedure would take three men less nan 10 minutes to accornplish. This is le:s time tnan it y
takes tne local constabulary to arrive en the scene.
2 Cnce the saboteurs have placed the charges and taken over the control ecom and.
the primary centrayalarm sy: tem, they thern:r'Ives are in a ponition to use the g
20 plant's security system. against the response force:
that arrive. Using the closed circuit televiision syher,n to monitor the exterior of the plant, and the plant Inudspeaker system 3sla method of communicating, they cuuld very well say " Keep ot,;'., or we'll blow this. place up."
Q This would not be as suicidal a threat as the layman wculd believe. In fact, at this poini, 'bd s iboteurs arl in the safect place in the entire courity. If they were to 25 ope 7 die PWR's containment purge valves and then cypMde the ctiarges, causing a meltdown, the containment would be breached, but the cloud of radicnuclides would be released at the top 6f tfie reactor' stack. Unicss there were a severe downdraf t, tne racicactive cloud would ventilat(upward away frem the normal intakes for the
=30 centrol room air.
Even if some of the cicuc cid begin to seap in thrcugh the vyntilating nystem, the charcoal filters would keep nut rncet of the nuc! ices except tor krypten and the otner ncble qaces. If those neqnn tn reach unacceptable levels, the centrol recm could be sealed off anc go on its own interior source of bottled air and. oxygen, which for most reactors is sufficient for at len:t 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of totally 35 sealed operation.
The centrol rooms also mahtain adequate food and water fcr several wecks.' If it became necessary to abanden the control reorn af ter some cperiod of time, the saboteurs could den radiation protection nuits nnd re:pirators
' that are kept in the control room anc make their erst from tne plant. 1; is highly
~
~- '
- unlikely triat anycne woutc be en the exterior of the plant to prevent them from
,0 4
leaving.
-l will di:Cuu: what demands the enouleurs art' li e!v to make a: part of my k
asse:: ment of motivation in Part Four. Meanwhile ! Or'ould b.e to a:sess what the
'^ NRC has been coing -- mostly not coing -- to prevent :uch events from taking place.
s APPENDIX "3"
(c0n.)
(
/W
Tec.CEE MCC N Cnr-776n PART THREE: SECUR!TY MCASURCS OF TF C N. R. C.
Until recer'tly, the only relevant AEC/NRC raquiatory decurnant On prevention of reactcr sabotage was Regulatory Guide 1.17 ( : sued June 1973), wnich referenced an Amerieren Nuclear Society standard ANSI..lfi.17 ( ANS-3.3). " Industrial Security
)
5 for Nuclear ocwer Plants"(March 23, 1973). This ANS stancarc mentienec en!y inceterminate numbers of pcssible saboteurs:
"In preparing this standard, specific considerat on was given to actential threats posed by: (1) a single disgruntled ernployee who is authorized to have access to the plant and who is - farniliar witn the details of 10 construction and operation of the plant;(2) a single fanatic or mentally deranged person, either an authorized ernployee or an cutsider, whcce knowledge of the plant may range frorn none to intimate familiarity;(3) a small group of discarcant individuals, not normally authorized access to the plant, who are intent on perpetrating acts of 15 sabotage er seizing control of the plant; and (4) spcntaneous and uncisciplined actions of a relatively large group of pecole involved in mob activities asscciated with acts of civil dicturbance. Although it is clear that other potential threats may eust or develop, conscienticus application of measures designed to protect again:t the threats 20 ciscu:ned above will provice substantial protection again:t other postulated threats."
Subsequently the AEC began to think in terms of an undefined "de:ign basis threat".
)
The fi.:t publishec estimates of the cecign haci: threat for nuclear facilities were contained in the so-ca!!ed "Rosenbaum Report" in 1974 According to ne report's 25
- authors, "The maximum credible threat to any f tIcility or element of tran portation hand!!ng special nuclear mate.' rial: i: 15 highly trained men, no more than three of wnom work wit hin the facility cr transcertatico company from which the inater:al i; to be taken".
30 (D. M. Rcsenbaum, et al., SPECIAL SAFCGU AROS STUDY, U. S Atomic Energy Commission, April 1974).
No basi: wa: given for the selecticn of this particular upper bound, althcugh the report statec tnat "It was arrived at after infermal discus: inns witn the FBI and CI A... and en prior relevant experiences of the members of thi: :tudy", many of 35 whcm were fccmer FBI specialists on terrcri:t and guerrs!!a activities.
In his testirncny before Congress on thi: subject near!v two year: later, General Kenneth Chapman, Director of the NRC': Office of Nuc! car Mnterial Safety and Suleguarcs, ::ta ted APPENDIX "3"
(C0r.. )
CSER$si.7 ccE-77co
" Historical data on the cize of terrorist group: indicate: that terrcrist a::ault groups larger than sis persons are not likely to be formed. ' */ c have examined over 4,000 incidents of terrcrism and other anti-social benauce and were able to find 1,271 cases wne. e the number of 5
perpetrators could be identified.
Tne number of incicents involving groups of more than six persons account for only about 2.5 percent of the cases. Groups with as many as 12 per:cns have been very rare. By far, the largest percent----86 percent----in volv ed groups of three persons or fewer."
10 (HEARINGS EEFCRE THC SUCCCMMITTEE CN ENERCY ANO THE ENVIRONMENT CF THE CCMMITTEE ON INTER!OR ANO INSULAR AFF AIRS, February 26-27,1976, pp.145-146.
The sample used by the NRC is of dubiou: value. The 4,000 incidents are known as the "HERC File" and were compilec by the Historical Evaluation and Research 15 Crganization, and are a listing of acts of violence and sabotage ecmmencing in 1870. Because many of the acts are assassination of public of ficials, inv:Iving only one perpetrator,1s well as many cther acts nf dubious relevance to attacks en nuclear facilitics, inclusion of a!! these data tend to reduce the size of the design basis threa,t unnecessarily.
20 A similarly faulty methodology was utilized by the GUM Corpor7 tion in its report i
to the NRC, which surveyed 1,204 incidants of terrori:m and othe r artned attacks, hijacking, etc. cetween 1965 and 1975.
In 702 of the inciderit t, no data were available on the number of attacker, so only M12 were uttarnate:1. analyzed. Of these, 247 were hijacking of aircraf t, and 77. vere 1:ornbings. Since nearly all of 25 these acts are usually perpetrated by indivicuals working n!ane, tt e ODM data base similarly underestimates the relevant group : /e, firn! L i enticlu: ton that le:: than 5 percent of the incidents involved more than 6 attackers and less than 1 percent involved more than 12 attackers is of questionable rnievance in a::es:ing the design basis threat to a nuclear power plant. (The BOM Ccrporation, ANALYSIS CF 30 CROUP SIZE, Vienna, Virginia,1975).
A more balanced approach has been followed in a Rond Corporatico rescrt done for the Nuclear Proliferatien and Safeguards Panel of the Office cf Techno!cgy Assessment.
" Current research at The Rand Corporation which involves a selected 35 number of events that are more c!csely ana!cgeu: to potential nuclear thef t er sabotage shows that groups of 3 to 6 are ecmmen, that larger groups cc appear, tnat a greco si:= of 12 doe: appear to be somewhat of an upper boundary although there are a few cases in mcdern industrialized societies ' United Kingccm, France, and United Stateshn
'40 wnich larger groups have been involved. More unportantly, the Rana re:carchers argue that une must be extr"meh cauticon in interpreting hi:tcrical data regarding the number of attacker: since the figures represent for the m est part what the perpe r-tor:, criminals or a
terrorists, pe.ceived to be nece::ary to acrun.c! en tncir mic:icn, and in 45 most cases what turned cut to ne sufficient. Io otner werd:, &cy came with a many as they needed to do the job, and no mere. The f act that mc:t came with a handf ul of por:an:, 3 to />, thu: ccc: not represent an upper limit on their capac Ly to mobihze pecple.
APPENDIX "3" (con.)
g
5 CEEMEG CeE 776e "Altnough the historical data nre useful as a guide, an Mtimate on the number of attackers is inescapably a matter of judgment. Without speaking in terms of a " maximum" threat, a cozen or so attackers would seem to be a prudent estimate. The term "a dozen or so" has 5
Seen encsen deliberately. We are not talking about a precise figure, but rather a range of anywhere from 7 to 8 to ahnut 15 To be more precise would imply some tyce of actuarial chart based upon concrete data that simply does not exist and a fal:e sence of precision. That is not to say that no group of adversarie cculd not truster more persons 10 if neecec, or even that this many would te needed to acecm;,lish the task. 'Prucent' is the key word here."
(i3rian Jenkins and Joseph Krafcheck, THE POTENTIAL NUCLEAR NCN-STATE ADVERSARY, Rand Corporation, Santa
- Monica, California, May 1977.)
15 As of this writing, the NRC cesign basis threat officially poctulated is stil! the "small group" of outsicers a:sisted by one " insider" at tne p! ant. From numerous conversations and internal memoranda of the NRC, it is clear that the NRC is Dosicallv proceeding with a 3-and-l design basis threat. Know!ccgcaDie cbeervers 20 were precicting that the NRC would upgrade this to a 6-and-2 scenario when it revised its reacter security regulations in the spring of 1977, but this did not cccur.
The group of experts convened by OTA (see paqe 2; hereinaf ter " January group")
g were in agreement that a more realistic design basis threat aq3 inst which nuc! car
,.7 25 f acilities shnuld be protected is a 12-and-3 scenario: 12 outsice attackers, and up to three incicers.
It should also be a:sumed that the out::ce attackers will be armed with more than long guns; since a commercially available AR-15 can be converted into a fully-automatic M-16 by fihng the-cam, the attackers can be expectec to nave automatic weapons, and given the tyce: of arms caches recently 30 ciscovered in California, heavier weapens including recoilecs rif!es, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and tne like cannot be excluded.
Tne Janut.
group was also in agreement that Lanchester equations ' mathematical models ceveloped curing Wor!c War I to predict battle results given the number of 35 attackers and cefencers) were not neces:arily the most apprcpriate models for engagements between a small group of heavily armed terrorists and a group of civilian security guards.
Use of suen matnematical moccis olaces too much emphasis on armed frontal assaults, which v>culd not be the bkely mode of attack i
on a nuclear plant. Terrcrists are much more likely to oce niversinnary techniques, i
40 multi-point penetration, deception and psycho!ccical warf are tecnniques to breach the cefenses of the f acility instead of sterming the fence, wea:cn: blacing. Fcr l
this reaccn, t:.c January group agrece th it 2'..prarda :hould be the :ecurity force for the cefense against sucn a 12-ond-3 ceci s basis tnrest. (:
.s intere:ung to note that Lrnchester equations yield 22 guard: in thi: in:tance.)
45
}
There was a:so consensus that the guarcs snou!:* have,,treng!y reinf orcec poirts of cefense suc9 as ccncrete bunkere, ficic-of-fire ;,cints, muteac cf "bu!!et-prcof" j
f ree-standing guarc shack:. They :houtc hat" firepower f ar in e s c's: of nctguns l
ano side-arms, and probably equivalent to.what the att ackers 'nay be excected to I
50 have.
i 15 l
APPENDIX "B"
(cen.)
l 1
6.CSENKN cet-776a The site s5culd be equipped with numerous arrays of physical barriers to slew down attackers, and all fixed systems snould incorporate " mystery and randemness" such as strobe lignts in entries, intense noise, cocrs leading nownere, etc.
5 Security procedures should be ecnstantly re-evaluated in lignt of new ceve!cpment not only in terms of increased security systems - tachncicgy improvement and more sophisticated strategies - but also in terms of changes in terrorist modes of operating both abrcad and domestically.
10 It was unanimously agreed that any response force that cannot arrive in fcree within ten minutes is irrelevant to any analysis of tne plant's defense capabilities.
In view of the f act (nat the NRC places heavy reliance on resconse ferees that now are en the scale of 3 sheriffs or policement arriving within 15 minutes with shotguns, and about 20 policemen withm 30 minutes armed with rifles, almost no 15 nuclear plants presently have meaningful outsice cefense f orces..
There was doubt on the part of the January grcup that any reli9nce should be placeo en response forces for plant security, since if there was any lesson gained from our ex;)erience in the Vietnam War, it was that the relief cctumn al. van gets 20 ambushed. In fact, the more isolated the plant site, ther f wcr the access roads, and the eas.er it is to set up such arnbushes. If. Can also be predicted that if the terrcrists a e at all sepnisticated, the response forces will probably have been diverted to some other location just before the pc..ctration of the nuclear power plant.
A majority of the January group also agreed that the NRC snould have an Inspectcr General Directorate with a capacility of constantly n!ack-hatting hcensees in order to test the cefense. Ncn-compliance should be penahzed with major penalties, not only fines of only 55,000 to 510,0CO, including f acihty license revocatien and 30 impriscnment or criminal fines against individuals f ailing to carry cut their responsibilities.
The guard forces should be ucgraded in terms of pay (current average pay is about 53.25 an nour) to $12,000 - $15,000 a year, with censicerably greater emphasis on 35 weapcns training.
In virtually all states at the present time, a nuclear plant security guard cannot kill an intruder unless he is defending his own li.fe. If he shocts someone mcunting the f ence, he is liable to the same punisnment under the law as any citi:en. Thus under 40 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3), the security organization is instructed to:
"fiv) Require guards or other armed response personne! *.o interpcse themselves between vital areas a J any adversary a** empting entry f or purposes of incustrial sacutage; and 45 Q
":v) instreet guarcs er other armed espnnse personnM M pre.ent er delay an act of incust.t al sacetage av :in;:t: :ng a suf 5c:cnt degree of force to counter that cegree of f:rce d. rect ed : t therr.. m:!ucing the use of cesc!y force unen there is ; enascancte ceilef it is 50 necessary in self-cefense er m the cefense of otners."
(42 FR 10810,24 Featuary 1977). APPENDIX "3"
(CCC-)
[
CSERiiWT cat 774a Thus a go.ird must "interpocr" Sunr. elf hetweern itm neversary nr.d the vital equipment and get the adversary to try to kt!! him before he is legally acle to use f atal fccce in resocnse. Whether Onwer: surn n: "sncot-to-kill" snoolc be in'.ested
-in civilian necurity forces under the centrol of private utilitie is a cccial decisicn 5
tnat must be made by legislative bccies af ter due ceticeration, but the present h
situation etintains vulnerabilitie from a security scint of view.
Backgroune inve:tigations on security guar:tc should also be strengthened to the equivalent of a full-field ("U" clearance) investigation.
Since these recommendations go far beycnd what the NRC has comtnitted to in its 10 recently p.omulgated (February 24, 1977, Maren 17,1977,' and July 5, 1977,
regulations, presently existing and prcpc:cd NRC requ!ations regarding the pnysical protection of nuclear plants do not in my opinion. of fer as:urance that saboteurs cannot gain access to the interior of 3 plant.
The pnysical security of a nuclear plant is seriously compecmised if any " insiders",
15 particularly within the plant security force, are involved in any sa:ctage cperation.
Just one security guard can render the plant wide cpen to any numccr of intrucers without cetection.
Because of the !cgal dif f.culties inherent ;n psychological testing and evaluation or use of sciygracn te:ts to cetect oc:::Dic internal cefectors, it is not clear that this problem can < ver ba solvnd. Any employee who 20 is at all vulnerable to blackmail because of qnenbling debts, menetary prob! cms, sexual predilections or atypical life style could be utilized by a grcup intent en sabotaging a reactor. Unle:s a licen:ce i: prepared to intrude on plant employees' i
privacy to an extent as yet untested in the courti, no atsurance can Oc given that h
"insicers" may not de a significant cabotage threat, either wur<ing en their cwn or 25 in ecllaboration with outsiders.
7here are already numercu: instances of cisaf fected employaes indulging in small acts of r.anorage at operating nuclear reactors; at the nuclear plant nearest my home, there have alreacy been 13 such incidents, plus 3 bomb threats that are celieved to na've been mace ay members of the plant security force.
30 The insicer threat is partially a que: tion cf motivation, however, which I wi!! cover below in Part Four.
tI APPE:; DIX "3" (con.)
l E CSETI.CiiT cf ::.- 7 7,.n PART FOUR: f.10TIVATIONS OF lif MENTIAL SAGOTEURS The nuc! car industry has not generally taken the potantialit y nf reactor sabetaca seriously. Most of the of ficials regard thair pechlems as largely the dif ficulty of g
complying with vague and ambiguous NRC rne;ulations, not of protecting the p! int U
5 against a threat they perceive to exist. The Rann Coran.ation researchers askec one directcr of security at a nuclear plant nat he reqarced as the biggest threat to his f acility; his reply was, "A dedicated arut determinec band of NRC im.p ec tors."
Some persons have speculated that organized crime would be interested in sabotage 10 of nuclear f acilities. I find this highly unlikely. Similarly I doubt that in peacetime foreign intelligence agents and saboteurs would be likely tu try to commit such acts.
The two principal groups most likely in my opinion to carry out sabotage attempts against nuclear reactors are (1) disgruntled employees and (2) terrorist groups.
15 Terrorists generally use violence or the threat of violence in order to gain publicity and cause fear. By doing so, they seek to influe nce people who would otherwise ignore them. Terrorists usually have little political cr military strength, so their terrorist acts are deliberately designed to he as alariton as possible. Thanks to wnrid-wide television and real-time news coverage, they have access to an 2t]
enormous population of witnesses.
If one defines " major terrcrist activities" as involving f atalities or the hold! g of a governenent of ficial hn :tage (and excludinq nnn-fatal airinie hijackings and planting of small bombs), then the trend of terrorist incice nts around the world is upward, as Figure e taelow indicates.
FIGURE A
40 u,
0 30 Q
o
- u. 20 O
T
'i 310
),
e 9
9 9
19e3 1969 1970 1971 197:
1973
': 97 1975 1976 MAJOR TERRCHIST !NC!! ENTS j
M _.._
t
.tCEE 3..--,n, sv t a cue-776a The que: tion hun arisen as to whether terrori:Lu are likel;. to begin attacking nuclear facilities. In a study commissioned by the NRC, tne MITRE Corpcration repcrted in 1975 that:
}
"There are active terrorist organizatinns in manv countries that have nuclear facilities of their own, often of AsnertCan de :ign. Thus large numbers of incivicuals in these countries know the cetaris cf the design anc operation of certain types of Amertenti nuclear pnwer plants.
" Terrorist groups with cub:tantial capabilities are to be found in Latin America, the Middle East, Eurcpe, anc Japan. These groups can, and 10 frequently cc, interact.
They use each other's v eapcns, training facilities, intelligence, money, and personnel. In addition, they have contacts with national intelligence agencies particularly thoce from the Soviet-Cuban bloc. It is not difficult to imagine that sucn organications could recruit members with any needed engineering, scientific, er 15 military ski!!s. They have no dif ficulty in acquiring wnstever portable' weapons they find useful.
"All of this must be coupled with the coenness of cur borders and the contacts and recources some foreign terroriet groups have in this country through students and other foreiqn nationala living here..
20 Terreri:t groups may find themselves in political positions where they feel they have nothing to lo:e by an
- act, no matter how outrageous... Terrori:ts might sabotage a nuclear f acility a: nn act of
.}
vengeance.
Alternatively, they miqnt attack and' onin centrol of a nuclear f acili t y, and hold it nost aqo to rW:truction ur.les: certain 25 cemands were met. Tnece groups are certainly aware of the power which any sort of nuclear action wouli! give thern. fly the strange logic of the world in sthich we live, it might 3!*.o maka thern heroes to a substantial segment of te werld, particularly if the target were the United States. Tnis is certainly a type of threat wnich chou!c Oc taken 30 very seriously."
(Matre Corpnration, THE THRCAT TO LIG NSID NUCLEAR F ACILITIES (MTR-7022), Septemt:er,1975, pp.137-138.)
The MITRE report regards unknown terrorist groups as equally dangercus as known covert organications.
35 "Both types of groups often like to start cperation in a vay which i
crows world puolicity.
Such an"cperation rnight involve a licen:cd nuclear f acility in the United State:. This wcu!c involve long and cetailed planning but... history is replete with examples of dramatic initial oceration: by in: urgent crgnnaration: whuce existence w a:
40 previou::y unknown to their acversaries...
g "The only prudent prediction is that there will ccctinue to be
'17 international coerations ::y most of the cresent!s active terrorist crgansrations tnrcugncut the wor!c; that new ene: wi!! :::r:ng into e xist ence, cemetimes withcut warnina before tncir fir:t dramatic 05 strik e, and that some of the:e groun:, cre.en bv iceclagy, need fer politien! leverage on the United States, or crepern:.cn, many chocse the Unitec States, anc pernaps bcensed nuc!ene f acthtie:, as a target."
- B
- 0., pp.139-140).
i gt ua.-
o a., -,
,CSE?iR.W cet-776a The NRC enneluded, in proniulgating its uccurity ruijulations in February of 1977 that "On the basis of intelligence and other relevant inferrnation available to tre NRC there are no known aroups in this ccunt.y ha ving the 5
e "nbir.ation of motivation, ski!!, and recource: to attack... a nuclear power reactor."
G2 F.R.10836, 24 February 1977).
Inasmuch at the first knowledge of the existence of many successful terrorist gecups was simultanecus witn their first terrorist operation, the NRC's evaluation 10 is slightly cptimistic. Simply because you have rn evidence of the existence of a terrcrist grcup is no a:surance tnat you are nnt tihnut to become the victim of an attack. Terrorists generally co not ring up in advance.
It is correct that although there nave been nearly 300 reenrded threats or incidents of vi !ence at nuclear facilities in the United Stetes. there have been few serious 15 incicents at nuclear power plants so far. Tne mont serious was a $10 millien fire at tne Indian Pnint nuclear plant on November 4,1971, caused by an arsenist wno was a fccmer employee of the ecmpany.
In Augu:t 1971 an intruder enterec the premises of the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant and woundec a nignt watchman.
Generally most of the incidents have been bomb threats or acts of low-level 20 sabotage.
In South America,15 members of the People's Revolutinnary Army cized a nuc! car
@4 plant under construction at Atucha, 62 miles nnrth of Buenns Aires on Mr,ren 25, 1973. They overran tne guarcs, stole weapons, painted slogans en tnc wa!!s, but did relatively little damage.
25 in Europe, hnwever, nuclear terrcrist incidents have inerenced markedly in the last few years. On May 3,1975, the Fe senheon nuclear pnwer plant in France was damaged by two bernbs planted by tne Meinhof Ruig Antien Group. Tne reacter at tne time did not centain any fuel.
A month later, a Demo was set off at Framatome's rnain ecmcuter center in Courbevuir, destroying half the input 30 terrninais. A seccnc bomb camaged the vaive testing shcos at Fraratame's f actcry in Argenteuil.
Tne Carmencia-Angelo Luther Ccmmanco group tock credit for these bemoings. In August of that year, two bombs were set of f at the Mt. D'Arree nuclear plant in France, camaging equipment anc causing t' e plant to ::e shut cown.
In November 1976, a very camaging bomb blast occurred in Paris at the of fices of 35 Cerca, a nuclear fuel manofacturer; a group called CCPE '.U claimec credit, and fc!!cwed up a week later with two bemos at the Margnac uraniurn mine that caused
$2 million camage anc ?ut the mine out of actinn for about two months.
In West Cermany, there have been dernunstraticon at noch.:ir plant.tt ee, inclucing cne where the pclice had to use tear gas and water cannons on JCCC cemenstraters 40 armed with Mclotov cocktails and otner weapons. In Swacen, a as-pound cynamite bcmb was fcunc next to the Rincnals nuclear reactern; the note, signed "M" said h-
"This is the last.varning. Next tiine we will level the stat;on to the grcunc."
APPENDIX "3"
(con.)
20
5-.CE8Fl?CCT Cat-776a Since c; occition to nuclear ::ower is mere crganize d in Europe than in the United States, these events may prove to be ::recurscrs of sienilar actiuties here in the
.. United States, particularly if direct acticn again: nuclear power comes to e :een as the on:y ef fective method of attackieg t hr-riue!"ar. itirlustry Oy, ecple 5
disillusionec witn wnat they view as meaning!acs and biased preceedings before Atemic Safety and Licencing Guard and Public utility Commissicns.
Whether or not tarrerist groups, either ' dome: tic nr imported, will ccme to siew-
. nuclear pov.er plants as dearable target: for sabotage cerend: largely ene one's assessment of the mctivation of terrcrist:.
Some propie have argued that 10 terrorists are not really interested in killing large nur-bor: cf neople. I tend to agree. Tnere have been few terrorist acts that have actually killed more than a few dozen people. In 1925, a bomb set of f at tne Cathecral in Sofia, Bulgaria killed 128 persons. !n 1946, 91 people were killed by a bomb set of f in the King David Hctel in Jeru:alem by the Irgun.
(It is ironic tn note that recently the man 15 re:pensible for that particular incident wa: wined and cined st the White Hou e by the President of the Unitec State ).
The most recent incident of mas: murder occurred in-late 1976 wnen anti-Ca:tro Cuban: killed 73 persons accard a Cucana Airlincs jet by placing a bomb aboard.
Generally terrorists have not set out to kill large number: of people. They are far 20 mere interested in hastage situations involving heavy co es of publicity. A nuclear power plant that has been seized and rigep il with explucive: that will csu:e a meltcown is preci:ely the sort of target that fulfills these requirements.- The taking of incian Pcint 1,2,3 would be a media event without parallel.
Ine justaposition of the worcs " terror:st" and "nuc! ear" ha: an especially. synergistic 25 ef f ect, probaciy exceeding any pos:ible threat froen tosins in the water supply cr other mass threats save detcnation of a nuclear device.
But aside from the dif ficulty of diserting special nuclear material and then fabricating a nuclear cevice, there is the whole question of crecibility of such a tnreat. Numerous nuclear bomb threats ht,v" heen mada and evaluated as beit'g 30 fal c.
Corsicerable ef fort is necessary On t"e part cf a "nuc! car bamcer" to convince autherttte: that he does in f act hu se the Opeci.il nuclear material and tnat the cecign of his device is such that it will go of f.
The sabeteurs who seice a nuclear power plant have nu Ouch prcblem. A!! they need to cc is call the mecia and say, "If you don't believe us, r:ng us back in the centrcl 35 rcom at tha nummer listed in the power coinpany's phone cirectcry." When they answer the return call, they have instarit credibility.
There is some evidence that terrorists evaluate ri:k var:u: the decrea of panic that their activities wi!! sncuce, tencing to stick with opportunitia";.nsn!ving low r::k but producirg maximum le e!s of fear in large number: af peuple. Jucged in these I.0 terms, reacter sabetage stancs out as a low-ri::4, hign-yiele act:en.
21 APPCIDIX "B"
(cen.i
h-. N b h CSC.7768 Given the f act that it would be extremely dif ficult for authoritin: to evacuate the large pcpulation trat woulc be ewooted if tho s3boteurs carried out their threat to cause a reactor meltdown, an extremely lart:e Grcup of inscluntary Mc:tauca, would be created.
We have no previous esperience with such situations, and few 5
guicecosts to help us.
I hase discussed elsewhere the pr blems nssociated w"h evacuatione arcund nuclear plants and the nume.ous in'tances wnere mock drills revealed serious gaps in carrying cut simu atad evacuat on esercices. ("Do Net Co Cent:e Into Tnat Radiatinn 7cn=", RUI I.F T!N CF !! E A T C.11C FCIEN FISTS, November 1975, pp. 45-47.) 'I doubt a succes:ful evacuation could be carried out.
10 Mcst evacuation planning focuses cnly nn arean of rnennnsinlity and means of communication. Little attention has been paid to developinq policie: with respect to irnplementing evacuation plans, particular!v in hoctage Situation: involving large numbers of people. Tne State of California's Of fice of Emergency Services nas procuced a plan entitled " Nuclear Glackmail, or Nur! car Threat Emergency 15 Respense Plan for the State of California", dated Oncembnr 1976. It coc: not, however, a.'!dre:: such que:tions as: What are the ba:n: on which officials must l
cecide wnether to evacuate a large population in tne f ace of a nuc! car threat?
Are public of ficials liable if they fai,1 to creer an evacuation? Are they liable if they cc orcer it and people are injured as a result? Who pays for fcoc, shelter, lost 20 time. etc., unen large numbers of pecple are evacuated?
Given the indeterminacy of the:e problems, terrorists wna rigged a reactor for sabotage would be able to make extraordinary cemancs, either political or menetary. Safe incide the control room, they are in enenmand of events and can cictate the terms they wish. Even if the nuc! car plant i: in an unpcoulated remote h
25 area, the owner may not be willing to see a one or two billion cc!!ar inve:tment written of f. '
Given the above argument:, it seems irresponsib!c to me for the NRC to write of f reactor sabotage as a higly unlike!y event, it seein: endly irreapon:icle for licensees seek ng to operste nuclear plant: not to in:pinmont the cert of strict 30 security measures I outlinec in Part Three. Yet mo:t utilitie: would talk at the icea cf having five chif ts of 24 security guard: at 3!'t.CO'! a sear each. The total Of 51,8C0/'00 in salarie: alone would be ccncidered unaccen:,7nie, een tncugn it. wculd be only a m -rginal incremental increase in the cost of e!cetricity procuced.
(For two C"O megawatt units, assuming tne reacter: ran at the 57.34% capacity 35 facter averaged by presently cperating We:tinghcure reacters in the U.
S.
l (cumulative-to-cate ave. age, weighted by plant :ize), the adit;onal coct would be l
C.19 mi!!s per kilowatt-hour, about
.,a half nf con percant increase). ( For Westinghou:e data, see Table a at the end of this t":.t unonyL Prctection of the olant against. " insiders" intnot en ermitticq cahntage is mere
(
40 ci f ficul t.
Cr.e nnelcar plant hn, in:talled a enmpnt oriero are"= cont rol sy stem to I
tre vital carety systems in its plant, so that each operm or nornor: rec to ccen cocrs j
in the vital area inserts a cceed magnetic core in a car d-rnader that is controlled g
by a ecmputer in the security control center. The cane even: only if tre c erater is l
prconriy autnerized to cpen that decr.
The cut cuter can ce re-:regramed 05 instantly tc bar access to that individual if the ca ",nuter s cws a serias Of
- u:picious door opening: not connected with rout.me iriepretico and maintenance.
l 1
APPCDIX "3" (con.)
[
,o
- .CEE M M C cec.776a Snma nor lear plant owners nave rejected such svstam, en tha grounes (nnt they entnoro nisr the safety of the plant, particularly if the enret; uter f ails or the electric supply to the system is interrupted.
( The T., tern also can be readily compromised ay the security guard wno programs the c-ticuter).
5 This.s symptomatic of wnst many nucleri plant eenigners f ar l is the crucia! aspect of crotectieg s:P.a! safety systems agarnst schotagr. To ttm esten: tnat ene makes it dif ficu!!.o gain cccess to the equioment to sabotrige ::. one makes it dif facult to gain access t.' repair it or check it in emergency si t un t inne..
5-curity protectico l
systems co ald prevent a minor accicent frorn Deing controlled before it escalated 10 into a majcr accident.
There is at:ia the additional hazard that frequent screening of plant employees for security lovalty and suspicious activities may produce a backlash and cause the very activities the security program is cesignec against. No one 1:kes being spied upcn. Some nuclear industry spckesmen have warned that qualified people will not 15 work uncer such conditions, and that this in itself wi!! lead to a diminution of safety.
1 I
3 i
l l
i 3
i i
23 APPENDIX- " - ". (con.)
3
l l
E CSEV PM Ce s 776a CCNCLUSICNS CN $ ABCIACE "To > valuate the risk resulting from sabotaca of a given target h
objecta nly. we must know the f ol!nwinq f actor : ':) tho !ikahncud tnat sacetage wili ::e attemotec.
(2) :ne suscepti::lity of the target to 5
sacotage, and (3) ne consecuences of successful abotage. Relia 0!e m e t ".o d s have not Deen covelnped for prod ction the itkelihcod of attack. Tnus judgments of the :ericusne.. of tha thee,t mu:t ce based on perception and intuition. The latter two f actor:, susceptibility and ccnsecuences, are amenable to anc!vsis."
10 (Nuclear Fuel Cycle Program Staf f, " Safety and Security of Nuclear Power Reactors to Acts of Sabctage", NUCLEAR SAFETY, Vol.17, No.
6, November-Cecember 1976, p. M A).
In Part One of this testimony, I hone attempted to show that the ccnsequences of sabotage-initiatec reactor accicents are extremely large.
They are suf ficiently 15 la.ge to mai<e reactor sabotage a societal risk as great as that of the exp!ccion of a nuclear weepen.
In Parts Two and Three, I evaluated the susceptibility of nuc!nar power plants to sabotage, and found that tne dif ficu' ties have been overestimatad and the security measures taken to prevent such sabctage incidents are too minimal to prevent them 20 f rom taking place.
)
In Part Four. I hav? tried to snow that although the likelihcod that sabotage of nuc! ear pcwer plants will ce atte rpted is an ewrci:e in jocgement a: to the motivaticns of terrorists and cisgruntled empimens. enough is known ahcut the medes of c;)eratien of terrorists to be aole tu prcctet that targets of cpoortunity 25 tnat hase a Icw cegree of risk and a high cecrae of-publicity value are tne mest hkely to be selected. In view of the facts set fortn to ParP, r'ne through Three, reacter sa::ctage would seem to rank quite high on the li of potantra! *.argets.
Guestiens may te raised a: te why I nave acproacned thr: nret:em in a: much detat!
asIhase. Sor e may argue tnat by reveahnc; tne gravity of t'a prco!em, I may ::e 30 making a self-fulfilling pecphecy. I am well aware of this rt:k. The informat:cn ecntained in tnic testimony, however, is alrear'y wolf known tn large number: of people in tne nuclear industry and the Nuclear Reculatory Ccmmi mon. It has been withneld fr;,m other public of ficials wno must make pahey cecisions about the sitinc anc c,peration of nuc! car power plants. I fnianr. they ahn has e acce:s to the 35 inf ormatien I hase given here, tney will ce unable to as:e:: :ne ri: :. and cetermine wrether tne puclic shculd incur it.
Fina!!y. ! beh eve
.ot ju:t as Ted Taylcr's puhhnntuirm on the cano of con:!ruct;ng nuclear ces.ce have lec to unprovec categuarc: f ar :;w.;al nuclone material and a greater uncerstanding of the cargers of nucl ear orchieratico, a fuller c:scu::icn of 40 reacter :abatage and its actential consequences will force improvement of security measures te maxe it mere ::sf ficult.
APPENDIX "B"
(cen.)
~ ~.
DAVID DINSMORE COMEY'S CUALIFICATIt.'MC AS AN EXPERT WITNESS FOR DISCOVERY OF APPLICANT'S SECURITY PLAN In his deposition, Mr. Cemey established that he was qualified as an expert witness on security matters under the guidelines of ALAB-410:
1.
Mr. Comey reviewed security plans under the terms of a protective order in 1974, inspected plant facilities, participated in negotiations of an in camera settlement agreement with respect to Donald C. Ccok, Units 1 and 2, nuclear plant.
(Depositions of David Dinsmore Comey, July 5, 1978, (hereafter " depo."] p. 6, 1.
23 -- p.
8, 1.
17).
2.
Mr. Comey reviewed the security plans under the terms of a protective order in 1973, inspected faciltties on the security plan for Zion, Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304.
(Depo. p.
8,
- 1. 18-23).
In reference to the relevant regulations applicable to that proceeding, Mr.
Comey was qualified as a "2.733 expert".
(Depo. p.
10, 1.
- 1).
He was examined by voir dire at the beginning of the i.2 camera proceeding, (Depo. p. 10,
- 1. 8-10), and ultimately was qualified by the Chairman to c'onduct cross-examinst on:
" Alright, the Board will rule.
Mr. Comey will be permitted to cross-exami.no in arean i ndica t< <i b,
his counsel.
That, of course, will ice subject to
~
control of his counsel."
(Cepo.
p.
11, 1.
12-15).
APPENDIX
- C
3 Mr. Comey has testified on security plant matters in 1. camera sessions before the Advisory Committee on 3
Reactor Safeguards on a number of occasions.
(Depo., p.
14,
- 1. 19 -- p.
15, 1. -1).
4.
Mr. Comey participated in numerous meetings with members of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, who were conducting a special study to determine what safeguards levels the NRC ought to impose; safeguards including physical security plans for nuclear power plants.
(Depo. p.
15, 1.
19 -- p.
16,
- 1. 24).
Mr. Comey participated in a special review grcup on physical security and safeguards against terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities established by the office of Technology Assessment for the purpose of going over a repgre on that subject that had been prepared by the Rand Corporation.
(Depo.,
p.
20,
- 1. 10 -- p.
21, 1.
24).
Mr. Comey was a member of the Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards Advisory Panel of that group.
(Depo., p.
22, 1.
5-6).
5.
Mr. Comey is currently writing a report on physical security and potentiality of nuclear sabotage cf nuclear power plants, and has been participating in that work for the past nine months.
(Depo. p.
2'3,
1.
15-17).
6.
Mr. Cemey is familiar with the relevant literaturc on security matters, particularly with the implementation et 10 C.F.R. 573.55, (Depo., p.
24, 1.
12-18) cnd has copics cf NUREGS 0 20 7, 0419, C220 (Depo.,
p.
25, 1.
3-6).
mme.. e.. w\\
7.
Mr. Comey made an extensive review of the literature on security systems in preparation for his deposition.
A list of those materials was attached as Intervenor Exhibit 2 to the deposition, and as Exhibit 1 to-Intervenor's Pet tion for Immediate Order.
(See Exhibit "A" of Intervenor's Appeal of September 22, 1978.)
8.
Mr. Comey is familiar with the qualifications and requirements, which were promulgated in 1974, for guards for nuclear plants.
(Depo., p.
2 6,,
1.
18-22).
9.
Mr. Comey is familiar with current rescarch being conducted in the field of, security systems, both by the contractors for ERDA and NRC, and groups such as Sandia Laboratories, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oakridge i.
National Laboratory, the Rand Corporatton, BUM Corporation, and Mitre Corporation.
(Depo.,
p.
27,
- 1. 22 -
p.
23, 1.
14.)
10.
Mr. Comey is familiar with the use of f4 alt-tree analysis in the development and identificatio'n of vital systems.
Ile was able to describe the methodoiogy of fault-tree analysis and what factors should be taken into account in such an analysis.
("You would f,irst start off with what device or devices or types of devices you would use in crder to initiate a rupture in the pri: nary coolant pipe, what sort of mechanical or explosive devices were necessary, then consider such questions as portability, access, acw many APPENDIX "C"
(con.)
c
~-
persons would be needed, what routes they would use to gain access to the pipe, what entries they would come through, et cetera, et cetera.")
(Depo., p.
29, 1. 14-21.)
11.
Mr. Comey was retained by the California Energy Commission as an expert witness and conducted a fault-tree analysis on breach of physical security for a nuclear plant.
(Depo., p. 29, 1. 22 -- p.
30, 1.
d6).
Mr. Comey incorporated this analysis into testimony on sabotage considerations of the Sundesert plant in testimony delivered July 19, 1977, before the California Energy Ccmmission.
A copy of Mr.
Comey's testimony in that proceeding is attached as Intervenor Exhibit 1 to the deposition, and is attached as Exhibit 2 to Intervenor's Petition for Immediate Order.
(See Exhibit A of Intervenor's Appeal of September 22, 197d.)
12.
Mr. Comey was able to describe scme currently available' perimeter detection systems, including microwave systems, seismic systems, magnetic systems, electrcmagnetic systems, all in some detail.
(Depo., p.
30, 1.
11 -
p.
32,
- 1. 9.)
13.
Mr. Cemey has spent a great deal of time instructing others in the use of hand-held arm. amends.
(Depo.,
p.
33, 1.
17-19).
14.
Mr. Comey effectively described the ; uruvue ef security at a nuclear plant:
"To prevent either an :ntruder APPE:iDIX "C"
(con.)
. ~
l or insider from comprcmising an-, of the safety systems such that a release of radioactivity to the environment could occur."
(Cepo., p.
34, 1.
24 -- p. 35, 1.
- 1).
He is 1
familiar with the defense in depth concept as applied to physical security.
("Sasically you have an isolation tone and you have a perimeter defense, and you have a vital area defense, and then within the vital area you have various other administrative and physical configurations designed to prevent acts of sabotage or of damage from taking place.")
(Cepo.,
p.
35,
- 1. 12-16).
15.
Mr. Cemey is familiar with practical considerations to be considered in the site of a guard force:
("One way of doing it is to use Lanchester equations.
Simply to postulate a certain attack force
")
(Depo., p.
36, 1.
24 -- p.
37,
- 1. 11).
Mr. Cemey knew what a central and secondary alarm station was.
He knew the minimum number of guards required for the protection of a nuclear power reactor.
(Depo., p.
37,
- 1. 12 -- p.
38, 1.
6).
Mr. Cemey described what protection should be provided for site specific information related to security systems.
("First of all, it ought to be kept under physical security.
It should probably be kept in the confines of the security force".
.")
(Ocpo.,
p.
38, 1.
23 -
p.
39, 1.
5).
He is able to identify criteria :nat he would use to identtfy vital equipment areau :.n a nuclear power plant.
(Ocpo.,
p.
39, 1.
20 -- p.
40, 1.
- 7).
ApFENDIX "C"
(cen.)
16.
Finally, Mr. Comey clearly understands that the function of a security expert in this-case is to determine wnether or not the' security plan for this facility. complies.
-with the regulations of the Commissicn...(Depo.,
p.
41, 1.
1-3).
l i
i i
i i
I 4
I
{
APPENDIX "C" teen.)
t