ML20024G756

Proposed Tech Specs,Including Pages 3.3/4.3-3,3.3/4.3-4 & 3.3/4.3-10

ML20024G756
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	09/22/1972
From:	NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20024G754	List: ML20024G753 ML20024G755 ML20024G756
References
NUDOCS 9104290333
Download: ML20024G756 (9)

Text

_ -

puppy s.-91: :.a-z . .m. -1 ; n- + 4 q > e N.- - + .

k

' i mi-: Q y ? i"G : -

_ , . .a G b - t- _

- v Q 3 . = 'L y'

4 , "'

4. -5 py y .

.g y . r .

3 7; 4 y (* T r. t

@g o , . f F

• u ~~p PJ +

b0 00 OU 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 1.0 4

SURVEILIANCE REQUIRD4ENTS 00 Fu ON UIPJ 00

.pg (b) when the rod is withdrawn the crJnJ first time subsequent to each re-

$ fueling outage, observe discern-ible response of the rmelear in-strumentation. liowever, for initial rods when response is not discernible, subsequent exercising of these rods after the reactor is critical chall be performed to observe nuclear instrumentation response.

2. The control rod drive housing 2. The control rod drive housing support sys-support system u.all be in place tem shall be inspected after reassembly during reactor power operation and awl the results of the inspection recorded.

when the reactor coolant system is pressurized above atmospheric pres- ' .5. k) To e e us , o, n r,re Foo Wear /7, mein erna ae ts, sure with fue1 in Lhe reactor vcsseL, '"E D'*'**"' *Y** N * Y CL " "##*M'OE unless all operable control rods are (/) Tsir coNr tloc A00 m/s ru o a nniec tsaQ ure,e a t-o n rwa fully inserted and Specification R,o O nr.w Mon one o c AR

3. 3. A.1 i s met. COM PUTE R GMMLL QE VM R S P IMD As g en t e e r.

' ~+

3 (a) .,1 n-

.1 ,-

c d , + ' - - - -

4 - -

.u.

. i .

,.1 11 ;e 5 t -im u a s_ .t ,g, '_ -

a _a

_: c , ._

__m..

- +1 .e

___i 1 : __

. - 4

.;; . i

,,;c_ _-

uw _=a=.

'-- 4 - ' . . , -

7- . .w cs, 4 _ > . m,, .

Cn ~ree t goo iv ,r u p A 4 wdt S EO u r *e 's (o. d. To e gea hicnye M s urnos ca paran aN.tous

'm sg t at cars a tosnso =so rar rue o

• A s er es rie. rest unnte aE cueenssrvery M A),It%'P1 L Altul AYED R E n c rou!Tr' Yt. Y c?n e t erto.

5.5/4.5 '4 --a n COULO BE ADDSO 6P DRD Pe u r or Amy l'f f I) W O P E R A N k u Ne I A T 10M or THE 77 sn e s trien sqRch or sr t us r ons our-cr-I Alc kE P1Ervr or ANY ONE conrGot 6 LADE GEQUENCE C 6 at Y A C L ROO sly S A OH VucLy stit L L No r' MAKE rHC CORE MOR E YNA N gqy g gg y y, gyggL gg

/. S *& a A S U PER c R trff L.

gyg g , g, gg.

S E QUEnt e E O o stTR O L RCD OE YONY T ff t nuesa ra n ns r.

3.0 LIMITITE CONDITION 3 FOR OPERATION h.0 SURVEILIANCE REQUIRH4 FLIT 3 3 (b) Whenever the reactor is in the 3.( 1) 1r rue Ec o Wonrn Manantzer is ><vo e s n n s e e startup or run mode below 1(Tj, W IL E THE R EA CTOR ts IN THE S TARYvP cg NO CO NTRO L ROD S SNA rated thermal power, ^

BC HOVED U N LESS 'TH E e 3D ~ ; t 1 -

kyy M ga g g gLo w /f % ggyED rpgA m M GM'

^ --il

_ s E'co WenTH NoNmo tEg  :: _ _

~ ' ' -! ,

^-  ; THE cSECOMO IND EPKNCEN T D P E CILA Td t OR

~ ? 5 '^ ^' "'"

13 OPERABLE eg A 2Econry gNCINCC R SHALL VGQ97Y VMAT ALL RCD '

Ine DEPEND EMr organten og " Y s: 'I' ^':i that the 9 , , 7, gg y g m y- mng 7g qqmy,y ENGs'IEER FER a rass gperator at the reactor console j is following the control rod W I Tet D E At4/A L OF C 4 C. H R60 G MtJ P .

program. 4 r

4. Control rods shall not be withdrawn 4. Prior to control rod withdrawal for for startup or refueling unless at startup or during refueling verify least two source range channels have that at least two cource range an observed count rate equal to or channels have an observed count rate l greater th:in three counts per second. of at least three counts per second.

5 Whenever the Engineer, Nuclear; deter- 5 Whenever the Engineer, Nuclear, deter-mines that a limiting control ro:1 minec that a limiting control rod pattern pattern exists, withdrawal of desig- exists, an instrument functional test '

nated control rods shall be permitted of the REM shall be performed prior to enly when the FPM system is operable, withdrawal of the designated rod (s) and daily thereafter.

l .

i i

l l

5.5/h.5-4 TS TT

.ry G k h~

0 ' '*

n

,$ n u a .&w w E{.

4'y' 2 ..- Nw@.1 + , 4 K UT? r * ~ :' .

7 _ ;u ^ ".a.';p ' Q W%* , , . i y ;f y v f ^

' ' ' Exhibit 'B (Continued)

, sm_.. ht g

e ,

Bases Continued 3 3 and 4.3 Section 6.5.3. This support is not required if t he reactor coolant system is at atmospheric pressure since there would then be no driving force to rapidly eject a drive housing.

Additionally, the support is not required if all control rods are fully inserted since the reactor would remain suberit,1 cal even in the event of complete ejection of the strongest control rod.

,,(Ru,m,a ..ar m s ; ,e es rr o .quencer rior to initial operation of the unit to limit the reactivity w u s of contr al g

rods in the cor and together with the integral rod velocity limiters, lir'u potential re-tetivity insertion - h that, the results of a control rod drop acciden will not exceed a naximum fuel energy con t of 280 calories / gram. Ref. Sections 7 f.2, 14.6.2, and 14.8.1.

MAR. The peak fuel energy  ;

ntent of 280 cal /gm is below the iergy content at which rapit ruel dispersal and primary synt damage are as::umed to oce .

Une specified sequences are characterizi. by homor . -ous, scattered patterns of control rod aithdrawal. The maximum rod worths encount m in these patterns are presented in Figure 5-3-4 & 3-3-5 of the FSAR. When the core ' at ted temperature and greater than about IT, af rated power, there are no possible . Vorths wh.. , if dropped at the design rate of the telocity limiter, 5 feet /see, coult esult in a peak fu enthalpy of 280 cal /cm. Thus, requirinC operation of the RWM ow lOf, rated power is con _- vative.

Che Rod Worth Minimize provides automatic supervision to assure th out of sequence contrt i rods will not be wi idrawn or inserted; i.e. , it limits operator deviat ns from planned althdrawal setr .ces. Ref. Section 7.') PSAR. It serves as a back-up to pro < ural control af control sd worth. In the event that t.ne Rod Worth Minimiser 13 out cf ser- , when require , a licensed operator or other qualified technical employee can manually fu. ill th.

2e ' .01 rod pattern conforr ance functions of the Rod Warth Minim 1:er. In this case, tn. or n1 n -i .a. a i ao s., 4 o >n.. . n -, + , 4. c._._

j

h. The Source Range Manitor (SRM) system performs no automtic saf ety system function; i. e., it has no scram function. It does provide the operator with a visual indication of neutron level.

This is needed for knowledceable aid efficient reactor ;tartup at low neutron levels. The 3.3/4.3-10 84 r

y _ _ww -= _

it B ued

• ~ Replace the deleted portion of the previous page (page 84) with the following words:

4 "3 The Ibd Worth Minimizer restricts withdrawals and insertions of control rods to those

! listed in prespecified control rod sequences which are established such that the maximum calculated worth of any control rod increment prior to withdrawal will not make the core more than 15% a k supercritical. 'Ihese sequences are developed to limit the reactivity worths of control rods in the core and together with the integral rod velocity limiters limit potential reactivity insertion such that the results of a control rod drop accident will not exceed a maximum fuel energy content of 280 calories / gram. The peak fuel energy content of 280 cal /gm is below the energy content at which rapid fuel dispersal and pri-l mary system damage are assumed to occur. The philosophy of developing a con' rol rod withdrnwal sequence, the associated rod worths, and the consequences of a control md g

drop accident for such a rod pattern are discussed in General Electric 'Ibpical Report NEDO-10527, "Ibd Drop Accident Analysis for Inrge Botlia; Water Beactors," Fhrch,1972.

! The Hod Worth Minimizer provides automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence control rods will not be withdrawn or inserted, i.e., it limits operator deviations from planned withdrawal sequences. Ibf. Section 7 9 FSAR. It serves as an independent backup of the nomal withdrawal procedure followed by the operator. In the event that the INM is out of service, when required, a second independent operator or engineer can ennually fulfill the operator-follower control rod pattern confomance function of the ."MM. In this case, an extra measure of procedural contml is exercised in that all control rod positions are verified after the withdmwal of each group, prior to pmceeding

• to the next group."

i 4

m

l $ 4 $w2 g, -3 3 q ffh, Y y Y;&?b 7 -y -

W e .. .- .t; _n f,.  ; f, .:p

~

fg j  ; -, > t. -j r _

- ; . ,(,

, , ,, g -4 g p  ;

3,. ,,

l .

' : fg Bases Cbntinued 3 3 and 4.3:

A. Reactivity Limitations l

1

, 1. Reactivity margin - core loading l

The core reactivity limitation is a restriction to be applied principally to the design of new fuel which may be loaded in the core or into a particular refueling pattern. Satisfaction of i the limitation can only be demonstrated at the time of loading and must be such that it will apply to the entire subsequent fuel cycle. The generalized form is that the reactivity of the core loading will be limited so the core can be made suberitical by at least R + 0.25% Zsk in ggg the most reactive condition during the operating cycle, with the strongest control rod fully withdrawn and all others fully inserted. The value of R in % a k is the amount by which the core j reactivity, at any time in the operating cycle, is calculated to be greater than at the time of

! the check; i.e., the initial loading. R must be a positive quantity or zero. A core which con-l tains temporary control or other burnable neutron absorbers may have a reactivity characteristic which increases with core lifetime, goes through a maximum and then decreases thereafter. See l Figure 3.3.2 of the FEAR for such a curve.

l The value of R is the difference between the calculated core reactivity at the beginning of j the operating cycle and the calculated value of core reactivity any time later in the cycle

{ where i, to be m1(W A k,ypyld' ' 'be greater

- ^r', -

" than 1: at

' - the

' - - beginning.

' 'tr

'-" ForAthe

. newfirst value fuelofcycle, R must R be was calculated determined for eacn fuel cycle.

The 0.25% b k in the expression R + 0.2$% A k is provided as a finite, demonstrable, sub- ,

i criticality margin. This margin is demonstrated by full withdrawal of the strongest rod 4

and partial withdrawal of an adjacent rod to a position calculated to inset at least R + 0.25% A k in reactivity. Observation of sub-criticality in this condition assures lh I j sub-criticality with not only the strongest rol f ully withdrawn but at least a R + 0.25% A k i margin beyond this.

i 2. Reactivity margin - stuck control rods 1

Specification 5.3.A.2 requires that a rod t.e taken out of service if it cannot be moved i

I 3.3/4.5-8 82 7

.a u p.

f F-

• b._ Exhibit B (Continued)

• i l 3.0 LIMITING CO?IDITIOliS FOR OPERATIOIl 4.0 SURVEILLAllCE REQUIFEJEITIS 3.7 C0fffAINMEllf SYSTDU 4.7 COffrAIIMEITT SYSTDG Applicability: Applicability:

Applies to the operating status of the primary Applies to the primary armi secondary ,

and secondary containment systems. containment integrity.

Objective: Objective:

i i To assure the integrity of the primary and To verify the integrity of the primary and secondary containment systems. secondary containment.

l Specification: Specification:

A. Primary Containment. A. Primary Containment.

1. Whenever primary containment is required, 1. The suppression chamber water level and the volume and temperature of the water in temperature shall be checked ance per day.

the suppression chamber shall be maintained " ' ' id =**^- p'**a - fr. c' s Se 1 within the following limits: nt-!' " ' ' p r : : u .-- - gi r - - - ' m l

^ -t- c'.-11 t_

. .q__11 '

1 (a) Maximum Water Temperature during - N iin,

- t ;;.

normal operation 90 degree F.

Amu rN s pe s tio n or rot ar s u r-s n oe n V}

(b) Maximum Water Temperature during RCIC or r*e t"D.ess u re suencesreu o.so a n s a 4 Operation 130 degree F. Water tem-perature shall be reduced toA _ 90 F

" " " *# ***### " # #""### ##E" wit' 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after placing the re- rf fiFucteus oursee, 7~,3 4 ,u s pa svreu s um ,

actor mode switch in the run position. o n se or A vi s u n sam mm op nEtNANne AL 4 aro a r e.u L T UCLAt. /N Tae A ar y OY Pf A N6 Eas , P o p s tys, gno STRusi~WmAL i 37/4.7-1 r gegaans, 4no 4 visv44 139 E*n!4 tMa rrers. er P4 ose rso s o ga rsa gs,

. - +

i 30 IRIITING CONDTTIOIC FOR OIERATION ")

i h.0 CURVEIUAICE IEQUITUTEITC l

1. The annual average mlease rates of gmss 1. Station reconis of gross stack mlease j beta-gamma acti vity, except, halogens ard rate of gaseous activity slall be j particulates with half lives longer than mintained on an hourly basis to assure eight days, shall not exceed: that, the specified rates am not being

! Average Annual Rate ( Q in curie /sec): exceeded, ard to yield inforrntion l concerning general integrity of the l

j Q1 4 QR5 O.27 0.021

< 1 fuel cladding. Reconla of isotopic analysis shall be rnintainad. The g

off-gas stack and mactor building l Any one fifteen minute reriod par hour monitoring systems shall be func-( Q in curies /sec): tionally tested and calibrated in accordance with SIecification h.2, Q1 + QIG ql Table h.2.1 2.7 0.21 -

Within one month of initial corrercial nervice of the unit, an isotopic analy-sis will be made of the gaseous acti-vity release rate. From this cample a ratio of long-lived ard short-lived activity will be establishad. Weekly camples of off-gas will be taken and gross ratio of long-li ved ard short-lived activity determined. When the g weekly samples indicate a change of gmater than 20% from the previous W

isotopic analysis, a new isotopic analysis will lie parformd. An iso-topic analysis of off-gas will ba p?r-forred at laast quarterly. Gaseous [

6 release of tritium shall be calculated on a monthly basis fmm measumd h s tac K 3ae4PLES o a n INEO QU A WTER LM

} 3.8/h.8-2 169

]

l

. _ _ . _ _ .7,,

Exhibit B (Continued) 30 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION h.O SURVEIIJANCE REQUIRE 2fENTG C. Liquid Effluents C. Liquid Effluents

1. Radioactive liquid released from the 1. The rad.lation monitor shall be facility shall be continuously monitored. calibmted quarterly and functionally To accomplish this, either the radiation tested monthly. The operability of monitor on the radwaste discharge line the sampler shall be verified on a -

i or the discharge canal sampler shall be daily basis.

opemble.

Anso 64 M M A

2. The concentration of gross bet / activity (above background) in the condenser cooling water discharge canal shall not exceed the limits stated below unless the discharge is  !

controlled on a radionuclide basis in ac-cordance with Appendix B, Table 11, Column 2 of 10CFR2O and Hote 1 thereto:

a. Maximum Instantaneous Concentration 2. a. Station records shall be main-(excluding tritium) tained of the mdioactive con-centmtion and volume beforc 61 x 10-7 uC1/ml J dilution of each batch of liquid effluent released and of the _

average dilution flow and length of time over which each discharge occurred.

l

b. The annual avemge - concentratipu of b. Each batch of radioactive 11guld tritium shall not exceed 3 x lo" effluent shall be compled and yC1/nl analyzed prior to release.

t 3.8/4.8h 171 i e== m W j

u {-

) AEC DI

,, BUTION Fort PART 50 DOCCT MAT ( '

(TEMPORARY FORM) - ~. , CO.'CRO* N01_ 6666

'

• i l 77Iy .. 3 FROM DAT3 0F DOC: DAW REC'D , LTR MEMO B i'.' Mn Northern States Power Co=pany Minneapolis, Minn. 55401 ,

( 0. mver 11-20-72 12-6-72 X t l W: ORIO CC MR SENT AEC ?DR v SE?C LOCAL PDR v Mr. Gin.minteso 't sicned CIASS: IATJT no CYS REC'D

, @>ROPIX/O DOC.ET AO:

X 37 '50-263 DF.,SCRIF210N a _

EXCLOSUPSS: .

Ltr re our 9-28-72 ltr, trans the following: Request for a Change to Tech Specs, Appendix A, notarized 11-20-72, for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.

Do Not Remove PLANT NAES: Monticello Nuclear Generating I lant ( 40 cys of encl rec'd) ,

FOR ACTION /INFOK4ATION 19-6-72 AB BWLER(L) SCW:NCER(L) SCHUMEL(L) 137IGCON(E)

W/ Copies W/ Copics W/ Copics W/ Copies CLARK (L) STOL"(L) V ZID%IH!(L) YOU:;33ID0D(E)

W/ Ccpics U/ Copics U/9 Copics W/ Copies GOLLER(L) V/SSALID(L) CHT:".700D(FM) m;G/J:(E)

W/ Copies U/ Ccpics W/ Copics W/ Copics KNIEL(L) H. DEICON DICEES(E)

W/ Copics W/ Copies W/ Copics W/ Copies II:TEnUAL DIS"RIBUTION

k,JCO[FTTD TECH REVIEW VOLUCR 1RRII;SS WADE E PAEC PDR HEADRI).; DDEON s/0GC, BOOM P-506A SHAFER F&M SCHROEDER GRIMES FGM BROWN E p Muu m nu/ STAFF MACCARY GAM ELL DTTI CASE G. WILLIM S E

LANGE(2) KASTNER NUSSBAUMER CIAMBUSSO E. GOUIJOURNE L PAWLICKI BALLARD BOYD-L(BWR) SHA0 A/T IND SPANGLER LIC ASST. ERAITMAN DEYOUNG-L(PWR) KNt7fH S wVICE L SALT"WJi VSKOVBOLT-L STELIO ENVIRO MASON L P. COLIIIG lOORE MULLEN WILSON L PLANS

! HOUSTON DICKER MAIGT.El' L NCDOI ALD REC OPR TEDESCO EITICI'IDIJ CMITH L *"" DUEE u-FIIS & REGION (2) IDNG "C'I':G F'.00D GEtaI:I L lORRIS LAIIIAS PR UJ . Q J K'R DIGCS L INFO STEgE ECIAROYA TEEH'S L C. MILES p23f;7 LEE L p* A. CAEELL W/Ltr Onl-/

l D~iW MT.DTSTFT" P eri I

p l-LOCAL PDR Minneanolic, Minn.

F 1-WIE(/dOIRTHY) (1)(5)(9)-I!ATIONAL LA3'S v"1-NSIC(EUCHA?!AN) 1-FDR-SAN /LA/NY 1-R. CARROLL-OC, GT-E2O l-GERALD LELLOUCHE l-ASL3-YORE /SAYP2 W 1-R. CATLIN, E-256-GT '

BROOKHAVCr NAT. L;a IdOODWARD[H.ST.

crS AcRS no=mn: SEIe TO LIC ASST. 1-COISUL/CC'S l-AGMED(WALTER KOLSTER, Rm C h27, GT)

, R. DIGGS ON 12 m NEw.ARr/ELUME/AoA3IAN N

=

Y = = = = = = -

1-RD...MULLES...F-399CT g.

= :--

'