ML20024G658

Proposed Tech Specs Re Core & CCS & Refueling Interlocks

ML20024G658
Person / Time
Site:	Monticello
Issue date:	02/02/1973
From:	NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20024G653	List: ML20024G652 ML20024G654 ML20024G658
References
NUDOCS 9102140412
Download: ML20024G658 (17)

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1/31/73 - ciudidE F%$ACT y PiCPOCLD UP.ANGT4', TO T!!E TECIU;ICAL FPECIFICATICNS '

A AFFElilIX A OP PE0VICICML OFDATI!!G

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• , Red Flock !bnitor UN Page 53, line h.a of Table 3 2.2:

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Change the ent:7 in the colutu entitle.1 "Run" from "X" to "X(c). "

Page 59, chance the cecend line rem the bottcm to read:

-tv m "e. FS! Upccale and Ewnceale rea bloenc n.ay be Lypaccea telev JOJ, of rat ed power. "

Page 67, (Iv rec ),1:. cert the : cla svi:4 centence prior to the last centence t- -

in the rirtn pa::.g:aph-9 P "Thic cutject is dicrucced in the Generel P.le:tric licencing Tcpiesl p4 .

Eeport !iEN-lOl89 70 I;ED 16 July 1970, An Analycic of Functional i Commcn !bde Failurec in GE Ein Protection and Inctrumentatier. "

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• Eencon for chan.*e:

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'Ihe FIM instrumentation ic designed cuch that all trip cutput e are t-I h b; #.

byparced when the reference AFFli ic telow a precet power level.

P Z.roucn an overci. ht, "Alicvable lypacc Cor.dition C" vac not wo rde u to include 1-3 q.ccale rol clocar, lhe :nu.ge in the bsces docu-mente the cupportinc cafety evnluation cn thic cub.iect.

Q ,. Core and Ce nt n i me n t !c oline Cycten::

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i (. . ,'. Page 106, add the rollcaing wordc to _.S.C.;:

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except 30 alleved by Epccificain 5.G.h L>clow."

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Page 103, add 3 5 0.4 readinC:

@] r 4 jr . "3 5 0.4 'n' hen irradiated fuel la in the reactor vencel and the vecsel head is rrmoved, the couppreccion chamber my be i drained corpletely and no cucre than cne control rod drive p boucing or instruraent thimble opened at any one time pro.

y, vided that the cpent fuel g ol cates are open and the

,e luel pool water level ic mintained at n level of greater g than or equal to 33 feet."

puge 113, (lucec), change paragrgh G to readt

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k.

f "G. Emergency Cooling Availability V

p me purpore of Cpecification G ic to accure ttnt cufficient eore

1. coolin; equipment ic available c.t all timec. It ic during re:uel-Q ing outagec that major maintenance ic performed and during cuch time b that all core and containn.ent ccoling cubcycteme may Le out of cer-Ne vice. Epecification 3 5.G. ? allows all core and contairnent cooling cubcystema to be inoperable provided no work ic Leinc done which han the potential for draining the reactor veccel. Thus evente requiring pd{ core ecoling are precluded.

Specification 3 5.G.4 reccrni ca that concurrent with control rod drive k, mintenance during the refueling cutage it may te nececcary to drain the cuppreccion chamber for maintenance or for the incpection required D(.9 , by Specification L.7.A.l. I.n thic situation, a cufficient inventory of water ic maintained to accure adequate core cooling in the unlikely A' event cf loco of oontrol rod drive housing ur inctrument thimble real U?

integrity."

!s 4',. Reason for change:

C hic requected change vill allow control roi drive maintenance concur-

1. rent vitn draining of the suppreccica chumber for maintenance and k' 5r increction. Thic vill carely provide more flexibility in performing mintenance and incpection vorr curing a refueling outage, o

..i A sufficient inventory of water can be maintained cucn that the ability

[ to cool the core in not jeopardiced. ~'he conditiona or propoced Epeci-If cnly one control fication 3 5 0.4 provide the following carecuardc.

+ rod drive or inctrument thimble is removed at one time the largert 79 potential locc of coolant ic limittd to the npproximately two inch diam-y eter opening in the control red drive noccle. The inctrument thimble y involvec a muen cmaller opening. Pj requirine the fuel pool gste to y be cpen the combined water inventory of the fuel pool, reactor cavity,

,,g and dryer /ceparator pool between the fuel pool lov level li.mit of 33 gy feet and the reactor vescel finnce ic 318,000 gallonc. Vnen performing s;

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control rod drive maintennnce the norml prnstice after removing a drive is to either inmediately inst rt a rebuilt cpare drive or to bolt a flar.ge cover over the drive bouciy opening. In either event the houting ic normally open for losu than two bourc. For the v3ter inventory available a two inch dir.ttter lean would regaire over )

hourc to drain the poolc to the reactor flance nccumine no r.i;e-up.

At this point the core is still covered with 25 feet er water. Any water draining from the reactor veccel vill collect in the cupi res.

cica chra:2er; cufficient water will te availalle for low prersure core ecoling cyctem operation before the water level reachec the fl ange. Ac refore, there ic adequate time and cooling water avail.

able to reect ablich core coolinc, in thic unlikely event.

Iwactor hecirculatien Fvrten crecctie Valve Intt rlock Pure 103, add itecc :. 5 1 ana 4. 5. I rea 11:v:

"j. 5. I Fccirculation Cycte::

1. Except ac cpenried in f.5. I.2 below, Mc:cwr irr'.ciated fuel $ c in the reactcr, with reactor coolant temperature creater than 212 0F an.1 both reaetor recirculatien pumpc ope rating, the recirculaticn cyctem erces tie vnive inter-leur chall be cperable.

2. The read roulatica cy tem arer tic valve interlocka .ay be insperable ir at leact Or. er:cc tie valve ic main-tair.es fully elecca.

L.5.I  ?.ecirralation Syctem

1. Once per month, when irradiat':d fuel ic ir. the reactor,

+

with reactor ecolant temperature creater than 2120F and both reactor recirculation pumps operating, the recircu-latic:. cyetem erosc tie valve interloexc chall be demon-A ctrated to be operable by verifying that the arcrc tie valvec rannot be oper.ed using the narnsl ;ntr:1 cuiten.

.t . ihen s .eeirculction cyctem recc tie alve ir.te: lock it i nope rnble , the pocition of at leact cne Jally cloced crccc tie mlve nr.all te recoraed daily."

Page llI, snrec, r.ad tne follevi: .

"I. F.ecirculation cytten y.

l 't-The capacity of the Dcercency Core Toulant Cycten ic baced on tr.e potential concequencet of a douole enned recirculation line brea%.

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e The peak fuel clad temperatum is a function of the size of line * ,

bnak presented in a document entitled, "Manticello helear l Generating Plant ECCS Conformance to New AEC Adopted Interim i ". Acceptance Criteria" culmitted September 21, 1971. A double *

ended recirculation line break involvec 4.2 sq. ft. When the i cross tie valves are closed and 5.6 sq. ft. When tic emse tie ,

valves are open. We referenced report chovs that the peak fuel clad tes:perature for the k.2 cq. ft. rupture while opcm.

's" ting at rated power is sufficiently lets than the 23000F limit i y set forth in the "AEC Adopted InterDa Acceptance Criteria for

1. Performnce of ECCS for Licht-Water Power lienetoro" dated June 19, 1971. However, a break of 5 6 sq. ft. vill result in clad y temperatures in excess of 2300 F. herefore, at least one crocs  !

w tie valve must remain closed to reduce the potential break aren. r b he cross tie valve is allowed to be open during one pump oper.

ation. With only one pump, rated power cannot be achieved. Un-  ;

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' der these conditions, the expected peak clad temperature during I ' a lors of coolant accident is less than that for two pump opera- t tion with the crors tig valves closed." >

I Reacon for chance:

p The ECCS ksign Sacic no ctated in Section 6.2.1.la of the FSAR states, '

im "No eladding melting shall occur (337CPF)." his was superceded by i

the AEC Interim ECCS Criteria which ststes, "The calculated maximum 't fuel element cladding temperature does not exceed 23000F." his limit y of acceptability ic based on the oxidation of the circaloy cladding to avoid embrittlement ad pocsible frag::;entation upon cooldown. General e Electric believes there is considerable margin in this limit which *i i

'l should be recognized ac being present becauce a limit of 27000F sprearc '

1' reasonable for the timeo of interect to EWR ECCS. Nevertheless, to i meet the 23000F limit set forth, the potential break eine restriction ,

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requires the croce tie valve to remain closed during two pump operation.  !'

@ I

.g s Refueline Interlocks

~

l P Page 187, change item 3 10.A to read:

ki p "3 10.A Refuelirg Interlocks

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• [ he reactor mode switch shall be locked in the "Fefuel" position during core alternations and refueling interlocks cha12 be operable except as

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i M specified in Cpecification 3 10. E ." '

b~ Reason for chance:

The added phrace allows for the addition of Specifications 3.10.E aa

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r.eruelinc Interlocks - Tx'onded Dre nrd Onnt rol Rg Drive th i r.t er.a rga ra, e ISS, add itern 310.T readinct

" 3 10. L Extended Core and Control !.oA Prive Wintenance Centrol roda my be withdrawn frera the ructor core provided the folleving conditionc urs cuticfici:

1. Le reactor made switch chull tv locked in the 'Teruel" p dtion. The res uelin:; interlvek input cir,nal frem 4 withdrawn control rod r.ay be t'ypactett ou a withamvn control r.id niter the f uel accomblica in the cell cen.

taining (controlled ty) that control rua have teen remove;i from the reactor core. All other retu lin,-

interlockc chall t e operat le.

.' . chm'c chall le operable in t he core <1undrunt wbere fue) or cuntrcl roat are beinc moved, tud in 'ut adjacent quadrant. le requirementc for nn EN4 to be considerrd opernt'le are given in . 10. B. "

Ptge 18% (in:;es ), incert the following paragraph:

" E. The intent or this :Tecifientie:. in to pern.it the unlandir.g of a cignificant portion of the reactor core for cuch purpoced ra s removal of temporary c0ntr;l eurtainc, cent rol ro.1 drive triin.

tenance, in-cervice intpect ion requirements, exhminatic.n of tLo co re cupport plate, etc. When the refuelin.; interlocr. input

, cignal frem a withdrawn centrol rod in bypne r ed udminirtrative centrols will be in errect to prchibit fuel from being leadea into that centrol cell.

There operatiens are 1erformed with the mode cwitch in the ,

"Feruel" pecition to provide the refueling interlocke normully available durin.; refueline ac explained in Part A of these Barec. In order to withdraw more than one control rod, it it nececcary to tylmes the refueline interlock on each with.irawn control rod. The requirement that the fuel accembliec in the cell euntrolled by the control rod te removed from the reactor

ore before the interloc

. can te byparred incuret that with-drawal or another cont rel rDd doec r.ot result in in'.avertent criticality. Dich control rod eccentiall:/ provides reactivity control for the fuel accembliec in the ce L1 acrociated with the control rod. Thuc removal c: an entire cell (ruel accem-L11ec pluc control rodh recult: L:. a lower reactivity potential of the core."

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, o This necification ic propoced to allev flexibility in Terfomita core .

t rind centrol rod drive rnintennnce without ,1eopardicing plant f afety.

• 0.atnge activitice will include removal of te:::perary control curtninc,' * '

chuffilig of fuel, addition er new ruel, in-vessel inspecticn nr.d .

• control red drive maintenance. Re charter propoced above vill per. * ' '

mit there cetivith:: to be dor.c in a cure, crder3y nnd erfielent

& raarane r. It chauld be noted that emptyir.g a e;cmlet e cell places '

the rN; tor in u 2ecc reu :tive cunditien than with it fully loadel p.

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Fuel will r.ct te luaGed into a control cell unices the ecntrol rod ic fully incertea. This ic numinictratively controlled ly requirira that whenever such a typnen exicte for si.y centrol rod in the core, both the crerstor cf the refueling cr9pp.te e nd t. nether lisenced it actor cperatcr ausw verify that a control rod is fully ir.r,erted in the con.

tro1 cell pri..c to loadins fuel. In additicn, placards will be placed en tt.e ore ins Lennt (whien is locnted on the refuelinc floor for

_ .c , <i Dny purporec) identifying whc2c fuel loriding ic not fuel :

pe: nit 2 ; t, i :nt rol rolc are withdr: wn.

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.- EXIIIBIT B (Continued) -

'Dible 3.2 3 - Continued Notes:

(6) Upon discovery that nininum requiranants for the enacber of operable er operating trip systems or instrument channels are not satisfied actions shall be initiated to:

(a) Satisfy the requirc:::ents ty placing apprepriate channels or systens in the tripped condition, or (b) Place the plant under the specified required conditions using norral operating procedures.

(7 ) %ere must be a total of at Icost k cperable or operatin6 APifi channels.

• Ilequired conditions when mininum ci niltions for operation are not satisfied.

9 A. Peactor in Diutdown nr>1e.

ii. Do rod withdrov31s permitted while in Peftel or Startup mode.

C. iv? actor in Itan mode.

f D. No rod withdrov els perni :,+1 while in the Ibn mode.  !

l E. Pcuer on 1111 ranee or belou ersi reector in Startup, Eeftel, or Uhutdown mode. I

• • Allovable Itrpass Con'iltions

a. SIfi Detector-not-fblly-inserted rod block may be bypassed when the SIM channel count rate is 300 cps or when all I m range switches are ebove Position 2.

b. IIM Dcr-Twcule rod block may be bypassed when the IIM ren6e switch is in the lovest range position.

Urss n uar Anc atce.xs

c. Pdn$Downscale rod h may be bypassed balov 30f rated power.

d. SIU1 Upscale block may be bypassed when associated IRM range switches are above Position 7.

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Bases Continued: DUIIBIT B (Continued)

• 32 he HPCI and/or ECIC high flow and temperature instnzentation is provided to detect a break in the HPCI and/or RCIC piping. Tripping of this instmmentation results in actuation of HPCI end/cr RCIC isolation valves; i.e. , Group h and/or Grcup 5 valves. We trip settin5s of 200 F ani 150) of g } deci Cn flow and valve closure time are such tirat core uncovery is prevented and fission product release 3g is within 10 CFR 100 cuidelines.

E4 o, y The instricentation which initiates ECCG nction is nrranged in a dual bus system. As for other ygg vital instricentation arranced in this thsLien the frecification preserves the effectiveness of the y tj ,9 systen even duripc periods when rninten mce or testing is being perfomed.

S "' S 3g he control rod block nmetiens are provided to prevent excessive control rod withdrawl so that a n ,; MCHFR does not decrease to 1.0. The trip logic for this hmetion is 1 out of n; e.g., any trip 3gg on one of the six API!!'s, eight II!!'s, cr four CHI's vill result in n rod block. Ze mini =n

[; 7 instrictent channel require:7.ents for the II!! and IGI! nay be reduced by one for a short period cf gjy time to allow for maintenance, testing, or calibration. See Section 7 3 FCAR.  ;

gj < d i gj g he APHI rod block trlp is referenced to ricv eni prevents a cirnicicant reduction in MCHFR g ,3 especially du ing operation at reduced flow. %e AFIM provides crcos core protection; i.e.,

g2g limits the cross core power increase frcu vithdrawal of control rods in the nomal withdrawal sequence.

gg The trips are set so that MCIER is naintained greater than 1.0.

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j g THE Elfi provides local protection of the core; i.e., the prevention of critical heat flux in a

, 5g local region of the core, for a sincl e rod withdrawal error fra= a 13miting control rod psttern.

D he trip point is referenCel to f10v. The Worst CBse Eine*le Control rol withdrawal error has teen N 'a m o o analyzed and the results show that with the specified trip settings rod withdraval is blocked i 80c when MCHFR is .,tl. L thus allowing a lequate mar :in. Ref. "ection 7.h.S.3 en1 It.5 3 F3AR. Pelow4C% power f]

ici & o the vorst case withdrawal of a single control rod results in t I'CHFR >1.0 vithout rod block action, thus below this level it is not require <1.f Fequiring at least half of the nomal IIHi inputs from YmN cach level to be operable assures tnat the lull response vill be odequate to prevent rod withdravel aNd

~4 oa-errors.

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U5o The IRM rod block function provides local as well as crosa core protection. The Ocelinc arrsngement k3 case is such that trip sett ing is less than a f actor of 10 above the indicated level. Analysis of the worst S"" accident results in rod block action before MCHFH approaches 1.0 Fef. Section 7.!*.k.3 FCAR.

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8. !! A downscale inlicotton of an ApF14 or IEM 13 an indication the in::ttrent has failed er the instricent 13 .2 O is not sensitiv> et mch. In ~i t her case the ins t rumnt will not respon1 to chances in control roS cotice.

and thus certrol ros motion is preventel. The dawnseale trips are set at 3/125 of full =cale, j 3.2/4.2 67

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, y G. Duergency Cooling Availability -

i d The purpose of Specification G is to assure that sufficient core coolir4 equip:nent is available at all times. It is during refueling outages that =ajor caintenance is perforev2d and during cuch time that all core and containment cooling subsystema may be out of service. Specifiestion 3 5.G.3 allows all core and containment cooling subsystems to be incpemble provided no work is being done which has the potentini for draining the reactor vessel. 'lhun events requiring com molir4 are precluded. '

I Specification 3 5.G.4 recognizes that concurrent with centml rod drive maintenance dur1P4 the Rfuelir4 outage, it may be necescary to drain the cupprescion chranber for maintenance or for the inspection required by Speelfication h.7. A.l. In this altuation, a sufficient inventory of water is reintaine;d to assure adequate core coollog in the unlikely event of loss of control rod drive housire or instrument '

thimble seal inte6rity.

i i

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6 3 5/4 5 n3a  ;

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3 .

EXELBIT b (Cuntinued) . ,

30 Ia1IIII;c conDITIGIt; roa orERATIO:I h.O SUR'EILIAI'CE REQJIF31ENTS

.i

• 3.10 EEFUELII:G k.10 RWELEG Apnlicabilitc: Arplicet111ty: ,

g Applies to fuel handling oral core reactivity Applies to the periolic testing of those limitations. interlocks nnd instn: ents used d:: ring ,

rettelir6 .

~ '

Objective: Objective- .

To assure core renetivity is within espatility <

To verify the cperability of inctnE:$btstion of the control rods and to prevent criticality during reitelirc.

and interlocks used in rettel1D6-

• Specification: Specification: '.

A. Refueling Interlocks A. Fefuelirc Interloets * * * *

. . ..;. * = . *

• t

'Ihe ret.cter code avitch shall be locked Prict to egy itel hsodling, with the . -

in the "Ecitel" pcsition during ecre alterntions and the refuelir4; interlocks head off the reactor vessel, the reiteling interlocks shall be func *

.h chall be cperable, c e e rn As simre. . tionally tested. 'Ibey shall also te o f oso s ay Spec t <rr e Ance 3.10. E. tested at veckly interials thereafter until no longer required and follevic6 ers repair w rk essociated with the '

interlocks. , ,

s . * .. .

s:

j 3.10/4.10 ,

e . . . . -

' ~

187*

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tl 3

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. * * * **M* ' ***** *""*M** * * * * - " -

w '

7

\

EXHIBIT B (Continued) 30 IJMITILG COUDIT10N3 FOR OP'W;. TION _

4.0 SUmMLIEiCE PEUIRHmrrh

. %=

B. Core Monitoring -

P Lore Monitorire , * '

During core alterations two SRPs chall 1* Prict operable, one in and one adjacent to any ccre *mkir4 ony alte ations to the core, the SH1's shall be functionally g

quadrant where fuel or centrol rods are beirc tested and checked for .2eutren response.

noved. For an SH1 to be considered operable, heresfter, the SH1'rs vill te checked the following conditions chall te catisfied: daily for respctse.

1. 'lhe SHI shall be inserted to the

• nomal operating level. (Use of

' ** +- '- - .

speciol moveable, dunking type . . . . *.

detectors during initial itel loading ..

and major core alterations is per- . ..

missible as long as the detector is . .

connected into the normal SIM circuit.) * .. .

2. h SR/. shall have a minimus of 3 cps ,

with ull rods fully inserted in the core. -

• C. Fuel StoroEe Pool Water Level C. Fuel Storsge Pool Water Icvel h Whenever irradiated fuel is stored Whenever irradiated itel is stored in in the ite] storage pool, the pool the faal storage pool the pool level water level shall be maintained at chsll te recorded daily.

~

a level of greater or equal to 33 feet. -

D.  % e reactor shall be chutdovn for a nininum of 2h hours prior to =crement ,, " ,

of itel within the reacter. . .

q .

~~

Ners: Aoo ma

~

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~

3.10/h.10 ~~

168 w: 1 r m

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C d e l e od eep hR neh cee eomf 'M Ehner e d ne n ri I' " ibt( rr S wama G e t v N t no 0 I x or . . 1 T E C p 1 2 I 4 M /

I . 0 L E 1 3

0 3

e n :

! .l ll (, lL11

DOIIBIT'B (Continued) - ,,

Bases Continued:

E. 'Ihe intent of this specification is to permit the unloading of a significant portion of the reactor core for such purposes as removal of tempomry control curtains, control rod drive maintenance, in-sarvice inspection requirements, examination of the core support plate, etc.

When the refueling interlock input signal from a withdrawn control rod is bypassed, administra-tive controls will be in effect to prohibit fuel from being loaded into that control cell.

g These operations are perfomed with the mode switch in the " Refuel" position to pmvide the re fuelind interlocks normally available during mfueling as explained in Part A of these Buses. In order to withdraw nore than one control rod, it le necercary ta bypasr the mfueling interlock on eech vithdrawn control rod. The requirerent that the fuel assemblies in the cell controlled by the control md be removed from the reactor core before the inter-lock can be bypassed insures that withdrawal of another control rod dces not result in inadvertent criticality. Each control rou essentially provides reactivity control for the fuel assemblies in the cell associated with the control md. Thus, removrd of an entire cell (fuel assemblies plus control rod) results in a lower reactivity potential of the core.

O 6

1 1 1

1 C

1 3.lo/h.10 -

189 a l4

'hf? N3 NN [N @ S . 5 as Esses: EXHIBIT B (Continued) 4' 'i A. Refueling Interlocks During refueling operations, the reactivity potential of the core is being altered. It is neces- <

sary to require certain interlocke and restrict certain refueling procedures such that there is assurance that inadvertent critic.~11ty does not occur.

To minimize the possibility of loading ftiel into a cell containing no control rod, it is required that all control rods are ful_1y inserted when fuel is being loaded into the reactor core. %is requirement assures that during refueling the reftzeling interlocks, as designed, vill prevent inadvertent criticality. he core reactivity limitation of Specification 3 3 limits the core g alterations to assure that the resulting core leading can be contreued with the reactivity control system and interlocks at any time during shutdown or the following ci-rating cycle.

" Addition of large amounts of reactivity to the core is prevented by operating procedures, which are in turn backed up by refueling interlocks on rod withdrawal and movement of the refbeling plat-

, fom. When the mode switch is in the "Befuel" position, interlocks prevent the refueling platfom from being moved over the core if a control rod is withdrawn and fuel is on a ho'st. Likewise,

if the refueling platfom is over the core with fbel on a hoist, control ro(1 motion is blocked by the interlocks. With the mode switch in the refuel position only one control rod can be withdrawn.

h For a new core the dropping of a fuel assembly into a vacant fuel location adjacent to a withdrawn control rod does not result in an excursion or a critical confi Euration, thus adequate cargin

=

is provided. -

^

B. Core Monitoring n .

he SH1's are provided to monitor the core during periods of station shutdown and to guide the O

operator during refueling operations and station startup. Pequiring tv0 operable SH1's, one in and one adjacent to any core quadrant where fuel o: ontrol rods are being moved, as,sures ade- .

' quate monitoring of that quadrant during such alterations. %e requirement of 3 counts per second provides assurance that neutron flux is being monitored. ,

t C. Fuel Storage Pool Water Ievel To assure that there is adequate water to shield and cool the irradiated fuel assemblies stored in the pool, a minimum pool vater level is established. %e minimum vater level of 33 feet is established because it would be a significant change from the nomal level (37'9") . and well above a level to assure adequate cooling.

/Vo rs : Ano ma /Wh I 3.1o/4.10 189