ML20024B839

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Forwards Draft Revs to Responses to Questions 410.10 & 410.12 Re Analysis for Rotating Components & Tornado Missile Spectrum.Responses Will Be Incorporated in FSAR Rev Scheduled for Aug 1983
ML20024B839
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  
Issue date: 07/06/1983
From: Bradley E
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To: Schwencer A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8307110491
Download: ML20024B839 (15)
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e PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 23O1 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 EDW ARD G. B AUER, J R.

weca Passioene ano semana6 counsak EUGEN E J. BR ADLEY associa7s ennema6 counsm6 DON ALD BLANKEN RUDOLPts A. CHILLEMI E. C. KIR K H A LL T. H. M AMER CORNELL PAUL AUERBACH aestsTan? SEnEmab counsel July 6, 1983 EDW ARD J. CULLEN, JR.

THOM AS H. MILLER. J R.

GRENE A. McKENN A assistant counssh Mr.

A.

Schwencer, Chief Docket Nos. 50-352 Licensing Branch No. 2 50-353 Division of Licensing U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Limerick Generating Station, Units I and 2 Request for Additional Information from the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB)

Reference:

Telecon between J.

N.

Ridgely (ASB Reviewer),

T.

G.

Szonntagh (PECo), and D.

A.

Klein (Bechtel) on July 5, 1983

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

In response to the requests made by Mr.

J.

N.

Ridgely in the reference telecon, enclosed are the draft revisions to the response to que s t ions 410.10 and 410.12.

These responses will be incorporated into the FSAR revision scheduled for August, 1983.

Si cerel 10 _

_)

ne ley Copy to:

See Attached Service List

${i 8307110491 830706 PDR ADOCK 05000352 A

PDR s

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a

cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/o enclosure)

Judge Richard F. Cole (w/o enclosure)

Judge Peter A. Morris (w/o enclosure)

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Ann P. Hodgdon (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Fran*: R. Romano (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Rooert L. Anthony (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (w/o enclosure)

Judith A. Dorsey, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Charles W. Elliott, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg (w/o enclosure)

Thomas Y. Au, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Mr. Thomas Gerusky (w/o enclosure)

Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (w/o enclosure) i Mr. Steven P. Hershey (w/o enclosure)

Donald S. Bronstein, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Mr. Joseph H. White, III (w/o enclosure)

David Wersan, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Robert J. Sugarman, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Martha W. Bush, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Spence W. Perry, Esq.

(w/o enclosure)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/o enclosure)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (w/o enclosure)

Docket and Service Section (w/o enclosure) i s

L i

A s1

~'-

l.45 TSAR jesTION 410.10 (Section 3.5.1) which verifies that if an internally generated missile wereProvide a For each rotating component whose casing cannot retain thegenerate related equipment, provide (1) a discussion of the methods usedi to protect the safety-related train and its redundant train and other safety-related structure, systems and components in the path of the missile and (2) missile paths, means of protection for other equipment,a drawing showing the com redundant safety-related train.

and the outside containment.

This applies to both inside and I

1.

Verify that no secondary missiles will be generated from any internally generated missile.

2.

Verify that any internally generated missile from safety-related equipment will not affect the redundant safety-related train.

i 3.

Provide the basis for concluding that "...other rotating components..., such as fans, do not have sufficient energy to (be)... considered missile hazards."

1

RESPONSE

1.

The bases for considering it unlikely for rotating break through their casings and adversely impact safety-compon to related equipment are the following:

bwn Areviewofeventreportsonfileat,[theNuclearSafety failures of fans and missile generat on indicated that no fanInfor failures have resulted in generation related areas of a nuclear facility, missiles in safety-j in generation of missiles, ump failures resulting are considered more improbable than fan failures resulting in generation of missiles because pump casings are generally thicker than fan casings and pump speeds are generally lower than fan speeds.

Even in the unlikely event that a rotating component does break through its casing, much of the component's kinetic energy would be dissipated in moving through the casing, thereby decreasing the probability of the component adversely damaging.a safety-410.10-1 23 OB Rev. 177 pub 3 Am

4

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related component.

Therefore, generation of secondary I

missiles from the internally' generated missiles described j {l above is not considered credible.

It is an even lower probability that a rotating component would adversely affect i

redundant safety-related systems because redundant equipment is generally located in different areas or separated by barriers.

MeSm hot prfedd miwNes hem bfp pbmp' N I

discussed in Section 3.5.1.

Potential missile sources identified outside primary containment are the residual heat removal and core spray pumps whose impeller sections are surrounded by concrete, and the HPCI and RCIC turbines whose missiles would be contained by their concrete compartment walls.

These compartment walls would also retain any secondary generated missiles.

Fcilure of the recirculation pump or motor (located inside containment) would not result in damage to the containment or vital equipment, as discussed in Section 3.5.1.2.

Other rotating components inside containment.are unlikely to produce missiles capable of penetrating their casing.

l I

2.

As discussed in Section 3.5.1, the internally generated missiles described above will not affect the redundant safety-related train.

3.

The bases for concluding that "... other rotating components..., such as fans, do not have sufficient energy i

to (be) considered missile hazards," are the reasons discussed in Item 1 above h d

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OUESTION 410.12 (Section 3.5.1)

Your tornado missile spectrum does not conform to the guidelines of the standard review plan (NUREG-0800 July 1981) Section 3.5.1.4 nor does it conform to the guidelines of standard review plant (NUREG-75/087, y 1980) Section 3.5.1.4.

Revise the FSAR to include the foll ing tornado missiles at all elevations:

1.

steel rod, 1 inch diamter x 3 feet long, weight 8 pounds (velocity =.6 x total tornado velocity);

2.

steel pipe, 6 inch diameter x 15 feet long, schedule 40, weight 285 pounds (velocity =.4 x total tornado velocity);

3.

steel pipe, 12 inch diameter x 15 feet long, schedule 40, weight 743 pounds (velocity =.4 x total velocity);

and to include the following tornado missiles at all elevations up to 30 feet above all grade elevations within 0.5 miles of the

,)

facility structures; 4.

utility pole, l'3.5 inch diameter x 35 feet long, weight 1490 pounds (velocity =

.4 x total tornado velocity);

and 5.

Automobile, frontal area 20 square feet, weight 4000 pounds (velocity =

.2 x total tornado velocity)

RESPONSE

Limerick was originally designed for the three tornado missiles listed below: wood plank (4 in. x 12 in. x 12 ft), steel pipe (3 in. diameter x 10 ft, schedule 40)', and an automobile (not more than 25 feet above ground).

This design basis was accepte I/~

  1. ff by the NRC at the construction permit stage, June 1974.

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The e.terior walls and roof thicknesses have been evaluated for i

the tornado-resistant enclosures listed in Table 3.3-2 and are capable of withstanding all of the missiles listed in tPr ;b:10 7'ad/ S t kn.

The 4000 psi strength concrete walls and roofs have Sif-V;;::imum thicknesses of 24 inches and 18 inches, respectively min (Table 3.5-8).

This exceeds the minimum acceptable missile

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barrier thickness requirements specified in Table 1 of Standard 3

Review Plan (NUREG-0800, July 1981).section 3.5.3.

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.m th; 4-b,.. ;., n _ _ r - d The total area of the nontornado-resistant features that a.

have safety-related components located behind them is extremely small compared to the total area of the tornado-resistant portions of the enclosures.

b.

To penetrate a nontornado-resistant feature and travel a sufficient distance to impact a safety-related component, a missile would need to strike the feature at a perpendicular angle.

Much of the missile's kinetic energy would be dissipated c.

in breaking through the nontornado-resistant feature, which reduces the possibility of the missile adversely damaging a safety-related component even if it strikes one.

d.

Redundant safety-related components are normally located in different areas of the plant or yard or are separated by walls so that a single tornado missile would not damage both redundant systems.

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Rev. 17, 02/83 410.12-2

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