ML20023C079
| ML20023C079 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1983 |
| From: | Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20023C059 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-09, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-09, TASK-A-9, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8305090640 | |
| Download: ML20023C079 (5) | |
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING Docket Nos. 50-445 COMPANY, et al.
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50-446
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(Comanche Peak Steam Electric
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Station, Units 1 and 2)
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AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES E. ROSSI I, Charles E. Rossi, being duly sworn, do depose and state:
Q.1.
By whom are you employed and what is the nature of the work you perform?
A.1.
1 am a Section Leader in the Instrumentation and Control Systems F, ranch, Division of Systems Integration, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. A copy of my professional qualifications is attached.
Q.2.
What is the nature of your responsibilities regarding the staff evaluation of the Salem anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) events on February 22 and 25,1983?
A.2.
I was a member of an interoffice, interdisciplinary NRC Task Force established to detennine the generic implications of the two events at Salem.
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1 2-Q.3.
What is the subject matter of this affidavit?
A.3.
I will address certain aspects of the concerns of Dr. Jordan as stated in the conference call of April 7,1983 (Tr.17-18) regard-ing the status of the Staff's position on Unresolved Safety Issue
("USI") A-9 in view of "the Salem events, which was considered in Board Notification 83-26."
Q.4.
Following the events at Salem, what action has the Staff taken with respect to Unresolved Safety Issue A-9 relating to Anticipated Transients Without Scram ("ATWS")?
A.4.
The Staff established the interoffice, interdisciplinary task force mentioned above in answer 2.
Q.5.
Would you describe the purpose of the Task Force?
A.5.
The Task Force was established to consider three questions:
(1) Is there a need for prompt action related to similar equipment in other nuclear power plants? (2) Are NRC and licensees learning the l
l safety-management lessons? and (3) How should the priority and content of the NRC proposed rule on ATWS be adjusted?
Q.6.
Has-the Task Force or the NRC Staff issued final generic actions or recommendations as a result of evaluations of the generic implications of the Salem events?
l A.6.
A number of short-term actions have been taken through the following Bulletins and an Information Notice:
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IE Bulletin No. 83-01: Failure of Reactor Trip Breakers (Westinghouse DB-50) to Open on Automatic Trip Signal (includedaspartofBoardNotification83-26);
2)
IE Bulletin No. 83-04:
Failure of the Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip Breakers (included as part of Board Notification 83-38);
3)
IE Information Notice 83-18: Failuras of the Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip System Breakers (copy attached).
Additional actions resulting from the Task Force evaluations are currently under consideration.
The above statements and opinions are true and correct to the best of my personal knowledge and belief.
CcV $ %
Charles E. Rossi Subscribed and sworn to me this ' n day of May, 1983
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E.Iqb7 b h M I Notary Public I
My Consnission expires:
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IN 83-18 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND PROCEDURES WASHINGTON, D.C 20555 April 1, 1983 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 83-18:
FAILURES OF THE UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP FUNCTION OF
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REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM BREAKERS
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Addressees:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or construction permit (CP).
Purpose:
This notice describes recent fail'ures of reactor trip system circuit breakers with undervoltage (UV) trip att.achments and provides additional information -
related to the UV attachment.
Description of Circumstances:
Reactor Trip System (RTS) b'reaker failures at Salem Unit 1 on February 22 and 25 and RTS breaker failures at San Onofre Units 2 and 3 reported to the NRC on March 11, 1983 led to issuance of IE Bulletins (IEB) 83-01 and 83-04 respec-tively.
Results of. testing of RTS breakers required by IE Bulletins 83-01 and 83-04 have been reported to the NRC.
These results show that electrical breakers may not be achieving the performance reliability expected of them.
The problem apparently lie's with the undervoltage trip attachment.
Failures of Westinghouse DB type, Westinghouse DS type and General Electric AK-2 type RTS breakers have been reported.
To our knowledge, all currently licensed PWRs which use breakers for the RTS use one of these types.
However, other safety-related systems may be configured with these breakers or breakers of other manufacturers and types which use an UV attachment to perform the required safety function.
Li.censees which use these breakers in other applications should be aware of the likelihood of failure to trip via the UV device.
It would be. prudent to check the operation and maintenance of these breakers.
IEB 83-01 was directed to plants using Westinghouse DB type breakers with undervoltage trip devices.
A summary of the information submitted by licensees in response to the bulletin follows:
(1) No failures of DB type breakers were reported as a result of the requested tests.
Only one unit, which is in an extended maintenance outage involving the reactor protection system, has not yet performed the required tests.
(2) Seven of the twenty.eight plants using the subject breakers had not been maintaining the breakers per the recommendations in Westinghouse NSD Data Letter 74-2, a copy of which was attached to the bulletin.
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s IN 83-18 April 1, 1983 Page 2 of 4 (3) Some plants reported that they were using the guidelines contained in the NSD Data Letter with certain exceptions (e.g., the maintenance inter-val had been extended from the recomended 9 or 12 month interval to either 18 months or during refueling).
(4) Because the lubricants recomended in the NSD Data Letter are no longer i
comercially available, some plants reported that they were using lubri-cants other than those recomended in the NSD Data Letter.
j IEB 83-04 was directed to plants using RTS breakers with undervoltage trip devices, other than those using DB type breakers, such as General Electric AK-2 i
type breakers and the Westinghouse DS-416 type breakers. A summary of the information submitted to date by licensees in response to IE Bulletin 83-04 follows:
(1) Several failures of the General Electric AK-2 type breakers and the Westinghouse DS-416 type breakers were' experienced during the tests and l
were reported to the NRC as required by the bulletin.
Failures involving the AK-2 type breakers were reported at the Maine Yankee plant and at the Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 and 2 plants. On March 15, 1983 Maine Yankee reported that three of the eight RTS breakers used at the plant failed to open in the required times; one breaker tripped in 1.9 seconds, another'in 2.7 seconds, and the third in 10.3 seconds. Maine Yankee further reported that these breakers were subsequently cleaned and lubricated after which they operated within the acceptable normal time. On March 15, Calvert Cliffs reported that two of the eight breakers in Unit I required approxi-mately 6 seconds to trip and that two of the eight breakers in Unit 2 required approximately 1.5 seconds to trip.
In its written report to the NRC dated March 21, 1983, Calvert Cliffs described three additional failures that were detected during tests at Unit 1 and three additional breaker failures detected at Unit 2.
The report also indicated that these breakers functioned within the acceptable response time subsequent to performing' maintenance on the breakers. On March 18, McGuire Unit 2 reported that one RTS breaker (DS type) failed to open upon deenergizing I
the undervoltage coil and on March 19 McGuire Unit 1 reported a failure of one RTS breaker.
On March 24, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Unit I reported failure to trip of an AK-2 type breaker.
l (2) Fa.ilures not previously reported to the NRC and identified thus far in the bulletin responses include.the following: ANO Unit 1 identified one RTS breaker that failed to open and which was subsequently tested 10 times succesyfully after.which it was surveillance tested daily until the breaker was ultimately replaced.
McGuire Unit 2 identified a breaker failure that occurred during preoperational testing after which it was reworked and placed into service on February 18, 1983 (this is the same breaker for which we received a failure notification on March 18).
Calvert Cliffs ident,1fied four. events involving the undervoltage trip device.
Two of.the' events occurred on Unit 2 and were described as sluggish trips which did achieve the protective system trip function. The other two events occurred one on each unit and resulted in the failure of the undervoltage device to trip the breaker. Three Mile Island Unit 1.
identified a failure which occurred on November 19, 1976, during post
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IN 83-18 April 1, 1983
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Page 3 of 4 maintenance testing and which was stated to be due to binding caus'ed by trans-porting and installing the breaker. Oconee Unit 3 identified one failure which occurred on December 17, 1978, for which the failure mechanism was not deter-mined and the breaker was replaced.
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It should be noted that IEB 83-01 failed to request information on previous I
failures of DB type RTS breakers which had not been reputed to the NRC, as IEB 83-04 did for other type RTS breakers. Any infomatian on previously unreported events of sluggish operation of all breaker types would be useful to the NRC..
The information from these plants shows that in some instances breaker trip I
operation and timing may be erratic when breakers are tested by tripping the UV trip attachment. Although all of the GE AK-2 breakers did trip at Calvert Cliffs, the breaker trip times varied significantly from one test to the next.
At McGuire, a Westinghouse D5-416 breaker intemittently failed to trip on successive tests. At ANO 1, an AK-2 breaker which tested successfully in vitie's. ?to the IE bulletin, failed a few days later during unrelated acti-res.ppnse The root cause of these failures has not yet been determined.
NRC meetings and discussions with various regulatory review groups,. licensees',
and vendors have pointed out the importance of certain aspects of breaker j
operation, maintenance and design. The breaker tests at Calvert Cliffs 1 and 2 and Maine Yankee showed that although all of the AK-2 breakers did trip, the trip times of some b~reakers varied'significantly from one test to.the next, up i
to a maximum of approximately 25 seconds. This type of sluggish operatpon.is not acceptable. There are some indications that if the pick-up voltage for the AK-2 UV device is not set accurately, sluggish and erratic response times may occur.
It is our understanding that the proper response time of the AK-2 breaker is less than 100 milliseconds. General Electric has described problems with lubricants used in breakers which become sticky after about 100 months of exposure. RTS breaker tests of the UV attachment which measure trip times may be a means of detecting a precursor of failure of the breaker to trip.
Preliminary study of breaker problems indicates the necessity of ' regular, careful maintenance of RTS b m akers. To reduce the likelihood of RTS breaker failure, Combustion Engineering and Babcox and Wilcox (in cooperation with General Electric), and Westinghouse have developed updated maintenance proce-dures which are expected to be available within a short time.
y The NRC has met with both General Electric and Westinghouse and learned that i,'
there may be limitations associated with the design life of the UV devices and with the luw design margin in terms of the torque available to trip the breaker
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by the UV device. Periodic replacement of UV devices may be necessary due to wear.
Consultation with the vendor is recommended. The torque available to trip the General Electric AK-2 breaker by the UV device is critical to proper operation. General Electric has indicated that breaker trip bar torque measure-ments are needed periodically (quarterly) to detect the onset of problems.
Preliminary review of the Salem event has pointed to one other area of plant operations that is important for detecting RTS breaker operational degradation and for preventing failures. The Salem precursor event of February 22, 1983,
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1 IN 83-18 April 1, 1983 Page 4 of 4 was not recognized as a failure until after the February 25 event. A thorough post-trip analysis including close scrutiny of the events recorder, could have detected the problem associated with RTS breakers.
It is suggested that holders of operating licenses or construction permits review this information for applicability to their facilities.
No written response to this notice is required.
If you have any questions ri regarding this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate Regional Office, or this office.
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Divisio of Emergency Preparedness and gineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical
Contact:
G. Lanik, IE (301) 492-9636
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued Information Notices e
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Attachment IN 83-18 April 1, 1983 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
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IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No.
Subject Issue Issued to 83-17 Electrical Control Logic 03/31/83 All power reactor Problem Resulting in Inoper-facilities holding h
able Auto-Start of Emergency an OL or CP Diesel Generator Units 1
83-16 Contamination of the Auburn 03/30/83 All Material Steel Property with Cobalt-60 licensees 83-15 Falsified Pre-Employment 03/25/83 All power reactor Screening Records facilities holding an OL or CP 83-14 Dewatered Spent Ion Exchange 03/21/83 All power reactor Resin Susceptibility to facilities holding Exothermal Chemical Reaction an OL or CP 83-13 Design Misapplication of 03/21/83 All power reactor Bergen-Paterson Standard facilities holding Strut Restraint Clamp an OL or CP 83-12 Incorrect Boron Standards 03/18/83 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 83-11 Possible Seismic Vulner-03/14/83 All power reactor ability of Old Lead Storage facilities holding Batteries an OL or CP 83-10 Clarification of Several 03/11/83 All NRC-licensed Aspects Relating to Use of facilities and NRC-Certified Transport registered users Packages of NRC-Certified transport packages 83-09 Safety and Security of 03/09/83 All power reactor f*
Irradiators facilities holding an OL or CP 83-08 Component Failures Caused 03/09/83 All power reactor by Elevated DC Control facilities holding Voltage an OL or CP i
OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit
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STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS CHARLES E. ROSSI e
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I have been with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) since g
October 1980.
Since August 1981 I have been a Section leader in the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, Division of Systems Integrat Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
I am responsible for supervising til(-
i review of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system designs Ifor compliance with regulatory criteria. From' October 1980 to August 1981 I was a Principal Reactor Engineer in the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branc I performed the operating license review of the Callaway and Wolf Creek instrumentation and control system designs, the review of construction pe applicant responses to Three Mile Island Lessons Learned Items related to instrumentation and control systems, and the review of licensee responses to recorrnendations made by Babcock and Hilcox resulting from failure modes and
!j, effects analyses of the Integrated Control System.
I have a Ph.D degree (1969) and M.E degree (1967) in Applied Physics from l
Harvard University, a M.S degree (1962) in Physics from George Washington University and a B.A degree Magna cum Laude Highest Honors (1958) in and Applied Physics from Harvard University.
I have a certificate from a six month reactor engineering course given by the Bettis Atomic Power 1
Laboratory (1960).
I was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in 1958 and Sigma Xi in 1962.
From June 1958 to July 1962 I served as a commissioned officer in the United States Navy.
I was assigned to Naval Reactors, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, where I reviewed and approved test and 'o'perating procedures for submarine nuclear power plant fluid systems and reactor instrumentation and 8
control systems designs for the pressurized water reactor at Shippingport, PA.
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Professional Qualifications Charles E. Rossi From Septeuber 1966 to November 1977 I held professional and management positions in the Nuclear Energy Systess division of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. As' a manager I supervised the preparation of system i
functional design requirements for nuclear reactor plant systems which affect plant control, protection, and transient perfomance.
In addition to reactor l
control and protection systems, these systems included emergency feedwater systems, emergency boration systems, and steam dump systems. For four years I was the lead engineer responsible for establishing functional requirements for reactor control and protection systems used in the Westinghouse 3 loop nuclear reactor plants and for performing transient and accident analyses of these plants for safety analysis reports submitted to the Atomic Energy Comission.
i From November 1977 to October 1980 I was Systems and Civilian Applications Program Manager in the Office of Inertial Fusion at the U. S. Department of Energy.
In this position. I provided technical and administrative direction for studies of the comercial applications of inertial confinement fusion.
I am a member of the American Nuclear Society and past member of the IEEE Nuclear Power Engineering Committee Standards Subcomittee (SC-6) on' Safety Related Systems.
I have authored or co-authored over ten technical articles for presentation at conferences or publication in journals.
I was a co-inventor for U.S. Patent 4,222,822 " Method for Operating a' Nuclear Reactor to Accommodate Load Follow While Maintaining a Substantially Constant Axial Power Distribution."
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