ML20023A794
| ML20023A794 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1982 |
| From: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| References | |
| TASK-15-16, TASK-RR LSO5-82-10-036, LSO5-82-10-36, NUDOCS 8210200025 | |
| Download: ML20023A794 (5) | |
Text
s October 14, 1982
. Docket No. 50-409 LS05-82-10-036 Mr. Frank Linder General Manager Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue South Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601
Dear Hr. Linder:
SUBJECT:
SEP TOPIC XV-16. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF SMALL LINES CARRYING PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE CONTAliciENT - LACROSSE Enclosed is the staff's evaluation of SEP Topic XV-16 for the Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor. This evaluation is based on our review of your topic safety assessment report submitted by letter dated harch 9,1982, and an independent analysis made by the staff.
The evaluation concludes that your facility meets current licensing criteria for this topic.
This evaluation will be a basic input to the integrated safety assessment for your facility unless you identify changes needed to reflect the as-built conditions at your facility. This assessment may be revised in the future if your facility design is changed or if NRC criteria relating to this subject is modified before the integrated assessment is completed.
Sincerely, s
Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enclosure:
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Mr. Frank Linder cc Fritz Schubert, Esquire U. S. Environmental Protection Staff Attorney Agency Dairyland Power Cooperative Federal Activities Branch.
2615 East Avenue South Region V Office La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative 200 $3uth Dearborn Street O. S. Heistand, Jr., Esquire Chicago, Illinois 60604 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N. W.
James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III Washington, D. C.
20036 799 Roosevelt Road Mr. John Parkyn Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor Dairyland Power Cooperative Mr. Ralph S. Decker P. O. Box 275 Route 4 Box 190D Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Cambridge, Maryland 21613 Mr. George R. Nygaard Charles Bechhoefer, Esq., Chairman Coulee Region Energy Coalition Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 2307 East Avenue U. 3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission La' Crosse, Wisconsin 54601 Washingten D. C.
20555 Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Dr. George C. Anderson Kendal at Longwood, Apt. 51 Department of Oceanography Kenneth Square, Pennsylvania 19348 University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Rural Route #1, Box 276 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Town Chairman Town of Genoa Route 1 Genoa, Wisconsin 54632 Chairman, Public Service Commission of Wisconsin Hill Farms State Office Building Madison, Wisconsin 53702 9
I.
i l
SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC XV-lb LACROSSE TOPIC: XV-16, RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE OF SMALL LINES CARRYING PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT I.
INTRODUCTION Rupture of lines carrying primary coolant outside containment can allow primary coolant and the radioactivity contained therein to escape to the environment. SEF Topic XV-16 is intended to review the radiological consequences of such failures. The review of this topic encompassed those lines which carry primary coolant outside containment during power operation. The scope included those lines that are not normally expected to be open to the primary system, but can be opened during power operation (i.e., reactor coolant sample lines, instrument lines, etc.).
II.
REVIEW CRITERION All small lines carrying primary coolant outside containment were considered, to ensure that,any release of radioactivity from their postulated failure was a small fraction of the 10 CFR Psrt 100 exposure guidelines. Small fraction is defined in the Standard Review Plan (SRP) to be no more than 10% of the 10 CFR Part 100 exposure guidelines.
III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES Lines which were excluded from this review included lines for which failure outside containment is not postulated, or lines for which interlocks prevent opening during power operation. The review also did not consider the release of radioisotopes from large pipes carrying primary system fluid prior to automatic isolation of such lines, (e.g.,
the main steam and feedwater lines of BWR). The consequences from failures in these lines are considered in SEP Topic XV-18, " Radiological Consequences of Main Steam Line Failure Outside Containment."
Atmospheric diffusion parameters were evaluated using methods described in Regulatory Guide 1.3.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review was conducted in accordance with SRP 15.6.2 and Regulatory Guide 1.11.
V.
EVALUATION In the submittal, the licensee indicated that at present there are no small lines which, if ruptured, could release significiant quantities
o of radioactive materials.
The licensee further stated that, in the i
near future, as a result of the requirements of post-TMI Primary Coolant Sampling System, a small 3/8-inch water sample line will be run between the primary sample sink inside containment to a j
sample system outside containment near the electrical penetration panel to a quick-disconnect sample cylinder inside the feedwater heater area. A break of this sampling line, upstream of the outboard isolation valve, would be the most severe case of the small line rupture outside containment.
Because of a lack of inboard isolation valves, the discharge from the break would continue until the reactor vessel is depressurized and action can be taken to stop the leak.
We estimate that approximately 30,000 pounds of primary coolant would be released outside the containment as a result of such a small line break.
Lacrosse has adopted the two-tier dose equivalent I-131 (D.E.1-131) primary coolant concentration limits in accordance with the BWR i
standard technical specifications (STS).
The staff has, therefore, evaluated the consequences of the small line break event for a primary coolant D.E.1-131 concentration of 0.2 pCi/gm.
l The assunptions used by the staff are sunmarized in Table 1 and the i
calculated doses are summarized in Table.
l VI.
CONCLUSIONS The calculated thyroid doses (provided in Table 2) show that the thyroid doses at the exclusion area boundary of 22.4 rems, and at the low population l
zone boundary of 0.65 rems, are within the SRP stated criterion of 10% of
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the dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100. We conclude, therefore, that the design of the proposed sample line is acceptable.
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. TABLE 1 Assumptions Used in the Radiological Consequences of Small Line Break Outside the Containment for Lacrosse 1.
Reactor Water Inventory 63,000 lbs 2.
Reactor Water Cleanup Rate 40 gpm 3.
lodine Spiking Factor 500 4.
Amount of Leakage 30,000 lbs 5.
Flash Fraction 39 %
6.
Duration of Accident 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> 7.
Diffusion Parameters, X/Q 0-2 hours (at J38 meter Exclusion 1.9x10-3 sec/n3 Area Boundary) 3 0-8 hours (at 4827 meter outer 5.6x10-5 sec/m Boundary of Low Population Zone) 8.
Primary Coolant Concentration 0.2pC1/gm TABLE 2 Radiological Consequences of Small Line Break Outside the Containment for Lacrosse Dose to Thyroid Rems Exclusion Area Bounddry 22.4 Low Population Zone Boundary 0.65 l