ML20011F541

Amend 51 to License NPF-30,allowing Continued Operation for 72 H for Diagnosis & Repair W/Control Rod Assemblies Inoperable

ML20011F541
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	02/22/1990
From:	Hannon J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20011F542	List: ML20011F541 ML20011F543 ML20011F546
References
NUDOCS 9003060238
Download: ML20011F541 (9)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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l UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY 1

CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. STN 50-483 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE f

Amendment No.

Si License No. NPF-30' j

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment filed by Union Electric Company (UE, thelicensee)datedAugust2,1989assupplementedDecember28, 1909 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the appliention, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulatioris of the Comission; 4

C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) tiet the an.ivities authorized by this emendment can be conducted widiout endangering the health and safety of tha public, and (ii) tt:t such 6ctivities will be cor. ducted in compliance with the Comission's rcgulations; D.

The issuance of this tmendment will not be inimical to the cormon defense and recurity or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The tssuence of this am9ndmert is in tecordance with 10 CFR Part bi of tna Comir,sion's regulations and '41 hpplicable requirements have been satir,fied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-tions as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and para-graph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-30 is hereby amended to read as follows:

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. (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 51, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of whic'i are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into the license. UE shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k.

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John N. Hannon, Director Project Directorate 111-3 Division of Reactor Projects - 111, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

February 22. 1990 c

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 51 OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-30 DOCKET NO. 50-483 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

REMOVE INSERT 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-15 3/4 1-15 B 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 1-4 P

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. REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ,4.1.2.6 Each required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

i a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1)

Verifying the boron concentration in the water.

2)'

Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and 1

l 3)

Verifying the Boric Acid Storage System solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is either less than 37'F or greater than 100'F.

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-CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-13 1

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS-3/4.1.~ 3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES GROUP HEIGHT-LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.1. All full-length shutdown and contrcl rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within i 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

' ACTION:

The ACTION to be taken is based on the cause of inoperability of control rods as follows:

Any immovability of a control rod initially invokes ACTION Statement 3.1.3.1.a.

Subsequently. ACTION Statement 3.1.3.1.a may be exited and ACTION Statement 3.1.3.1.d invoked if either the rod control urgent failure alarm is illuminated or an electrical problem is detected in the rod control system.

CAUSE.0F IN0PERABT' ITY ACTION More Than One Rod One Rod 1.

Immovable 6s a result of excessive friction (a)

(a) or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, 2.

Misaligned by more than i 12 steps (c)

(b)

(indicated position) from its group step counter demand height or from any other rod in its group.

3.

Inoperable due to a rod control urgent (d)

(d) failure alarm or other electrical problem in the rod control system, but trippable.

ACTION a - Determine that the SHUTOOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and-be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, g

ACTION b - Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

ACTION c - POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within 1 hour:

1.

The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or

• See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-14 Amendment No. 51

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ACTION (Continued) l 2.. The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within i12 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and' insertion limits of Figures 3.1-1 and 3.1-2.

The THERMAL, POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or 3.

The rod is. declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN require-ment of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

a) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confinn that the previously analyzed results of these accidents remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions; b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable N

incoredetectorsandF(Z)andF are verified to be q

H within their limits within 72' hours; and d) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4~ hours the High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION d - Restore the inoperable rods to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.1.1 The position of each full-length rod shall be determined to be within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> except during time intervals when the rod position

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deviation monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

4.1.3.1.2 Each full-length rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-15 Amendment No. 51

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TABLE 3.1-1 l

ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE FULL-LENGTH ROD Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or from Cracks in

'Large Pipes Which Actuates the Emergency Core Cooling System Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures-(Loss of Coolant Accident)'

g Major Secondary Coolant System Pipe Ruptura Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection)

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-16

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.c REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASIS BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one Boration System is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity l

condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single Boron Injection System becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable in MODES 4, 5, and 6 provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or an RHR suction relief valve.

The boron capability required below 200 F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200'F to 140'F.

This condition requires either 2968 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the

, boric acid storage tanks or 14,076 gallons of 2350 ppm borated water from the l

RWST.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated i

within Containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of l

iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boration System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

l-3/4.1. 3 M0VABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES l

The specifications of this section ensure that:

(1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated acci-dent analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits. Verification that the Digital Rod Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within + 12 24, 48, 120 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 1E, steps at 210 and 228 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurance that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.

Since the Digital Rod Position System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 210 steps, only points in the indi-cated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded position.

Shutdown and control rods are positioned at 225 steps or higher for fully with-drawn.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. #, 44

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' REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

_ BASES -

MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

For purposes of determining compliance with Specification 3.1.3.1, any imovability of a control rod initially invokes ACTION statement 3.1.3.1.a.

Subsequently, ACTION statement 3.1.3.1.a may be exited and ACTION statement 3.1.3.1.d invoked if either the rod control urgent failure alarm is illuminated or an electrical problem is detected in the rod control system.

The rod is considered trippable if the rod was demonstrated OPERABLE during the last performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.1.2 and met the rod drop time criteria of Specification 3.1.3.4 during the last performance of Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.4.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in _ THERMAL POWER. These restrictions

~ provide assurance of fuel rod. integrity during continued operation.

In addition..

those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation..

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used'in the safety analyses. Measurement with T greater than or avg equal to 551*F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the y,,

measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.

These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No. 51

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