ML20011E213
| ML20011E213 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1990 |
| From: | Murray B, Ricketson L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011E211 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-89-47, 50-368-89-47, NUDOCS 9002090177 | |
| Download: ML20011E213 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1989047
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APPENDIX B
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-313/89-47
Operating Licenses: DPR-51
50-368
Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)
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P.O. Box 551
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Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
~ Facility Name:.' Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO)
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Inspection At: AND Site, Russellville, Arkansas
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Inspection Conducted:
December 13-14, 1989
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inspector;
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icketh'on\\ Ra'diation Specialist
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Facili 4 d and Rkdiological Protection Section
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Approved:
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Protection Section
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted December 13-14, 1989 (Report 50-313/89-47: 50-368/89-47)
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced inspection of the events surrounding the
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release of radioactive material into an uncontrolled area.
Results: Within the area inspected, one licensee and one inspector violation
were identified.
(See paragraph 3).
The licensee's program for the identification and investigation of problem
areas functioned well. However, the licensee's program for surveying and
control of radioactive materials and contamination necds increased attention.
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9002090177 900119
ADOCK 05000313
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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- N.~S. Carns, Director of Nuclear Operations
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- R. A. Sessoms, Central Operations Manager
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- T. C. Baker, Technical Assistant
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- J.
J._ Fisicaro, Manager, Licensing
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- H. L. Hollis, Manager, Security
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- J. D. Jacks, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Specialist
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- E. E. Bickel, Superintendent Radiation Protection (RP) and Radwaste
- R. Carroll, Health Physics (HP) Specialist, Nuclear Oversight
- J. Dorset, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- 0. W. Cypret, Senior HP Specialist
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D. Sne111ngs, Jr., Corporate Health Physicist
Others
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R. C. Smith, Task Leader, Babcock & Wilcox (B&W)
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R. V. Fite Engineer, B&W
E. A. Nickles, Nuclear Field Service Represantative, B&W
R. E. G1111spie, Field Engineer, B&W
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A. L. Stults, Daniels, Maintenance Support Group
T. R. Rose, Nuclear Support Services
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting on December 14, 1989.
2.
Reason for Special Inspection
On December II,1989, the licensee notified Region IV that it had
identified an apparent violation involving a failure to follow procedures
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concerning the release of radioactive material from a controlled area and
was initiating an investigation of the incident to determine the cause and
effects of the apparent violation.
The inspector obtained the following
details through interviews with the individuals involved.
Times.given are
approximate, unless otherwise stated.
On December 10, 1089, two contract workers (Individuals A and B),
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contacted an HP technician and asked him to assist them in obtaining seven
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control rod drive-mechanisms flange covers (CRDMFCs) from the contractor's
storage box in the licensee's "old radioactive waste building" (ORWB).
The components of the CRDMRCs were shipped to ANO on approximately
December 1,1989, as low specific activity (LSA) material from Germany,
where they were last used.
Aiding Individuals A and B was a maintenance support worker (Individual C)
employed by another contractor. The HP and Individual C signed in on
their respective radiation work permits (RWPs) and entered the restricted
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area surrounding the ORWB at approximately 3:30 p.m. and removed CRDMFCs
components from the LSA container. All individuals interviewed stated
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that the.HP technician performed surveys of the components, including
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taking them to a separate frisking area within the controlled area
boundary. The HP technician determined that the components were not
radioactively contaminated (less than 1000 disintegration per minute [dpm]
per 100 square centimeters [cm ), removable activity) and released the
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parts to Individuals A and B, who had not entered the controlled area.
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Individuals A and B took the parts to their office space located in the
maintenance facility, a nonradiological controlled area, and Individual B
began to assemble them with the help of Individual D, another contractor
employee.
Individuals B and D stated that they remained in the office
area or nearby and did not enter other controlled areas for the rest of
the day.
Individual D was attempting to leave the protected area shortly
after 7 p.m., when the portal radiation monitor alarmed. He made a
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second attempt after resetting the monitor. The alarm again sounded. He
asked security personnel to contact HP.
HP arrived, performed surveys, and identified contamination on
Individual D's jacket cuff. Besides the few hundred counts above
background of general contamination, a discrete particle measuring
approximately 20 nanocuries was found. A set of clothing normally worn
under anti-C coveralls which Individual D had worn earlier, and later
placed in his briefcase were also found to be slightly contaminated. The
individual was taken for a body count and the results indicated a body
burden of 0.3 percent maximum permissible for cobalt-60. The cobalt-60
was identified as external contamination. The individual's termination
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whole body count performed on December 14, 1989, did not identify any
contamination.
When questioned by the licensee, Individual D stated that he had worked in
the radiological controlled area earlier in the day, but had successfully
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passed through a high sensitivity personnel contamination monitor (PCM)
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afterward.
Individual D then told HP of the work he performed on the
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CRDMFCs in the contractor office.
Representatives from HP surveyed the
area and found no contamination other than on the CDRMFCs and.a small
amount on a piece of tape.
Individuals working in the area were directed
to proceed for whole body counts.
Those working on the night shif t were
counted first. Those on the day shift were directed to go when they
arrived the next morning.
Individual B was the oily person found with contamination.
Contamination
was found on his pants which he had also worn the previous day.
Once the
contamination was identified, HP surveyed his rental car, motel room, and
clothing. General contamination was found on the shirt he wore while
working on the CRDMFCs and a discrete source was found in the seat of his
car and retained for analysis.
The analysis determined that the source
was approximately 24 nanocuries of cobalt-60.
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Even though Individual A had carried most of the components of the CRDMFCs
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to the office, he was not found to be contaminated. He, like the rest of
the day shift, was not surveyed (whole body counted) until the following
day, but stated that he wore the same clothes as the previous day.
3.
Discussion
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During the interview, the HP technician responsible for performing the
initial survey and releasing the components of the CRDMFCs on
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December 10, 1989, stated that on December 11, 1989, he re-surveyed the
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components plus others still in the storage box and found radioactive
contamination ranging to 80,000 dpm per 100 cm2
When questioned by the
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inspector concerning the apparent ease with which he and other HP
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technicians had found contamination following his initial surveys, he
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stated that he did not know why he had not discovered the contamination on
the previous day, unless he had the disks spread similar to a deck of
cards, slightly overlapping, and failed to do a thorough survey.
He also
conceded that he might not have surveyed as carefully because Individual B
had told him (incorrectly) that the components were new and therefore not
likely to be contaminated.
Tne licensee stated that the health physicist
had always been a competent worker.
The licensee's Procedure 1622.017, " Operation of a Control Point,"
Revision 5, sets forth in Section 7.6 the requirements for the
unconditional release of material from a radiological controlled area.
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does not allow the release of material which has removable beta or gamma
contamination levels in excess of 1000 dpm/100 cm2
The licensee
identified to the.NRC the apparent violation for failure to follow the
requirements of this procedure and initiated corrective action.
Because
the apparent violation was self-identified and the licensee has taken
effective corrective actions, the NRC has elected to use its discretion in
accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.G.1 and not cite the
violation.
During the ir.terview, Individual C acknowledged that he had not performed
a whole body frisk after completing work under RWP 892249 issued
November 27, 1989, which covered work activities associated with minor
maintenance, as required.
Licensee representatives stated that they had
determined that the reason the individual had not performed the frisk was
because he had not read the RWP and was unaware that frisking was
required. The licensee's Procedure 1000.031, " Radiation Protection
Manual," Revision 9, requires in Section 6.7.2.B that all workers review
and follow the RWP requirements.
RWP 892249, under which Individual C was
working, requires that all personnel perform a whole body frisk whenever
exiting any radiological controlled area outside controlled access.
Technical Specifications 6.10 and 6.11 for ANO Units 1 and 2 require that
procedures for personnel radiation safety shall be adhered to for all
operations involving personnel radiation safety. The failure to follow
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procedures is an apparent violation of Technical Specications 6.10
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and 6.11 (313/8947-02; 368/8947-02).
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Individual C had changed clothes in a break room assigned to his employer,
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before successfully clearing the portal monitors at the secondary guard
house.
The licensee stated that this area would be surveyed.
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The licensee demonstrated to the inspector that a discrete source of the
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size of that was found in Individual B's rental car could pass through the
portal monitors undetected. Currently, the portal monitors are calibrated
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to detect a source of 200 nanocuries in the centerline of the monitor and
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will detect smaller sources only if they are positioned sufficiently close
to the detectors, as-in the case of Individual D.
During the interview,
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Individual B stated that he had gone through a portal monitor before
exiting the protected area and there had been no alarm.
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The inspector observed other possible ways radioactive contamination could
be allowed offsite, by way of the secondary guard station. The inspector
first noted that the portal monitors were positioned so that individuals
could bypass them and exit through the turnstiles.
The inspector
determined that bypassing the portal monitors could go undetected by
securit/ personnel. The potential for this appeared less likely in the
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primary guard station because the portal monitors were arranged so that
they could not be easily bypassed.
The insoector and a licensee representative also demonstrated that it was
possible for an individual to step through the portal monitor too quickly
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to be surveyed, set off an alarm on the portal monitor (which
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automatically turns off after the next counting cycle), and still exit
without being questioned by security personnel.
Individual D stated that
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after he had repeatedly set off the alarm, he had to call-to the security
personnel present and ask them to contact HP.
He further speculated that
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he could have left unimpeded.
Licensee representatives stated that they
were evaluating the repositioning of the portal monitors so that they
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might be more easily observed. The licensee's actions to ensure that all
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individuals leaving the protected area pass through the portal monitors
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and are observed by security personnel is considered an unresolved item
(313/8947-02; 368/8947-02).
The inspector reviewed the results of dose calculations performed by the
licensee which indicate the dose resulting from 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of exposure to
radioactive sources of about 20 nanocuries would be on the order of
0.673 rads to a small area of unshielded skin (0.079 rads if shielded by
clothing). Whole body dose would be negligible.
As a result of this incident, the licensee has taken or plans to take the
following actions:
The licensee has reviewed with the HP technicians the requirements
for releasing items from controlled areas.
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The licensee identified a need for clearer delineation of who has
authority to relet te material from various locations.
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The licensee will evaluate ways of tightening controls over
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restricted areas outside controlled access, such as the ORSB.
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The licensee will evaluate ways to improve observation and control of
portal monitors at the secondary guard stations.
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4.
Conclusions
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'The discrete source found in an individual's car would not have resulted
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in any significant exposures. However, the failure to identify the source
along with the release of the contaminated CRDMFCs, served to identify
portions of the licensee's program which need increased management
attention.
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5.
Exit
The inspector met _with the licensee's representatives denoted in
paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection oa December 14, 1989, and
summarized the setpe and findings of the inspection as presented in this
report. . The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materialt,
provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector during the inspection.
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