ML20010J078
| ML20010J078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1981 |
| From: | Leasburg R VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010J069 | List: |
| References | |
| 504, NUDOCS 8109290572 | |
| Download: ML20010J078 (3) | |
Text
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,; p VIMOINIA ELECTMIC AND Powan COMPANY Rucuxoxu, VINGINIA 20261
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September 4, 1981 g,,
vaca Passionat Nrca. san OyssArtone Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Serial No. 504 Office of Inspection and Enforcement N0/RMT:acm U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis
- n Docket Nos. 50-338 Region II 50-339 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 License Nos. NPF-4 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 NPF-7
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
We have reviewed your letter of August 6,1981 in reference to the inspection conducted at North Anna Power Station between July 6-10,1981 and reported in IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/81-18 and 50-339/81-15. Our response to the specific infraction is attached.
We have determined that no proprietary information is contained in the re-ports. Accordingly, the Virginia Electric and Power Company has no objection to these inspection reports being made a matter of public disclosure.
The information contained in the attached pages is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Very truly yours, R. H. Leasburg Attachrrent Ci'.y of Richmond Commonwealth of Virginia d
Acknowledged before me this I
day of.b., 19 8 /
Ld 7h h Notary Public My Commission expires:
4 - A4, 19 W SEAL cc:
Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.3 Division of Licensing 8109290572 810924 PDR ADOCK 05000338 G
PDR-
Attcchment Page 1 RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION ITEM REPORTED DURING NRC INSPECTION CONDUCTED FROM JULY 6-10, 1981 NRC COMMENT Technical Specification Section 3.7.15 requires all fire barrier penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire docrs and fire dampers) in fire zone boundaries protecting safety related areas to be functional at all times.
If the required fire barrier becomes non-functional, a continuous fire watch must be posted on at least one side of the affected penetration.
For Unit 2, in lieu of a continuous fire watch, the operability of the fire detectors on at least one side can be verified and an heurly fire watch patrol can be_
established.
Contrary to the above, the following fire doors were found by the inspectors to be non-functional in that the latching devices for these doors were in-operative and the doors were not fully closed and latched, and the actions specified in the limiting conditions for operation had not been established:
- 1) Fire door between turbine building and Unit 2 emergency switchgear room -
Door S-53-11.
- 2) Fire door between turbine building and diesel generator rooms 2J and 2H -
Doors T-16 and T-18.
- 3) Fire doors between emergency switchgear rooms and stairway - Doors S-54-6 and S-54-7.
This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I.E.)
RESPONSE
1.
ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEG_ED VIOLATION The Notice of Violation is correct stated.
a 2.
REASONS FOR THE VIOLATION
- 1) Fire door S-53-ll between the Unit 2 emergency switchgear room and the turbine building is used extensively during maintenance periods and it sustained damage to the strike plate.
This caused an occasional failure of the door to latch.
- 2) The fire doors between the turbine building and diesel generator rooms 2H and 2J (T-18 and T-16) sustain damage when the diesels are running when access into the area is required. The differential pressure caused by air induction into the diesels causes the door to slam shut, distorting the door and damaging its hardware. All four diesel generator room doors and their frames have been replaced within the past year and they remain a constant maintenance problem.
On door T-18, (D.G. 2H) the magnetic latch became unreliable causing oc-casional failure of the door to latch. On door T-10 (D.G. 2J) the door was distorted severely and the latch was completely broken.
Attcchm:nt Pegs 2
- 3) Fire doors between emergency switchgear rooms and stairway (doors S-54-6 and S-54-7) have card readers installed, but they were never put into use. This infraction was the result of an administrative error.
3.
CORRECTIVE STEPS TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED
- 1) A new strike plate was placed on fire door S-53-ll between the Unit 2 emergency switchgear room and the turbine building which allows the door to fully latch when closed.
- 2) The magnetic latch on the 2H diesel room door has been repaired and it now latches upon closure. The 2J diesel room door has been temporar-ily repaired by the removal of its latching hardware and installation of a steel bar across its frame. This bar maintains the door firmly in its frame and it is considered " latched" for fire prottetion purposes. Metal plates have been welded over the hardware openings to maintain the three hour rating on the door.
- 3) Metal plates have been welded across the magnetic latches on doors S-54-6 and S-54-7 leading from the emergency switchgear rooms to the back stairway. These doors now cannot be " pushed" open, but the knob must be turned to unlatch and open the door.
4.
CORRECTIVE STEPS WHICH WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS A new fire door has been ordered for the 2J diesel room (door T-16).
Also, an Engineering Work Request has been written to add an inner door to each diesel generator room to minimize suction damage from the diesel intake. This extra door would provide an air lock whereby there would be a closed door to prevent an air in-rush whenever the rooms are entered with the diesel in operation.
5.
DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVED Full compliance has been achieved. The 2J diesel room fire door ir temporarily repaired, but it is considered functional at this time. A new door will replace the damaged one by October 31, 1981.