ML20010F280

Forwards LER 81-127/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

ML20010F280
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	08/31/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20010F281	List: ML20010F280 ML20010F290
References
NUDOCS 8109090560
Download: ML20010F280 (3)

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WILLI AM O. PA R M E R, ,J R.

WCF PRE S# DF N T TELEPaoNE: AncA 704 SYtaw PaoouCYsoN 373-4063 August 31, 1981 Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director a D U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'y ,. ,

Region II

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Atlanta, Georgia 30303 b 5 P 0 91981> $

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Re: Mc"f re Nuclear Station Unit 1 5( s,s.ensaans ==-

act No. 50-369 99B~

Dear Mr. O' Dilly:

Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81-127. This report concerns T.S. 3.0.4, " Entry into an operational mode or other specified condition shall not be made unless the conditions of the limiting condition for operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the action requirements." This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, 1 ke ,

PBN/php Attaclunent cc: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management and Program Analysis Nuclear Safety. Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 Washington, D. C. 20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 Ms. M. J. Graham Resident-Inspector-NRC McGuire Nuclear Station

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION-

' REPORTABLE. OCCURRENCE-REPORT NUMBER: 81-127

' REPORT DATE: August 31, 1981' OCCURRENCE DATE: . August 14, 1981; August- 16, 1981

-FACILITY: McGuire Unit 1;.Cornelius, NC IDENTIFICATION OF' OCCURRENCE: The Unit entered mode 2 from mode 3 with

' train "B" of the Control Area Ventilation (VC) System inoperable. The outside air filters on "B" train of the VC System had been changed but

[notretestedpriortotwo_startupsasrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification l- '3.0.4.

i CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: Mode' 2,~Startup DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: The Unit #1 reactor was. started up (changed from l

mode 3 to mode 2) on August. 14, 1981 and aga'in on August 16, 1981 with one

( train of VC inoperable. During Zero Power Physics. Testing on August 14, 1981

! some laaks were fou'nd in the pressurizer' level instrument tubing. After the repairs were complete'the reactor was brought up to criticality. The operators i on duty checked the Technical Specification Action Item Log and noted that one trail of VC was inoperable. They-then checked the Technical Specifications and misconstrued them to mean that the inoperable train of VC would not prevent a mode change.

i-( On August _16, 1981 the reactor was restarted following a trip that was part of the Zero Power Physics Test program. The operators on duty again evaluated j the items in the Technical Specification Action' Item Log and misinterpreted

i. the specifications regarding a mode change with one train *i VC inoperable.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: The incidents were-caused by misinterpretation of the Technical Specifications by Operations personnel.

l ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: On August 12, 1981, Operators noticed that the pressure drop (AP) across.the outside' air filters on the "B" train of VC '

L was approaching the Technical Specification limit of four inches water column.

Performance was notified that the filters would be. changed and a work request-

-was written to cover.the work. Performance measured the AP across the filters and pointed'out to the-Shift Supervisor.that the filters still met the limits for operability. Performance requested that Operations swap.to "A" train of

VC and void _the work. request'already written because they wanted to complete-a new filter testing procedure before writing a work request to change the filttrs, and scheduling the retest required by the filter change. The per-

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i formance personnel thought that'this arrangement had beenl agreed upon but 1

the original 1 work request _was processed and the "B"3 train filters were changed-

on August 12,.1981. - The work request was then processed through'the normal

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--retest. program channels and Performance was informed on August 14, 1981 that

- the "B" train outside air filters had been replaced and a' retest was required 9 ' '

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- Report Number 81-127 Page_2 l'

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by August 19, 1981. Performance decided to do the test on August 17, 1981

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-when the new procedure would be available. The erroneous interpretation'of

..the Technical Specifications by the first Shift Supervisor may have influenced the opinion of the'second Shif t Supervisor on the same shif t and also the opinion of-the Shift Supervisor.on the following shift. . Shift Supervisors involved with both of the startups were together when the first startup-

. (August 14, 1981) occurred since the shift turnover was in progress at that time.

SAFETY ANALYSIS: - The outside air filters on "B" train of.VC were functional throughout.the incident as verified by subsequent testing. Therefore, VC train "B" was actually functional and the safe operation of the plant as well

- as the health and safety of the public were not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTION: All Operations personnel including the individuals involved in this incident will be cautioned to read and interpret Technical Specifica-tions carefully. - Personnel will also be encouraged to evaluate _ decisions independently and not be swayed by the opinions of others.

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