ML20010B580

Advises That Save the Valley Petition Has Been Forwarded to Director of IE for Consideration

ML20010B580
Person / Time
Site:	Marble Hill
Issue date:	06/04/1981
From:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
To:	Dattilo T DATTILO, T.M., SAVE THE VALLEY - SAVE MARBLE HILL
Shared Package
ML20010B572	List: ML20010B571 ML20010B575 ML20010B578 ML20010B580
References
NUDOCS 8108170265
Download: ML20010B580 (1)

Text

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UNITED STATES

[ \\ w.( j' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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wassmcToN. o.c. 20sss j'

June 4, 1981 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY Mr. Thomas M.

Dattilo 311 East Main Street Madison, Indiana 47250

Dear Mr. Dattilo:

The Commission has received the petition you filed on behalf of Save the Valley requesting the Commission to review the March 27, 1981 letter permitting the resumption of construction at Marble Hill.

With respect to item 7, the Director of Inspection and Enforcement briefed the Commission on May 7, 1980'.

The Commission viewed this briefing as satisfying the instructions in its Memorandum and Order of March 13, 1980.

The Commission has determined that the issues presented by the petition should be addressed in the first instance by the Director of Inspection and Enforcement.

Accordingly, your petition has been forwarded to the Director for consideration pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

31ncerel

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el J.

hilk S cretary of the Commission 6

0108170265 810626 PDR ADOCK 05000546 O

PDR

v BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION VASHINGTON, D. C.

Commissioners, Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman, Peter A. Bradford Victor Gilinsky John F. Aherne IN THE IIATTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE OF INDIANA, MARBLE HILL NUCLEAR POWER PLAliT, DOCKET NOS. STN 50-546 AND STN 50-547 SAVE THE VALLEY'S PETITIOff TO THE COMMISSIONERS TO REVIEW THE fiRC MARCH 27, 1981 ORDER TO RESUME COrlSTRUCTIOIT AT MARBLE HILL Comes now Save The Valley, by its attorney, and for cause of Save The Valley's' Petition To The Commissioners To Review The NRC March 27, 1981 Order To Resume Construction at Marble Hill, states:

1.

That on or about March 27, 1981, the ITRC acting by and through Victor Stello, Director of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.

C.,

(hereinafter called Director), lifted the August i

15, 1979 Order Confirming Suspension of Construction to the Public Service Company of Indiana.

2.

That there has been approved by the Director in conjunction with Save The Valley, the petitioner herein, an agreement to allow an independent examination of the existing concrete at Marble Hill and an examination of the report submitted by the licensee as prepared by Sargent & Lundy, Report SL-3753, 11-20-79,

" Evaluation of In-Place JD

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Concrete, Marble Hill Generating Station, Units 1 & 2"; at the conclusion of the review, the consultants were to provide '* written findings and conclusions which address the adequacies of'the licensee's investigation and repairs relative to problems found in the field after concrete placement," and will " provide written findings and conclusiens addressing the adequacy of the repaired structural or expected strength reduction," Scoce For Civil-Structural Censultant Support On Marble Hill dated May 1, 1980 The NRC, Division of Inspection and Enforcementc Washington, D.C.,

attached hereto and entitled Exhibi; "1".

3.

That the NRC, Division of Inspectio" and Enforcement, Chic ago,

advised orally that a written report of the independent engineers woulc be submitted to Save The Valley; that Save The Valley's engineering consultant would be privileged to comment thereon, either by mail or personally in Washington, D.C., at a meeting of the independent enginee.

the Save The Valley engineering consultant (presumably with a Save The.

Valley representative) and the URC.

4.

That to the petitioner's knowledge, there has.been provided no written findings and conclusions which address the adequacy of the 3

licensee's investigation and repairs relative to problems found in the field after concrete placement; to the petitioner's knowledge, the consultants have not provided signed written findings and conclusions which address the question of adecuacies of the repaired struc tures cr

' expected strength reduction and have offered no findings concerning porosity in said concrete.

2.

5.

That the petitioner questions whether Victor Stello, the Director of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.,

has abused his discretion in lifting the August 15, 1979 order confirming suspensic of construction without having complied 'with subparagraph four (4)

~

herein.

6.

That the NRC Division of T.tspection and Enforcement, has stated further that Report SL-3753,. supra, should include therein as its criteria that the concrece quality of internal concrete in structures at Marble Hill shall meet the structural integrity criteria of 95%

reliability and 95% confidence level; that on or about March 4,

1981, the Save The Valley engineer submitted Exhibit "A" to the NRC, Region III with copies to the Director and the two independent engineers; said Exhibit "A" questioned whether the NRC had actual reason to believe that said test criteria had been met and/or exceeded.

That on March 26, 1981 the petitioner responded to a letter of Victor Stello dated March 20, 1981 and also enclosed as Exhibit "B".

7.

That as part of a certain March 13, 1980 Memorandum And Order by the NRC, the Commission ordered the Director to "brief the Commissicr.

prior to lifting the order suspending construction at Marble Hill", and,-

"in any event-not (to allow resuription of construction) earlier than five (5) days after the briefing".

8.

That Save The Valley has standins and a cognizable interest cf Save The Valley has been adversely affected by the actions of the Director, on March 27, 1981, and prior thereto i f a briefing has been held before the Commissioners and no notice giver. to the petitioner i

herein of said briefing.

3.

9.

That, further, Save The Valley's interest has been adversely affected by the fact that the Director has granted a resumption of work order without having received the signed written findings and conclusions of the independent engineers; further, the Director of Inspection and Enforcement has made said order allowing resumption of concrete placing before allowing Save The Valley's engineer time to review the independent engineers' final written report.

10.

That 20 days have not elapsed since the date of the Director of Inspection and Enforcement's decision.

For the above reasons, Save The Valley respectfully requests tha:

the NRC Commissioners review the March 27, 1981 decision of Victor Stello, to determine if he has abuseo his discretion under 10 CFR 2.208 (c)fl-) and other relevant sections of the CFR, and for all other proper relief in the premises.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, SAVE THE VALLEY, PETITIONER Al bM[N BY:

THOMAS M.

DATTILO, ATTORNEY FOR SAVE THE VALLEY, PETITIONER DATED: APRIL 14, 1981.

M E M O R A 'I D U M Commissioner Bradford in re Public Service Company of Indiana, Memorandum And Order, dated March 13, 1980 in his dissenting opinion stated:

4.

"w

The quality assurance and quality control (QA-QC) program is supposed to assure that the plant is built according to its design.

If the QA-QC program fails, the plant becomes a potential threat to the public health and safety, for NRC's regulctory decisions assume tha plant is built according to its design.

NRC does no t normally monitor nuclear power plant construction.in great detail.

Instead, NRC relies primarily on the licensee and their contractors to assure the QA-QC program is workini.

7 AEC 7, 11, (1974)

(T)he URC has found it difficult to support a civil penalty sanction for QA-CC violations because of the general nature of construction permit and QA program requirement.

The Director of NRC's Division of Inspection and Enforce-ment has properly suspended safety-related construction at the OHarble Hill) site pending the licensee's submission of a new QA-QC program which will be judged according to certain stated criteria.

Tha issue is whether the inspection efforts in this case a:id the Lirector's judgment about the proper remedy should be examined in an evidentiary proceeding.

Given the seriousness of the problems uncovered at the site and their possible significance to the safe operation of the plant (a hearing),is potentially helpful to us as a supplement to our own enforcement effort.

Additionally, it would allow interested citizens to participate in assessing and determining the risks they are being told to live with.

( A) t Marble Hill,

. events have given citizens some basis for concern about the licensee ('s) '

commitment to their safety and about the sufficiency of NRC surveillance.

Commissioner Bradford further stated in Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket No. 50-266 in an' Order dated May 12, 1980 in dissent in x,onjunction with Commissioner Gilinsky the following concerning the levels of illusion involved in the URC's application in denying hearing 1 l

The (NRC) agency so misstates his tory that it 'is clearly either incapable of giving an accurate account i

of its own past doings or else its legal positions are being chosen after the desired result has been decided.

the Commission's Pell Mell Retreat from meaningful public inquiry in the twisting between here and Harble Hill so suggests to the staff and the outside world that the agency is run by people living in fear of tneir own citizenry.

(T)he message can only be that the NRC's priority in citizen invo,1vement is a relatively low one."

s.

L

This (dissenting) opinion (would) (allow) a hearing to a group able to make a reasonable showing that the action taken by the staff had failed in some important respect to remedy a particular safety concern.

The petitioner herein analogizes the present fact situation with the stated comments of Commissioner Bradford with their relevance toward the present Marble Hill state of facts.

The URC Director of Inspection and Enforcement has, albeit gratuitously, provided for an independent examination of concrete in conjunction with the petitioner under certain stated criteria.

The Director has made a present judgment dated March 27, 1981,'which on the surface would manifest that the URC wanted a desired result, that result being the same as its prior interpretation in initially approving Report SL-3753 soon after Hovembe2 20,3979.

Has the stated criteria of 95% confidenc3 with 95% reliability, A

been met and/or exceeded?

The petitioner contends based on statistical evidence that said criteria has not been met and/or sufficiently explained to assure the NRC and the people of Southern Indiana and Northern Kentucky that the plant is built according to its design and that the concrete is a potential threat to the public health and safety of the area.

The NRC's independent consultants were to. pro. vide written findings and conclusions; they were to provide an independent assessment of the type and extent of deficiencies in concrete construccion; they were to 6.

+

provide an independent assessment of needed repairs or remedial actions and independent conclusions regarding capabilities of affected structures to perform the intended design func tions.

The Director has, in our opinion, abused his discretion in allowing a resumption of work, allegedly based on the NRC's position prior to the tendering of said above written documentation to the public and to the affected STV engineer.

See Task Order No.

2, Objections Of Tasks, Page 1 of the NRC, Division of Inspection and Enforcement included herein and made a part hereof and entitled Exhibit "C".

This action is not intended to delay the proceedings; has the Director made the resumption order effective immediately, in essence frustrating any attempts by Save The Valley to appeal or thwart his decision Shafly v. NRC, No. 80-1691 (D.C. Circ. Ct.), November 19, 1980, as reported in ERC, 12-5-80, page 1185.

Concerning 10 CFR, Sec. 2.206(C)(1), within 20 days after the date of the Directors' decision, under this section that no proceeding will be instituted or other action taken in whole or in part the Commission may on its own motion review that decision in whole or in part to determine if the Director has abused his discretion.

This review power does not limit in any way the Commission's supervisory power of delegated s taff actions.

7.

e

If the Director has granted the original Section 2.206 request of Save The Valley for the purpose of not allowing any further review thereon, then the Code of Federal Regulations ' letter and spirit, in our opinion, has been violated.

It is obvious that the original Order of August 15, 1979, grantind a hearing, was a sham.

See Bradford dissenting opinion, in Wisconsin Electric Power Comoany, Docket tio.

50-266, dated May 12, 1980, supra.

Likewise the granting of a Section 2.206 Motion of Sc"e The Valley without a firm commitment on the part of the Director to carry out his stated objectives may be considered to be less than acceptible.

For the above reasons, the petitioner respectfully requests the iTRC Commissioners to review in whole and in part th'e actions of the Director on March 27, 1981 to determine whether or not he has abused his discretion; and to rescind the Director's March 27, 1981 resumpticr.

of work order, and for all other proper relief in the premises.

SAVE THE VALLEY, PETITIOfiER BY:

4. MI THOMAS H.

DATTILO, ATTORtJEY FOR SAVE THE VALLEY, PETITIONER 311 EAST hAIll STREET MADISOIf, IliDIAtlA 47250 PHOtlE : 812-265-6355 DATED: APRIL 14, 1981 8.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the forehoing Petition has been mailed to the following:

Peter A. Bradford, URC, Washington, D.C.~20555, Certified Mail Joseph M.

Hendrie, URC, Washington, D.C.

20555, Regular U.S. Mail Victor Gilinsky, NRC, Washington, D.C.

20555, Regular U.S. Mail

• John F. Aherne, URC, Washington, D.C. 20555, Regular U.S. Mail James Keppler, NRC, Roosevelt Rd.,

Glen Ellyn, Ill., Reg. U.S. Mai; James Pope, Public Service Co. of Indiana, 1000 E. Maln St.,

Plainfield, Indiana 46168 Regular U.S. Mail NRC Docketing Section, Washington, D.C.

20555, Regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this 14th day of April, 1981.

f.M-l W.

THOMAS M.

DATTILO 6

I 9.

l l

SCOPE FOR CIVIL-STRUCTURAL CONSULTANT SUPPORT ON MARBLE HILL The scope of the work to be completed by a civil-structural engineer or group will include. a revf ew of the deficiencies which were found through visual observation such as the local honeycombing and voids to ascertain that significant deficiencies were detected.

The effort will also involve a review of the other techniques used to locate voids, discontinuities, etc., to determine if j

all significant deficiencies have in all probability been detected.

These,

i techniques included coring and pulse echo.

The repair procedures and repairs made as a result of the findings of the investigations ard also to be reviewed for adequacy.

The main basis of the consultant's review effort will be the report submitted by the licensee 'and its references as prepared by Sargent &,

Lundy, Report SL-3753,11/20/79', " Evaluation of In-Place Concrete, Marble Hill Generating Station, Units 1 and 2."

At the conclusion of the review, the consultant will provide written findings and conclusions which addres's the adequacy of the licensee's investigation ~ and repairs reiative to problems found in the field after concrete placement.

The consultant.will also need to provide written findings and conclusions which address the question of structural adequacy of the repaired structures or expected strength reduction, if such is the case.

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UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 4o208 SPEED SCIENr!FIC SCHOOL JAMES BRECKENRIDGE SPEED FOUNDATION DEFARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGIN4ERING March 4, 1981 Mr.. G. Fiorelli, Chief Projects Branch 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

Dear Mr. Fiorelli:

During the Marble Hill meetir.g on February 9 and 10,1981, I informed Cordelle Williams that an analysis was being prepared as a follow-up to my letter and report to D. W. Hayes dated September 26, 1980.

The analysis has been prepared by S. M. Alexander, Ph.D., PE, Assistant Professor of Engineering Management and Industrial Engineering at the University of Louisville. A copy of Prof.. Alexander's report is attached.

The objective of Prof. Alexander's analysis was to investicate the

[

actual confidence of the S&L/ PSI evaluation study of in-place concrete l

at Marble Hill performed by Construction Technology Labcratories.

His analysis establishes a specification which considers the risk associated with the sampling plan used at Marble Hill involving 60 test sites.

Inherent in'the S&L plan, which is intended to assure with a confidence level of 95% that no more than 5% of the concrete volume is defective, is the assumption that no test error exists. The analysis is intended to determine the risk associated with this assumption. Thus, the probability that defective concrete will be erroneously accepted is not conjoined with tne probability of finding defective cencrete in the S&L plan.

This omission results in a plan that inevitably provides less than the required 95%

confidence.

The probability of test error which will result in accepting defective concrete has not been evaluated or considered by Construction Technology Laboratories in their report for this test program. However, there is imple evidence that error of this type exists.

The following is a summary of some factors which provide clear indication of the need to consider the probability of testing error of the type cited above.

The qualification test was performed on June 28, 1979 on concrete test blocks which contained several different types of. flaws including representative conditions for honeycomb, cracks, air voids, and embedments.

Although no photo record is available to verify the results, the test was witnessed by several persons including representatives of NRC.

The i-

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Mr. G. Fiorelli

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March 4, 1981 Page Two conclusions of the qualification test was that the microseismic procedure tas able to distinguish the several tyns of defects and accurately describe their condition.

Presumably this qualification also. included the ability of the analyst to identify honeycomb and to distinguish between honeycomb and dispersed air of 1/8-to 1/2-inch diameter size.

On June 27, 28, and 29 of 1979 several tests conducted on the in-place concrete produced the following results indicating the presence of honeycomb.

The results are cited in the test data supplied with Mr. Robert T. Bartczak's letter to Mr. Donald Stegemoller dated January 29, 1981.

The data represent raw I

field data and test photos in several areas at Marble Hill not ingluded l

in Volume II of Report SL-3753, Revision 1.

Date Area Page No.

Grid Point Photo No.

6/27/79 1

4 B-3 8

6/27/79 2

7 A-1 9

6/28/79 8

16 A-7 No ohoto 6/29/79 9

14 B-3 49 6/29/79 Rad Waste 1

C-9 1&3 These interpretation results were changed during the February 9 & 10, 1981 meeting from honeycomb to dispersed air or entrapped air.

Such revision which may be appropriate for the tests leads to serious doubt concerning the accuracy of the qualification test.

No matter how the responses were interpreted at the time of the qualification tests, it would appear reasonable to expect that a consistent basis for interpreta-l tion was being applied over the three-day period of June 27-29, 1979.

A change of definition with respect to the test results for in-place con-crete may also be interpreted as a corresponding change in the interpreta-tions applied during the qualification tests.

Then how are we to interpret the difference between a honeycomb reflection and dispersed air in the qualification tests vis-a-vis the field tests.

No photographic data exist in the qualification tests record, and what record does exist is uncertain with respect to size of defect and corresponding reflection signal.

1 Other situations involving inter;,retation of wave reflections also raise concern about the need to consider test error.

For example, on July 6,1979 a test reported in Area 16 on pages C-43, photo 61 of "olume II of Report SL-3753, Revision 1, indicates a discontinuity.

The field notes for the test report honeycomb, separation and entrapped air. The un-certainties of the definitions being applied require that some provision be made to evaluate the probability of test error.

Other situations ii.volving different thicknessas of wave reflections that are termed discontinuities raise the question concerning extent of

P Mr. G.. Fiorsili March 4,.1981 Paga Thrco the opening.

An example of this is in connection with tests of area 50 reported on page C-160 of Volume II of Report SL-3753, Revision 1.

Photo 289 reports discontinuities for two wave reflections in which the space for one it twice as wide as for the other.

Further, the member thickness is 54 inches, making the larger reflection about 2 inches wide.

~

When these considerations are applied to the S&L sampling plan the result is that the probability of test error must be considered.

Applying equation (c) in Prof. Alexander's report (typical results are given in the accompanying table) for a test error of 15". With 60 samples the confidence level will be 92% rather than 95% as required by NRC.

Actually, there is reason to believe that test errors may be greater than 15% resulting in a confidence level less than 90%.

Since no qualification test data are available to evaluate the test error to be applied, it is recocinended that such an evaluation be made.

A series of concrete test specimens with various types of flaws should be tested with appropriate photography to both evaluate the analyst's ability to discern differences in response signals and to identify large voids.

When an appropriate test error has been detemined, it may then be applied to the appropriate sampling plan to determine the number of test sites needed to satisfy a condition of 95% confidence with more than 5% defective concrete.

Sincere d

y ichael A. Cassaro, Ph.D., PE Professor of Civil Engineering lw cc:

D. W. Hayes-NRC C. Williams-NRC A. Parme R. Fam T. Catillo I

ThisisacritiqueofthesectioN"StatisticalBasis for Testing Program" (Section III - Fgs. 4-8) included in the report SL-3753 - Revision 1.

This critique was prepared by Suraj M. Alexander, Ph.D.,

P.E.,

Asst. Professor, Engineering Management / Industrial Engineering, Speed Scientific School, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY.

This critique addresses three main areas of the above section.

They are as follows:

(i)

The lack of specification of risk associated with Statistical Quality Assurance Program.

(ii)

Incorrectness of the theoretical background provided as related to the statistical program actually used.

- (iii)

Possible misinterpretation of terminology.

A.

DEFINITIONS Some-standard Quality Assurance definitions are provided below in order'to clarify the use of these terms in the cri-tique which follows.

(i)

Sampling Plan - A specific plan which states a) the sample sizes and b) the criteria for accepting, rejecting or taking another sample, to be used in inspecting the lot.

(ii)

Single Sampling:

Sampling inspection in which a decision to accept or to reject is reached after the inspection of a single sample.

(iii)

Multiple Sampling:

Sampling inspeccion in which 1

to roject, or to take anothbr samplo but in which l

there 10 usually a prescribed maximum number of samples, after which a decision to accept or reject is reached.

Note: Multiple sampling as defined here is sometimes called sequential sampling or group sequential sampling.

The tern multiple j

sampling is preferred.

(iv)

Sequential Sampling:

Sampling inspection in which, after each unit is inspected, the decision.is made to accept, to reject, or to inspect another unit.

Note:

Sequential sampling as defined here is some-times called unit sequential sampling.

(v)

Acceptance Number:

The largest number of defectives (or defects) in the sample or samples under con-sideration that will permit the acceptance of the... - -

inspection ' lot.

B.

CRITIQUE (i)

The lack of specification of risk associated with the Statistical Quality Assurance Procram.

In deriving the sampling plan, Sargent & Lundy E".gineers l

(S & L) define (Np)(Ng )

r C=1-E x

n-x (1) x=-0~ g )

N where they define C = Confidence level n = Sample size N = Size of population p = Acceptable maximum fraction defectives in the population.

2 m

camplos.(n out of a population N), wa can establish with confidence C that the max. fraction defective is p if the observed number of defectives is r."

The above equation for C is infact the probability of rejecting a lot of quality p (fraction defective p), when a single sampling plan is used with a sample size n and accept-ance number r.

Since NRC expects the sampling plan to reject ' defective' concrete volumes 95% of the time (95%

confidence level), the presumption here is that concrete volumes with p% defective are ' defective.'

The above equa-tion (i), which represents the probability of having more than r defectives in a lot is derived from the Hypergeometric distribution.

S&L uses the Binomial approximation to the Hypergeometric distribution in deriving a value for n using a value of r equal to 0.

The' Binomial approximation to the Hypergeometric is shown below in equation (2).

r C=1-E

(")p g

(2)

X n-x x=0 The above Binomia:.

pproximation is valid if n is small com-pared to N.

1 i

S& L uses equation (2) with a value of C = 95. p =.05 and r = 0 to solve for n and obtains a value of n = 59.

They then suggest a sampling plan with sample size n = 59 and acceptance number r = 0.

In their words, "as a first step, a sample of 59 areas is to be tested.

In order to establish with a confidence level of 95% that no more than 5% of the population is defective (i.e. reliability of 95%) none of the 3

t l

l

c

~

If the campling plan colected samples'should fail the tact".

we.s used an a single sampling plan, (i.e. Samplo sizo n = 59, Acceptance number r = 0); it would reject a population with 5% defective 95% of the time.

In order to understand what happens to populations with larger and fewer defective per'-

~

centages an Operations Characteristic (O.C.) curve must be constructed for the sampling plan.

As an example the O.C.

Curve shown in Figure (1), which was plotted after seme rough calculati,ons were made by me, detail the probabilities of acceptance of different quality populations using a single sampling plan with n = 59 and r = 0.

+

t O.C. Curve P rob..,.

n=59, r=0 of Acceptances, I

.s.

t-

+

• r i i s' ft s'

1 s 1 **

p%

Figure 1 4

a l Thuc if the sampling plan was a single sampling plan (the equations used to derivo.n are only valid for a single sampling plan) the risks associated with using the plan is best illustrated by the O.C. Curve Figure (1).

These risks have not been specified by S & L in their statistical program.

(ii)

Incorrectness of the theoretical background pro-vided as related to the statistical program actually used.

S & L's theoretical backing for its sampling procedure (equa--

tions (1) & (2)) are for a single sampling plan, but at the end of the section on Methodology (See Pgs. 5 & 6 of the report) they state that "the sampling program is sequential in that if a defective area is encountered in the first 59 samples, the sample size is increased to a total of 93 units

'nd the acceptance number is increased to 1, if another, a

defective is found the sample size is increased to 124 with acceptance number 2 and so on (See Table III-l on pg. 8 of the report SL-3753).

No explanation is provided as to how

- these numbers are obtained, though a quick check reveals that they are obtained from the same two equations (1) and (2).

These equations as mentioned before, determine the probability of rejection of a population of fraction defective p by a single sampling plan of size n and acceptance number r.

However the procedure followed in the testing program is that of pseudo sequential sampling (see pages 5 and 6) no theoretical background or references is provided for this sampling pro-cedure in the report.

The sampling procedure is neither a unit sequential sampling plan, (which is generally used to minimize the number of samples taken to make a dec ision for 5

necaptancs or roject' ion), nor is it a multiple sampling plan (group sequential; see definitions provided at tho beginning of the critique).

The main point to be noted here is that the program suggested by S & L is not a single sampling plan hence it is 4

incorrect to derive parameters for the plan from equations (1) and (2).

Moreover, since the plan is not a standard

=

plan and sincq n'o references are provided the determination of risks associated with the plan become difficult.

In my opinion no sampling procedure for testin,g should be used without a proper indication of the risks associated with the procedure.

Therefore S & L should either change their test-ing program or provide correct theoretical backing for their sampling program and indicate thu associated risks.

(iii)

Possible misinterpretation of terminology.

S & L defines a population with 5% defective as 95% reliable.

In other words they state that if 5% of the concrete volumes existing are defective then they'are 95% reliahle.

This in-terpretation of reliability is not clear from the letter from t

l NRC (Exhibit 1) which states, "Public Service of Indiana will-l 1.

With its contracted organizations, ccntinue surface and volumetric examination of existing concrete volumes to estab-f lish its adequacy and test a statistical sample, representative of both congested and other concrete volumes to assure with 95% reliability and 95% confidence level, that concrete volume i

meets recuirements."

The term reliability used above is quite ambiguous, it could for example relate to the accuracy of the test, whereas S & L has interpreted reliability to be synonomous with requirem*nts and hence attempted to design a sampling I

W pl'an which rejects populations of 5% defectiva (95% raliability acco'rding to S & L interpretation, Sco bottom of pg. 6) with a probability of.95,(Confidence level 95%).

O O

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THOMAD M. DATTILO ATTORNEY AT LAU 318 EAST MAIN STRCT MACISON. lHOIANA 47250 PwcNE 812 2654355 March 26, 1981 United States Nuclear Reduiatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 ATTN:

fir. James G.

Keppler, Director Re:

ST!! 50-546 STri 50-547

Dear Ifr. i'eppler:

Thank you for your response to Dr. Cassaro dated.'! arch 20, L981.

Find enclosed as Exhibit "A"

herein dr. Cassaro's upecific response to yours.

This writer in conjunction with the enclosed Exhibit "A" categorically states that the flRC has not responded to the

!! arch 4, 1981 letter of Dr. Cassaro and the specific statistical and quality control en ineerinc comments therein.

It is our u

ed explanations are simply insufficient position that your atieu to manifest to the NRC t ha t.

L:s own criteria of OS% reliability with 95% confidence has been met and, or e xceeded by tne test progran devised by 3gt. 5 Lundy and conducted by Portland Coment Ansociation.

In addition, it was our specific unde rt, tanding t ha t, no t1RC responses would be made until there was time to review what the independent engineers stated in a final written report subject to the additional input of Dr. Cassaro.

From all indications, it is not necessarily correct that the !!RC has approved the te s t int, standards and criteria specifically set out by the siRC in its prior o rders herein.

For that reason, wu await the final written reports of the independent en incera and the o

specific reports of the IiRC.

Very t.ruly yours, e

g

.Ln i" >hli'/,

Thomas I-I.

Daccilo TID /mjb Znciosure 41-g u ?f.

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m Micha91 A. Cassaro, Ph.D.,PE Professor of Civil Engincoring Speed Scientific School Dept. of Civil Engineering University of Louisville Louisville, Kentucky 40208 March 26, 1981 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt P.oad Glen..Llyn, Illinois 60137 ATTN:

Mr. James G. Keppier, Director Re; STN 50-546 STN 50-547

Dear Mr. Keppler:

't he !!RC ictter of t~ arch 20, 198L is qui:.e de tailed ar.d reanonab Ly co:nprehenn tve.

I'us t o f the.coints in my Letter of September 26,.1980 have been discussed and handled.

It is the t' arch 4, i9di letter of mine that has not been completely unawcred and is the 5:ubject of this correspondence.

" he ifRC muc t rely on mic roccia.nic inves t. : cat ion to de te r: a.r.e if voids, :;eparationu or honey, v::.b3 exist ;n ;he ecncre te since all observable voids are con.;idered "curface con rete de fec tives".

Since the !;P.C han eatabiished the criteria, 95% reliability with 95% conficence, using Equation

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it must be reco nized that this is a prouabtistic equation u

imp tyind no instrument or human error associa :ed with the statistical approach.

Ihe f,' arc h 4 letter dives an acceptib'e procedure fo r ue.ermining and including the human error and the ir.ci;rumenc icrar in the test program.

Several examples of thin ::/pe o f e r ro r _tre c i ted in the i' arch a letter.

Fo r e nt':n le. if the interpretor declared a " honeycomb" the mur.e day he cased the qualification test and the honeycor.b turr.ed c

.o ha/e alunificant bubbles in the concrete, then there.tppear

c t

e roananable room for error.

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Mr.. Jamps G. Koppler Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

March 26, IS11

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We do not question Mr. Muenow's qualifications.

liowever, everyone is capable of making an error.

It appears that no

_.. written qualification exists in~ the record at Marble Hill.

A qualification record must be performed to evaluate if we have

. 95% reliability with 95% confidence.

As it now stands, there is certainly less than 95% reliability

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as_ outlined in the March 4 letter, and we believe that no verbiane will erase that reality, only clear statistics.

This writer avaits the furtner response of the flRC.

Sincerely, bi ) Co e ' -

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S3

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Michael A.

Cas;aro, Ph.D..

PE MACi;nj b g

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f, coco of Work:

4 Provide NRC-IE assitance as a technical consultant in the review of 1) concrete deficiencies, known as "honeycombing,." found at the Marble Hill facility through visual observation, 2) the pregram to determine if internal voids exist, 3) the repair p,rocedures, 4) the completed repairs, and 5) evaluation of the affected structures to meet the original design '.

intent.

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The effort will involve a review o' the techniques used to locate voids, discontinuities, etc., to determine if all significant deficiencies have

. in all probability been detected.

These techniques included coring and

__ __ _ a puTse echo. 'The repair procedures and repairs made as a result of the

• findings of the investigations ard also to be reviewed for adequacy.. The main -basis of the consultant's review effort will be the report submitted

' ~- by the licensee and its references as prepared by Sargent &.Lundy, Report SL-3753,11/20/79,." Evaluation of_In-Place Concrete, Marble Hill Generating --- - -

Station, Units 1 and 2," dated November 20, 1979.

/

2.

Objectives of Tasks:

To provide an independent assessment of the type and exten?'o!

a.

deficiencies in concrete construction defined as honeycombing and/or voids.,that could have safety significance;

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b.

to provide an independent assessment of any needed repa' irs or '

remedial actions;

'c.

to provide independent conclusions regarding the capability of tne affected structures t6 perform the intended ' design functions.

Statemen't of Work:

3.

Determine thal any structurally significant honeycombing and/or a.

voids visually detectable have been located and identified, b.

Evaluate the.need for.and adequacy of the nondestructive techniques used by the licensee in the investigation of possible internal 1

voids.

If other techniques or additional investigation are neces-sary to assure structural adequecy, rec.ommendations should be provided.

This evaluation and any necessary recommendations should i

consider sample location and size.

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