ML20010B336
| ML20010B336 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 07/28/1981 |
| From: | Blough A, Cowgill C, Doerflein L, Mccabe E, Roxanne Summers NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20010B274 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-277-81-14, 50-278-81-15, NUDOCS 8108140375 | |
| Download: ML20010B336 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000277/1981014
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COR4ISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
50-278/810414
50-277/810422
Region I
50-277/810424
50-277/S10428
50-277/81-14
50-277/810327
Report No. 50-278/81-15
50-277
Docket No. 50-278
C
License No. DPR-56
Priority
Category
C
Licensee:
~ Philadelphia Electric Company
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Facility Name:
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3
Inspection At:
Delta, Pennsylvania
Inspection Conducted:
May 1-31, 1981
Inspectors:
M. b k ,b. k
ilvilfi
C.J. Cowgill, III, Senior Resident Inspector
date signed
t. e, CO<A , h , h
slwI l
A.R. Blough, Resident Inspector
date signed
f,e, d Q
b., k
(May 27-29)
3 lulpt
L. Doerflein, Resident Inspector (Fitzpatrick)
date signed
h eLa L
-Jab i
R y ummers, R 4 tor Anspector, May 13-14, 18-22 data signed
f O. b
,b
'7 /7.9 fti
Approved by:
_E.C. McCabe, Jr. , Chief, Reactor Projects
date signed
Section No. 2B, DRPI
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 1-31, 1981 (Combined Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/81-14
and 50-278/81-15)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspections by the
resident inspectors (56.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Unit 2, 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> Unit 3). Areas inspected
included accessible portions of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities, operational
safety, radiation protection, physical security, control room observations,
LER review, IE Bulletin followup, radwaste shipping, outstanding items follow-
up, plant safety during organized labor activities, periodic reports. and
allegations received through local news media.
Results: Noncompliances:
none in eleven areas, one in one area (failure to
meet primary containment integrity Limiting Conditions for Operation, Detail
3).
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8108140375 810729
PDR ADOCK 05000277
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
M.J. Cooney, Superintendent, Generation Division (Nuclear)
J.K. Davenport, Maintenanc' Engineer
G.F. Dagson, I&C Engineer
- R.S. Fleischmann, Assistant Station Superintendent
A. Fulvio, Results Engineer
N. Gazda, Health Physics, Radiation Protection Manager
S.R. Roberts, Operations Engineer
D.C. Smith, Outage Coordinator
S.A. Spitko, Site Q.A. Engineer
S.Q. Tharpe, Security Supervisor
- W.T. Ullrich, Station Superintendent
H.L. Watson, Chemistry Supervisor
J.E. Winzenried, Technical Engineer
Other licensee employees were also contacted.
- Present at exit interviews on site and for summation of preliminary
inspection findings.
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2.
Outstanding Item Update
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (277/81-09-03), review recirc pump
failure and drywell fire alarm. During a Unit 2 Reactor Shutdown on
April 22, 1981, a drywel ? fire alarm actuated.
Initial drywell in-
vestigation showed no evidence of fire.
The licensee performed ST
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15.4 " Calibration Test of 2 Reactor Building Up River Smoke Detectors",
Revision 2, dated September 19, 1980 and ST 15.5 " Calibration Test 2
Reactor Building Reactor Vessel Smoke Detector Down River", Revision
2, dated September 19, 1980. The results of these tests showed that
both smoke detectors in the drywell were operating satisfactorily.
The 'B' recirculation pump motor had displayed high vibration prior to
Unit shutdown and the mechanical seal for the pump had fa. led.
In-
vestigation showed that the recirculation pump motor oil reservoir was
empty, the motor bearings had seized, and some Saaring material had
been imbedded in the pump motor. Additionally, the motor shaft showed
evidence of heating. The smoke detectors used in the Unit 2 drywell
operate on an ionization principle which detects and reacts to heated
vapors. No visible smoke or flame is required. The licensee concluded
that, based on the above information, the smoke detector actuation was
proper.
The inspector reviewed the completed surveillance tests, observed the
discolored areas on the motor shaft and inspected the area surrounding
the 'B' recirculation pump in the Unit 2 drywell. There was evidence
that oil had been sprayed in the area. Additionally, the inspector
reviewed the instruction booklet containing the operating characteristics
for the fire detector and discussed the event with Region I fire
protection specialists. The licensee replaced the Unit 2
'B' recirculation
pump motor with the 'B' recirculation pump motor from Unit 3.
The
inspector identified no unacceptable conditions.
(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (79-11-05 and 79-12-06).
Numerous
indicating lights were inoperative. Through observations and discussions
the inspector determined that operating personnel are responsive to
indicating lights requiring repair or bulb replacement.
Only isolated
cases of indicating light failure have been identified by the inspector
-- licensee response to these had been prompt.
(0 pen) Inspector Follow Item (278/81-10-01).
Review of HPCI room
flooding event. The licensee found that measures for alerting workers
in the torus and torus room to evacuation (or other matters) were not
adequate. During torus modifications, noise level from chipping,
grinding and welding can render the PA system inaudible.
Two field
engineers in the torus room during the HPCI room flooding and CARD 0X
initiation did not hear the PA.
Both exited upon feeling slightly
dizzy and were not hurt. Corrective measures initiated by the licensee
and the contractor involved in torus modifications included adding
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additional PA spealers, raising PA speaker volumes, and devising a
flashing light alert system. Temporary torus and torus room lights
are manually flashed by a worker to signal evacuation (normal lighting
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stays on).
The inspector verified that appropriate personnel were
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familiar.with the flashing light alert system.
This items remains open pending licensee analysis and inspector review
of other aspects of the event.
3.
Plant Operations Review
a.
Logs and Records
(1) Documents Reviewed
A sampling review of logs and records was made to:
identify
significant changes and trends; assure that required entries
were being made; to verify that operating orders and night
orders conform to Technical Specification requirements;
check correctness of communications concerning equipment and
lockout status; verify jumper log conformance to procedural
requirements; and to verify conformance to limiting conditions
for operations. Logs and records reviewed were:
(a) Shift Supervision Log - May 1-31, 1981
(b) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 2 - May 1-31, 1981
-(c) Reactor Operators Log - Unit 3 - May 1-31, 1981
(d) CO Log Book - May 1-31, 1981
(e) Night Orders - Current Entries
(f) Radiation Work Permits (RWP's) - Units 2 and 3, (Sampling)
May, 1981
(g) Maintenance Requerc Forms (MRF's) - Units 2 and 3,
(Sampling) May, 1981
(h) Ignition Source Control Checklists (Sampling), May,
1981
(1) Operation Work & Information Data - May, 1981
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Control room logs were reviewed pursuant to requirements of
Administrative Procedure A-7, " Shift Operations." Frequent
initialing of entries by licensed operaters, shift supervision,
and licensee on-site management constituted evidence of licensee
review.
Logs were also reviewed to assure that plant conditions
including abnormalities and significant operations were accurately
and completely recorded.
Logs were also assessed to determine
that matters requiring reports to the NRC were being processed
as suspected reportable occurrences.
No unacceptable conditions
were identified.
(2)
Fceility Tours
(a) During the course of this inspection, which also included
shift turnover, the inspector conducted daily tours and
made observations of:
-- Control Room - (daily)
-- Turbine Building - (all levels)
-- Reactor Building - (accessible areas)
-- Diesel Generator Buildino
-- Yard area and perimeter exterior to the power block,
including Emergency Cooling Tower and torus dewatering
tank
-- Security Building, including CAS, Aux SAS, and control
point monitoring
-- Vehicular Control
-- The SAS and power block control points
-- Security Fencing
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-- Portal Mod toring
-- Personnel and Badging
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-- Control of Radiation and High Radiation areas including
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locked door checks
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-- TV monitoring capabilities
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Off-Shift Inspections during this inspection period'and the
areas examined.were as follows:
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DATE
AREAS EXAMINED
May 1, 1981
Access Controls
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May 4, 1981
Observations of CAS and Protected
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area access controls, checks of
Security force manning
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May 5.1981
Security force manning, Control-
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Room Tour
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May 6, 1981
Tours of Unit.2 and Unit 3
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Reactor Building, checks of
security force manning
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May 7, 1981
CAS and SAS observations, Control-
Room Observations
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May 11, 1981
Control Room Observations
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May 14, 1981
Control Room Observations,
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Turbine Building Tour
May 18,1981
Control Room Observation,
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Reactor Building Tour
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May 20,1981
Control Room Observations
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May 28, 1981
Protected Area Tours
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May .29,1981
Control Room Observations
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-- Off-Normal Alarms.
Selected annunciators were discussed
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with control room operators' and supervision to assure they
were knowledgeable of plant conditions and that corrective
action, if required. was being taken.
The operators were
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knowledgeable of alarm status and plant conditions.
-- Control Room Manning. On frequent' occasions'during this
inspection, the~ inspector. confirmed that requirements of-
10CFR50.54(k), the Technical Specifications, and commitments
to the NRR letter of July 31, 1980 for minimum staffing were
satisfied. The inspector frequently confirmed that a senior
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licensed operator was in the control room complex. No un-
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acceptable conditions were identified.
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Fluid Leaks.
No significant fluid leaks were identified
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which had not also been identified by the licensee nor for
which necessary corrective action had not been initiated.
The inspector observed sump status, alarms, pump-out rates,
and held discussions with licensee personnel.
No unaccept-
able conditier.s were identified.
Piping Vibration.
No significant piping vibration or
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unusual conditions were identified.
Monitoring Instrumentation. The ir.spector frequently
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confirmed that selected instruments were operating and
indicated values were within Technical Specification
requirements.
On a daily basis when the inspector was
on site, ECCS switch positioning and valve lineups,
based on control room indicators and plant observations
were verified.
Examples of instrumentation observed
included breaker positioning, PCIS status, and radiation
monitoring instruments.
On May 18,1981 Reactor coolant temperature exceeded 212'F
for about 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, from 12:45 p.m. until about 3:15 p.m.
During this time period the primary containment was not
intact. The inspector reviewed this event and held dis-
cussions with various licensee reprwentatives regarding
the causes.
At about 7:00 a.m. the shutdown cooling system was blocked for
an estimated 4-hour repair of a packing leak on MOV-17 (Shut-
down Cooling Suction Isolation Valve).
Prior to isolating
the system reactor coolant temperature had been reduced to
about 110*F as indicated by Reactor Water Cleanup inlet
temperature. About 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> later the operator checked the
maintenance status and requested that the system be restored.
Reactor coolant temperature as indicated by reactor skin tem-
perature at the main stem lines, and verified by an indica-
tion of steam pressure, reached 231'F before shutdown cooling
was restored.
The inspector reviewed maintenance request form M2-10-M-0-
125 which was initiated in November 1980 for the repair of
a packing leak on MOV-17.
The Plant Staff Investigation
and Approval Section identified that Technical Specifica-
tions governed this maintenance action but failed to iden-
tify any special plant restraints under required plant
restraints. The inspector discussed the event with a
licensee representative who stated that instructions F.
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had been given to shift superintendent to allow only four
hours for completion of the maintenance.
He stated that
he based the four hour time limit on previous cycle times
for the shutdown cooling system.
However, no specific
reactor coolant breakup rate had been calculated. Also,
the temperature. being monitored, Reactor Water Cleanup
Inlet, was not representative.
Since recirculation
pumps were not running, cleanup inlet temperature lagged
actual reactor water temperature near the top of the vessel
during heatup, due to stratification. Technical Specifi-
cations require that primary containment be maintained
when reactor coolant temperature exceeds 212 F.
The fail-
ure to have primary containment integrity prior to increas-
ing reactor coolant temperature above 212 F is an item of
noncompliance. (277/81-14-01)
-- Fire Protection. On frequent occasions the inspector
verified the licensee's measures for fire protection.
The inspector observed control room indications of fire
detection and fire suppression systems, spot-checked
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for proper use of fire watches and ignition source con-
trols, checked a sampling of fire barriers for integrity,
and observed fire-fighting equipment stations. No un-
acceptable conditions were identified.
4.
IE Bulletin Followup
a.
IE Bulletin 79-07, " Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping
p ril 14, 1979)".
The bulletin specified algebraic summation techniques which could result
in erroneous seismic analyses. The bulletin required licensees to iden-
tify any safety systems or portions thereof which employed specified
summation techniques for the seismic analysis of said systems; to pro-
vide computer listings which employed the specified techniques; to
verify that all piping computer programs were checked against appro-
priate piping benchmark problems or other piping computer programs
and to identify the benchmark; and, if the specified techniques are
identified, to submit a plan of action and an estimated schedule for
correction. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated
April 24, 1979.
The response stated that neither the licensee nor
their vendors used the specified summation techniques in the seismic
analysis of safety-related piping at Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3. How-
ever, the licensee had deferred submittal of some of the benchmarking
data required by Action Item No. 3 of the bulletin. The inspector
asked about the missing information. A licensee representative said
the information had been received and reviewed but had not been sub-
mitted to the NRC. The inspector requested that the submittal be
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made. The inspector also verified that PORC had reviewed the bulletin.
Subsequent to this inspection period and prior to report issuance, the
inspector reviewed the licensee's supplemental response, dated June 3,
1981, and verified that the required information was provided.
No
unacceptable conditions were identified.
b.
IE Budetin 79-12, "Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities (May 31,1979)."
The bulletin required licensees to ensure that an estimate of the cri-
tical rod pattern be made prior to criticality and that the method of
estimation take into account all important reactivity variables.
It
also required licensee measures to limit the notch worth of individual
control rods; to provide cautions to operators on conditions that can
result in high notch worth; and, further to review and evaluate the
" emergency md in" switch for operability.
The inspector reviewed the
licensee's response; procedure for startup; and documentation of Unit 3
startups 80-11, 80-12, and 80-13. The licensee's response stated that
they could not predict the critical rod pattern to the accuracy desired
by the bulletin, but that they reviewed their startup procedures and
together with the changes required by action items 2 and 3 of the bulletin,
would provide the purpose of reducing the probability of short period
scrams. The inspector's review of startup procedures (GP-2, GP-2A and
the C.0.L. PG-2A) identified that the licensee is concerned with short
period scrams, high notch worth, and the operability of the " emergency
rod in" switch.
The procedures contain cautions on short period scrams;
instructions, including special group notch control sequences (Banked
Position Withdrawal Sequence), and operability tests of the " emergency
rod in" switch; to reduce the possibflity of short period scrams, limit
high notch worth, and provide assurance that in event of a short period
condition, the " emergency rod in" is operable. The inspector also ver-
ified PORC review of the bulletin.
No unacceptable conditions were
identified.
5.
Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)
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The inspector reviewed LER's submitted to the NRC:RI office to verify that
the details of the event were clearly reported, including the
accuracy of the description of cause and adeouaey of corrective action.
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The inspector determined whether further information was required from
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the licensee, whether generic implications' were indicated, and whether
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ccatinued operation of the facility was conducted in accordance with
Technical Specifications.
Report accuracy, compliance with current re-
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porting requirements and applicability to other site systems and components
were also reviewed. The following LER's were reviewed:
LER No.
LER DATE
Event Date
Subject
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2-81-27/3L
May 22,1981
April 24,1981
During a maintenance outage
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had low oil -- snubbers were
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LER No.
LER Date
Event Date
Subject
2-81-28/IP
April 29, 1981
April 28,1981
Selected fans listed in
and 2-81-
May 11, 1981
FSAR were not seismically
28/lT
designed and therefore
required modification
2-81-29/3L
May 18, 1981*
March 27,1981
Battery and switchgear
room ventilation damper
pneumatic operators have
non-seismic air supply--
appropriate dampers have
been mechanically secured
pending permanent modifi-
cation
- originally reported by letter April 13, 1981
6.
Radiation Protection
During this report period, the inspector examined work in progress in
accessible areas of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 facilities. Areas examined
included:
a.
Health Physics (HP) controls
b.
Badging
c.
Use of protective clothing
d.
Personnel adherence to RWP requirements
e.
Surveys
f.
Handling of potentially contaminated equipment and materials
Additionally, inspections were conducted of use of friskers and rGrtal
monitors by personnel exiting various RWP areas, the power block, and
the licensee's final exit point, More than 100 people were observed to
meet frisking requirements of Health Physics procedures during the month.
A sampling of high radiation doors was verified to be locked as required.
Compliance with RWP requirements was verified during each tour; special
emphasis was placed on RWP adherence at the Unit 3 Drywell, Torus, and
Refuel Floor, and the Unit 2 Drywell. Over 30 RWP's were checked during
the month, several hundred line entries were reviewed to verify that
personnel had provided the required information; and about 50 people
working in h?P areas were observed to be meeting the applicable require-
ments.
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While touring the Unit 3 Reactor Building on May 28, the inspe-tor reviewed
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 3-74-0243, Requirements for Entry and Work in
the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) room.
The inspector noted
that only two persons were signed in on this RWP and that there were actually
three persons in the area.
The inspector identified the inconsistency to a
Health Physics technician, who then entered the area and directed the indi-
vidual that was not properly signed in to immediately exit the area. Fur-
ther review showed that the individual met the entry requirements specified
on the RWP. (i.e., protective clothing and monitoring devices).
Based on
the large number of people observed to be properly following Health Physics
procedures, this instance of failure to provide data for entry into an RWP
area is considered an isolated case.
The occurrence was discussed with
station management. The inspector will continue to monitor Health Physics
practices and adherence- to procedural requirements in future inspections.
7.
Radwaste Shipment Operations
On May 19, the inspector observed one truck being loaded with low specific
activity waste for shipment. The inspector observed the licensee's strvey
for loose contamination on the vehicle.
In addition, the inspector sr:lec-
tively verified that radiation levels, exterior to the truck, were less
then required by both regulation and licensee procedures (less than or equal
to 10 milliroentgens per hour and less than or equal to 8 milliroentgens
per hour, respectively, at six feet from the outer edges of the vehicle).
Further, the inspector reviewed the licensee's shipping documentation for
the above shipment, including the Radioactive Shipment Report (RSR), the
RSR form for the burial contractor, the shipping documents for the carrier,
the vehicle survey report, the isotopic reports for the material shipped,
the check-off list for procedure HOP /C0-71F-1; and the procedure HP0/CO-71G.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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8.
Physical Security
a.
Observation of Activities
The inspector spot-checked compliance with the Accepted Security Plan -
and implementing procedures, including operations of the CAS and SAS,
over 30 spot-checks of vehicles onsite to verify proper control, obser-
vation of protected area access control and badging procedures on each
shift, inspection of physical barriers, checks on control of vital
area access and escort procedures.
A strike of security force personnel began with the absenteeism of some
members on the afternoon shift on April 30.
The strike continued through-
out this inspection period and was honored by a number of personnel
varying from about one-fifth to one-half of the regular force. The
security contractor provided sufficient qualified personnel to meet
regulatory requiremer.ts through use of overtime, supervisory per-
sonnel, qualified guards from other sites, and newly hired personnel.
The inspector verified at least daily that selected security force
activities met the requirements of the Accepted Security Plan. On
May 1, May 4 and May 6 the inspector observed all posted guard and
watchman locations. corducted discussions with security personnel
to verify that they understood their responsibilities, and verified
guard alertness and proper performance.
Signs of inexperience of
x-ray operators were discussed with on-shift supervisors and the
Security Supervisor.
The inspector also verified licensee adherence
to commitments made to a region-based physical security inspector
during an in:pection on May 1 (e.g., use of site-experienced versus new
personnel for certain tasks).
The inspector noted that for several
hours on May 5 the roving " clock" guard was not stationed in the
Protected Area as called for in the licensee's procedures. Accepted
Security Plan requirements were met, however, in that another con-
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tinuously roving patrol was on duty in the Protected Area and com-
pleted a tour at least every two hours.
This matter was discussed
with the Security Supervisor.
Additional detail is contained in the
following physical security inspections:
Date
Report No.
Inspector
May 1, 1981
50-277/81-13
G. Smith
and 50-278/81-14
May 7-8, 1981
50-277/81-15
R. Ladun
and 50-278/81-16
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b.
Examination of Allegaticns
A number of allegations were provided to the NRC Region I office by
the York Daily Record (newspaper) or. May 6, 1981. The newspaper had
received these allegations from Peach Bottom Security force personnel
involved in the labor dispute. The inspector examined and evaluated
these allegations.
In evaluating the allegations, the inspector re-
ferred to previous IE inspections, consulted region-based specialist
inspectors who have conductad inspections at Peach Bottom, used per-
sonal knowledge of site act'vities and inspections, observed security
force operations, and reviewed records.
The allegations and inspector
findings are summarized below:
(1) Allegation: Short-staffed guard force; posts left unmanned
This area hr) been specifically inspected, during the labor dis-
pute, by the inspectors and by NRC region-based security special-
ists.
No instances of failure to man NRC-required security posi-
tions were identified. There were instances of securing of
optional posts.
One instance of a roving, " clock" guard not being
on duty for several hours on May 5,1981 was identified, but that
function is one required by the licensee in addition to the require-
ments of the NRC-approved security plan. This allegation has not
been substantiated.
(2) Allegation:
Clock round records falsified
The inspector and a region-based security specialist reviewed the
clock round entries in the security logs and identified no dis-
crepancies. The licensee stated to the resident inspector that
their periodic audits of clock tapes have identified no discrep-
ancies. Although the clock rounds are not part of the NRC require-
ments, anv false entry in the security logs would be cause for NRC
concern, and the individual who made the allegation will be con-
tacted to obtain more details when he returns to work (81-14-02
and 81-15-01).
(3) Allegation:
Vehicles entering the gate cannot be
)roperly
checked at night; guards are rushed to coinplete velicle checks
Resident inspector che;ks during 1980 found no failures to meet
vehicle check requirements during darkness.
Inspection of
vehicle checks during region-based security specialist inspection
have identified no failures to meet vehicle check requirements
during darkness.
Neither the resident inspector nor visiting
region-based security specialists have observed the guards to
be rushing. The resident inspector has noted instances of
vehicle drivers appearing to be concerned about the time re-
quired to complete vehicle checks.
This allegation has not been
substentiated.
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(4) Allegation:
Licensee personnel have stated that the guards are
for " window-dressing" only
The security force is required to meet specific NRC security
requirements adjudged necessary to protect the public.
There
is no indication that this licensee is treating security as a
decorative function, and considerable licensee effort and resources
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have been committed to security. Security is routinely inspected
and discussed with licensee management, and this allegation appears
to constitute individual statement or statements of opinion which
are not consistent with the actual situation.
(5) Allegation:
Security force personnel are assigned as fire watches
and are trained improperly for that job
Guards have been used, on occasion, as fire watches after-receiv-
ing verbal instructions.
Fire watches are routinely checked by
the resident inspectors.
No inadequacies in the ability of those
fire watches to detect and report fires have been identified.
This allegation has not been substantiated.
(6) Allegation: When the day shift departs, it is impossible to check
that all security badges are turned in
Approved and NRC-reviewed procedures cover badge issue and return.
There are checks which will reveal failures.to turn in badges.
There are also other measures for protection against introduction
of unauthorized materials and against improper entry into sensi-
tive areas. Whether the existing measures should be improved is
'
being reviewed by the NRC ind by the licensee. No significant
hazard to security has yet been identified.
It is true, however, that
no check that all . security badges are turned in is specified.
(7) Allegation: Portal monitors don't work.
In 1975, a worker with
contaminated shoes got through a portal monitor
Portal monitors are intended to check for radioactive sources or
significant contamination. More sensitive detectors, located on
site at the exit points from contaminated areas, will detect lower
levels of contamination.
The resident inspector has observed
portal monitor failure and proper licensee response (taking in-
operable equipment out-of-service).
No public hazard has been
identified in this area.
(8)_ Allegation:
600 Rad /hr leak at the plant
The allegation described circumstances which indicate that the
event involved was the April 27, 1981 radwaste discharge line-
break near tne 'B" cooling tower. The water which leaked'had
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15
been processed for discharge and was within the limits for
discharge (see combined inspection report:277/81-09 -and 288/81-10).
Discharge paths to the environment' are routinely monitored and
. recorded, and reviewed by the NRC.
No major releases have been -
identified, and annual release limits.have not been exceeded.
- It is possible that the alleger has misunderstood radiation ter-
minology. 'The allegation has not.been substantiated.
(9)' Allegation: Security force member received no whole body count
(WBC) for 22 months
The licensee verified that this is true, and stated that a WBC
was not required for the individual involved. -Licensee procedure
HP0/C0-26, " Personnel Bioassay Program", revision 5, dated-
October 20, 1980, specifies that a WBC should be provided annually
for individuals who use respirators; upon receipt of a specified
"
radiation dosage; at 3 year intervals; and upon termination.- A
WBC can also be obtained by request.
No violation of't!"C require-
ments has been identified in this case.
.
(10) Allegation: Guards are not taught what protective clothing to wear-
The inspector has confirmed that protective clothing is covered in
General Employee Training (GET). Security personnel are required.
to receive GET.
Entry into areas requiring protective clothing
is governed by Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)~or by a posting which
specifies the protective clothing required. More comprehensive
training is provided for personnel ' qualified- to wear ' respirators,
and that training is not required for all' security force-personnel.
NRC requirements.are being met in this area.
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9.
Operational Safety During Organized Labor Activities
On May 1,1981, striking security force personnel picketed site access roads.
Many contractor employees honored the lines.
From May 2 to the end of the
inspection, with the exception of May 6, the picketing was limited to the .
Unit 1 access road in accordance with a court injunction. On May 6, the
Unit 2 and 3 access road was also picketed and contractors again honored
the-lines.
Throughout the inspection, the inspector. frequently verified
that operating shift personnel and those security personnel not on strike
were not being detained at the picket lines.
The inspector frequently ver-
ified, during regular and back-shifts, that staffing of operating personnel
ant. of the security force met regulatory requirements. ' Security force
activities were closely monitored (see Detail 8).
The inspector confirmed
that liaison had been established with law enforcement agencies and that
prompt access of emergency vehicles and essential supplies was-assured.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
10.
In-Office Review of Monthly Operating Reports
The following licensee reports have been reviewed in-office onsite.
,
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Monthly Operating Report for:
April 1981 dated May 12, 1981
This report was reviewed l pursuant to Technical Specifications and verified'
to determine that operating statistics had been accurately reported and
that narrative summaries of the month's operating experience were contained
therein.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
11. Management Meetings
a.
Preliminary Inspection Findings
A sumary of preliminary findings was provided to the Statio'n Superin-
tendent at the conclusion of the inspection.
During the period of this
inspection, licensee management was periodically notified of the pre-
liminary findings by the resdient inspectors. The dates involved, the
senior licensee representative contacted, and subjects discussed were
as follows:
Senior Licensee
Date
Subject
Representative Present
May 1
Routine Discussions
Assistant Station Superintendent
May 8
Routine Discussions
Station Superintendent
May 15
Routine Discussion
Station. Superintendent-
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May 21
Er ineer_ Operations
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(Detail 3)
May 22
Routine Discussions
Station = Superintendent-
May 29~
Routine Discussions
Station Superintendent
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b.
Attendance at Management Meetings Conducted by Region-Based Inspectors _
The resident inspectors attended entrance and exit interviews by region-
based inspectors as follows:
Inspection
Reporting
Date'
Subject
Report No.'
Inspector
May 4,1981 (entrance) Maintenance
277/81-12
N. Blumberg
May 8, 1981 (exit)
program
and 278/81-13
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May 7, 1981 (entrance) Security
277/81-15
R. Ladun
May 8, 1981 (exit)
and 278/81-16
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