05000280/LER-1981-045-03, /03L-0:on 810703,BIT Recirculation Valves Closed. Caused by Isolation of Instrument Air to Auxiliary Bldg to Avert Reactor Trip.Air Line Break Isolated & Auxiliary Bldg Instrument Air Restored,Reopening Valves

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/03L-0:on 810703,BIT Recirculation Valves Closed. Caused by Isolation of Instrument Air to Auxiliary Bldg to Avert Reactor Trip.Air Line Break Isolated & Auxiliary Bldg Instrument Air Restored,Reopening Valves
ML20009H676
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1981
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009H621 List:
References
LER-81-045-03L-02, LER-81-45-3L-2, NUDOCS 8108100351
Download: ML20009H676 (2)


LER-1981-045, /03L-0:on 810703,BIT Recirculation Valves Closed. Caused by Isolation of Instrument Air to Auxiliary Bldg to Avert Reactor Trip.Air Line Break Isolated & Auxiliary Bldg Instrument Air Restored,Reopening Valves
Event date:
Report date:
2801981045R03 - NRC Website

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ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO:

50-281 REPORT N0:

81-044/03L-0 EVENT DATE:

07-05-81 TITLE OF EVENT:

HEAT TRACING FAILURE 1.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

With Unit No. *. at 100% power PT-27A revealed that the amp readings for heat tracing panel 10, circuits 2A (BIT inlet) and 4A (BIT recirculation return) and Panel 11, circuits IA (BIT outlet) and IB (BIT outlet) were below the acceptance criteria stipulated in the PT.

This event is contrary to Technical Specification 3.3. A.4 and is reportable per Technical Specification 6.6.2.b(2).

2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The heat tracing circuits are Intended to maintain a fluid temperature above that needed for flow. The redundant heat tracing circuits were operable; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3

CAUSE

The loss of heat tracing was due to excessive heating of the tape.

4.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

The immediate corrective action was to verify that the redundant circuits were operable.

5 SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The defective heat tracing tape was replaced and tested within the time span specified by Technical Specifications.

6.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

No additional actions were deemed necessary.

7 GENERIC !MPLICATIONS:

A task force has reviewed the total spectrum of the Heat Tracing System and a design change is being prepared as a result of the Task Force Study. Long lead items are being procurec'