05000280/LER-1981-017-03, /03L-0:on 810702,discovered That No Fire Watch Had Been Posted for Two Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations in Cable Spreading Room Area.Caused by Const Personnel Error. Fire Watch Posted & Seal Installed

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/03L-0:on 810702,discovered That No Fire Watch Had Been Posted for Two Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations in Cable Spreading Room Area.Caused by Const Personnel Error. Fire Watch Posted & Seal Installed
ML20009H637
Person / Time
Site: Surry Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1981
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009H621 List:
References
LER-81-017-03L-01, LER-81-17-3L-1, NUDOCS 8108100310
Download: ML20009H637 (2)


LER-1981-017, /03L-0:on 810702,discovered That No Fire Watch Had Been Posted for Two Unsealed Fire Barrier Penetrations in Cable Spreading Room Area.Caused by Const Personnel Error. Fire Watch Posted & Seal Installed
Event date:
Report date:
2801981017R03 - NRC Website

text

1 NRO FORM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMi$siCN

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'5 REPOPT OATE 80 EVENT :Escw nON ANO *ROS ASLE 00NSEOUENCES h 3:,;,, With the unit at cold shutdown, two unsealed fire barrier penetrations were dis-1

3 4.,, i covered during a QC walkdown of the cable spreading room area. No fire watch had 43,,, ; been established, contrary to T.S.-3.21.G.2.

This is reportable in accordance withi T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2).

No fires occurred in the affected area during this period, and 1

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{ o is ; ; other fire orotection systems remained ooerable:

therefore, the health and safetv 1 lai-!I of the public were not affected.

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ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO:

50-280 REPORT N0:

81-017/03L-0 EVENT DATE:

07-02-81 TITLE OF EVENT:

FIRE BARRIER PENETRATIONS NOT SEALED 1.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

With the unit at cold shutdown, prior to startup following an extended steam generator replacement outage, two unsealed fire barrier penetrations were discovered during a normal QC tour of the plant.

'o fire watch had been established, contrary to T.S.-3.21.G.2.

This is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2.b.(2).

2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

The unsealed fire barriers separated the cable spreading room from the control room and the cable vault.

During the time period when the fire barrier penetrations were not sealed, all other fire protection systems remained operable, and no fires occurred in the affected areas. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3

CAUSE

Construction personnel failed to inctall a fire barrier seal af ter opening fire barrier penetrations to install a new cable, and did not post a fire watch.

4.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

A fire watch was posted until seals could be installed.

5 SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Temporary seals were Installed in accordance with maintenance procedures, and verified by subsequent QC inspections. ~ Permanent seals will be installed when construction work on these penetrations is complete.

6.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The construction personnel have been reinstructed on the importance of fire barrier penetration seals, as well as maintaining a fire watch at all open fire barriers.

7.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.