ML20009G786

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IE Insp Rept 50-267/81-11 on 810501-31.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Adhere to Tech Spec Limitations & to Follow Procedural Requirement Re Accountability of Subtags on Deviation Forms
ML20009G786
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/1981
From: Dickerson M, Plumlee G, Westerman T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20009G782 List:
References
50-267-81-11, IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, NUDOCS 8108040661
Download: ML20009G786 (10)


See also: IR 05000267/1981011

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT.

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REGION IV

IE Inspection Report: -50-267/81-11

License DPR-34

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Docket: 50-267

Licensee: .Public Service Ccmpany of Colorado

P. O. Box 840

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Denver, Colorado

80201

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Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generation 5tation

Inspection at: Fort St. Vrain Site, Platteville, Colorado

Inspection Conductad: May 1-31, 1981

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Inspectors:

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M. W. Dickerson, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector

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G. L. Plumlee, III, Resident Reactor Inspector

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Approved By

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s T. F. ~Wes.,enhan, Chief,- Reactor Project Section No.1 '

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Inspectio Summary

Inspection conducted on May 1-31, 1981 (Report: 50-267/81-11)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of surveillance; maintenance;

operationel safety verification; plant operations; preparation for refueling;

refueling activities; plant trips-safety system challenges; IE Bulletin Follow-

up; Followup on previous violations; and review of periodic and special reports.

The inspection involved 185 inspector-hours on site by two NRC inspectors.

Results: Within the ten areas inspected, two items of noncompliance were

identified (failure to adhere to Technical Specification limitations, para-

graph 3.A.; and fatiure to follow a procedural requirement, paragraph 3.B.).

8108040661 010624?

PDR ADOCK 05000267

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

L. Brey, QA Manager

R. Craun, Senior Engineer

W. Franek, Results Supervisor

J. Gahm, Supervisor Technical Services

W. Franklin, Shift Supervisor

E. Hill, Superintendent of Operation

W. Hillyard, Administrative Services Manager

D. Hood, Shift Supervisor

F. Mathie, Operation Manager

T. Orlin, Superintcadent QA Services

L. Singleton, Superintendent Operation QA

J. Vandyke, Shift Supervisor

. Wadas,-Training Supervisor

D. Warembourg, Manager Nuclear Production

The inspector also contacted other plant personnel including reactor

operators, maintenance men, electricians, technician; and administrative

personnel.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings _

(Closed) Violation (50-267/8103-01): Liquid waste release resulting in

release of tritium to unrestricted area in excess of LC0 4.8.2(a) ii: nit

of 3.00E-3pCi/cc. The licensee modified the system to provide a bypass

around the oil separator for use during liquid releases.

(Closed) Violation (50-267/8103-02). Personnel failed to comply with

requirements of RWP. All personnel involved were reprimanded and

working foremen and supervisors have been instructed to emphasize

RWP requirements in job briefings prior to job commencement and to

continue such briefings throughout the job.

(Closed) Violatior. (50-267/8021-01): Two valves required to be sealed

in position wera missing locking devices.

A new system for assuring

valves required to " sealed has been placed in service and confirmed

by the NRC inspectw.

3.

Operational Safety Verification

The NRC inspector reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the

facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory

requirements, and the licensee's management control system is effectively

discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation.

The

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review was conducted by direct obse'vation of activities, tours of

the facility, .interviaws and discussion with licensee personnel, independent

verification of safety system status and Limiting Conditions for Operations,

(LCO), and review of facility records.

Included in the inspection were observation of control room activities,

review of operational logs, records, and tours of accessible areas.

Logs

and records reviewed included:

Shift Supervisor Logs

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Reactor Operator Logs

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Equipment Operator Logs

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Auxiliary Operator Logs

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Technical Specification Compliance Logs

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Operations Order Book

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System Status Log

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Form 1 Log (Jumper Log)

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Plant Trouble Reports

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During tours of accessible areas, particular attention was directed to

the following:

Monitoring Instrumentation

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Radiation Controls

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Housekeeping-

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Fluid Leaks

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Piping Vibrations

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Hanger / Seismic Restraints

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Clearance Tags

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Fire Hazards

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Control Room Manning

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Annunciators

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The operability of selected systems or portions of systems were verified

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by walkdown of the accessible portions.

Observed was the feeawater

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heater vent and drain system.

Procedures were also eviewed and imple-

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- mentation observed for Gaseous Effluent Releases No

537 and 540. The

releases appeared to have been made in a satisfactory manner.

No violations or deviations were identified.

A.

Technical Specification LC0 4.8.2(a) - Exceeded

On May 14,1981, at 1:00 p.m., the licensee reported to the

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Re;;ident Inspector that the limits of Technical Specification

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Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 4.8.2(a) for the concen-

tration of tritium in an unrestricted area had been exceeded on

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May 12, 1981. TS 4.8.2(a) states that "The maximum instantaneous

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release rate of radioactive liquid effluents from the site shall-

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be such that the concentration of radionuclides in the cooling

tower blowdown water discharge does not exceed the values specified

in Table II, Column 2, 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, for unrestricted

areas."

The specified release rate was 9.0 gpm at a dilution rate of

circulation water blowdown of 2,000 gpm.

A subsequent analysis

indicated an average release rate of 9.2 gpm and an average

dilution rate of 2,496 gpm.

However, a special test was perfonned

on release No. 460 to track liquid waste concentrations in the

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unrestricted area during the course of the release.

This con-

sisted of sampling on an hourly basis throughout the release.

The analysis run on the sample taken at 1:00 p.m. on May 12, 1981,

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25 minutes after start of the release indicated a concentration

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of tritium of 3.55E-3pCi/cc, in excess of the 3.00E-3pCi/cc speci-

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fied by LC0 4.8.2(a).

The cause has been attributed to an interruption of blowdown at

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12:55 p.m. for approximately two minutes which also caused automatic

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trip of the liquid waste transfer pump and closing of HV-6216,

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the liquid waste system isolation valve.

This allowed draining

of the highly concentrated liquid waste in the piping system

downstream of HV-6212 and resulted in an above limits concentration.

The licensee is considering relocating another isolation valve

at the junction of the liquid waste discharge line and the

circulating water blowdowr. line to isolate the dead leg until

conditions are acceptable for release.

Details on the release are available in the 14-day License Event

Report 81-036 dated May 27, 1981.

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Additionally, this matter was discussed with the licensee who was

informed that. failure to meet the requirements of the Technical

Specification was a violation (8111-01).

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The inspector had no additional questions in this area.

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'B.

Systems Abnomalities Book

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During a review of the Systems _ Abnormalities Book on flay 19, 1981,

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the NRC inspector noted two deviation foms which were initialed

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by a reactor operator as " equipment normal." However, a check of

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the System Status Tags Nos. 2196 and 2249, assigned respectively

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to each of the two forms, showed them to still be in place on the

equipment specified on the fonns for tagging.

System Status Tag 2196 was assigned to Loop 1 Steam Water Dump

Valves HV-2215 V-2213 and HS-2215.

System Status Tag 2249 was

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assigned to the Backup Bearing Water System Valve V-21453, on

HC-21417/48 and on HS-21331. A check of these tags by the

NRC inspector showed that they were still in place.

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Procedure P-2, " Equipment Clearance and Operation Deviation,"

paragraph 4.2.13, instructs the reactor operator to remove _the .

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" Operation Deviation Sheet" from the " Systems Abnormalities Book"

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and initial the form to indicate the system is normal and para-

graph 4.2.14 states that he is to verify all subtags listed on

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the deviation form have been returned.

Additionally, Operations

Order 81-01 requires that "the responsible operator will initial

the deviation form as indicated when the equipment is normal.

Reactor operator will check accountability of subtags on the

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deviation form, and transfer all paper and tags to shift supervisor."

The review of the deviation forms by the NRC inspector indicated

that for. System Status Tags 2196, the equipment had been altered

on December 19, 1980, and that the equipment was returned to normal

on December 16, 1980 (note inconsistency in dates).

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Status Tags 2249, the tag indicated that the equipment was altered

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on April 18, 1981, and that the equipment was returned to normal on

April 30, 1981. A check later in the day on May 19, 1981, indicated

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that both deviation forms had been initialed to indicate equipment

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altered with a new date of May 19, 1981.

The matter was discussed with the licensee who was informed that

failure to comply with the procedural requirements was a violation

(8111-02).

The inspector had no additional questions in this area.

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C.

High Vibration Turbine Trip

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(1) Activities During Event

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A high vibration turbine trip occurred on May 13, 1981,'at-

1:34 p.m. while the reactor was operating at approximately.

79% reactor power.

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When the turbine tripped, the hot reheat bypass valves opened.

However, the low condensate header pressure switch sensed less

than 234 psig pressure'and in a few seconds tripped the hot

reheat bypass valves closed. This plus an unexplained time lag

in the opening of the hot reheat electromatics caused the turbine

exhaust pressure to increase rapidly.

This caused both circulators

in Loop 2 to trip on drain malfunction resulting in an Tutomatic

Loop 2 shutdown.

The rapidly changing reheat pressures created instabilities

in the 150 pound steam header. As a result, the feedwater flow

from the steam driven feed pumps began oscillating,

Compounding

the oscillating feedwater flow problem was a problem with the feed-

water flow rate limiter which ramped down at a rate inconsistent

with the setting of 0.25%/second.

The recctor operator placed both header pressure controllers

in manual position to eliminate the 150 pound header instabilities.

The pressure stabilized but at low pressure, which caused the

two steam driven feedwater pumps to go into the recirculating

mode. The loss of the two steam driven feedwater pumps caused

the flow from the motor driven feed pump to increase.

Adjust-

ments to the controller helped stabilize the feedwater flow.

However, at this time the auxiliary boiler was approaching

its high pressure trip point and the pressure was manually

relieved. This caused the pressure in the 150 pound header

to increase sharply and in turn caused the feedwater from

the steam driven feed pump to increase sharply.

This sharp

increase in feedwater flow resulted in tripping both Loop 1

circulators on low programmed speed and the reactor scramed

from about 17% reactor power on a two loop trouble scram. The

ISS switch was then placed in the " low power" position and

"B" circulator restarted.

This ended a one minute loss of

forced circulation.

"A" circulator was restarted two minutes

later.

An inspection of the turbine-generator has revealed no damage

other than loose integral covers on each of the two sixteenth

stages of the low pressure turbine.

Small portions of five of

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the lugs holding the : overs in place were missing.

Additionally,

four diaphragms, two for each of twelfth and thirteenth stages

of the low pressure stages were loose. At the end of the report

period the licensee was preparing to repair and reassemble

the turbine.

(2) Radiological Considerations

At approximately 1:40 p.m. on May 13, 1981, activity was noted to

be increasing on all of the high pressure separator monitors.

This

was attributed to Reactor Coolant being forced down the shaft of

one or more of the helium circulators due to a buffer system

upset which was caused by the circulator trips.

Air sampling in the Reactor Building was initiated along with

constant monitoring of the Reactor Building exhaust stack.

At 2:01 p.m. air samples detected activity in the Reactor

Building of 1.7E-9 mci /cc and acces' control to the Reactor

Building was established. At 2:33 p.m. the air sampling

indicated an increase to 4.5E-9 mci /cc.

All persons were

removed from the Reaccor Building and a respiratory require-

ment for entry was established.

By 3:01 p.m. the activity

level had decreased to 2.1E-9 mci /cc and general access

was established.

During this period of time no personnel overexposures

occurred nor did any of the stack monitors indicate any

release of measurable radioactivity from the Reactor Building.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Surveillance (Monthly)

The NRC inspector reviewed a.il aspects of surveillance testing involving

safety-related systems. The review included observation and review

relative to Technical Specification requirements.

The surveillance

tests reviewed and observed were:

SR 5.4.1.2.1.C-M Steam Pipe Rupture (Pipe Cavity) Test

SR 5.4.1.2.2.C-M Steam Pipe Rupture (under PCRV) Test

SR 5.8.1.abc-M Radioactive Gaseous Effluent System Test (Release #537)

SR 5.4.1.1.4.b-M Linear Power Channel Scram Test

SR 5.8.1.abc-M Radioactive Gaseous Effluent System Test (Release #540)

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The NRC inspector noted that during the performance on May 14, 1981,

- of SR ~5.4.1.1.4b-M,I .e low level trip for channel 3. LLT-2 which

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should trip at 1.93 O 05V corresponding to 6% reactor power actually

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tripped at 2.112v.

Immediate corrective action was taken by the licensee

to recalibrate the power range channel.

No-violations or deviations were identified.

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5.

Maintenance (Monthly)

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The NRC inspector reviewed records and observed work in progress to

ascertain that the following maintenance activities were being conducted

in-accordance with approved procedures, Technical Specifications and

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aopropriate Codes and Standards.

PRT 4-382 Repair Hydraulic oil leak on HV-2254 in accordance with

MP 91.10, Hydraulic Operator Relief Valve Replacement

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PRT 4-383 Repair Hydraulic oil leak on HV-2292 in accordance with

MP 91.10

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PRT 5-54

Repair Hydraulic oil leak on FV-2206

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PTR 5-143 Noise in LP section after turbine trip and during coast down

PTR 5-286 Remove and Replace "B" Circulator C-2102 in accordance with

MP.21-15, Helium Circulator Change Out Procedure

PM 21.20

Quarterly Inspection of Helium Recovery Compressor C-2107S

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"B" Rix

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Refueling

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Non-Routine Fuel Reflector Handling

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Refueling Activities

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's Refueling Procedure FHP-4

and the procedure for Non-Routine Fuel Reflector Handling,.FHP-7, to

verify technical adequacy and procedure canpletion prior to handling of

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fuel in the core.

The NRC inspector r.ct.ed that Task 78 of FHP-4 trans-

ferring RCD's between FSC and FHM, as written requires transferring the

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region constraint devices from the fuel storage cask to the fuel handling

machine.

The actual transfer should be from the fuel handling machine

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to the fuel storage cask.

The NRC inspector also noted in Task 208 of

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FHP-4 that a data tape number was incomplete.

The licensee stated that

deviations to the procedure where necessary would be written and approved

prior to performance of the specific evolution.

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The NRC inspector also verified ventilation requirements in the fuel

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storage areas and that the licensee was maintaining good housekeeping

in the refueling area.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Report Reviews

The NRC inspector reviewed the following reports for content, reporting

requirements and adequacy:

Monthly Operating Information Report, March 1981

Monthly Operations Report, March 1981

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

IE Bulletin

The NRC inspector verified by record review, observation and discussion

with the licensee, the action .aken in response to IE Bulletins.

The following Bulletin was reviewed:

81-02 - Failure of Gate Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure.

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The licensee has determined that neither the Borg-Warner or Westinghouse

valves in question have been purchased or installed at Fort St. Vrain.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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9.

Review of Plant Operations

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The NRC inspector reviewed aspects of facility operations to determine if

they were being accomplished in accordance with regulatory requirements.

A.

Procurement and Storage

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The NRC inspector reviewed the following purchase orders, receipt

records, storage and certification records. Additionally, observa-

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tion as made of the receipt inspection for two of the purchase orders

and observed several items in storage.

P0 N3128 Repair of P-9105X

P0 N3443B Cage, Equal Percentage, for Fisher Valves

S/N 6374792

P0 N2951 Pipe 2h" CS

Pipe 3" CR. Molly

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P0 N3263 Relief Valve

P0 N3327 22 AWG 3 twisted pr. shielded

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The NRC inspector questioned the disposition cf NCR 80-27 which

indicated a hold point for notification to QA prior to disassembly

was not a quality hold point.

This'was resolved.at the time of

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discussion and_NCR 80-27A was issued which requires the :aotor to

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be insulation resistance tested prior to installation and verifica-

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tion of motor operability; e.g., excessive noise, vibration, over-

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heating, and pump pressure for P-9105X (P0 N3128).

The inspector had no additionai questions in this area.

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B.

Review and Audit

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The NRC inspector attended a Plant Operating Committee Meeting No. 411

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to determine compliance with the Technical Specifications and other

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regulatory requirements.

Additionally, the NRC inspector observed

portions of QA Audit No. QAA 601-81-01 of the Water Chemistry and

Radiochemistry areas.

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Security

The NRC inspector attended a training lecture and verified that

lesson plan objectives and the schedule were-being met.

Additionally,

the NRC inspector observed that acceptable scores were achieved by

several individuals during the conduct of weapons qualification

testing.

D.

Emergency Preparedness

The NRC inspector verified that the licensee's on site arrangements

for medical support and treatment are implemented as described in the

emergency plan.

The NRC inspector also witnessed a training session

for emergency preparation in which the control room cperators were

required to wear fresh air masks.

The records of licensee personnel

were also reviewed for emergency training.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Exit Interview

Exit interviews were conducted at the end of various segments of this

inspection with Mr. D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Production, and/or

other members of the Public Service Company staff.

At the interviews,

the inspector discussed the findings indicated in the previous paragraphs.

The licensee acknowledged these findings.

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