05000324/LER-1981-059-01, /01T-0:on 810629,valve Lineup for Loop a of RHR in Standby Readiness Was Incorrect.Caused by Control Operator Commencing Plant Startup W/O Knowing That Valve F020A Was Open.Rods Inserted & Sys Lineup Verified

/01T-0:on 810629,valve Lineup for Loop a of RHR in Standby Readiness Was Incorrect.Caused by Control Operator Commencing Plant Startup W/O Knowing That Valve F020A Was Open.Rods Inserted & Sys Lineup Verified

ML20009G170
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	07/09/1981
From:	Poulk R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009G157	List: 05000324/LER-1981-059, Forwards LER 81-059/01T-0 05000324/LER-1981-059-01, /01T-0:on 810629,valve Lineup for Loop a of RHR in Standby Readiness Was Incorrect.Caused by Control Operator Commencing Plant Startup W/O Knowing That Valve F020A Was Open.Rods Inserted & Sys Lineup Verified
References
LER-81-059-01T, LER-81-59-1T, NUDOCS 8108030393
Download: ML20009G170 (2)

LER-1981-059, /01T-0:on 810629,valve Lineup for Loop a of RHR in Standby Readiness Was Incorrect.Caused by Control Operator Commencing Plant Startup W/O Knowing That Valve F020A Was Open.Rods Inserted & Sys Lineup Verified

Event date:
Report date:
3241981059R01 - NRC Website

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' NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK: I l

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bo 61 DOCKET NUMBER 6J 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 j

EVENT OESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h 10121 l While performing a normal reactor startup. it was determined that the valve lineup l

[Ol3l l for the A loop of RHR in standby readiness was incorrect.

The F020A valve, torus l

l 014 l l suction for the A loop, was reported to be in the shut position with the mode switch l

10 l s l ] in Startup and seven rods withdrawn.

This condition makes the A loop of LPCI inoper-l 10lsl lable. This event did not affect the health or safety of the public.

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. I i 10 l l The cause for this event was the-Control Goerator commancine 1 i lwithout knowine that the F020A valve was or.en.

The seven withdrawn rods were immedi-l

[ii7l l ately inserted and the mode switch placed in Refuel. The F020A valve was opened, the__j y l system lineup verified correct and a normal reactor startup was performed.

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LER 2-81-59 A'ITACHMENT Facility: BSEP Unit No. 2 Event Date: 6/29/81 At approximately 0430 while establishing a standby readiness lineup for A loop of RHR in preparation for a reactor startup, the breaker for the torus suction valve, F020A tripped. Two Auxiliary Operators were sent to manually open the valve. The Auxiliary Operators were not able to break the valve disk off of' its seat, so another Auxiliary Operator was sent to assist with a manual valve operator. At 0528, prior to receiving word on the status of the F020A valve, a normal reactor startup was commenced.

Shortly after the commen ement of the startup, the Shift Operating Supervisor questioned the position of the F020A valve during a review of the control panel. The startup was secured with seven rods withdrawn and the Auxiliary Operators' assigned to open the valve were contacted to determine the actual valve position. At 0554, word was received in the Control Room that the F020A valve was still shut and still could not be broken of f its seat. The seven withdrawn control rods were immediately inserted and the mode switch was taken to the Refuel position.

An investigation of this event hcs determined that the main cause was personnel error with slow communications being a minor cause.

The Control Operator assumed that sufficient time had elapsed to open the F020A valve and thus initiated a reactor startup.

Hu also initialed the step on the startup procedure requiring the valve to be open as complete. To correct these problems the following acticns have been or will be taken:

1.

A meeting was held with senior plant management and those personnel involved to discuss the series of events that led to this violation of technical specifications and the seriousness of that violation.

2.

Appropriate disciplinary action was taken with the individuals involved in this event. The Shift Foreman and the Control Operator involved with this event were removed from duties requiring a license until the investigat!on was completed. Following the investigation and the meeting described-in 1.

above, the personnel were returned to normal duty.

3.

Each Shift Operating Supervisor will review this event with their respective shifts with emphasis on ensuring that items are verified complete prior to signing them off, and that all blocks are completed or an explanation documented and an approval signature obtained prior to initiation of any event requiring the documentation.

4.

The Shift Foreman will discuss with all Auxiliary Operators and Control Operators the need to maintain effective communications and to report problems to the Control Room in an expedited manner.

5.

GP-1 (plant startup procedure) will be reviewed and revised as required to better define startup prerequisites.