05000280/LER-1981-019-01, /01T-0:on 810707,urgent Failure Alarm for Control Rods Occurred,Indicating Rods Were Inoperrable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Power Cabinet.Fuse Replaced

/01T-0:on 810707,urgent Failure Alarm for Control Rods Occurred,Indicating Rods Were Inoperrable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Power Cabinet.Fuse Replaced

ML20009F744
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	07/21/1981
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009F730	List: 05000280/LER-1981-019-01, /01T-0:on 810707,urgent Failure Alarm for Control Rods Occurred,Indicating Rods Were Inoperrable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Power Cabinet.Fuse Replaced ML20009F729
References
LER-81-019-01T, LER-81-19-1T, NUDOCS 8107310489
Download: ML20009F744 (2)

LER-1981-019, /01T-0:on 810707,urgent Failure Alarm for Control Rods Occurred,Indicating Rods Were Inoperrable.Caused by Blown Fuse in Power Cabinet.Fuse Replaced

Event date:
Report date:
2801981019R01 - NRC Website

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PDR ADOCK 05000280

SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1 DOCKET NO:

50-280 REPORT NO:

81-019/01T-0 EVENT DATE:

07-07-81 FAILURE TO SHUTDOWN WITH lNOPERABLE RODS 1.

DESCRIPTISH OF EVENT:

With th<< unit critical at 0% power curing low power physics testing, an urgent f ailure alarm occurred, indicating that the control cods were inoperabic.

This condition existed for more than two hours, but the unit was maintained critical. This is contrary to T.S.-3.12.C.3, and is reportable per T.S.-6.6.2a(2).

2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES:

The rods remained inoperable fer less than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

The unit remained in a controllable state throughout this period, and all control rods were capable of being dropped if required.

Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3

CAUSE

The control rods were Inoperable because of a blown fuse in a power cabinet.

The unit was maintained critical for greater than the two hour period al-lowed by the Technical Specifications due. to inadequate annunciator proce-dures.

4.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

The blown fuse was located and replaced, making the control rod system operable.

5 SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None required.

6.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

The annunciator procedure will be revised to provide further guidance to the operators concerning control rod operability requirements.

7.

GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.

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