05000339/LER-1981-047-03, /03L-0:on 810609,solid State Protection Sys Train B Stop Valve Generator Trip Logic Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Faulty Universal Card A404. Card Replaced & Logic Channel Returned to Svc

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/03L-0:on 810609,solid State Protection Sys Train B Stop Valve Generator Trip Logic Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Faulty Universal Card A404. Card Replaced & Logic Channel Returned to Svc
ML20009F708
Person / Time
Site: North Anna Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/07/1981
From: Cartwright W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009F706 List:
References
LER-81-047-03L-01, LER-81-47-3L-1, NUDOCS 8107310431
Download: ML20009F708 (2)


LER-1981-047, /03L-0:on 810609,solid State Protection Sys Train B Stop Valve Generator Trip Logic Failed to Meet Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Faulty Universal Card A404. Card Replaced & Logic Channel Returned to Svc
Event date:
Report date:
3391981047R03 - NRC Website

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION a

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1)

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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(8) f DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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/ _ On June 9, 1981 during Mode 1 operation, the solid state protection system

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train B "stop valve-Generator Trip" logic failed to meet the acceptance criter-/

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ia of 2-PT-36.1B.

The logic was restored within the requirements of the T.S.

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3.3.1.1 action statement, therefore the health and safety of the public was not/

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affected. This item is reportable pursuant to T S. 6.9.1.9.b.

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SYSTEM

CAUSE

CAUSE COMP.

VALVE CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE

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SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/R0 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO.

CODE TYPE NO.

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ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENTi TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURERI LA/ (18)

/Z/ (19) /Z/ (20) LZ/ (21) /0/0/0/0/ (22) g/ (23) g/ (24) LN/ (25) /W/1/2/0/ (26l CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) l

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The logic failure was traced to a faulty Universal Card (A404).

The card was /

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replaced and the logic channel returned to service after calibration.

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FACILITY METHOD OF DISCOVERY DFSCRIPTION (32)

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Surveillance Test

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PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

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PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)

NRC USE ONLY

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NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151 i

]8107310431810707 DR ADOCK 050003

Virginia Electric and Power Company j

North Anna Power Station, Unit #2

Attachment:

Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-339 Report No. LER 81-047/03L-0

Description of Event

During the performance of the Reactor Protection and E3F Logic Test (2-PT-36.1B), the positioning of the logic test switch (Position 18) in the SSPS train B resulted in a " logic-fault" light j

on the test panel indicating a failure in the logic circuit.

Investigation revealed a failed universal card in the train.

The reactor trip logic from the closure of turbine stop valves (4 of 4 logic) was the trip feature affected.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence The reactor trip from the closure of all stop valves provides a loss of heat sink protection by providing for a reactor trip 3

when above 10% power (P-7).

Since the faulted channel was restored within the requirements of the T.S. 3.3.1.1 action statement and the redundant train remained operable to provide a reactor trip if c.il stop valves were closed, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

cause of Event

This event was caused by the failure of the universal card (A404) in the SSPS train B logic.

Immediate Corrective Action

1 The faulted card was replaced, the channel calibrated and returned to service.

Scheduled Corrective Action No further action required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence No further action required.

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Generic Implications There are no generic implications as a result of this event.

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