ML20009E723
| ML20009E723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 07/24/1981 |
| From: | Cole R, Mark Miller, Remick F Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| To: | ACORN ALLIANCE, Citizens Association for Sound Energy, CITIZENS FOR FAIR UTILITY REGULATION |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8107280390 | |
| Download: ML20009E723 (20) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
?y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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3g.dgoj\\7 3 '0MIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD I
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--i lrgi Before Administrative Judges:
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R Marshall E. Miller, Chairman
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Dr. Forrest J. Remick y
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Dr. Richard F. Cole s
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N In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-445 50-446 TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, ET AL.
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(Application for Operating License)
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2)
July 24, 1981 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER SEEC o 14 ' M I.
ACORN'S hDTION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL The Intervenor Texas Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) filed its motion for voluntary dismissal from this proceeding on June 16, 1981. ACORN stated in its motion that it "has limite'd funds and cannot afford to pay" what it deemed to be the " massive" costs involved in paying "the consultants and expert witnesses who are necessary to continue this litigation." ACORN further indicated that "in initiating and carrying out this litigation", it assumed that necessary experts and consultants would be made available free of charge. The assumption proved false.
Texas Utilities Generating Company, et al. (Applicants) responded on June 24, 1981, supporting the motion for dismissal as a party, and urging the Board to dismiss ACORN's contentions. The Applicants also requested 8107280390 910724 PDR ADOCK 0500C445 G
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- that a prehearing conference scheduled for July 8-9, 1981 in Fort Worth, Texas be cancelled as unnecessary in view of ACORN's withdrawal as a party intervenor. The Staff filed its response on July 6, 1981, not opposing ACORN's motion for voluntary dismissal and suggesting that each contention previously sponsored solely by ACORN be dismissed. The Staff also suggested that a new " lead party-intervenor" be designated for contentions sponsored jointly by ACORN and others.
The Board sent a telegram on June 26, 1981, to all parties which read as follows:
Comanche Peak prehearing conference scheduled July 8-9, 1981 is cancelled /0rder concerning all pending motions will be issued shortly / Expedited schedule for termination of discuery and early commencement of evidentiary hearing on NEPA and selected issues will be included.
ACORN's motion for its voluntary dismissal will be granted, as no intervenor can be compelled to remain a party against its will. All pending motions by or against ACORN are dismissed as moot.
l On June 16, 1980, the Board ruled on the admissibility of contentions and it admitted 17 of ACORN's contentions.1/ Those contentions were some-what modified and combined, in part, with contentions filed by the other two Intervenors, CFUR and CASE. ACORN's renumbered and accepted conten-l tions for which it was solely responsible then became Contentions 10 and 12 through 21.
Subsequently ACORN was designated as the " lead party-inter-venor" for those contentions which it alone had sponsored.E/ ACORN was also l
1/ rder Subsequent to the Prehearing Conference of April 30, 1980, entered l
O June 16, 19f30, pp. 6-8, 10-17.
E# Memorandum and Order, entered December 31, 1980, pp. 12-13.
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. designated lead party on several other contentions (5 and 23) which it had sponsored jointly with other Intervenors (Id_. at 13).
As to the jointly sponsored contentions, CFUR is designated as the lead party on Contention 5, and CASE as the lead party on Contention 23.
If either party is unable or unwilling to lead on these contentions, they shall so advise the Board within 20 days from the date of this Order. The disposition of the contentions asserted solely by ACORN (10 and 12-21), is discussed infra in our consideration of sua sponte jurisdiction.
II. SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION OF CONTENTIONS AND ISSUES Prior to November 23,1979,10 CFR 62.760a provided that in a contested operating license proceeding, findings of fact and conclusions of law should be made:
"on the matters put into controversy by the parties to the proceeding and on matters which have been determined to,be theissuesinthepgceedingbytheCommissionorthe presiding officer."_
In its prior form, 52.760a further provided that:
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" Matters not put into controversy by the parties will be examined and decided by the presiding officer only in extraordinary <.ircumstances where he determines that a serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security matter exists. This authority is to be used sparingly."1/
3/40 Fed. R_eg. 2974, Jan. 17, 1975. This regulation had its genesis in the Commission's decision in Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3), CLI-74-28, 8 AEC 7, 9 (1974). The Commission's regulations, in accordance with the express direction in that decision, were conformed to the construction embodied in that memorandum and order by means of amendments effective February 18, 1975 (40 Fed. Reg. 2973).
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. In 1979 certain changes were made in the second paragraph of 92.760a quoted above, which now reads as follows:
" Matters not put into controversy by the parties will be examined and decided by the presiding officer only where he or she determines that a serious safety, en ronmental, or common defense and security matter exists."_
Although the former requirements relating to a finding of " extraordinary circumstances", and the sua sponte authority-being "used sparingly" were deleted by this amendment of the regulations, it is nevertheless still necessary to make a finding that a " serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security matter exists."N Finally, the Commission has recently reviewed licensing procedures used by its adjudicatory boards, including the application of the sua sponte rule. The latest action taken by the Commission in this regard is described in a memorandum issued by its Secretary on June 30, 1981, as follows:
,"On June 2, 1981, the Commission requested that henceforth:
(1) When a Licensing Board or an Appeal Board raises an issue sua sponte in an Operating License proceeding, it shall issue a separate order making the requisite findings, briefly state its reasons for raising the issue; and it shall forward a copy of that order to the Office of the General Counsel and to the Commission and (2) when a Licensing Board or an Appeal Board has raised an issue sua sponte, the 0#fice of the General Counsel shall, as part of its regular monitoring of adjudicatory proceed-ings, make a prompt report on the matter to the Commission.
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'The Comission made clear that in so requesting, it was not
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altering in any way the provisions of the Commission's E44 Fed. Reg. 67088, Nov. 23, 1979.
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. rules regarding the raising and consideration of. issues sua sponte. Accordingly the Boards shall continue to make the initial determination of whether a Board question is an exercise of sua sponte authority or a question asked to ensure the completeness of the record on an admitted contention.
Furthennore, the fact that an issue has been raised sua sponte, and that the Commission will be advised of that action by the Office of the General Counsel through its monitoring of adjudicatory proceedings, would not pro-vide a basis for any party to fail to meet its obligation to respond expeditiously to the Board's questions."
In applying the foregoing principles of sua sponte jurisdiction to this proceeding, the Board will next consider two groups of contentions or i
admitted issues. The first group deals with three questions which the Board in its June 16, 1980, Orded directed the Applicants and the Staff to address during the forthcoming evidentiary sessions. The second group of potential issues revolve around the previously admitted contentions sponsored solely by ACORN (10 and 12-21),in light of _the voluntary dismissal.
of ACORN as an intervening party.
A.
Board Questions Propounded June 16~, 1980 By its Order subsequent to the April 30, 1980, Prehearing Conference, the Board ruled on the admissibility of contentions. Certain contentions led the Board to propound questions which it directed the Applicants and the Staff _ to address during the forthcoming evidentiary sessions. Al though s
these questions might be considered as follow-up to issues raised by the U rder Subsequent to the Prehearing Conference of April 30, 1980, entered 0
June 16, 1980, pp. 4-6.
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. parties, i n honoring the spirit of the Commission's recent directives the Board will regard them as exercises of the Board's sua sponte authority.
The Board questions were propounded in the June 16, 1980 Order as follows:
Board Question No. 1:
Describe in detail the planned methods for handling any hydrogen gas in the CPSES containment structure.
Board Que.stion No. 2: Applicant and Staff should describe in detail the operating quality assurance program for CPSES. A description of the provisions for conduct of QA audits should be provided, includ hg a descrip-tion of how reactor operat 1s and reactor operator training..,1 be audited.
Board Question No. 3: Describe the status of resolution of Safety Issue TAP A-9 (ATWS) as it relates to CPSES 1 and 2.
Boar 6 'luestion 1 could be construed as necessary to ansure the completeness of the record on admitted contentions.8_/ However., the wording of the admitted contention is such that the issue of handling hydrogen gas in the containment structure might not have been included in the evidentiary l
responses.b/ The Boahl finds that the methods and plans of the Applicants for handling any hydrogen gas in the containment structure are important and have significant implications from a health and safety viewpoint.
8_/ ontention 4.
Some accident sequences heretofore considered to have C
probsbilities so low as to be considered incredible, based, in part, upon l
the findings of WASH-1400, are in fact more probable in light of additional findings, such as those of the W ii Committee and should be evaluated as credible accidents for CPSES. This evaluation should include a hydrogen explosion accident.
In order to insure conservatism, the probabilities associated with such Mcident sequences should be the highest probabilities within the specified confidence band (CFUR 3a, 3b and ACORN 11).
EISee discussion in Order entered June 16, 1980, p. 4 (fn. 1, p. 2, supra).
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Board Question No. 2 was propounded as the, result of the reformulation of a proposed contention which was denied as lacking adequate basis and specificity (ProposedCFURContention48). The Board believed that the most forthright and expeditious way to handle the issues raised was to phrase it in the form of a specific question or request for information, more focused on issues than in the form of generalized allegations of inadequacy.
1 This question could also be cons #dered a logical extension to admitted l
Contention 5, which deals with quality assurance and quality control during l
the construction stage. The Board considered operational QA to have the potential for serious health and safety implications, particularly as
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related to reactor 'perator training, and accordingly raised the question I
under its sua sponte authority.
Board Question No. 3 was propounded as the result of the denial of a proposed contention. CFUR Contention 9 concerning hardware modifications and Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) was denied as being too speculative, and because it was beyond the Board's jurisdiction insofar.as it suggested that the Board override any possible future Commission-granted exemptions for ATWS-related hardware modifications. The Board considered i
the ATWS issue to have significant heali.h and safety implications, and therefore directed the Applicants and Staff to describe.its status as related to Comanche Peak.
i' In compliance with the Commission's June 2,1981 directives regarding i
l sua sponte issues (supra pp. 4-5), this Order and especially pages 5-7 thereof will be forwarded to the Office of the General Counsel and to the 1
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i Commission. This section of our Order is deemed to satisfy the above requirements for the Board to issue an " order making the requisite findings, briefly stat [ing] its reasons for raising the issue" (_Id.)
B.
ACORN's Solely Sponsored Contentions Because this is one of the first proceedings in which the Commission's recent sua sponte directives have been construed and applied, the Board will carefully consider the status, following its voluntary dismissal, of the 11 contentions that were solely pleaded and sponsored by ACORN. The Board does not entirely agree with the Staff's position in this regard, which it j
described as follows:
"The Staff believes that ACORN's failure to provide vir'aally any information in response to legitimate discovery requests, which would support or elucidate its contentions -- notwith-itanding the fact that it was ordered to do so by the Licensing Board -- effectively precludes the Licensing Board from being able to ' determine that a serious safety, environ-mental, or common defense and security matter exists' (10 CFR 52.760a), and precludes the Staff and the Applicant from being able to litigate the merits of ACORN's contentions. Cf.
Tyrone Energy Park, supra, 5 NRC at 1301. Accordingl K the Staff believes that each of the contentions which were sponsored solely by ACORN -- i.e., contentions 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21 -- should be dismissed from this proceeding._]:_.I "13/In an operating license proceeding where a hearing is convened as a result of intervention, the Licensing Board will resolve all issues raised by the parties and any issues which it raises sua sponte.
10 CFR 62.760a; Consolidation Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976). The decision as to whether any other matters need to be considered prior to issuance of the operating license is the responsibility of the NRC Staff alone.
Indian Point, supra, 3 NRC at 190; Portland General Electric t,o. (Trojan Nuclear Plant),
ALAB-181, 7 AEC 207, 209 n.7 (1974).
In the event that ACORN's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal is granted, the contentions solely advanced by ACORN would no longer be issues raised by a party and for the reasons stated in the
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text above, the Board lacks sufficient information to make the determination necessary to exercise its sua sponte jurisdiction. Accordingly, the contentiggs sponsored solely by ACORN should be dismissed."Z/
The Staff correctly states that where a hearing is triggered in an operating license proceeding by an admitted intervention, the Board will then resolve all cognizable issues (1) properly raised by the parties, and (2) any issues raised by the Board sua sponte.I0/ In this regard, the Staff cites Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976). That case was decided when the earlier (1975) version of the sua sponte regulation was still in-force, requiring that such " authority is to be used sparingly" (52.760a).
Nevertheless, even with the former language then in effect regarding
" extraordinary circumstances" and "used sparingly" (now deleted, supra pp. 3-4), the Appeal Baord's discussion of sua sponte principles is helpful:
"Tc be sure, the board in an operating license case does have the residual power to delve into any serious matters which it uncovers, even if no party has put them in issue. This power is, however, to be exercised sparingly; an operating license board is neither required nor (xpected to pass upon all the items which the staff must consider and resolve before it approves the license. The upshot is that, once an operating license board has resolved any contested issues and any issues raised sua sponte, the decision as to all other matters which need to be considered prior to the issuance of the requested license is the responsibility of the staff and it alone. On the other hand, the staff may 9I-NRC Staff's Response to ACORN's Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (7/06/81),
- p. 5 and fn. 13.
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. not issue an operating license while the licensing board presiding at the operating license hearing still has any unresolved issues under consideration, even if the staff is satisfied as to all the subjects committed to it for decision."
(Footnotes omitted) (3 NRC at 190).
It is therefore clear that the power of the Staff alone to decide whether any other matters need to be considered prior to the issuance of an operating license, arises only after the Board has resolved the question of potential sua sponte issues, and it does not qualify or limit the Board's jurisdiction in that regard.
The Staff further argues that "the Board lacks sufficient 4. formation to make the determination necessary to exercise its sua sponte hrisdiction,"
and hence that the ACORN contentions should be dismissed. This result was allegedly required by ACORN's prior failure to provide discovery information on those contentions, although crdered to do so.
Such failure, the Staff argues, " effectively precludes the Licensing Board from being,able to
' determine that a serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security ratter exists' (10 CFR 52.760a), and precludes the Staff and the' Applicant from being able to litigate the merits of ACORN's contentions.
Cf. Tyrone Energy Park, supra, 5 NRC at 1301."$
The Staff's position might be tenable if this were a purely adversary proceeding and the only cognizable issues were those resulting from admitted contentions.
An intervenor's failure to provide ordered discovery informa-tion could then result in sanctions extending as far as dismissal of a party and issues.
However, the Staff's argument ignores the other possible l
ENRC Staff's Response etc., supra, p. 5, fn.13.
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. source of litigable issues, namely, those raised sua sponte by the Board.
The possible imposition af sanctions such as dismissal of an adversarial party, would not of itself impair or preclude the consideration of a " serious safety" or other issue under 52.760a.
The Staff cites Tyrone Energy Park, supra, a construction permit pro-ceeding, to show that intervening parties and their contentions have been dismissed where they have been in default of discovery orders and they have failed to provide necessary information. As there stated, to " permit a party to make skeletal contentions, keep the bases for the.a secret, then require its adversaries to meet any conceivable thrust at hearing would be patently unfair, and inconsistent with a sound record."EI However, it is s
also important to note that after dismissing certain parties and their contsr.tiens following detault, the Licensing Board in Tyrone. Energy Park then expressly stated that "[t]he Board retains Contention 11.A.(2) as its own contention."
(Emphasis supplied.)N This illustrates the different criteria that there governed the treatment of issues raised by adversarial parties, and those same issues when adopted by the Board "as its own contention."
Finally, the Staff argues on this point that because of ACORN's failure to provide discovery information, "the Board lacks sufficient information to rake the determination necessary to exercise its sua sponte jurisdiction."EI i
EIS NRC at 1301.
bid., at 1302.
EINRC Staff's Response etc, p. 5, fn. 13.
. This argument overlooks the Board's inherent power to obtain whatever information is reasonably necessary to determine "that a serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security matter exists" under 52.760a.
If serious safety matters are potentially involved in an operating license hearing, the public interest would not condone a Licensing Board having its hands tied by being wholly dependent upon an intervenor furnishing discovery information or retaining the status of a par v. The situation is comparable to that described by the Court in Scenic Hudson as follows:
"In this case, as in many others, the Commission has claimed to he the representative of the public interest.
This role does not permit it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public must receive active Commission."M/ protection at the hands of the and affirmative Undoubtedly, the Board could require the remaining parties, particularly the Applicants. and the Staff, to supply such information or data as might reasonably be required for the analysis and possible exercise of sua sponte authority.E/
If the safety or other issues involved were sufficiently serious and significant, the Board could probably take rea_sonable steps to obtain indispensable information on the record from independent experts, EIScenic Hudson Preserv&cion Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608, 614, 620 (2nd Cir.1965). See also Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412, 419 (2nd Cir.19T2);
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1309, 1119 (D.C.
l l
Cir. 1971); Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
l E Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 247, 249 (1978).
. subject to notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard.El A Board can also use the expertise of its own members in making a sua sponte analysis of issues.
Accordingly, the Board will review the ACORN contentions and make an independent judgment as to sua sponte issues, in accordance with the pro-visions of 10 CFR 92.760a, as amended, and in compliance with the Commission's directives of June 2, 1981.
1 The Board has carefully reviewed each of ACORN's eleven solely sponsored contentions.
Part of that review involved a study of pertinent portions of Applicant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)El and NRC Staff's recently completed Safety Evaluation Report (SER)--N" MG-0797.El The Board n'otes that the Staff listed 30 outstanding issues in its SER.El Nine of ACORN's eleven contentions are directly related to these open issues.
In addition to those areas where the Staff has not completed its review, the SER lists 14 unresolved safety issues applicable to Comanche Peak. The SER also indicates that the Staff has issued NUREG reports providing its proposed resolution to five of these issues.EI Two of the NUREG reports (NUREG-0609 E/10 CFR 992.718, 2.722.
E/ omanche Peak Steam Electric Station Final Safety Analysis Report (as C
amended).
[CPSES FSAR]
E/ afety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Comanche Peak Steam S
Electric Station Units 1 and 2,NUREG-0797, July 1981.
(SER)
E/
. at 1-7 through 1-10.
Id E/
. at 1=12 and Appendix C.
Id
4 and NUREG-0612) relate directly to ACORN contentions.El Only one of ACORN's contentions (#20) is not asrociated with either an outstanding SER issue or an applicable generic safety issue.
The ACORN contentions and the Board's disposition of them are as follows:
Contention 10. The CPSES design fails to adequately account for the eff ect of asymetric loading result-ing from a pipe break in the areas between the reactor vessel and the shield wall.
The issue of asymetric blowdown loads on PWR primary coolant systems was first identified as a problem,<ith generic implications in 1975.El The NRC Staff initiated a generic invesiigation (Task Action Plan A-2) which concluded in December 1980. The NRC Staff resolution of this issue is described in a report, " Asymmetric Blowdown Loads on PWR Primary Systems --
Resolution of Generic Task Action Plan A-2 (NUREG-0609 publi:hcd January,1981). The report provides acceptance criteria and guidelines for use in plant-specific analyses. Staff SER 53.9.2.3 discusses the status of the Staff's application of these acceptance criteria and further states that the final results of the review will be reported in a supplement to the SER.
Absent any showing to the contraryt the Board considers this issue sufficiently resolved so that the issue need not be raised under the Board's sua-spont 9 authcrity. However, the Board will c.xpect the Staff to report on S/
. at Appendix C-5.
Id E/askActionPlansforUnresolvedSafetyIssuesRelatedtoNuclearPower T
Plants (NUREG-0649, page A-2/1, February,1980).
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the ultimate resolution of this issue in a subsequent supplement to the SER.
Barring an unfavorable ultimate resolution report, Contention 10 is not an issue in this case.
Contentions 12 through 19 are related to issues which the Staff is still reviewing. These contentions and the Staff's open item identification numbersareasfollows:2y Contention 12. Neither the Applicants nor the Staff has reliable methods for evaluating and insuring that structures, systems and components the affects (sic] y are designed to withstand important to safet t
of the safe shutdown earthquake wthout losing the capability to safely shut-down the plant; thus, General Design Criterion SER Open Item 2 has not been satisfied.
- 9: Seismic and dynamic qualification of mechanical and electrical equipment (SER 53.10),
and SER Open Item 12(a): Low-temperature over-pressure protection system (SER 55.2.2.2),
(a) Power-operated relief valve (PORV) operators not qualified to be functional after seismic loads (SER 55.2.2.2).
Contention 13.
Present fire protection measures proposed by
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Applicants ar' not adequate to minimize the probability and effect of a fire from disabling the electric cables for all redundant safety systems; thus, General Design Criterion 3 has not been satisfied.
SER Open Item #24:
Fire protection program (SER 658.4.6, 9.5.1 and 9.5.3).
Contention 14. ' The D C Power System for the CPSES plant fails to meet the single failure criterion as defined in SER Open Item #12(b):
Low-temperature overpressure protection system, (a) PORV not single-failure proof for loss of vital de bus power (SER 55.2.2.2).
Contention 15. The CPSES design does not provide adequate, reliable instrumentation to monitor variables and systems affecting the integrity of the reactor core, the pressure boundary of the containment after an accident, in violation of General Design -
ESER at 1-7 through 1-12.
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. Criterion 13 of Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 50.
SER Open Item #21:
Environmental quali-fication of control systems for a harsh environ-ment associated with a high-energy line break (SER 57.7.2), and SER Open Item #30(f): TMI Action Plan--(f) Instrumentation and controls.
II.F.1 Additional accident monitoring instru-mentation, attachments 1, 2 and 3.
II.F.2 Instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling.
Contention 16. The CPSES design does not provide adequate equipment outside of the control room to promptly put the reactor in hot shutdown and so maintain it until attaining cold shutdown (also from cutside the control room) as required by General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
SER Open Item #19:
Remote shutdown capability (SER57.4.2).
Contention 17. Neither the Applicants nor the Staff has adcquately considered the effects of aging and cumulative radiation on safety-related equipment which must be seismically and environmentally qualified, thus, General Design Criterion 4 has not been satisfied.
SER Open Item #4:
Fracture-toughness roperties of Unit 2 reactor vessel materials (SER 155.3.1.2 and 5.3.3)-
t Contention 18. The CP5ES design fails to present a means for dealing with pressure transients produced by component failure, personnel error, or spurious valve actuation which exceed the pressure / tempera-ture limits of the reactor vessel.
SER Open Item #10:
Enviror. mental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment (SER 53.11) and SER Open Item #30(a), (b), (f), (g) and (h): TMI Action Plan (H22),
(a) Operating and support personnel I.A.1.2 Shiff manning I.B.1.2 Evaluation of organization and management improvements of near-term operating license applicants.
- i (b) Operating Procedures I.C.1 Guidance for evaluation and development of procedures for transients and accidents I.C.8 Pilot monitoring of selected emergency procedures for near-term operating license applicants.
(f)
Instrumentation and controls II.F.1 Additional accident monitoring instrumen-tation, attachments 1, 2 and 3 II.F.2 Instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling.
(g) Measures to mitigate small-break loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) and loss of feedwater accidents II.K.2.13 Thermal mechanical report--effect on high-pressure injection on vessel integrity for small-break LOCA accident with no auxiliary feedwater II.K.2.17 Potential for voiding in the reactor coolant system during transients II.K.".1 Installation and testing of automatic PORV isolation system II.K.3.2 Report on overall safety effect of PORV isolation system II.K.3.11 Justification of use of certain PORVs.
(h) NRC and licensee preparadness III.A.1.1 Upgrading emergency preparedness III.A.1.2 Upgrading emergency support facilities III.A.2 Improving licensee emergency preparedness, long term.
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. Contention 19. The CPSES design fails to protect against corrosion within the steam generators which causes cracking of pipes and leakage of radioactive water.
SER Open Item #15: Steam generator secondary side water chemistry program (SER 55.4.2.3).
The Board prefers to retain Contentions 12 through 19, at least until the Staff arrives at a position via supplements to th5 SER. Accordingly, t,he Board exercises its sua sponte authority to retain these issues, which may have significant health and safety consequences.
Contention 20. The CPSES design does not adequately insure that safety-related water supplies will be available for plant operation in the event of ice buildup at the service water intake structure.
ACORN Contention 20 concerning ice buildup at the service water intake was accepted as a contenti'n under the Allens Creek umbrella.EI Mean monthly temperatures in the area of the proposed site range from 45 F in January to 81 F in July and August.E/ On-site measurements during the month of January during the period 1972-1976 showed average daily maximum and minimum temperatures of 12.8 C and 2.0 C (55 F and 3G F).EI Absent more specific information concerning the potential for ice problems at the station intake, this issue does not appear to this Board to reach the status of a problem requiring sua sponte adoption.
EIHouston Lighting and Power Company (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590,11 NRC (1980).
EISER 52.3.2.
2_7/CPSES FSAR Table 2.3-16 Sheet 1 of 13.
S
. Contention 21. The CPSES design fails to protect against accidents involving the movement and handling of heavy loads in the vicinity of spent fuel at the facility.
ACORN Contention 21 is a restatement of Task No. A-36, " Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel."
In July 1980, a report " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (NUREG-0612) was issued. This report describes the Staff's review and provides the criteria that should be satisfied to assure safe handling of heavy loads. Absent any information to the contrary, the Board considers this issue resolved and declines to raise it sua sponte. The Board does however take note that this issue is listed as an open iten. in Staff's SER (0 pen Item #23): Handling of heavy loads in conformance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612 (SER 59.1.4). Barring an unfavorable resolution report by the Staff in its SER supplement (s), Contention 21 is not an issue in this case.
ORDER i
For all the foregoing reasons and based upoe a consideration of the entire record in this matter, it is this 24th day of July,1981 ORDERED (1) That ACORN's motion for its voluntary dismissal as a party is granted.
(2) All pending motions by or against ACORN are dismissed as moot.
(3) With regard to jointly sponsored contentions, CFUR is designated as the lead party on Contention 5, and CASE as the lead party on Contention 23.
. If either party is unable or unwilling to lead on these contentions, they shall so advise the Board in writing within twenty (20) days from the date of this Order.
(4)
Board Questions 1-3, as propounded in the June 16, 1980 Order,
-hall constitute issues to be addressed in this proceeding.
Copies of this Order dealing with those matters shall be treated as sua'sponte issues, and copies of this Order shall be forwarded to the Commission and to the Office of the General Counsel in compliance with the Commission's June 2,1981 directive regarding sua,sponte issues.
(5)
Contentions 10, 20 and 21 shall not constitute issues in this proceeding by sua sponte action of the Board, and they are dismissed as contentions.
(6)
Contentions 12 through 19 are retained as issues at this time by the Board's exercise of its sua sponte authority.
Copies of this Order dealing with Contentions 12 through 19 shall be forwarded to the Commission and to the Office of General Counsel, in compliance with the Commission's June 2, 1981 directive.
THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD rrest J. Remick D
RATIVE JUDGE i !--
5 Dr. Richard F. Cole ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
{s Marshall E. Miller, Chairman ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE