ML20009D871
| ML20009D871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1981 |
| From: | Utley E CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| IEB-81-02, IEB-81-2, NUDOCS 8107240451 | |
| Download: ML20009D871 (5) | |
Text
-
v OFFICIAL COPY
~
Y)
July 9, 1981
[.-
};
b
'h g 6MD s
'Y JUL~3*t33 Y5 n
'j (( son h-u Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Region II 46 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
}<
.b
%,j h
101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30303 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS. 1, 2, 3, AND 4 DOCKET NOS. 50-400, 50-401, 50-402, AND 50-403 IE BULLETIN 81-02
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) has completed its review of IE Bulletin 81-02, " Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential Pressure," and has determined that each unit of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP) has seventeen (17) affected valves. An Interim Report from N. J. Chiangi to J. P. O'Reilly dated December 29, 1980 was submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).
In addition to the list of ten valves submitted previously, three PORV block valves have been identified as requiring attention.
The total thirteen (13) affected 3-inch valves are identified in Table 1, along with their planned service, the maximum differential pressure at which they would be required to close, and the safety consequences of the valve's failure to.close.
Also included in the table are the four affected 4-inch valves planned for service at SHNPP, as identified by IE Bulletin 81-02.
These valves, however, have a functional requirement less than the operational capability and therefore, should not recuire modifications.
76//
s
/
I 8107240451 810709 PDR ADOCK 05000400 0
PDR l
L
i The testing and redesign program to determine the best modification for each valve type has not yet been completed by Westinghouse.
After receipt of the results of this pro,mram and an evaluation of the results by CP&L, the planned modifications and schedule for those modifications will be submitted to you.
If you have any further questions on this subject, please contact our staf'f.
Yours very truly, E. E. Utley Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering & Construction ONH/je (N#63)
Attachment ec:
Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 E. Licitra (NRC)
E. E. Utley, having been first duly sworn, did depose and say that the information contained herein is true and correct to his own personal knowledge or based upon information and belief.
jaahDfbl&T L'@
Notary Public
, ', '.. * * * ~
~****.,#,
$ !,sOTARyi My commission expires: October 4,1981 p
i g
gg a
........p,,,,,,,
i
TABLE 1
- 1 MAXIMUM AP (PSID)
ZERO BELOW WHICil POTENTIAL W-EMD MODEL W VALVE Equip.
Funct.
VALVE WILL CLOSE SAFETY VALVE I.D.
REFERENCE VALVE FUNCTION & SYSTEM IDCAT10N NO.
Spec.
Reqmt.
(AS SHIPPED)
CONSEQUENCES 3-GM88FNil 3GM99 PZP. PORV Block 8000A*}
2750 2750 750 1, 5 Reactor Coolanc System 3-GM88 FNil 3GM99 PZR. PORV Block 8000B }
2750 2750 750 1, 5 Reactor Coolant System 3-GM88 FNil 3GM93 PZR. PORV Block 8000C 2730 2750 750 1, 5
, Reactor Coolant System 3-GM78FN 3GM99 Chg. Pump Miniflow Iso.
8106 2750 2750 750 2, 4 Chem. & Vol. Control Sys.
3-GM78FN 3GM99 Chg. Line Iso.
8107")
2750 2750 750 2, 4 Chem. & Vol. Control Sys.
3-GM78FN 3GM99 Chg. Line Iso.
8108 )
2750 2750 750 2, 4 c
Chem. & Vol. Control Sys.
3-GM78FN 3GM99 Boron Inj. Tank Iso.
8801A 2750 1200 750 2, 3 Safety Inj. System 3-GM78FN 3GM99 Boron Inj. Tank Iso.
8801B 2750 1200 750 2, 3 Safety Inj. System 3-GM78FN 3GM99 Boron Inj. Tank Iso.
8803A 2750 1200 750 2, 3 Safety Inj. System 3-GM78FN 3GM99 Boron Inj, Tank Iso.
8803B 2750 1200 750 2, 3 Safety Inj. System 3-GM78FN 3GM99 Ilot Leg Recire. Iso.
8884 2750 1200 750 2, 3 Safety Inj. System 3-GM78FN 3GM99 Cold Leg Recire. Iso.
8885 2750 1200 750 2, 3 j
Safety Inj. System 3-GM78FN 3GM99 Ilot Leg Recirc. Iso.
8886 2750 1200 750 2, 3 i
Safety Inj. System l
r.
=.
TABLE 1 (C:nt.)
,e
/
MAXIMUM AP (PSID)
ZEk0 BELOW WHICH POTENTIAL W-EMD MODEL W VALVE Equip.
Funct.
VALVE WILL CLOSE SAFETY VALVE I.D.
REFERENCE VALVE FUNCTION & SYSTEM LOCATION NO.
Spec.
' R?eqmt.
(AS SHIPPED)
CONSEQUENCES 4-GM78FN 4GM88 Chg. Pump Disch. XO Iso.
8132A 2750 500 750 6
Chem. & Vol. Control Sys.
4-GM18FN 4GM88 Chg. Pump Disch. XO Iso.
8132B 2750 500 750 6
Chem & Vol. Control Sys.
4-GM78FN 4GM88
'Chg. Pump Disch. XO Iso.
8133A 2750 500 750 6
Chem. & Vol. Control Sys.
4-GM78FN 4GM88 Chg. Pump Disch. XO Iso.
8133B 2750 500 750 6
Chem. & Vol. Control Sys.
Notes:
Each valve contracted for all four Shearon Harris units.
,)
a)
Unit 2 valve sent to Marshall Test Loop for EPRI Test Program.
b)-
Unit 2 valve sent to Pilgrim.
c)
Unit 2 valve sent to Farley via Westinghouse.
i 9
l i
,4
- \\
L 9
m
,-L 1
w TABLE 1 (Cont.)
Key to Potential Safety Consequences ID No.
Consequence 1
(POR7 Block Valves)
Potential incomplete isolation of pressurizer PORV.
2 Potential cavitation of a centrifugal charging pump or safety injection pump or safety injection pump due to operation beyond maximum runout flow.
3 Potential inability to perform post-accident containment. isolation.
4 Potential degradation of safety injection flow below values given in SAR.
5 Potential inability to isolsce RCS pressure boundary.
6 None yet identified - valves meet functional requirement.
N#63
-- -