ML20009C736
| ML20009C736 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1981 |
| From: | Parker W DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Adensam E, Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8107210411 | |
| Download: ML20009C736 (34) | |
Text
,E DUKE POWER COMPANY Powen Buru>ixo 422 SouTn Curucu STnzar, CiuntoTTE, N. C. 2824a 3
Witt?%M O. PARKER,JR.
Wer Pntsioggt TcLtemoNE:Anta704 sica-Paooucno~
July 15, 1981 273 4oe3 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
- 1/p Office of Nuc] wr Reactor Regulation
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U. S. Nuclear sagulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Attention:
Ms. E. G. Adensam, Chief JUL 'o. 01987 % ~\\
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'8-Q l jew 4roav Licensing Branch No. 4 n
' 'l Re: ' McGuire Nuclear Station N)~ W f I kg 1 [/>
d#/
Docket Nos.'50-369, 50-370 f
y
Dear Mr. Denton:
The attached information is provided in compliance with the provisions of McGuire License No. NPF-9, condition '.C.(7)(c).
Also included is a description of the planned testing to be conducred on the D. G. O'Brien electrical penetration con-
-nectors as discussed in a meeting with the NRC Staff on July 6, 1981.
It should be noted that the NRC Staff's Safety Evaluation Report on equipment qualification was issued on April-17, 1981. However, it was not until the July 7-10 meeting that the NRC Staff was in a position to provide clarification on what was expected of licensees in reponse to the SER's.
The short time between this meeting and our required submittal date did not give Duke Power Company ade-quate time to incorporate all of the staff guidance into this submittal. Accordingly, this submittal includes only equipment located inside containment.
Equipment located outside containment in potential harsh environments, including high radiation and high energy line break (HELB), will be addressed in a separate submittal by August 15, 1981.
t V y truly yours, j
.. ($.
n William O. Parker, Jr.
.GAC:pw Attachment cc:
Ms. M. J. Graham Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Direccor Resident Inspector - 1:aC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Station Region II ON Il in 07210411 810715 PDR ADOCK 05000369 A
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McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit I t
Environmental qualification of Class lE Equipment NRC letters dated October 15, 1979 and February 15, 1980 concerning the environmental qualification of Class lE equipment defined the NRC Staff's requirements with respect to NUREG 0588, Interim Staff Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment.
Basically, the Staff's requirements were as follows:
1)
Provide a table listing by generic type all Class IE equipment including the appropriate qualification data for the equipment. The format for this table was provio'ad in the Staff's October 15, 1979 letter.
- 2) Review the adequacy of the environmental qualification for the equipment identified in item 1 above with respect to the Staff's position described in NUREG 0588, document the degree of conformance, and justify any deviations.
Furthe., the NRC issued a Memorandum and Order on May 23, 1980 establishing NUREG 0588 as the requirement which applicants must meet in order to satisfy General Design Criterion 4 relating to the environmental qualification of Class IE equipment.
In response to the NRC Staff's requests for information in this matter, Duke Power Company has conducted a thorough review of the environmental qualifica-tion of Class !E equipment located in a potentially harsh environment. A summary of the findings of this review was provided to the NRC Staff in submittals dated January 18, 1980, August 13, 1980, and October 14, 1980.
On April 17, 1981 the NRC Staff issued Supplement 5 to the McGu e Nuclear Station Unit 1 SER which contained the Staf f's evaluation of the McGuire Unit i NUREG 0588 submittal.
It is the purpose of this document to provide the e Hitional information necessary to resolve the items identified by the Staff ir. both the SER text and in the accompanying tables.
SER Text - Paragraph 3.1 This paragraph of ;he SER addresses the completeness of the Class lE equipment qualification re.ew from a systems standpoint.
In this paragraph the Staf f requested that the main steam isolation system be addressed or that proper justification be provided for not addressing the system. We have concluded that the Class 1E components of the main steam isolation system were erroneously omitted f rom our NUREG 0588 submittal and that the qualification of these components will be addressed in the next revisic.a to the submittal. The revision is scheduled for September 15, 1981.
m
"o Page 2 SER Text - Paragraph 3.2 This paragraph of the SER addresses the basis of the service conditions identified in the NUREG 0588 submittal.
in this paragraph the Staff requested verification that the containment spray system is not subJcct to a disabling single - component failure.
It has been verified that the McGuire Unit I containment spray system as described in the McGuire FSAR, Section 6.5 is not subject to a disabling single component failure.
SER Text - Paragraph 3.3 This paragraph of the SER addresses the temperature, pressure, and humidity conditions inside the containment resulting from a LOCA or MSL8.
In this paragraph to 10 gaff requested that the profile for the MSLB be extended f rom 1000 seconds the S seconds.
In a review of the MSLB scenario, it was determined that within 10 minutes into a MSLB cvent, all feedwater flow to the affected steam generator will be terminated.
Following the blowdown and subsequent dryout of the affected steam generator, the containment temperature decreases rapidly due to the termina-tion of stecm release. Af ter 20 minutes following a main steamline rupture, the containment temperature is Icss limiting than the temperature exhibited following a postulated rupture of the reactor coolant system. Therefore, it is not necessary to extend the MSLB profile to 105 seconds.
In this paragraph the Staff also questioned the use of the LOCA temperature in the upper containment as the limiting temperature. The question is based on the fact that the hydrogen skimmer f ans take suction f rom the lower containroent and d'scharge in the upper contali. ment following either a LOCA or MSLB.
In a review of this con:crn it was determined that the discharge of the hydrogen skimme: fans into the upper containment will have no adverse effect on any Class IE equipment also located in the upper containment for the following reasons:
1.
The actuation of both the hydrogen skimmer f ans and the containment air return fans is delayed 10 minutes f rom receipt of a containment high prc>sure signal. This means that the lower conte:nment temperature will have already begun to decrease pi lor to initiation of these f ans.
2.
The actuation of the hydrogen skimmer fans is concurrent with the actuation of the containment air return fans; therefore, mixing provided by the containment air return fans will negate any potent ial temperature in the upper containment due to hydrogen skimmer fan discharge increase. This is evident from the capacitics of the fans:
hydrogen skimmer fans - 3,200 cfm; containnent air return fans -
30,000 cfm.
3.
The hydrogen skimmer fans are located at cicvation 820 which !s approxi-mately 50 feet above the operating check. There is no Class IE equip-ment located in the direct discharge path of these fans.
\\
Page 3 SER Text - Paragraph 3.5 This paragraph of'the SER addresses submergence.
In this paragraph the Staff noted that the NUREG 0588 submittal identified certain safety-related motor operated valves including associated cables that are located below the maximum post-LOCA water level. The Staff requested that an assessment of the failure modes of these components be provided with consideration of the effects of their potential submergence on any other safety function including the potential of misleading information bcIng supplied to the operator. The Staff further requested that this review consider operating time, across the spectrum of events, in. relation to'the time of submergence.
In a review of the safety-related motor operated valves located below the maximum post-LOCA water level, it was determined that for all defined events the valve motor operators will perform their safety function petor to becoming submerged.
The flood level will reach the lower most safety-related valves at approximately 5 minutes into an accident situation. These valves,however, will have moved to their safety position at approximately 15 seconds into an accident situation and are not reaut red to reposition subsequent to submergence. This time interval provides adequate margin to assure the completion of the required safety function.
Additional information concerning these valves is found in the McGuire FSAR, Section 15.4.1.3.
The aspect of misicading information being supplied to the operator is under review. Further information on this matter will be provided in an update to this report.
SER Text - Paragraph 3.6 This paragraph of the SER addresses chemical spray, in this paragraph the Staff requested additional information regarding the concentrations of the chemical sprays used in the various qualification programs. We have reviewed the qualification programs for the Class 1E equipment located inside the containment and have provided the requesteo information as appropriate on the attached tab.e.
SER Text - Paragraph 3.7 This paragraph of the SER addresses the aging of safety-related equipment.
In this paragraph the Staff discusses the aging requirements for valve operators qualified in accordance with IEEE 382-1972 and continuous duty motors located inside containment qualified in accordance with IEEE 334-1971. The Staff also discusses the aging program for other safety-related equipment.
For the safety-related valve operators (mctor and solenoid) located inside I
containment,-a review of the qualification documentation shows that these operators were ncchanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent 40 year service life in accordance with 8EEE 382-1972. prior to DBE testing.
Additionally a review of the qualification documcntation for safety-related
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Page 4 continuous duty motors installed inside the containment shows that these motors were mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent 40 year service life in accordance with IEEE 334-1971 prior to DBE testing.
Maintenance schedules have been established for these valve operators and continuous duty motors that will assure that the 40 year life of the equipment is maintained.
For other equipment, addressment of aging was not a requirement in qualification programs committed to IEEE 323-1971 (i.e., Category II equipment).
- However, with the wealth of in-service experience covering a variety of equipment types, no significant in-service aging mechanisms have been identified which could prejudice the qualification tests performed en new equipment within a few years from start-up.
Duke Power Company is evaluating the in-containment Class IE equipment and will report at the time of discovery any equipment for which significant aging mechanisms are identified including the Justification for continued use and/or reasonable alternative action. This on-going investigation will necessarily be very time consuming and will rely heavily on EPRI research, NRC studies, NPRDS Information, IE Bulletins and Circulars, and industry research and testing. Duke is an active member of the EPRl/ Utility Advisory jroup on Equipment Qualification and the AIF Subcommittee on Equipment qualification and is participating in the current efforts to develop an industry position in regard to the aging issue.
In addition to the program described above, there are several on-going programs within Duke Power Company which address the surveillance, maintenance, and replacement aspects of SER Text - Paragraph 3.7.
These programs are described below.
The incident Investigation Program provides for the evaluation of equipment failures. As part of this program any components that may have degraded and caused equipment failure would be identified and appropriate corrective action taken-Identification of a component which degrades unacceptably over a period of time would result in either (1) replacement of the component with a better component or. (2) estabilshment of a periodic replacement schedule for the com-ponent based on the length of time the original component functioned, in either of these two cases, tha potential for futura failures is diminished with a re-sultant increase in reliability and safety. Failures are also evaluated to determine whether any gmtematic trends exist. Additionally, the Maintenance Management Program presently under development will provide trend information on a wide variety of equipment problems. This is a computer based system with the capability to identify recurring equipment problems. As problems related to aging or degradation are identified similar corrective action to that metioned above can be taken.
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Page'5 SER Text - Paragraph 3.8 This paragraph of the SER addresses the basis for the calculated radiation
' doses both inside and outside the containment.
in this paragraph the Staff questioned the radiation dose value range identified for inside the contain-ment since certain values were below the Staff's screening criteria. A review of this situation indicates that the equipment which has a 40 year plus accident TID that is less than the Staff's screening criteria is only required for a'sbatterm. function and is, therefore, not exposed to a high radiction dose prior to performing its safety function.
SER Text - Paragraph 3.9
- This paragraph o# the SER addresses margin.
It should be noted that where margin has been identified as a potential deficiency for a given piece of equipment, it has been addressed on the attached tables.
SER Text - Paragraph 4 This paragraph of the SER addresses the Staff's assessment of the individual equipment items identified in Duke Power Company's NUREG 0588 submittal. The potential deficiencies identified by the Staff on a per equipment basis are addressed on the attached tables.
I
McGUlp! NUCLEAA STATION * (Mlf I Page I l
Steenaf 0F ENVIRONMENTAL QUAllflCATION OF CLA55 IE EQUIPMENT Aevisloa 0 LOCATED IN51DE CONTAINMENT EQUleMENT N00EL 0A MCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPERAO f LLYf OMRADILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALf'ICATiCM I
'IDENTIFICATICIl MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICAT4001 INVIRONMENT TO ndHICH REQulRfD IN DEMOIISTAATED REQUIRED DEMOIISTRATED SEPORT Afl0 l
(3)
IRMSER (2)
QUAllF4ED ACCIDENT METNCE l
EmVin0NMENE ())
(% of Span)
(1 of Spen)
(4) l
/
ransmi t t'er -
Sarton 763 Tew:
327 F Temp:
380 F S1 Initiation 5 minutes
+ 101 Man.f a rer 7.7%
WCAP 9885 I
fss sur int Pressure (Lot 2)
Press: 14.8 psig Press:
75 psig
(<5 mia.)
post Det (5 min)
Method: Test j
1 RH:
100%
RH:
t001 Rad:
2.5ml0 R Rad:
5:1074 l
LMr coatstruent) 6 Chem 5 pray: N/A Chem Spray: Boric acid and sodlum hydroxide soin.
i l
jSERItem lCS:
These transmitters are not exposed to any degradation f rom the ef fects of chemical spray prior to performing their safety function.
lA:
Aging was not a requirement in the quallfication program for the Barton (LOT 2) transmitters, which was developed to address i
Radiation aging, however, has been adequately addressed by the LOT 2 testing program. The materials and components used do not have a known therrnal aging mechanism (as compared to Appendix C of IE. Bulletin 79-01B) that could af fect the performance of the transmitte. s during the first two fuel cycles of reactor operation.
Upon the completion of Barton LOT 4 tests, which include aging, our intent is to demonstrate the similarity of the Barton LOT 4 and LOT 2 transmitters and thus obtain a proven qualified life.
- ti -
The qualification tests demonstrate that the trip accuracy requirement is maintained-for up to five (5) minutes and probably much longer although that was not the intent of the program.
Once the protection sig,a1 is generated, it is
" locked-in" by the protective system and will not reset regardless of the transmitter's subsequent perforTnance. The qualification program also verifies that the transmitters will continue to operate for at least four (4) months post-accident within a relaxed accuracy requirement which provides additional margin for the five-minute trip requirement.
McGulRE NUCLEAR STATION
- UNlT I Page 2 SLPtMRAT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUAllFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUlfttENT Revision 0 LOCATED IM51DE CONTAIMMtNT EQUIPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE M81 LITY CPE MBI LITT ACCURACY ACCU MCY QUALIFICATION IDENTIFICATIENI MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATiell EnvlRONHCNT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED AEQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT ANO (1)
InsiSER (2)
QUALIFIE0 ACCIDENT METN00 ENVIR0setENT (3)
(% of Span)
(1 of Spen)
(4) frewsmittst -
Barton 764 Temp:
327 F Temp:
380 F 2 weeks 4 months g 251 Man. Error 15; WCAP 9885 brsssurl2:r Level (Lot 2)
Press:
14.8 psig Press:
75 psig post LSE post DBE hethod: Test L Lawer cse t tironent)
RH:
8001 RH:
1071 7
7 Rad:
1.4x10 R Rad:
5=10 R Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric acid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetraborate soln.
hydroulde soln.
SER ltem
.CS:
Initial Spray:
2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray:
1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray:
As documented in y_ CAP-9885, the chemical spray consisted of 2750 ppm boric acid dissolved in water and adjusted to a pH of 8.5 by sodium hydroxide, which is representative of the range of pH values permitted in the long term.
A-Aging was not a requirement in the qualification program for the Barton (LOT 2) transmitters, which w, developed to address IEEE-323-1971.
Radiation aging, however, has been adequately addressed by the LOT 2 testing program. The materials and components used do not have a known thermal aging mechanism (as compared to Appendix C of IE Bulletin 79-018) that could affect the performance of the transmitters during the first two fuel cycles of reactor operation.
Upon the completion of Barton LOT 4 tests, which include aging, our intent is to demonstrate the' similarity of the Bartc.. LOT 4 and LOT 2 transmitters and thus obtain a proven qualified life.
M:
This deficiency was deleted per discussions with M. Slosson, NRC-EQB, 7-8-81.
l licGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION = UNIT I Page 3 5LfvMAY OF ENVIRONNENTAL QUALIFICATION OF (LASS IE EQUIPMENT Revisto. O LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINNENT EQUI PMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE M8 t LITY OPERASILITY ACCURACY ACCUMCY Qt*Li FICATICII IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER 10ENTIFICAT1004 ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DDt0NSTRATED REQUIRED DDooltSTRATED REPORT Amp (1)
NL848ER (2)
QUALIFIED ACCIDENT MET 1000 ENVIRoletENT (3)
(% of Spr.n)
(1 of Span)
(4) fresmittir -
Barton 764 Temp:
327 F Temp; 380 F Reactor trip 4 months Trip Fur.ctfun:
<p $1 ($ alnl W Ap 9885 5/G Lsv31 (44)
(Lot 2)
Press: 14.8 psig Press:
75 psis (C5 min.)
post 08E
+ $% ($ min) tie thod: Test (Lower contsinment)
RH:
100%
RH:
1004 Plus 4 months I
7 Red:
2.3x10 R Rad:
SnIO R post D8E PAM Function:
Maa Error IS%
Ctwa ': pray: Boric Chem Spray: Soric 1 25% (4 mo)
(4 ao) acid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetraborate soln.
hydroxide soln.
(Note $)
SER ltem -
CS:
Initial Spray:
2000-2100 ppm Boron Reci rculated Spray:
1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray:
As documented in WCAP-9885, the chemical spray consisted of 2750 ppm boric acid dissolved in water and adjusted to a pH of 8.5 by~ sodium hydroxide, which is representative of the range of pH values permitted in the-long te rm.
A-Aging was not a requirement in the qualification program for the Barton (LOT 2) transmitters, which was developed to address IEEE-323-1971.
Radiation aging, however, has been adequately addresse'd by the LOT 2 testing program. The materials and ccmponents used do not have a known thermal aging mechanism (as compared to Appendix C of IE Bulletin 79-018) that could affect the performance of the transmitters during the first two fuel cycles of reactor operation. Upon the completion of Barton LOT 4 tests, which include aging, our intent is to demonstrate the similarity of the Barton LOT 4 and LOT 2 transmitters and thus obtain a proven qualified life.
M.
The qua'lification tests demonstrate that the trip accuracy requirement is maintained for up to five (5) minutes and probably much longer although that was not the intent of the program. Once the protection signal is generated, it is " locked-in" by the protective system and will_not reset regardless of the transmitter's subsequent performance. The qualification program also vcrifies that the transmitters will continue to operate for at least four (4) months post-accident within a relaxed accuracy requirement which provides additional margin for the five-minute trip requirement.
The qualification program utilized a 15-day test period simulating a four-month post-DBE environment based on conservative aging procedures referenced in WCAP-9885. This conservative basis (0.5 ev in the Arrhenius equation) ensures that adequate margin exists.
P
b McCulRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Page SLMi%RY OF ENVIR0petENTAL QUALIFICATl0N OF CLAS5 lE EQUlFNENT Reves9en 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINhENT EQUIPMENT M00EL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RA88 LITY OPE RA81 LITY ACCURACV ACCURACY QUALIFICAT10es IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATl0N ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMoh5TRA TE D REQUIRE D DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND (1)
WUMBER (2)
QUALIFIED ACCIDENT METHOD ENVIR08# TENT (3)
(% of Span)
(% of Span)
(4) arO.
Rosemount 176 KF Temp:
327 F Temp:
332 F Reactor Trip r, M o g 0.2"4
+ 0.27 WCAP 915 7 aad 0.ka KC5 Tampsriture (NR)
Press:
- 11. 8 psig Press:
66 psig
(< 5 min)
R >_ S t 6 letter Parker to (towr contsinment)
RH:
1007 RH:
500%
t,enten dated Decerce r 0
Rad:
IXIO A Rad:
Iml0 R 19, 1973 Chem Spray: N/A Chem Spray: Soric acid and sodlum method Tast/ Analysis hydroxide soin.
SER Item CS:
These RTD's are not exposed to any degradation f rom the effects of cliemical spray prior to performing their safety function.
A-Addressment of aging, was not a requirement in qualification program for these RTD's which was developed to meet the require-ments of IEEE-323-1971.
Furthermore, in-service experience with the type of equipment supplied by Westinghouse shows that it is highly unlikely that a significant in-service mechanism exists which could prejudice the qualification tests performed by Westinghouse on new equipment.
In addition, radiation aging has been adequately addressed by the Westinghouse test p ro g ram.
A marginal application of one material (ethylene propolene rubber) has been identified in Appendix C of IE Bulletin 79-01B. The RTD's will be replaced within 10 years unless it can be shown that the EPR is a non-critical material.
0 M-Based on the radiation test of 1 x 10 gamma, the RTD's qualified life would be in excess of 40 years plus five minutes post-SLB.
If the EPR is judged to be a critical' material, the life would be limited to 10 years. The Rosemont RTD oualification test program utilized a 6-day test period simulating a 52-day post-DBE environment based on conservative aging procedures.
This test documented by W_ CAP-9157 ensures that adeqt' ate margin exists.
l
'l McCulRE huCLEAR STATION = UNIT 1 Po,e 5
l StetMARY Or ENVIR0 MENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLA$$ lE EQUlPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED IN$lDE CONTAlletENT
, EQt'I PMENT HODEL OR ACCl0ENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RA81 LITY OPERAtiLITY ACCURACV ACCURACY QUALIFICnTICII (DENTIFICATION leseUFACTURER 10ENTIFICAT1016 ENVIRONMENT 10 WHICN REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED dot 0er$1 RATED REPORT ANS (1)
NL3e8ER (2)
QUALIFlED ACCIDENT METN00 ENVIRC*etENT (3)
(% of Span)
(% of Span)
(4)
IGDD-Rosemount 176 KS Temp:
327 F Temp:
332 F 2 weks t 0.2%
1 0.21 WCAP 9157 and Oure Press:
Ife.8 psig Press: 66 psig post 08E wt m O E.
letter Parker to l0C5 T2mperature (WR)
Denton dates Cecember l(Lawr coatsinment)
RH:
10 RH:
10016 19, 1979 i
Rad:
IX10 R Rad:
Iml0 R Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric t'e t hod
- Ccsapatison to acid and sodlum acid and sodlum l
Mode l ( 76 KF
(
tetraborate soln.
hydrDalde soln.
Test / Analysis l
(SER ltem' iCS:
laitial Spray:
2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray:
1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray:
The chemical spray solttion consisted of 1.146 wt. % boric acid and 0.17 wt. % NaOH dissolved in H O which 2
corresponds to a pH o. 8.5 and is representative of the range of pH values permitted in the long term.
lA,M: Addressment of aging was not a requirement in qualification program for these RTD's which was dev".!oped to meet the require-ments of IEEE 323-1971.
Fu rt he rmore, in-service experience with the type of equipment supplied by Westinghouse shows that it is highly unlikely that a significant in-service mechanism exists which could prejudice the qualification tests performed by Westinghouse on new equipment within a few years from startup.
l l
The materials used in this component have been compared with the list of components in Appendix C of IE Bulletin 70-018 and, based on this comparision, no significant degradation would occur during this time.
Based on the new requirement source terms associated with contained accidents in the reactor coolant system and the test program dose of 1 10go address l
rads gamma, radiation aging effects have been adequately addreseed for 13 effective full power months (1st fuci cycle), and 2 weeks post-DBE. These RTD's will be replaced during the first refueling outage. The qualification program utilized a 6-day test period simulating a 52-day post-DBE environment based on conservative aging procedures documented in WCAP-9157. This provides adequate margin for the time period discussed above, i
l
b McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Page StMMARY OF ENVIROWENTA1. QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EqulPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPEPA81 LITY OPERASILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY
'IUALIFICATl000 IDEllTIFICATicel MA38UFACTUAER 10ENTIFICAT8001 ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED 1.1 DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT ANO (1)
NLMBER (2)
QUALIFIED ACCIDENT METN00 ENVIR00etENT (3)
(% of Span)
(% of 5 pen?
(8i)
El:ctric Hydrogen W 5turtevant A
Temp: 180 F Temp:
309 F 3 months 1 year N/A N/A WCAP 7820 and R; combiner Press: 14,8 psig Press:
62 psig post LOCA post LOCA supple ents 13 (upper contilnment)
RN:
100%
RH:
100%
7 0
Rad:
8.1X10 R Pad:
2ml0 R WCAP 7709-L and Ct.em Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric Supplerents I-4 acid and sodlum acid and sodium tetraborate soln.
hydronide soln.
Method: Test SER ltem CS:
Initial Spray:
2000-2100 ppm Boron Reci rculated Spray:
1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: MCAP 7709-L, Supplement 2 describes chemical spray testing conducted on the H2 Recombiner.
Several types of spray tests were conducted including one using 2500 ppm boron (boric acid) with NaOH added to give a pH of 10.0.
To this spray, sodium tetraborate was also injected.
A The metallic materials used in the H2 Recombiner are not known to be susceptible to significant degradation due to aging.
All electrical components furnished with the y electric recombiner which may be exposed to post-LOCA environments and which use electrical insulatian were tested.
The power cable, heater connector wi re, heater elements, thermocouples and extension wire were subjected to thermal preaging of 80 heatup and cooldown cycles followed by six LOCA steam pressgre and spray cycles. All of the abov items plus the terminal blocks were subjected to a radiation' exposure of 2 x 10 rads gamma followed by another L0re test as described in HCAP 7709-L, supplement 2.
Due to the fact that no significant degradation was observed following the thermal cycling, radiation exposure and LCCA cycle described in ECAP 7709-1 and Supplements 1-4, it is felt that the H2 recombiner will provide adequate service for 40 years of normal operation plus 1 year post-LOCA.
M-This deficiency was deleted per discussions with M. Slosson, NRC-EQB, 7-8-81.
W McCulRE NUCLEAR STATION = UHlf I Page 7 StetMRRf 0F EllWl A0NME ~fAL QUALIFICATION OF r.LA55 IE EQUIPMENT Aevision 0 LOCA*ED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE M81LITY OPERASILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATOW8 1900TIFICATilms MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATl004 ENysRONMENT TO WICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTAATED REQUIRED DDIONSTRATED REPORT AIID (1)
NUMSER (2)
QUALIFIED ACCIDE NT METN00 ENvlRoutENT ())
(% of Span)
(% oF Spen)
(4)
Co7tstrment A!r Joy /Dellence 2AF-))0081 Temp:
180 F Temp:0 F 2 acnths I year N/A N/A 'est Repart F F-i te 282 R1 turn F4-n Motors Press: 14,8 psig Press: 85 psig post ont post Def, and supplever.t al (t:pptr cs>ntainment) RH: 1001 RH: 1001 Technical Paper TA-%8 7 9 Rad: 7.6Al0 A Rad: IX10 R ie s t Repos t X-604 Chem Spray: Boric Chen Spray: Boric fest 8eport NUC-9 enf acid and sodlum acid and sodlum Supple wn 4/lV30 tetraborate soin. hydronide soln. Method: Test SER Item - CS: Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 3000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH A.- Safety-related continuous duty n.otu. = located inside containment have been mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to
- n equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with IEEE 334-1971.
M This deficiency was deleted per discussions with M. Slosson, NRC-EQB, 7-8-81. f
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
- UNIT I Page 8 SLMMARY OF ENVIR0 MENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CEA55 IE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPHENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPERASI LITY OPE M 81LITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO 1AllCH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMON 5fMTED REPORT AND (1)
NUMSER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDENT METHOD ENVIRomENT O} (% of Span) (% of Span) (ii) WJregen Shimer Joy /Rellance t YF-882)lS Temp: 180 F Temp: 330 F 7 onths I year N/A N/A Test Peport FF-1428E 18.8 psig Press: 85 psig .st Det post CBE and Sur.plemer.tal ren Nttr$ Press: 6 IUpper containment) RH: 1007. RN: 100% Tect nical paper 'A 3 0t! 7 Rad: 7.6x60 4 Rad. lalo 94 Test R9 ort a -6% - Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: soric fest ac+o r t huC-9 and acid and sodium acid and sodfum hs,:, l e ma. n t f./ 84/B0 tetraborate soin. hydroalde soln. ret &od: Test 3ER ltem - i Init al Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron-Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron CS: 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 3000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH A-Safety-related continuous duty motors located inside containment have been mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with 334-1971. IN : This deficiency was deleted per discussions witis M. Slosson, NRC-EQB, 7-8-81. + 4 .I
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STAT 108 - UNIT I reg. 9 SthMARY J ENVIRONMENTAL QUAllFICA',10N OF CLA55 IE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUlPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RAS OPERA 81LITY ACCURAfV ACCURACY QUALIFICATION IDENTIFICATlose IMMUFACTURER IDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WICH REQUti ? DEMONSTRATED REQUIREO DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND METHOD (1) NtMaER (2) QUALIFIED ACCII ENVIR044 'l ) (% of Span) (% of Spau) (4) V2ive Motor Rotork 7 NAl, Il NAl, Temp: 327 F Temp: 340 F 5 min 30..ays N/A N/A Test Reports. Nllh, Dece@er 497G Op2rtttrs 14 NAl, 16 NAl, Press: 14.8 psig Press: 75 psig (Notes 8 and 9) post OBE TR 116. Cctober 1973 (Lower cont:inment) 30 NAl, 40 NAI, RH: 100% RN: 10Cri 7 g TA 222, 4re @$ 70 NAI, 90 NAl Rad: 6.7110 R Rad: 2nlo R f Chem Spray: Soric Chem 5 pray: Boric Method; Test acid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetraborate soln. hydrulde soln. 9 SER ltem - QT,M: The actual qualification test duration is 30 days post-DBE which adequately exceeds the required operating time. A Safety-related valve operators located inside containment have been mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with IEEE 382-1972. CS - Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppn. Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 10,000 ppm Boric Acid, 7-9 pH O
e 10 NcCulRE NUCLEAR STATION a UNIT 1 Page 5th WAY OF ENVIRONMENial QUALIFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED IN5IDE CONTAlHMENT I EQUIPMENT N00EL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMiNT OPERASILITY OPERA 83LITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION IDENTIFsCATION M uuTACTURIR IDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHICN REQUIR[0 IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REP 02T AND (1) NUM8ER (2) quALIFl[D ACCIDENT METHOD ENVIR00edNT (3) (% of Span) (% of Spen) (4) Yst e Mottr Limitorque SM8 Te 180 F Temp: 3An F 5 min 30 days N/A N/A Limitcrtae Test 0;erstors Press: 18e.8 psig Press: 105 psig (Notes 8 and 9) post DBE Re pr t : 50059 (@ par contsinment) RH: 1001 RH: 100% January ll, 1960 g Rad: 1,2x10 R Rad: 2=100 Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric Methcd: Test acid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetraborate soln. hydroalde soln. SER ltem QT,M: The actual qualification test duration is 30 days post-DBE which adequately exceeds the required operating time. A Safety-related valve operators located *nside containment have been mechanically, thermally and radiation aged to an equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with IEEE 382-1972. CS Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 3,000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH
II ficGUlpE NUCLEAR STATION = UNIT I Page SWiMARY OF ENVIR0 MENTAL QUALIFICATirwe OF CLASS BE EQUIPMENT Revlalon 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAsh'ENT EQUIPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RA8 8 LITY CPERASILITY ACCUMCY ACCUMCY QUALIFICATION IDENTIFICATION WJiUFACTURER 10ENTIFICAT10N ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND (1) NLsteln (2) QuALIFIE0 ACCIDENT METM00 ENVIRomENT (3) (1 of Span) (1 of spen) (4)
- .tve Stirnold Valcor V526 Temp:
327 F Temp: 346 F Operate upon 31 days N/A N/A ~est heports .pe ra t or s V59 Press: 14.8 psig Press: II) psig receipt of a post CBE 49-516fM-Sit ar.s Lo-er contilnment) RH: 100% RH: 100% safety signal Ch-57300-5220 1-8 0 Rad: 7,5x107R Rad: 2x10 R October 31, 1977 Chem Spray: 8aric Chem Spray: Boric Mar 15, 1973 acld and sodlum acld and sodlum tetraborate soln. hydroxide soln. Method-Test SER l t em - QT,M: The actual qualification test duration is 31 days post-DBE which adequately exceeds the required operating time. A Safety-relatcd valve operators locatef inside containment have been mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with IEEE 382-1972. CS Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 1720 - 2200 ppm Boric Acid, 9.5 - 10.5 pH e M
12 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I rage $LMMARY OF ENVIRO # MENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLA$3 IE EquifMENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUlPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RA8ILITY CPERASILITY ACCuau. ACCURACY quALIFICAfl0N
- CENTIFICATION MANUFALTURER IDENTIFICATION ENVlRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONST RATED REPORT Asse (l)
NUM41R (2) Qt1ALIFIED ACCIDENT METH00 ENVIR00 MENT (3) (% of Span) (% of Span) (4) Etilnmeit Air Rotork IINAll Temp: 140 F Temp: 340 F $ min (men) 30 days N/A N/A Test Report Nil /4 eturn isoittlon Press: 14.8 psig Press: 75 psig post OBE post 08E Cece ter 1970 TW3r M m ? RH: 1001 RH: 10M b 0 Jooer contsinment s Rad: 8.IX10 R Rad: 2ml0 R Test Report Tall 6 Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric Octoter 1973 acid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetraborate soin. hydroxide soln.
- 4troo:
Test SER ltem - CS: Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 10,000 ppm Boric Acid, 7-9 pH A-Safety-related valve operators located inside containment have been mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with IEEE 382-1972. M This deficiency was deleted per discussions with M Slosson, NRC-EQB, 7-8-81. 9 f
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION = UNIT I Page I3 StmMrRY OF ENVIR000tENTAL QUAtlFICATION OF CLA55 IE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED IN51DE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL 01 ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPERABILITY CPERABILITY ACCU W.Y ACCUMCY QUALIFICATidul IDCTIFICATION MANIFACTURER IDENTIFICA~il0N ENVIRONMEa7 TO MilCN REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRL4 0000NSTRATED REPORT AND (1) Ntmeth (2) QuRLIFIED ACCIDENT METNDS ENVincemENT (3) (% of Span) (% of spen) (4) Ysiv9 Solanoid Asco NP8316E34E Temp: 327 F Temp: 346 F Operate upon 30 days N/A N/A fest Aeport Ope rat @r s NP8316E36E Pre ss: 14.8 psig Press; llo psig receipt of safety post 08E AQ528678/TR (Lwr contcInrwnt) RH:
- 10CPT, RH:
10 74 signal 7 8 Rad: 7.5m!0 R Red: 2ml0 g g,,,,3; y,,, Chem Spray: N/A Chem Spray: Boric acid and sodium hydronide soln. SER ltem CS: Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray; 3000 ppm Boron, 9.5 - 1* 5 pH QT,M: The actual qualification test duration is 30 days post-DBE which adequately exceeds the required operating time. A-Safety-related valve operators located inside containment have been mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with IEEE 382-1972. O
e Ik McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION
- UNIT I Page SI.MMRY OF ENVIRGNMENIAL QUAllFICATION Or CLASS lE EQUIPNENT Revision 0
LOCATED IN51DE CONTAINNENT a l EQUIPMENT HODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT l OPE PA81LITY CPERASILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION lDE::TIFICATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPOPT AND (1) NUNSER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDENT NETHOD ENVIRONNENT (3) (% of Span) (% of Span) (4) Mlv9 Solenoid Ta rge t 77CC Temp: 327 F Temp: 335 F (Note IO) 14 days N/A N/A Test Report 2375. Cperators Rock Model Press: 14.8 psig Press: 66 psig post 08E 9/26/13 (Lower centsinnent) RH; 100% RH: 100?. 7 8 Rad: 5.7x10 R Rad: 1.3=10 R Method: Test Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric acid and sodlum acid and tetraborate soin. hydrosine SER ltem. l CS: Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH t Test Spray: 6200 ppm Boric Acid, 8.6 - 10 pH A Safety-related valve operators located inside containment have been mechanically, thermally, and radiation aged to an equivalent of 40 years of service in accordance with IEEE 382-1972. M-The Target Rock solenoid valves are used in ine reactor head vent system to provide a path for remova' af non-condensable gases. Core events leading to the generation of significant amounts of non-condensable gases occur eorly in the postulated accident sequences and are of short duration; t he refo re, these valves are only required to operate within the first few days of the accident. The need for venting non-condensabic gases is not anticipated beyond the 14 qualification of the valves.
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION = UNIT I Page 15 5tmMARY 0F ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICAfl0N OF CLAS$ IE EQUllHENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RA81LITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY l QUALIFICAfl0N IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER 'nENTIFICATION EhVlRONMENT TO WHICH REQUlkED IN DEMONSTRATEl' REQUIRED M MONaTRATES M PORT AND {1) huMSER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDENT METN00 ENVIRosedNT (3) (% of Span) (1 of Spen) (4) l olffsrential Pres-Solon 7 PSIA 0W Temp: 140 F Temp: ISO F i min 5 min 1 0.5 psig 1 0.3 pilg Test Report A.233-80 strs 5.Irch for Press: 14.8 psig Press: 15 psig post DBE post DBE Test Report A299-80 Damper Control RH: 100% RH: 8001 5 6 (Opper containment) Rad: 8.lul0 R Rad: 2.imIO R Method: Test Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric acid and sodlum acid and sodlum tetraborate soln. tetraborate soln. SER ltem _ CS: Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 2000 - 4000 ppm Boron, 4.0 - 4.7 pH A: This pressure switch has been qualified for the 40 year normal life plus the accident environment. Additionally, refer to the generic discussion SER text paragraph 3.7, Aging. M-Within the first sixty (60) seconds following an event requiring this switch to function, the switch will actuate permitting the containment isolation damper to open. At that time the differential pressure switch is electrically isolated f rom the control circuit and subsequent failure has no impact nn safety. w
McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATICM = UNIT I Page StHMART OF ENVIR0f@1 ENTAL QUAllFICATION OF CLAS5 IE EQUIPMENT Revisto.t 0 LOCATED INSIDE CCNTAINMENT Equl PMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RA88 LI TY CPERASILITY ACCURACY ACCUMCY QUAtlFICATION IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIF6 CATION ENVIRONMENT TO VHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTMTED REQUIRED DEMGNSTRATED REPORT AND (I) - NUMBER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDE NT METHOD ENVIRONMENT (3) (7, of Span) (% of Spen) (4) El ctrical D.G. O'Brien Types A.8,C, Temp: 327 F Temp: 340 F 8e conths 8e months N/A N/A Tas; Feports E4-247, Perie t r:t tot s 0, E. F. C, H J. Press: 14.8 psig .ress: I5 psig post CBE post DBE Eb252, and Eb227 (Lower contilnet) K L.M. and RH: 100*. RH: 100' 7 3 cathodic pro. Rad: 8.5xt0 R Red: 2 10 R MetooJ: Test / Analysis tection pene-Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Soric tration acid and sodium acid and sodlum (Note ll) tetraborate Soln, hydroxide soln. (Note $2) g SER Items QT,M,CS,A: These items will be r2 solved pending the completion of the test program outlined below: These penetrations have been included in the NRC Qualification Verification Program. Recently there has been an interchange of information between Duke and NRC concerning a failure mechanism observed during testing conducted by Sandia Laboratories, in order to investigate the failure mechanism of the EPA (Elect rical Penetration Assembly) test a't Sandia and to verify the adequacy of the cualification of the connectors on the EPA's, Duke Power Company plans a two part program: First, a material data search will be made to obtain a more definitive understanding of the material characteristics of the connector sealing grommets which relate to the f ailure mechanism. Second, an environmental qualification test will be performed to repeat the test pro.ile performed in the original qualification program by D. G. O'Brien. The test will include 1) individual components, thermally aled and irradiated, 2) various sizes of connectors, 3) a close simulation of the actual installation, 4) a variety of cable types actually used at the station. The test seqNnce will include aging, irradiatiCsn and then the steam environment test with electrical tests in between. All circuits wil1 be energized with thei r appropriate voltages and currents. This program is expected to be complete by January 1982 with a report available shortly thereaf ter. A more detailed sche'dule v'll be provided as arrangements are made.
i McGUlRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Page I7 5LNMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLA55 IE EQUIPMENT
- Rawlslos, O
LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINHENT EqulPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE R481 LITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCl%W. QUALIFICAfl0N BOENElFICATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND (I) MUMSER (2) QUAllFIED ACCI DE NT METHOD ENVIRONMENT (3) (% of Span) (1 oi Span) (4) Cabl3 - Okonite EP insulation Temp: 327 F Temp: 345 F 30 days 130 days N/A N/A Test Reports FN-1, Cu. tral. Instrumen-Press: 14.8 psig Press: 104 psig post DSE post D8E M-l. G-), 810E, ae.d t: tion, end 2 KV RH: 1004 RH: 1001 148 7 8 pcw r Rad: 6.7X10 R Rad: 2ml0 R (Lcur coatsinment) Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric Method: Test acid and sodlum acid and sodium tetraborate soln. hydromide soln. SER ltem. CS: Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH l i Test Spray: 3,000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH A This cable has been qualified for the 40 year normal life plus the accident envi ronment. Add'itionally, refer to the gereric discussion of SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging. M This deficiency was deleted per discussion with M. Slosson, flRC-EQB, 7-8-81. Y
Ib McCutRE NUCEEAR STATION - UNIT I rage SLMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUAllFICATION OF CLA5s IE EQUlFNENT Fevision 0 LOCATED IN51DE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RASILITY CPERABI LI TY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION le?"erlCATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIREO IN DEMONSTRATE 0 REqulRED DEMONSTR/TED REPORT AND (I) NLMSER (2) QUAllFIED ACCIDENT METHOD ENvlRONMENT (3) (1 of Span) (% of $psa) (si) C: bis - Okont r e Tefiel 280 Temp: 327 F Temp: 341 F 4 runths 15o days N/A N/A Test Repor t K 0 lastronentition insulation Press; 11.8 psig Press: Il2 psfg. post 08E (September 1979) 6 (Low r cortainment) RH: 1007. RH:
- 1001, 7
Rad: 8.5x10 R Rad: 2ato"R nethod: Test Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric acid and sodlum acid and sodiwa tetraborate soln. hyd rom i de soln. SER ltem QT,M: Operability requ~ ired is 120 days. ~ Actual test time is 130 days. Margin is 10 days. A This cable has been qualified for the 40 year normal life plus the accident environment. Addicionally, refer to the generic discussion of SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging. CS Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 3,000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH
t9 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Page
SUMMARY
OF ENVIR0petENTAL QUAllFICATION OF CLASS IE EqulPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED IM51DE CONTAINMENT EQulPMENT MODEL 04 ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPERASILITY OPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURIA lDENEIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REqulRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND (1) NUM8ER (2) quAllFIED ACCIDENT METHOD ENVIR00etENT (3) (% of Span) (% oF Span) (4) Ct_bts - Anaconda EP Insulation Temp: 327 F Temp: 346 F 3 ont hs 4 months N/A N/A Test Reports F*C4350-2 Control End 2RV and Press: 14.8 psig Press: II) psig (.st Det post DBE and F-C4)$0-). and power (P/Hypalon RH: 100 RH: 100% S upp le me nt 0 (Lower containment) Insulation Rad: 9410 R Rad: 2x10 R Chem spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric esethod: Test aclJ and sodlun acid and sodlum tetraborate soln. hydronlde soln. SER ltem. CS: Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Reci rculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 3,000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH A This cable has been qual!fied for the 40 year normal life plus the accident environment. Additionally, refer to the generic discussio. of SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging. M This deficiency was deleted per discussion with M. Slosson, NRC-EQB, 7-8-81. O P
e McCutRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Page 20 StatMRRY OF E.FdlR0tetENTAL QUAllFICATION OF CtA55 lE EQUIPMENT Revisio,, O LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT CPERASILITY CPERASILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUAllflCAT W IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATI0lt ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEM(P85TRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPotT AND (l) NL890ER (2) QUAllFIED ACCIDENT METH00 ENVIR0009ENT (3) (% of Sp.n) (% of Span) (4) Cably - Brand Rea XLPE insulation Temp: 327 F Temp: 346'F 30 days 30 days N/A N/A Test Report F-C411) Control Press: 14.8 pstg Press: II) psig post CBE post 08E (L w r containnent) RH: 100% RH: 100% Method; Test I 8 nad: 7.5=l0 R Rad: 2ml0 R Chem Spray: Boric Chem Spray: poric acto and sodium acid and sodlum tetraborate soln. hydroxide soln. SER Item. $T,M: The actual qualification test duration of 30 days post-DBE was performed at a higher steady state temperature than evpecteC': Inside containment. The operability time demonstrated, t he refo re, did not take credit for the additional qualification time which could be derived from proper Arrhenius Techniques, j CS Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Soron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH A This cable has been qualified for the 40 year normal life plus the accident environment. Additionally, refer to the generic discussion of SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging.
2I McCUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Page SLHMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUAtlFICATION OF CLA55 IE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAlHMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL DR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RA8ILITY CPERASILITY ACCUMCY ACCURACY QURLIFICAT80el IDCTI FICATION MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICAT1006 ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND (1) NUM8ER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDENT METHOD ENVIR0letENT (3) (% oF $ pan) (% of Span) (4) Cabla - Samuel Moore EP/Hypalon Temp: 327 F Temp: 340 F 30 days 30 days N/A
- N/A Test Report F-C368) anstr m atition Insulation Press: 14.8 psig Press: 105 psig post DBE post DBE (Lowr coattinment)
RH: 100% RH: 3001 Method: Test I 8 Rad: 7.5mID R and: 2x10, Chem Spray: Boric Cnem Spray: Boric acid and sodlum acid and sodium tetraborate soln. hydroxida soln. SER ltem @T,M: The actual qualification test duration of 30 days post-DBE was performed at a highe-steady state temperature than expected. The operability time demonstrated, therefore, did not take credit for the additions 4 qualification time which could be derived from proper Arrhenius Techniques. CS Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 2,000 ppm Boron, pH 9-11 A This cable has been qualified for the 40 year normal life plus the accident environment. Additionally, refer to the generic discussion of SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging.
.~ 22 l McCulAE NUCLE #'. STATION = UNIT I rege 0 SLMMARY OF ENVIR0eMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLA55 IE EQUIPMENT Revision LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL 0A ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT CPERASILITY OPE RASILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUAllFICATION IDENTIFICATitel MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICAT10ll ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUSAED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REP 0AT AND (3) lum 8EA (2) QUALIFIE0 ACCIDENT METN00 ENvlA0ecENT (3) (x or Span) (s or Spen) (4) i l l l Cable Termination / Aaychen WCSF-N Temp: 327 F Temp: 357 F 4 m nths 4 m nths N/A N/A Test Reports F-C4033-) l5plicaMitarial S leeve s Press: 14.8 psig Press: 70 psig post CBE post DOE and 71100
- (Lower cutstruent) and RH:
100% RH: 100g 7 l Greakouts Rad: . 5El0 A Rad: 2x10 A Method: Tee dAnalysis l Chera Spray: Boric Chem Spray: Boric l acid and sodlum acid and sodlan i tetraborate soln. hydromide soln. lSER ltem _ l @,T, M : The actual qualification test duration of 113 days post-DBE was performed at a higher steady state temperature than expected inside containment. The operability time demonstrated, therefore, did not take credit for all the additional qualification time which could be derived from proper Arrhenius Techniques. Only 7 days were taken credit and not the full Arrhenius time potential. l Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Reci rculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Doron CS 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 3,000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH A This material has been qualified for the 40 year normal life plus the accident environment. Additionally, refer to the generic discussion of SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging. e
E_ _.E 23 Page PicCJ1RE NUCLIAR STATION - UNIT I Revision 0 SWiMARY OF ENVIR0ffiENTAE QUAllFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUlfttENT LorRTED INSIDE CONTAINMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPERA 8tLITY CPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION IDENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER l0ENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN DEMCL45TMTED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATIO REPORT AND EQUIPME;'T METHOD NUMBER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDENT (1) ENVIRONMENT (3) (% of Span) (1 of Span) (4) EA 180 Temp: 327 F Temp: 340 F 5 min 30 days N/A N/A Namc0 Test Repo rts dated March 3, IS78 EA 740 Press: 14.8 psig Press: 63 psig (Note 9) post DBE and February 20, 1976 5t m-Mounr+d Llmit Namco RN: 100'4 RH: 100% $=itcees Rad: 6.7x10 R Rad: 2x10% rethcd: Test (Lower Containrwnt) 7 Chem Spray: Boric Chem 5?r ay: Soric acid and sodium acid and sodites tetraborate soln. hydromide soin. SER l ten QT,M: The actual qualification test duration is 30 days post-DBE which adequately exceeds the required operating time. CS Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray-3,000 ppm Baron, 10.5 pH A The aging qualification for this limit switch is under review. Additionally, refer to the generic discussion of the SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging. ~
24 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT I Page 5tMMARY OF ENVIR0wtENTAL QUAllFICAfl0N OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL 04 ACCICENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RASILITY OPERASILITY ACCUnACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION lMNTIFICATION MANUFACTURER lDENTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHICH REQUIRED IN M MONSTRATED REQUIRES DQe0NSTRATES REPORT AND (l) NtateER (2) QUALIFIES ACCIDENT METN00 ENVI A0setENT (3) (% of Spen) (% of Spen) (4) Sest maarlat for 3M Scotch Cast 9 Temp: 327 F Temp: 340 F M 6brS ta days N/A N/A Test Report 44 HO-i, Cthie Entrance (XR-5240) Press: 14.8 psig Press: 15 psig post DsE Rev. 4 Fittings (L M r RH: 100% RH: 800 4 7 Math d; Test / Analysis Contalevnent) Rad: 6.7x10 R Rad: 2ml0 R Chem Sproy: Soric Chem Spray: Soric acid and sodlum acid and sodissa tetraborate soin. hydroxide soln. SER Icem QT,M: Ope ability required is 24 hours. ~ Actual test time is 12 days. Margin is 11 days. The 24 hour operability time is adequate time for mitigation of the containment pressure transient and termination of containment spray. CS Initial spray: 2000-2)nn ppm Boron Reci rculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4./ pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 4,000 ppm Boron, pH is not available A This material has been qualified for the 40 year normal life plus the. accident environment. Additionally, refer to the generic discussion of SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging.
McCulRE NUCLEAR STATION = UNIT I rage 25 5tMMARY OF ENVIROWtENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS IE EQUIPMENT Revision 0 LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT h00EL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPERA 81LITY OPERABC 4 ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICAfl0N 10ENTIFICATION MANUFACTURER IDEhTIFICATION ENVIRONMENT TO WHitel REQUIRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND (1) NLMSER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDENT METHOD ENVIR04tCNT (3) (% of Span) (% of Spen) (4) (cetain w t Radiation General Atomic RD-23 Temp: 240 F Temp: 315 F 2 weks 18 dan Here 20 r4cTc PO Test Report. E-234-9sb nonitors-High Range Ionization Press: 14.8 pelg Press: 70 pstg post LOCA post LOCA dated stay l, 1981 (Lcwer Cantainment) Chamber RH: 100% RH: 100% 7 Rad: 8ml0 R Rad: Note 17 M4' hod: Test /Aralygl5 Chem Spray: 80ric Chem Spray: Soric acid and sodlum acid, sodlum thlo-tetraborate soin. sulfate and sodlum hydroxide kbis for Containment Rockbestos R55-6-104 Temp: 240 F Temp: 315 F 2 weeks 195 days N/A N/A Test Peport: E-2 54-%3 Iediation Nonitors-Press: 14.8 psig Press: 70 psig post LOCA post LOCA dated nay 1, IMI Ilgh Range RH: 100 RH: 3001 (Note 18) g (Low r Contilnment) Rad: 8x10 R Rad: 2al0 R Method: Test them Spray: Note 16 Chem $ pray: Soric acid, sodlum thlo-sulfate and sodlum hydroxide SER ltem NOTE: This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in NUREG 0737. QI The test data for this equipment as noted auove was received af ter the submittal of Duke's NUREG 0588 data. CS Initial Spray: 2000-2100 ppm Boron Recirculated Spray: 1800-2200 ppm Boron 4.0 - 4.7 pH 6.0 - 10.0 pH Test Spray: 3.000 ppm Boron, 10.5 pH (Radiation Monitor) The Rockbestos cc_ble is installed in conduit and is therefore not exposed to a chemical spray environment. A This equipment has been qualified for 40 years normal life plus the accident environment. Additionally, refer to the ~ generic discussion of the SER Text Paragraph 3.7, Aging. r
O McCulRE NUCLEAR STATION = UNif I rege 2b 0 SIMh*RY OF ENVIR0 MENTAL QUALIFICATION OF C'J55 IE EQUIPMENT Revision LOCATED INSIDE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT MODEL OR ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENT OPE RABI LITY CPERABILITY ACCURACY ACCURACY QUALIFICATION IDC:.TiflCAT1018 MANUFACTURER IDENTIFICATION 'WIRONMENT TO WHlCH REQulRED IN DEMONSTRATED REQUIRED DEMONSTRATED REPORT AND (1) IluMSER (2) QUALIFIED ACCIDENT METH00 CNVIRONMENT (3) (1 of Span) (1 of Spen) (b) 5:fity vsive Position TEC 914 Temp: 327 F Note 19 2 webs Note 19 N/A N/A liote 19 tidicatlon-Acoustic Press: 14.8 psig post 08E Nonitirs RH: 100% 7 (Lower Containment) Rad: 8 m 10 R Chem Spray: Soric acid and sodlun tetraborate soln. SER ltem. QI: This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in NUREG 0737. Test results are expected by August, 1931. b
Page 27 Revision 0. MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1-ENVIRONMENTAL QUAllFICATION OF CLASS lE EQUIPMENT LOCATED INSIDE' CONTAINMENT -Note 1 All equipment identified in this table is located inside the containment, specifically in the lower compartment except for the electric hydrogen lrecombiner, containment air return f an motors, hydrogen skimmer fan motors, containment air return. isolation damper motors, dif ferential pressure switches for damper control and cables associated with these devices which are located in the upper compartment. Note 2 The parameters that compose the overall worst-case containment accident environment are as follows: Temperature (Upper Compartment): 180F peak; time history as shown in FSAR Figure 6.2.1-24 (Rev 36). Temperature (Lower Compartment): 327F peak; time history as shown in FSAR Supplement 1, Q042.73, Figure 7 Revision 39 Pressure (llpper and Lower Compartment): 14.8 psig peak; time history . as shown in FSAR Figure 6.2.1-23 (Rev.' 36). Relative Humidity: 100% Ra'di at ion: Total integrated radiation dose for the equipment location includes 40 year normal operating dose plus the appropriate accident dose (except for thc narrow-range and wide-ran'ge RTD's). Chemical Spray: Boric acid and sodium tetraborate spray resulting f rom mixing in the containment sump of borated water from the RWST and sodium tetraborate solution f rom ice bed melt. Note 3 ' Equipment operability requirements in the containment accident environment are as identified in FSAR Table 3.11.1-1 (Rev. 25). ~
f-Page 28 Revision 0 Note 4 Environmental qualification test reports for the following equipment have previously been submitted to the NRC Staff: Transmitters-Barton (by Westinghouse) RTo's-Rosemount (by Westinghouse) Electric Hydrogen Recombiner (by Westinghouse)
- Containment Air Return Fan Motors (by Duke)
Hydrogen Skimmer Fan Motors (by Duke) . Solenoid Operators-Valcor (by Duke) Electric Penetrations (by Duke) Cable Termination / Splice Material (by Duke) Stem-Mounted Limit Switches (by Duke) -Cable Entrance Seal Material (by Duke) Note 5 A requirem, for McGuire Unit I is to limit the positive error for the trip function of narrow-range steam generator level transmitters to +5%. b The original Lot 2 report noted an error of +7.3 %,c,e early in the steam test transient. Additional tests were performed on-the same unit b,c'
- This caused using ~ water as the process medium instead of nitrooca thetgmperatureofthe strain gage to track the temperature of the circuit board
,c, more closely during the first minute and limited the positive b 4 %,c,e. the temperature difference In other words, b,c,e has been reduced to a cerror to less than between the strain gage and the circuit board level compatible to McGuire Unit I functional requirements. Note 6 Deleted Hote 7 Deleted Note 8 Five minutes is adequate time to assure containment isolation and the required repositioning of other safety-related valves. Note 9 During the 30 days following a postulated accident, the containment temperature and pressure will approach normal; therefore, additional service can reasonably be expected from this equipment. I
Page 29 Revision O' Note 10 The Target Rock solenoid valves are used in the reactor head vent system to provide a path for removal of.:an-condensable gases. Core events Icading to the generation of significant amounts of non-condensable gases occur early in the postulated accident sequences and are of short duration; therefore, these valves are only required to. operate within the first few days of the accident. The need for venting non-condensabic gases.Is not anticipated beyond the 14 day qualification of the valves. - Note 11 Electric penetration types B,C,F,G and K are the only penetrations required- -to function electrically in *Se containment accident-environment. All electric penetrations,.however eco designed.and qualified to maintain their mech'anical integrity under normal and postulated accident environmental conditions. Note 12 The McGuire electric penetrations are protected from direct spray impingement by galvanized steel boxes. . Note 13 Deleted 4 - Note 14 ~ f Deleted Note 15 4 The radiation environment for this equipment is dependent on operating time in the accident environment. This.information will be provided upon receipt and review of Lformal test reports by Duke Power Company. Note-16 The cables for the containment radiation monitors (high range) which are located inside the' containment are routed in condu'c, and, therefore not exposed to chemical spray. Note 17 The manufacturer's test report states that the detector assembly is e constructed of metal and ceramic and is not affected by rodlation. f -w
Page 30 Revision 0 Note 18 Subsequent testing by the manufacturer showed a failure of a sample of cable at a higher temperature. Note 19 This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in MUREG 0737. Qualification testing for this equipment is scheduled for completion in August, 1981. The results of this testing will be provided upon receipt and review of the formal report by Duke Power Company. Note 20 This equipment is being installed per NRC requirements stated in NUREG 0737. Overall system accuracy should be within a factor of 2 over tSe entire range. as stated in Regulatory Guide 1.97, rev. 2*. The demonstrated accuracy is under review. o A}}