05000369/LER-1981-050, Forwards LER 81-050/03L-0

Forwards LER 81-050/03L-0

ML20009C348
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	05/11/1981
From:	Parker W DUKE POWER CO.
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009C349	List: 05000369/LER-1981-050, Forwards LER 81-050/03L-0 05000369/LER-1981-050-03, /03L-0:on 810411,during Mode 3 Initial Fuel Loading,Containment Pressure Exceeded Tech Specs.Caused by Insufficient Amount of Time to Perform Sampling,Analysis & Reporting.Controlled Release Was Initiated
References
NUDOCS 8107200480
Download: ML20009C348 (2)

LER-1981-050, Forwards LER 81-050/03L-0

Event date:
Report date:
3691981050R00 - NRC Website

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pRoouctio May 11, 1981 372-4o.3 Mr. J. P. C'Reilly, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '3gion II y 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 / 'h, Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 !___' sUL 171981 > 1 u.a m e,g i Docket No. 50-369 ir O somerssic Y. 8

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

1. sreport Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81.

ihi concerns the primary containment internal pressure reaching.305 psig. This incident was considered to be of no significar.:e with respect to the health and safety of the public. Vetdtrulyyours, b .\\ b. ;/cw G L. WilliamO. Parker,Jry,-{

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RWO/dj s cc: Director Mr. Bill Lavalee Office of Management and Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 10412 Washington, D. C. 20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 Mh ???883as88% PDR

, {' ~os MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION INCIDENT REPORT REPORT NUMBER: 81-50 REPORT DATE: April 29, 1981 OCCURRENCE 1MTE: April 11, 1981; 0220 hours FACILITY,: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Cornelius, N.C. IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Primary containment internal pressure reached .305 psig. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: Mode 3, Hot Standby, prior to initial criticality. DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: While waiting for proper doc'7entation to nake a gaseous release through the Containment Air Addition & Release System (VQ), containment pressure exceeded the limits specified by Technical Specification 3.6.1.4 by.005 psig. This constituted a degraded mode of operation. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: An insufficient amount of lead time was given to perform the necessary sampling and analysis. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: The Reactor Coolant System (NC) had been increasing in temperature d pressure for some time during this and the previous mode of operati. Consequently, the containment ambient temperature and internal pressure were increasing at a corresponding rate. To maintain containment internal pressure within specified linits, gaseous waste releases (GWR's) were' frequently made through the VQ system. At the time of this event, the normally scheduled Shift Supervisor was absent from work; his position was filled by one of the plant's Operating Engineers. This individual was not made aware of the amount of lead tima necessary to complete the paperwork involved with GWR's. At 0030 hours sampling for a GWR of containment was initiated. The sample was drawn from 0105 until 0155 hours. Then it was counted and analyzed. The results were reported to the Control Room at 0220 hours. (Total elapsed time was 90 minutes.) The release vas commenced at 0234 hours to decrease containment pressure; it was restored to.3 psi, at 0241 houga. The GWR was secured at 0530 hours following a total release of 11,690 f t

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A controlled gaseous waste release to reduce containment pressure was initiated prior to surpassing Technical Specification limits. SAFETY EVALUATION: The +.3 psig limit imposed by Technical Specificatien 3.6.1.4 is to ensu e that containment vessel pressure is maintained within a safe margin so th _t the designed peak pressure load (2 5 psig) would not be exceeded in the event of a simultaneous design base accident. There is currently no thermal load to the system as a result of decay heat or neutron activity because only new, non-irradiated fuel exists in the core. Additionally, no major accident occurred in containment during the plant operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected. }}