05000369/LER-1981-086, Forwards LER 81-086/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 81-086/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20009C324
Person / Time
Site: McGuire Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1981
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009C325 List:
References
NUDOCS 8107200462
Download: ML20009C324 (2)


LER-1981-086, Forwards LER 81-086/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
3691981086R00 - NRC Website

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DUKE POWER COMPANY WFICIAL ggpy Powen Dust.omo 422 SouTu Curucu Starzt, CnAH1.OTTE, N. C. 28242 ji W 6 L LI AM O. PA R M E R, J R.

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June 11, 1981 373-4o83

.T/- C@ - Gb Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director c'

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// )'p { M U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I

Region II 3

101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 J

Atlanta, Georgia 30303 TUL 17 b p#,[ *4 Re: McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-369 3

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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o Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-369/81-86. This report concerns both trains of the control room ventilation system inoperable while in Mode 4.

This incident was considered to be of no significance with respect to the heaich and safety of the public.

htrulyyours, V

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iA a.c Cs-William O. Parker, Jr.

RWO:pw Attachment ec:

Director Mr. Bill Lavallee Office of Management and Program Analysis.

Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Post Office Box 10412 Washington, D. C.

20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 Ms. M. J. Graham Resident Inspector - NRC McGuire Nuclear Station S vi B107200462 810611 PDR ADOCK 05000369 S

PDR m

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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION INCIDENT REPORT Report Number:

81-86 Report Date: June 8, 1981 Occurrence Date: May 28, 1981 Facility:

McGuire Unit 1, Cornelius, N. C.

Identification of Occurrence:

Both trains of the Control Room Ventilation (VC)

Syatem were inoperable while in Mode 4.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Mode 4, Hot Shutdown; prior to initial criticality.

Description of Occurrence:

On May 27, 1981, the VC train B Control Room Area (CRA)

HEPA filters and Pre-filter 3 were replaced. However, a HEPA filter retest on train B was omitted. This retest was required to make train B operable.

Therefore, when the plant entered Mode 4 on May 28, only VC train A was operable.

The Shift Super-visor, however, thought that both trains were operable.

He therefore tagged out (AHU breaket disconnected) train A for maintenance leaving no trains of the VC System operiole while in Mode 4.

This was reportable pursuant to Technical Speci-fication 3.7.6 and 6.9.1.12(b).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

VC train B was not listed as a Technical Specification item in the Operations Technical Specification log book and no HEPA filter retest was performed on VC train B prior to the plant entering Mode 4.

After enterin; Mode 4, VC train A was tagged out for maintenance with train B inoperable (because of outstanding retust requirement).

Safety Analysis

Even though VC train B HEPA filters had not been retested and train B was technically inoperable when the plant entered Mode 4, it was inad-vertently returned to service. However, no problems occurred and safe plant operation and the health and safety of the public were not affected. Also, both trains tested satisfactorily after the incident was discovered.

Corrective Action

The plant began cocling devn to Mode 5 at 1002 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00166 weeks <br />3.81261e-4 months <br /> on May 29.

VC trains A and B HEPA filters were retested and declared operable.

Shift Super-visors were cautioned about expanding work requests without proper reviews.