ML20009C304

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Forwards LER 81-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20009C304
Person / Time
Site: Oconee Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/08/1981
From: Parker W
DUKE POWER CO.
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009C305 List:
References
NUDOCS 8107200449
Download: ML20009C304 (2)


Text

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g} gg il A9:0 TELtpwows:AntA704 seta- PacoaCnow May 8, 1981 272-4c es 2l-o/Sa 054 Mr. Jaries P. O'Reilly, Director 93 -.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiasica fsf g,"

Region II fI 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 gQ ' 8 j 'j

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JUL171gg y Re: Oconee Nuclear Station $- U.s, %

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Decket No. 50-269 L **

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

8 Please find attached Reportable Occurrence Report R0-269/81-07. This report is- ~

submitted pursuant to Oconee Nuclear Station Technical Specification 6.6.2.1.a(2).

which concerns operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of an LCO, and describes an incident which is considered to be of no significance with respect to its effect on the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours, William O. Parker, Jr. ,

JLJ:pw Attachment cc: Director Mr. Bill Lavallee l

Office of Management & Program Analysis Nuclear Safety Analysis Center U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 10412 Washington, D. C. 20555 Palo Alto, California 94303 l

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8107200449 810508 PDR ADOCK 05000269 S PDR L. ._ _ _ _. _ . . . - .

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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNITS 1 & 2 Report Number: R0-269/81-07 Report Dato: May 8, 1981 Occurrence Date: April 10, 1981 Facility: Oconee Units 1 % 2, Seneca, South Carolina Identification of Occurrence: Fire Barriers Breached Without Proper Fira Watch Maintained Condition? Prior to Occurrence: Unit 1 - 100% FP Unit 2 - 100% FP Description of Occurrence: From 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on March 27, 1981, until 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> on April 10, 1981, one fire barrier door each for Unit l's and Unit 2's West Eenetration Room were inoperable without proper fire watches having been maintained. The fire barrier doors-had been propped open to permit the temporary routing of hoses through the doors. This constituted operation less conservative than the least conservative aspect of an LCO and is re-portable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.6.2.1(a)2.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence: This occurrence was-the result of a personnel error. The individual responsible for coordinating the work involved failed to properly communicate the requirements for the fire watch to the craft personnel. This resulted in uncertainty as to (1) How to perform watch? l (2) At what frequency? (3) Specifically which doors invcived? The responsible '

individual also failed to follow up and assure the fire watch was being performed properly.

Analysis of Occurrence: Prior to the breaching of the fire barriers, several meetings were conducted'to discuss the various aspects of the work. During one of these meetings, the requirements for establishing and maintaining the fire watch while the doors remained propped open were addressed. However, due to poor communication, the requirements were not made clear to the craft personnel. As a result when the work was done, the required fire watch was not initiated.

During the period of time that the doors were propped open, the fire detector instrumentation in the West Penetration Room was operable.< Also personnel were periodically working in the areas involved, and during these periods could have observed any fire. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Action: The individual involved.has been counseled concerning the importance of specific and complete communication in this type of evolution. Station administrative procedures will be reviewed as to their adequacy in controlling this type of event.

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