ML20008F107
| ML20008F107 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1981 |
| From: | Michelson C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008F099 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103120285 | |
| Download: ML20008F107 (3) | |
Text
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t'EMORANDUM FOR:
William J. Dircks Exe:utive Dire: tor for Operatiens FROM:
Carlyle Michelson, Dire:ter Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational' Data
SUBJECT:
INVESTIGATIONS D:TO INFORmTION FLOW CONCERNING THE TMI ACCIDENT Referen:es:
(1) January 17, 1981 memorandu-for the NRC Concissioners from V. Stello, Jr., transmitting a draft ce;y of "IE Investigation Int: Infen a-ion Flew During the A: ident at Three Mile Island."
(2) Draf : py of the U.S. House of Representatives Co=ittee en Interier and Insular Affairs' re: Ort, "Tseportinc cf Infor.ati n C n=erning the Accider.:
at Three Mile Island."
inis is in response to y:ur recuest for a statement of my personal views cen:ernin; the referen:ed reports.
First, I would like to state that ry views are based, in part, up:n considerable previcus exposure to many aspe:ts of the a::ident (including the general subject area cf the referen:ed re:cris) while servin; as a censultant :: the the A RS.
I exarired numerous de:utents an: ii s te r.e: :: extensive relevan testim:ry as a full-tire c:nsultan: te several A:r.S sur:0--ittees during the three c:ntts inmediately f:11ceing the a::ident, a-d part-time thereafter until j:ining the NRC.
I still have a personal ir:erest in, and a;;reciati:n for, this subject area.
' Since the referenced rep rts were extensive and ry time was lir.ited, I re;uested a rember Of rv staff, Ft1 C-stei, wh: had revie.<ed the re :-ts in seme cetail previcusly, :: give ce an inf:rcal briefing statement.
Hal served en the NRC Spe:ial In;uiry Gr:u; fer :ver six c:nths and had censideratie kn:w.iedge of the events that :: k pla:e a
- ne piant curing the a: icent, and
- ne a: icns of Met Ed, NE: and B&W persennel.
t Itsed en ry :revi:us views and experien:e, a brief examination of the subje:: reports, and the views cf Hai Cr.stei as expressed ir. '.is briefir5 state ent, ry present viess con:erning this situation are best summarized as fcilows:
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U William J. Dircks D 6
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There has not been, and is not now, any reasonable basis, other than circumstantial, for concluding that one er more members of the Met Ed staff in responsible charge of the plar.t during the accident purposefully issued untrue statements or withheld information with the intent to deceive or mislead the NRC or the State of Pennsylvania regarding the severity of the accident.
2.
On this basis, I must conclude that the persen or persons in responsible charge were either unaware of or did net understanc the numerous indications of impending or onsetting ccre damage and final gross degradation.
They did not put together the significan:e of numerous tell-tale symptoms, each of which in itself was a sign of significant core degradation,
- which, when taken concurrently, revealed an uncontestable picture of significant damage to the core that was : lacing the plant in a configuration beyond those which had been analyzed, anc had the potential for further degradation with significant irpact upcn the public health and safety.
These symptoms included:
a.
High in-core ther noccuple temperatures (obtained using direct millivolt readings because the plant data logeing and recording
/ equipment could not handle temperatures above 700*F).
b.
Extremely high containment building radiation levels.
c.
A containment building pressure spike at 1:50 pn and the subsequent initiation of the containrent sprays (pressure was re.ctstered on t< '*:e:erder.: :
tai ect ;-essu-e recc-ders in plain view cf the cer.trel room :::c;ar.ts at the tir.e cf the " thud").
d.
High h:t leg temperatures, 73C*F (ic0; A) and 750*F (100; E),
verifying :ne presen:e of superheatec steam and an uncovered core.
t.
Overexposure of the Met Ed staff who took samples of primary system cc:iant (ir.:ense radica::ivity ass::iatsd with t e sar; Es sh:.':
have been a clear indication of significant core degradation).
3.
Since the reports clearly indicate that several Met Ed staff me.bers were aware cf these indications, I must con:1ude that such information was either ret rade known te, or n t underst:cd by, the person (s) in re.co:.siole :harge cf the a::icent res;:rse.
It is not apparent fron the reperts that the person in charce attempted to assure hirself that all critical inf:r.!! ion was being received fer his consideration, as would be the behavior of a prudent manager in a similar situation where there were un:c. testable siens that the situation was ex:eeding all expectatiens with:ut a;:arent reason.
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William J. Dircks J;g gg g At this ;: int, I must c:n:1ude that ene cf :s situati:ns prevailed:
either there was a sericus la:k Of attenti:n :n the part cf the persen in responsible charge t: heed a fully visible and cc ;elling need to find cut what was happening by searching or asking every available s:urce in the a:ple tine available; cr the needed inf:r=atien was, indeed, being received but n:t undirste:d er ec=:anicated te c her orgar.i:atiens (such as the NRC) fer their censiderati:n.
In either case, I would judge that the pers:n er pers:ns in charge did n:t fun::icn responsibly er a:t in a tanner c:=mensurate with the needs Of the situatien and sh:uld net again be:::e pla:ed in a similar situati n in a nu: lear power pl ant.
If the needed inf:reation was being re:sived at the time cf the a::icen but this re:eipt was later denied, then a questien cf perjury an: the willful withnolding Of infer ation exists.
a.
It a:: ears
- ce that in some areas the II investiga: fen re: Ort :es n:t 50 far en:c;h, and in ::her areas the cen:1 siens and re::=mendati:ns c: n:t appear : be fully su;;:rted by the fa:ts. The re:: mende:
enfer:ement a:tions d: n:t appear te be censistent with the fa::s revealed by the investigatien. The House :nterier Centittee repert is me:h more ccrprehensive and d:es not appear :: suffer frer similar sho rtcomings.
o Carlyle P.ichelsen, Dire:ter Of# ice f:r Analysis and Evaluati:n cf 0:e a:icnal Ca:a D
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