ML20008F105
| ML20008F105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1981 |
| From: | Bradford P NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008F099 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103120272 | |
| Download: ML20008F105 (3) | |
Text
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g-UNITED STATES
.-[
ft NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Cg/J M A SHIN G TOPS,0.C. 20:55
- c. Sh / '5 February 24, 1931 CFFCE 08 THE Cor.WISSION E *.
-me Mcnorable M0rris K. Udall Cnairman C m-ittee on Interior and Insular A#fai-s L*. 5. house of Representatives Wasnington, D.C.
20515
Dear Concressman Udall:
In your January 30 letter, you asked for irdividual commissioner's views regarding the witnholding of information during the accident at Tnree Mile Island.
I should note at the outset that the Commission did not fully endorse the recent NRC investig: tion recommendation o7 this point and did, on Mr. Stello's recommendation, impose acditional citations in which the investigators now concur.
It has been my position since 0:: ber,1979, that the fai* ure of certain information (most notably tne high thermocouple readings) to reacn the NP.C and the authorities in Pennsylvania justified tre revo-cation (rather than suspension) of the TMI 1 and 2 licenses,iegardless of whether the withholding was deliberate.
In the TMI case, revocation would have had little practical consecuence since one of the plants cannot be operated and the license of the other has been suspended pending a hearing.
However, Commissioner Gilinsky and I believed that ne more drastic revo:ation action would have been the correct response to the inexcusable failure immediately to pass on temperature information strongly indicating that the core was uncovered, that it had heated part the point at which fuel cladding would fail and release radioactivity and hydrogen, and that the company did not have the situation under
. control.
I believe that evacuation measures, probably more extensive tnan those that were later unnecessarily recommended for the first weekend of the accident, might well have been the correct response if the thermocouple readings had been known to outside authorities.
Failure to pass on information of that magnitude runs a risk that must not be repeated, whatever its cause.
I am in agreement witn the investigators' conclusions that informa-tion was not adequately analyzed or conveyed on Marcn 25.
My personal conclusion may go somewhat further tnan the staff's in that I believe tnat it is fair to say that there was a cons:ious desire within the cor.cany not to disclose facts that wouic have alarmed the public. To some extent, this may have flowed from a reasonable cesire to avoid causing panic.
To some extent. it well may have flowed from a desire to minimize the damage both to the compary's imarq and to nuclear power.
I cannot catermine which of these or other poss Ole motives was dominant and to what extent these motives coerated consciously or sub:ensciously in particular indiviouals at particular times.
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2 I would not have reached the investigation's cor.:lusion that none of the conflicts in testimony is the result cf lying. Inis con:lusien may be correct, but it depends heavily on some assumotions about motives for tes:imony that is at times not fa:tually a:: urate and at times 4
di#ficult te recon:ile with other :estimony.
Fy cen cer.:lusion is t:
".e e'fe:: :nat, wnile lyinc canno ir all cases :e rule: cc, tne evi:en:e as to wno may hat lying c::urred er fur tner prose:::icns case: lied does not justify ei ner a firm tna:
on :enje::ure.
On
- nis :oint. : nave atta:ned a se: of memoranca tna: I sent to the staff toge:ner witn a summary of the staff oral response to the questions that I raised.
I should note that I believe the staff effort in this most recent investigation to have been conscientious, though the report is defic'ient in the areas that led to my subsequent questions.
- However, tne initial NRC and Soe:ial Inouiry Group investigations cid no:
these issues adecuately, and the re:ent enforcement actions would not pursue have been taken in the absence of the continuing oversign: ef your subcommittee.
I am mindful that something very different : nan a true Dicture of people in tne surrounding area, to the state of Fennsylvania an wna:
- n;ress during the first 45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br /> of the accident.
to ne It is cifficult to conclu:e Ina witnou such a widespread set of misterce:tions can have existed witnheid significant information.any individual having told a celiberate lie or n
.Su:h a pattern of lies without liars has in other contexts been called "a process of immaculate deception,*
and I have been reluctant to swallow it here.
To accept it to tne extent of not pursuing further sanctions against individuals, one must also accept both that the accident really was not generally well understood u ^il late on March 29 and that, even where some level of understanding may be surmised, the surmise is not strong enough to support further enforcement action.
I think that these two conclusions are correct.
I have. found that I cannot prove that individual acts of omission in reperting information flowed from a conscious desire to mi lead rather than a failure to appreciate the information's significance.
am willing to give the individuals involved the benefit of the doubt I with regard to this conclusion in part because it is so clearly appli.
cable to the NRC, where inadequate appreciation of the more limited. data that we had in our possession led to a significant Commission failure to inform your Committee fully on the morning of March 29.
In the end, I cannot orove that Met Ed's failings, any more then. our own, flowed from something more sinister. than a general refusal ~ o look realistically at the available data or a pervasive tendency to be too cotimistic.
is clearly an unacceptable attitude for us and for a licensee (which is This wny I would like to have established a precedent in favor of revocation),
but I cannot find sufficient grounds for proceedinc against the in-cividuals.
(specifically Messrs. Herbein and-Miller) had acces.t. My personal c to sufficient-i nformation by the early afternoon of March 25 that they nad.to at least
l have considered the possibility of an uncovered core and a more serious accident than tney acknowledged in their meeting with Lieutenant Governor 5:ranton.
They did not voice any such possibility in that meeting.
They snould have, even if (as may well be the case) tney oelieved that
- ne accident was cor.ing under control ty the tir.e cf tne resting.
Cid ney witnnold their full rar.ge of con: erns over what had na:Dened early in tne day?
I believe so.
DeF oerately? : think cerhaos.
A.!
- cr.ficen :na: y beliefs could be proven? he.
Tna: tr.ey are correc:?
Only moderately.
Is there reasonable doubt about tnem based on the investigations as they stand? Certainly.
Have I personally interviewed any of the witnesses? No.
Could I responsibly recommend further prose-cution or censure of individuals on the basis of my conclusions? No.
I:should clcse by noting in rese:nse to yor earlier inquiry the:
- do not :nink tnat new legislation is required here. We have already mocified our regulations to impose clear reporting duties.
Beycnd tnat, I would hope ns: we would be much more aler; to :ne need for ce: ailed investiga:icn of points such as these in the cays and weeks immediately following any suen event in the future.
Sincerely, m
. - - ~ ~,
Y. T f_,/
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Peter A. Bradford Commissioner Attachments:
As-stated