ML20008F102
| ML20008F102 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1981 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Udall M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008F099 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-3351 NUDOCS 8103120263 | |
| Download: ML20008F102 (3) | |
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% ~--~&/lj c.c s iNsTor.. o.c. 20sss February 20, 1951 carir s or T s cow.usness a The Honorable Merris K. Udall Chairman Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On January 30, 1981, you asked for a statement of the Comnc.ssion's position on the matters of possible intentional withholding of informa-tion during the Three Mile Island accident and the truthfulness of staterents made to the various investigators of the accident.
Since the extent to whien the Commission endorsed the conclusions of the staff investigation was not clear to you, you asked for the Comission's position and for the views of individual Commissioners.
Ycu have received tne Commission's' response.
My own views follow.
The conclusions of the staff investigation (mJREG-0760) are worth restating nere. They are:
"1 There was significant infomation that did not adequately flow either on the site or to the necessary offsite groups on the day of the accident.
2.
3n the day of the accident, an effective system did not exist to ensure adequate information flow; i.e., to preside significant information for dissemination and evaluation within the onsite organization or offsite within the Met Ed and GPU organizatien as well as the NRC, Comonwee of Pennsylvania, and other agencies.
3.
Those individuals on site failed to understand the extent and significance of the problems confronting them on -the day of the accident; this contributed to the inadequate flew of information.
4.
Met Ed was not fully forthcoming on March 28, 1979 in that they did not apprise the Co=cnwealth of Pennsylvania of either the uncertainty concerning the adequacy of core cooling or the potential for degradation of. plant' conditions.
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B108120 t
C o
ine Honoracle Merris K. Udall "
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- nformation was not intentionally withheld from the State en tne day of the accident.
6.
Information was not intentionally withneld from the NRC on :ne day of the accident.
7.
The NRC did not have an effective system to ensure tnat information was properly accumulated, evaluated, anc disseminated.
8.
Reporting requirements, both to NRC and to the State, were not sufficiently specific on March 28, 1979."
I have reviewed the report and appended references and discussed the investigation with the staff.
Tne staff investigators reviewed existing information from all sources.
They identified a numoer of apparent conflicts concerning the knowledge of individuals about specific information at various times, and conducted interviews in an attempt to resolve the core significant conflicts.
I am not surorised that there are differences in the accounts of the individuals concerned as to who knew what and wnen.
In the circumstances, I would have found it more than a little odd if there had been no inconsistencies between the individual accounts.
Tne staff investigators suggest several possible explanations for the conflicts:
... poor recall, different statements by an individual on tne same subject as a result of a slightly different question, tne inability of an individual to differentiate between what was known en March 28,.1979 and knowledge gained latar, and the effect of elapsed time." The staff investigators also considered the possibility that one or mere incividuals had lied.
The investigators concluded that none of the conflicts that they examined were the result of lying.
My own reading of the interview documer.:: does not lead me to differ with this limited conclusion.
In tne abser:e of clear and unambigu;us cocumentary evidence, judgments of tnis kind must necessarily be subjective.
I have considerable faith in the integrity and diligence of the investigators and I accept their judgment on this point.
In order to follow the flow of information on the day of the accident, the staff investigators examined what was known and understood by plant personnel about a series of key events and plant parameters. These are listed in the staff report.
For each, a summary of the knowledge of various individuals is given, together with the conclusions of the investigators as to the understanding of the event or parameter by the persons in charge and the apparent bases for particular actions by thtse persons.
The investigators also examined tne overall flow of information at tne plant, at the NRC, and the operating information supplied to the state authorities.
In _makir.; their evaluations, the investigators had to resolve the various' conflicts between accounts of indivicuals.
Tne investigators then summarized their conclusions in the eight points
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L The h>norable Morris K. Udall 3-quoted above.
My own review of the source materials and the discussions the Commission nas had with the staff investigators convince rae that the investigators have made fair and reasonable judgments and I endorse their conclusions as given above.
I note that the NRC's Director of the Office of Inspector and kaditor has judged, based upon his staff's part.cipation in the investigation and ris personal review, that the inyt:stigation disclosed no direct evidence that the licensee deliberately and wil1%lly withhcid information from the NRC.
I also note that the ccnclusions of the itt'<estigation cc i
not differ significantly from those of the NRC Special Inquiry Group on the matter of intentional withholding of information.
I would emphasize ths importance of the first three :enclusions of the investigators.
There was an abundance of significant information at hand on March 28th.
Unfortunately, it was immersed in a sea of miscel-laneous alarms and spurious signals and the licensee was not organized to sort out the significant points and understand what had happened.
It is cold comfort indeed to conclude trat there was not a proper flow of information because the licensea did not understand the accident, rather than because the licensee intentionally w thneld information.
Much of i
our effort over the past 22 months has gone toward assuring that licensees are prepared to understand and deal properly with emergencies and I think tnat has been a more productive use of our resources.
nSincerely,
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~~ToEph M. Hendrie Commissioner cc:
Rep. Manuel Lujan e
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