ML20008F098
| ML20008F098 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1981 |
| From: | Swanson D NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Jordan W, Little L, Smith I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008F099 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103120259 | |
| Download: ML20008F098 (2) | |
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Ivan P. Smith, Esq., Chaiman Dr. Linda W. Little G
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atonic Safety and 75 North Court Street Licensing Board Harrisburg, PA 17105 25 North Court Street Harrisburg, PA 17105 Dr. W'.1ter H. Jordan Adninistrative Judge Atonic Safety and Licensing Board 25 North Court Street Harrisburg, PA 17105 In the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Company, e_t al..
(Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)
Dear Judges:
On February 18, 1981, Noman C. Moseley of the Office of Inspection and Enforcerent testified about NUREG-0760, " Investigation Into Infomation Flow During the Accident at Three Mile Island" (Staff Exh. 5; see Tr. 13,023-78).
In connection with that natter I an enclosing, for the infomation of the Board and parties, a copy of the January 30, 1981 letter from Congressman Udall to Chaiman Ahearne (referenced on l
Tr. 13,052-54), as well as the responses of the individual Connissioners to that letter dated February 13, 20, and 24,1981.
Also enclosed is a copy of a nenorandum from Carlyle Michelson of the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data to William Dircks dated February 20, 1981 l
in which he states his impressions of the investigations into the flow of infomation concerning the TMI-2 accident.
As the menorandun indicates, I
Mr. Michelson did not conduct an independent investigation of this natter, i
but merely reviewed NUREG-0760 and had a staff nenber review the NRC Special Inquiry Group report.
It is my understanding that the Staff and Licensee now expect to fill up the weeks of March 16 and 23,1981 with design modification testimony.
Apparently the session related to management capability will then comence around March 31, 1981. Based on that assumption, the Staff now intends to 8103120 M S f
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file its testimony on the rmaining manacenent capability issues on or i
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l Sincerely, 4
Danici T. Swanson Counsel for NRC Staff f
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The Honorable John Ahearne cChairman, Nucicar Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
. Dear Mr. Chairman
.I am. concerned that the recently completed NRC staf f investigation into reporting of information during the accident at Three Mile Island does not provide adequate support for its conclusions concerning possible intentional withholding of information and the truthfulness of statements made during the course
'. ~. of the various inves tigations into the accident.
Since it la unclear as to the extent tc which the Commission has endorsed the. conclusions of the NRC staff report, I would appreciate a (statement of the Cor.:nission's position, including the views of' individual Commiccioners, with regard to intentional
' withholding of information and truthfulness of statements made to the TMI investigators.
i Sincerely, l
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MO RIS K.
UDALL Chhirman l
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. CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI wAssiscTch. o. c. 20sss
\\; cx; Februa ry 13, 1931 CH AIRMAN ine honorable Morris K. Udall Chairman Co=ittee on Interior and Insular Affairs V. S. House of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your January 30,19S1 letter regarding the NRC's recently completed investigation into reporting of information durie.g the accident at Three Mile Island.
As you know, on January 27, 1951, the Director of the NRC's Office of :nsoe: tion and Enforcement issued a Notice of Violation to the Metropolitan Edison Company after completion cf its investigation into tne flow of information on March 28,1979 curin
- ne a::ident at Three Mile Island.
The Director's action was based upon relevant information developed in a series of earlier reports, includin: the NRC Spe:ial Inouiry Group's report, the Presidential Comission report, the report published by I&E as NUREG-0600, testimony and depositions taken during the Senate Sub:c=ittee on Nuclear Regulation investigation, and testi-meny be# ore the House Interior Subcomittee on Energy and the Environ,ent, as well as depositions and interviews conducted as cart of the most recent investigation.
The enforcement action, a copy cf which is enclosed, was issued following a presentation to the Co=ission and reflects the position of the majority of the Co=i;sion.
My views and those of Cox,issioner Gilinsky are attached.
Co=issioner Bradford and Cc=issioner Hendrie will forward their views next week.
Sincerely, e
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ohn F' Ahearne En:losures cc:
Re::. Manuel Lujan e
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Mr. E. C. Arnold Senier Vi:e President 250 Cnerry Hill Roa:
Fa sippany, NJ 0705 Gentlemen:
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On April 1,1950, the Office cf Inspe: tion and Enfer:e=ent (IE) resu.ed its investigation into the flow of information on March 28, 1979 surrouncing the a::icent which c::urre: at your Three Mile Island Unit 2 facility (TMI-2).
Inat ef fort has now been :c=pleted and a ecpy f the repor* (NUREG-0750) is en:1:sec for your use.
Two itets Of nonte :lian:e icentified curin: -his investication are set fert' ir. A:cen:ix A.
Tnese items relate to tne failure of the licensee te it:le ent an adequate systet te c:tain, evaluate and cct:unicate infer:atien witnin :ne onsite crgani:ation an: between the onsite and responsible offsite agen:ies.
It is the responsibility of each licensee to ensure that information is adequately transmitte: to management personnel curing normal, as well as erergen:y, conditions.
Ea:h li:ensee is resp nsible that precedures previce fe and are icplemented tc assure that infcrmation and interpretation of it a e immediately availt::le te plant managers as well as responsit:le effsite agencies during emergen:y conditions.
Our ce isien to take enforcement action based en the findings of this investigation reflects 1:te jud;:ent that Metrepelitan Edisen Ce:pany as a licensee has a unique and direct responsibility for protecting the health an:
safety of the publi: curing an emergen:y.
k* nile other entities play a signi-ficant role in responding to an emergen:y situation, it is the licensee wn:
must effectively gather data and analy:e the in:ident for its own e:ergen:y response, as well as these of supporting lo:al, state and federal agencies, to be effective.
It is in this particular area that on the cay of tne TMI-2 a::ident, tnere was a : lear failure in Metropolitan Edison Cocoany's resp nse.
Tha atta:hed Notice of Violation specifies the items cf nonce plian:e inv:ived.
Be:ause :f statutory limits in effe:
at the tire of the accident, ne further civil penalties are pre:: sed.
Sin:e y:ur :Orre:tive a:. ions will be assessed by the NE* Staff in COnjuncticn witn tne issues related to restart cf your TMI-1 f acility, no response to the Notice of Viciation is required.
A : py cf this letter and our investigation report will be forwarded to _the Ato i:
Safety and Li:ensin: E:ard for use in :nat pro:eeding.
Shoule you wish ic respond to my office with respect to the icentified items of noncompliance, your comments will certainly be consicered.
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l'ett:politan Edison Co!.pany sanuary 27, 1951 In a:::rdan:e with Section 2.790 cf the tiR-'s " Rules cf Fra:ti:e," Far d,
Titie 10, Cooe of Federal Regulations, a c:py of tnis le.ter and the en:lesures will be pla:ed in the fiRC's Public Dc:ument Pco:.
Sin:erely, W $:
heterStelko, Dire :or Office of Inspection and Enfortete.:
En:lesures:
1.
Appendix A - tioti:e of violation 2.
Irvestiga-ion Rep:rt - tiUREG-0760 1
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L APPENDIX A NOTICE OF VIOLATION Metrep:litan E:ison Cenpany Do:ket f4:. 50-32'. '
inree Mile Islan: Unit 2 EA-El-17 A.
Operation of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 facility is authorized by License Nc. D?R-73 which requires that the fa:ility be operated in a::ctdance with its Te:hnical Spe:ifi:atiens and the Rules and Regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission.
Se: tion IV.10 CFF. 50, Appendix E, " Content of Emergency Plans," requires ti,at emergen:j plans shall centain, but net necessarily be li=ited te:
"A. Tne organization for coping with radiation emergen:ies, in which spe:ific authorities, responsibilities, and duties are defined and assigned..."
Section 6.E.1, Three Mile Island Unit 2 Te:hnical Spe:ificatiens, requires that written procedures be estaclished, implemented and maintained ecvering Energency Fian imple entatien.
The Radiation Energency Flan for Three Mile Island, Section 3.2.1, "Restensi:ilities and Duties," cefines tne resp:nsitilities an: duties cf plant persennel assigned to the emergen:y crganization Under the terms of this section, the Station Superinten:ent, or Snift Superviser will, upcn being notified of any emergency,
...b.
Obtain ne:essary information to properly evaluate the s i tuati on. "
Cent-ary te the above requirements, on March 28, 1975, fellowing the trip of Unit 2 an: the subsequent degradatien of plant cenditions, examples cf instances where information was not obtained and evaluated by responsi:le indivicuals, include:
1.
Infc: cation con:erning the extended period during which the EMOV was open and the changes in system status asso:iated with closure of the bicek valve was available to plant personnel before 8 a.m., but was either not gathered or not adequately evaluated in a timely manner by responsible licensee supervisers.
2.
Readings taken from the core exit thermocouples (which eculd indicate some' temperatures in the range where the zirconium water reaction is of e.cncern) were improperly evaluated by responsible licensee supervisers at the time they were reasured.
3.
Tne c::crren:e and validity of the containten* pressure spike' was -
not ecmmunicated to responsible indivicuals in a ticely manner, n:r was the information on the pressure spike properly evaluate: by
-subordinates.
Tnis is a violation.
TME. 0 G 3ycc]>%O539
Appendix A (Continued) January 27, 1c51 Cnsite supervis:ry personnel cent-ibuted to the aL_.
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f ailures in implerenting the f acility emergency pro:euures.
However, in particular, the Emergency Director, in his unique position as overall coordinator, and the responsible indivioual for managing the emergency, failed to effectively utilize ensite and offsite resources to:
1.
Ob*.ain a:: urate information describing the accioent and plan.
sta.us; 2.
Ar.alyze accuired information to plan corrective action, and 3.
Adequately notify federal and state officials.
Finally, while the Emergency Director did take prudent a:tions to ensure continued management of the emergency prior to leaving the site to orief the 1.ieutenant Governor, on balan:e, he should not have left the site curing an ongoing a::icen..
E.
Section 6.5 of Tnree Mile Island Unit 2 Te:nnical Specifi:ations s.ates ins. writ e, pro:edures still be estatiished, implemented anc maintained covering Emergen:y Plan Implemen.ation.
Radiation Emergency Pro:ecure 1670.3, whi:h imolements the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Emergen:y Plan, states that, in a General Emergency, it shall be the responsibility of licensee personnel "...
to provide maximur as sistance and infermation possible..." to the NRC,(among others)..
Contrary to the above requirement, the follo.eing are exa ples of issues which were not reported to the NR or to the Commonwealtn of Pennsylvania:
1.
Uncertainty cf core cooling and potential for degradation.
2.
Pressure spike.
3.
Incore therme:ouple readings.
t 4.
EMOV status during the initial phase of the accident.
Because this item was caused by ine violation in Item A, it is consicered to be an infra:tien, in this case.
Oncer other circumstances, such a failure, in itself, would be a serious violation.
wy scrfc. w V der Stelle, 6 Dire:ter Office of Inspection and Enforcement Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 27th day of January,1951 L_
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cract os THE yf fis3,y,g February 13, 19El che Ecnorable Merris K. Udall Chair an Cc=mittee en Interior and Insular Affairs C.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.
C.
20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I am responding to your letter of January 30, 1981 on the conclusion reached by the NRC staff investigation of infor-mation reperting during the TMI accident.
You asked for the views of individual Commissioners on whether information was intentionally withheld by Metropolitan Edison Cc=pany and en the truthfulness of statements made during the varicus subsequent investigations.
The NRC staff investigation report's conclusion that "information 1
was not intentionally withheld" from the State er frcm NRC is more-an assertion than a conclusion.
I do not find in the report-the reasoning that led the investigators to make this statement.
Moreover, it is inconsistent with another of.the report's conclusions that:
" Met Ed was not fully forthcoming on March 25, 1979, in that they did. net appraise the commonwealth of Pennsylvania of either the uncertaintv..concernine. the adec.uaev of core cooling or the potential for degradation of plant conditions."
To say that Met Ed was not " fully forthcoming" is to say it consciously held back significant information on the accident.
My own judgment is that' Met Ed, in dealing with the State and the NRC on March 28, 1979, probably withheld information which would have made the accident appear more serious and the reactor situation more precarious.
It is perhaps under-
-standable that company officials should have tried te dampen public ' excittment by playing down the~ severity of the accident ir briefing State and federal officials, but it is not e::: usable in view of the. responsibility ef government officials.
for public protection.
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',,,,.e February 13,19El c.si.unu s The Honorable Morris K. Udall Chair.an
%..i :ee on Interi:r and Insular Affai s L. 5. House c' Re: esentatives Lasningtor., C. C. ICEiE
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your letter of January 30, 1931. The investigators who prepared the re:ent tZ investigation recort conclude:
that information was not intentionally withheld from the State of Pennsylvania or the fiRC on the day of tne accident.
This was based up;n neir personal review of existing in'ormation and interviews wnich they conducted to supplement that information.
In addition, based up:n his staff's participation in the investigation and his personal review of the report, the Dire::or of the Office of Inspec:or and Auditor con: luted tnere was ne cire:: evidence to substantiate inter.:icnal withholding of informa tier. f rc-the fiP.C.
In licht of the information developed fro tr.at investigation, the Director of :ne Office of Inspection an: Enforcement proposed tne enforcement action he found to be appropriate.
As the Comission's cover le::er indicates, the enforcement action which was issued refle::s tne position of the majority of the Comission.
In my coinion the important lesson to be learned from this issue is that the licensee must be responsible for evaluatinc and responding to an accident.
Tne _ licensee is the entity with detailed operational knowledge of a particular reactor.
Altnough the i;P.C has a role to play and it needs adeouate infomation in orcer to fulfill that role, the licensee mast bear primary responsibility for evaluating and controllino plant conditions.
I supported the enforcement action because I believed it properly emphasized this aspect of the infomation flow issue.
With regard to intentional withholding of information and truthfulness of statements made to the TMI investigators, I have found nothing which would cause me to disagree with the findings u.1d conclusions of the tRC staff.
The investigators are more familiar with the technical details of the issues and have personally interviewed rany of the key individuals-involved.
Eased uoon their expertise, their personal knowledce, and my lack of any basis for disagreeing, I personally en:orse their con:1csions.
Sincerely,
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John F'.
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