ML20006B785
| ML20006B785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1990 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20006B713 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9002050353 | |
| Download: ML20006B785 (1) | |
Text
-
l JAFNPP 3.2 BASES (cont'd)
High 'adiation monitors in tha main steam line tunnel have. _
The trip settings of approximately 300 percent of design flow '
l been provided to detect gross fuel failure as in the cocitrol rod for this Ngh flow or 40'F above maximum ambient for high 7$
drop accedent. : With the established setting of 3 times normal temperature are such that uncc.J g the core is prevented background, and main. steam line isolation valve closure, and fission product release is withm Imts 33 fissien product release is limited so that 10 CFR 100 guedefines gg are not exceeded for this accident. Reference Section 14.6.1.2
% RCIW h h 'wh We a m
h m m M W HPCI. N @ W of ar_n FSAR. During the Hydrogen Addition Test, the normal w
@ 300 pacent fu @ h a Mh p
N background Main Steam Une Radiation Level is expected to gg.
Increase try approximately a factor of 5 at the peak hydrogen
- P cr the I-oo concentration as indicated in note 16, Table 3.1-1. : With the o8C hydrogen addition, the fission product release would still be The reactor water cleanup system high te nperature g
well within the 10 CFR 100 guedefines in the event of a control
. instrumentation are arranged similar to that for the HPCI. The W
- rod drop accident.
trip settings are such that unccmig the core is prever5ted and Pressure instrumentation is provided to close the main steam sssonfM rhis & M isolaSon valves in the run mode when the main steam line The instrumentation which initiates ECCS action is arranged in pressure drops below 825 psig. The reactor pressure ve.sel a dual bus system. As for other vital instrumentation arranged thermal transeerd due to an inadvertent openmg of the turt,ine _
in this fashion, the specincation preserves the effectiveness of bypass valves when not in the run mode is less severe than the -
the system even dunng penods when mantenance or testmg is loss of feedwater analyzed in Section 14.5 of the FSAR, being performed. An exception to this is when logic functional therefore, closure of the main steam isolation valves for thermal testingis bemg pedsmed.
transient protection when not in the run mode is not required.
The control rod block functions are provided to prevent The HPCI high flow and temperature instrumentation are -
excessive control rod withdrawal so that MCPR does not
. provided to detect a break in the HI3Cl steam peping. Trippog decrease to. the Safety Umit. The trip of this instrumentation results in actuation of HPCI isolation
- valves. Tripping logic for the high flow is a 1 out of 2 logic.
Amendment No. ' If,7/,32f,4tf,90,14147 57
~
l I'
~--W