ML20005A495

Forwards Response to Section 2.1 of NRC 801222 Ltr Requesting Evaluation of Procedures & Sys Re General Requirements for Overhead Handling Sys,Per NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads.

ML20005A495
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/22/1981
From:	William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 NUDOCS 8106300395
Download: ML20005A495 (20)

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Omaha Public Power District -

1623 MANNEY t OMANA. NEsRAsMA 68102 s TELEPHONE 538 4000 AREA CODE 402 June 22, 1981 Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference:

Docket No. 50-285

Dear Mr. Clark:

The Commission's letter dated December 22, 1980, requested all licensees to evaluate their procedures and systems for control of heavy loads over irradiated fuel and systems required for safety. The results of Omaha Public Power District's evaluation of compliance of the Fort Calhoun Station with Item 2.1 of Enclosure 3 to that letter is attached.

Sincerely, W. C. vones Division Manager Production Operations

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cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. b, u s, e*dfu"&a^meu", '

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RESPONSE TO SECIION 2.1 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL

-INFORMATION ON CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS 2.1 General Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems 2.1 Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to

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identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedure;,

or detailed structural analysis).

RESPONSE 1:

The cranes und trolleys identified throughout the plant that handle loads in areas where equipment for shutdown or decay heat removal is located are listed below. -

CONTAINMENT Polar Crane AUXILIARY BUILDING Auxiliary Building Crane ITEM 2.1-2

• Justify' the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

RESPONSE 2:

The following cranes and hoists have been excluded from Item 1.

a)- The turbine building crane was excluded from Item 1 above since no system or component required for plant shutdown or core decay heat removal is located in this building.

b) The drumming area and the maintenance shop cranes also are not listed since there is no safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment in these areas.

c) The two 24-ton monorails in the Diesel Generator Station Area do not have a hoist physically attached to them. The hoist is stored elsewhere, and only used for maintenace on one or the other Diesel Generator, only one generator ,

can be serviced at any given time by this hoist. Thus this crane has been l excluded from Item 1.

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-9 d)^ -The Filter Area Crane has also been excluded from Item 1 above since no system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal is located in this area.

e) The two concrete slab removal cranes, the waste evaporator equipment handl-ing crane and the deborating demineralizer. area crane are excluded since a heavy load dropped from these cranes cannot prevent the plant from achiev-ing hot shutdown ~. The system that these cranes operate over (the Safety Injection pump room) is not required to achieve hot shutdown. These cranes are physically separated by two floors from the Safety Injection pump room. The ability of these floors to withstand a heavy load drop will be verified by analysis.

, f) There are also' miscellaneous plant hoists located in the turbine building.

These hoists are completely separated from any safe shutdown or decay heat removal equipment.

g) The Intake Structuro crane has been excluded since a heavy load dropped from this crane cannot prevent the plant from achieving hot shutdown.

The system that th!.s crane operates over (the raw' water system) is not required to achieve hot shutdown. The crane is separated from the raw water system by an intervening floor. The ability of this floor to with-stand a load drop will be verified by analysis, h) There is also a jib crane being installed in Containment. This crane will only be used when the plant is shutdown. It will be installed on .

el. 1045'0" near the Reactor Vessel Closure Head laydown area. This crane has a capacity of IT. and will be used to work on CEDM's. Since this is not a permanently installed crane', and will only be used during plant shutdown, the District believes it should be excluded from item 1 above.

ITEM 2.1-3 With-respect to the design and operation of heavy-load-handling systems in the containment and the spent-fuel pool area and those load-handling systems identified in 2.1-1, above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1. The following specific information should be included in your reply:

ITEM 2.1-3a ,

Drawings or' sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths,. spent fuel, and safe- -related equipment.

RESPONSE 3a:

The prints listed below are attached:

GHDR Drawings

11405-A-5 el. 989'0" - Primary Plant Basement Level '

11405-A-6 1007'0" - Primary Plant Ground Level i 11405-A-7 1025'0" - Primary Plant Interaediate Level  ;

11405-A-8 1036'0" - Polar Crane Restric;ed Areas 11405-A-8 1036'0" - Auxiliary Building Crane Restricted Areas j l

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-. , . - = . . -

These drawings have load paths for.the polar crane and auxiliary building crane clearly marked, and the nearby equipment is also identified.

Safe load path information concerning containment and .the auxiliary building was also previously submitted to NRC in the District's letter from T. E. Short to Robert W. Reid dated August 9, 1978.

ITEM 2.1 - 3b A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for. deviation from these paths.

RESPONSE 3b:

. Loads moved in the areas defined in Section 5.1.1(1) (Containment and Auxiliary Building Crane) are listed in attached Table 3-1. The procedures governing these loads are also listed.

Load numbers 1 through 4 listed in Table 3-1 are covered by maintenance procedures.

The paths for the movement of these loads are not explicitly stated in the proce-dures, but the load paths are restricted by operating instructions OI-HE-1 for the polar crane, and OI-HE-5 for the Auxiliary Building' Crane.

These restrictions are as foilows:

OI-HE-1 .

1. The polar crane will not be used to carry loads over the reactor coolant system when the reactor coolant system temperature exceeds 225*F (Technical Specification 2.11(1).

2. The polar crane will not be used to transport any load over the core when the reactor vessel head is removed without Plant Review Committee (PRC) approved procedure.

3. The polar crane will not be used to transport any load over the area bounded by containment columns 10 and 11 and the RC-2B biological shield without a PRC approved procedure pending the results of a load drop analysis.

4. Loads should not bo lifted higher than necessary to safely clear obstacles along the load path, i The operating instruction for the Auxiliary Building Crane (OI-HE-5) will provide the following restriction:

1. The Auxiliary Building Crane will not be operated over the spent fuel pool without a qualified crane supervisor present and a PRC approved p rocedure.

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, DISCUSSION 3b: .

The District is of the opinion that the restrictions on the Polar Crant operation given above provide for a safe load path by exclusion. The potential to impact irradiated fuel is ninimized by allowing only necessary loads to be transported over the core and by using a PRC approved procedure as indicated in Table 3-1.

Heavy loads are moted with the polar crane only during refueling. These loads are the reactor vessel head, the upper guide structure and the four missile shfelds.

Technical Specification 2.8.5 requ4.res one shutdown coolant pump and one heat exchanger to be in operation during refueling. The pumps used for shutdown cooling are low pressure safety injection pomps. These pumps are located in the auxiliary building rather than in containment as are both shutdown heat exchangers. Associated piping and cabling is located below the level that could be reached by a dropped component.

The conclusion is that no heavy load drcp can be postulated which would inter-fere with the safe shutdown of the p]snt since heavy loads are not handled while the plant is operating. While the plant is shutdown there are no loads which would affect the equipment required to be operating, because the required equipment is located away from the area the '.oads are being handled.

If a heavy. load drop were to occur over the core, the release of offsite doses -

can be reduced by rapid containment isolation on a high radiation signal. Also, decay heat removal capability is assured by prohibiting transport of a heavy load ovt - locations where a single load drop could remove both HPSI and LPSI as decay he+ removal paths unless an alternative decay heat removal path is avail-able. Safe shutdown and decay heat removal capability is therefore, assured.

Movement of the trolley over the' core with no loads on the hooks is allowed since only a spontaneous failure of the cable or sheeves could cause a load drop in this mode. The possibility of this type of failure is minimized by the preoperational inspections performed per Item 3e.

Load numbers 5 and 6 are governed by maintenance and special procedures.

Although the paths for these movements are not stated they are restricted by OI-HE-5. We feel this restriction on the Auxiliary Building Crane provides a safe load path by exclusion. The potential to impact irradiated fuel is minimized by not allowing loads to be carried over irradiated fuel (Technical Specification 2.11(2)). The potential for a load drop in this area, is also minimized by the fact that we are currently installing a new retrofitted

" single-failure proof" crane in the auxiliary building.

If the analysis requested by the NRC indicates that other controls are appropriate they will be addressed in the report covering Section 2.2 -

2.4.

ITEM 2.1 - 3c A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verifi-cation that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(2).

RESPONSE 3c:

The attached Table 3-2 lists the cranes and the loads normally handled by each.

Table 3-1 indicates the written procedures that govern the handling of each load. These procedures include identification of required equipment, inepections, and acceptance criteria required before movement of the load, and steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load. These pec,cedures meet the intent of Section 5.1.1(2) of NUREG 0612.

Restrictions on loads in the vicinity of spent fuel pool and reactor core are stated in 01-HE-5 and OI-HE-1 respectively. These were addressed in Item 2.1 -

3b.

Procedures are also available for spent resin and filter disposal. These pro-

- cedures do not address load handling since these loads are not carried over or in proximity to irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

Procedures for handling other heavy loads identified in Table 3.1-1 of NUREG 0612 will be written and/or reviewed prior to handling of those heavy loads.

Specific load handling devices are identified below:

Reactor Vessel Closure Head Lifting Rig

, Upper Guide Structure Lift Rig ITEM 2.1 - 3d ,

Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3c, above, comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate th'eir equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.

RESPONSE 3d:

We are currently evaluating the design of our lifting rigs to show compliance with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30.9-1971. As of this date the District has not fully developed a response to Item 2.1-3d, due to lack of info rmation. This information is being obtained from Combustion Engineering (CE).

C.E. wrote the specifications for our lif ting rigs. We will advice the Commission of our compliance as soon as possible, and send a response.

ITEM 2.1 - 3e l Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to l i

I this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.

6 RESPONSE 3e:

The Auxiliary Building Crane and the lontainment Polar Crane will be inspected

'and maintained in accordance with ANSI B30 2-1976

. . The Auxiliary Building Crane will be inspected daily ~or prior to each use (whichever is less frequent) according to 0I-HE-5. The daily ins'pection will include checking operation

. of the hoist uplimit switches and normal operating controls and a visual inspection of the hook, hook latch and hoist rope of the hooks to be used.

A monthly inspection will include checking operation of the spent fuel pool boundary limit switches, and the bridge and trolley travel limit switches and inspection of the hoist rope and end clamps.

The Containment Polar Crane will be inspected daily and during use, according to OI-HE-1 (Refueling Outages). The daily inspection will include checking

_ operation of the hoist uplimit switches and normal operating controls and a visual inspection of the hook latch and hoist rope of the hooks to be used.

A monthly inspection (MP-HE-1A), performed during refueling, will include checking operation of the trolley travel limit switches and inspection of the hoist' rope and end clamps. Additional maintenance and inspections are performed as part of the preventive maintenance program and as prerequisites to specific critical lifts.

ITEM 2.1 - 3f Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.

RESPONSE 3f:

1. The Containment Polar Crane used at Fort Calhoun was purchased to Gibbs, Hill, Durham and Richardsons' specifications for Hoisting Equipment.

This specification was based on the Electric Overhead Crane Institute, Inc. Specifications and USAS Safety Code B30.2-1967. A comparison of the requirements - f G.H.D.&R specs to the CMAA-70-1975 specification is shown in Table 3-3. Tables 3-3, 3-4, 3-5 and the following discus;'on shows that the Fcet Calhoun polar crane procurement specification meets the intent of CMAA-70.

2. The Auxiliary Building Crane is currently being retrofitted. This crane will be classified as a " single-failure-proof" retofitted trolley system.

This crane has been designed to meet ANSI B30.2-1976 standards and CMAA Spec. No. 70.

o DISCUSSION 3f:

. Impact Force: -The Electric Overhead Crane Institute's (E0CI)

Specification was referenced in the design for the Polar Crane.

t' This-specification requires a design force equal to 15% of the rated capacity of the crane. The CMAA #70-1975 specifies that the impact load be 1/2% load x hoist speed in feet per minute and that the impact should not be less than 15% or gre ter than 50% of the rated capacity. Therefore, the Polar Crane has been procured to a criteria which conforms to the requirement.s of CMAA specification for hoist speed.less than 30 ft/ min. The Polar Crane has a-hoist speed of 6ft/ min or less. Therefore, this crane satisfies CMAA-70-75.

2. Compressive Stress: As shown in Table 3-3, the allowable compressive stress specified in the Polar Crane design specifications is identical to-those specified by CMAA-70-1975 for members with non-slender com-pressive flange. A comparison of the allowable compressive stress

< iteria given in the design specifications and CMAA-1975 is shown re 3-1. r the Polar Crane in Fort Calhoun in Figg/c has a ratio of 24.TheFor boxthis girders fg/c ratio,- this structural. clement meets the requirements of CMAA 70-1975.

' ITEM 2.. - 3g:

Exceptions, if ar.y, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operacor

-training, qualification and conduct.

RESPONSE 3g:

It has been determined that our standing order M-8 " Control of Crane Operations" does comply with ANSI B30.2-1976. This order requires operators, signalmen and supervisors of the Containment Polar Crane and tha Auxiliary Building Crane to be trained and qualified, in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976. Quality Control administers qualification exercises and retains certifications. Currently, qualified crane operators, signalmen and supervisors will be advised of new requirements resulting from NUREG 0612.

M' TABLE 3-1 Load Procedure

1. Reactor Vessel Closure MP-RC-6-1 Head and Lifting Rig " Removal of Reactor Vessel Closure Head" MP-RC-6-2

" Inspection and Replacement of Reactor Vessel Closure Head"

2. Reactor Upper Internals

• SP-RC-6-2 and Lifting Rig " Upper Guide Structure Lift Rig and ICI Plate Removal and Installation" MP-RC-7-2-A

" Upper Guide Structure and ICI Plate Removal' MP-RC-7-2-B

" Upper Guide Structure and ICI Plate Installation"

3. Missile Shields MP-AE-4 a

" Missile Shield Removal" MP-AE-4-2

" Missile Shield Replacement"

4. Spent Fueld Pool Gates MP-FH-16-1

" Removal of Spent Fuel Pool Gates" MP-FH-16-2 .

" Installation of Spent Fuel Pool Gates"

5. New Fuel SP-NFR-2

" Fuel Receipt Procedures"

6. Spent Fuel No procedure now. Will be Shipping Cask developed when needed.

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TABLE 3-2 lCr,ane/ Hoist Location Load Weight Load Path Polar Crane Containment Missile 10T each See Figure 1A

~130T Main Hook elev. 1095'-1/2" Shields Diagrams A-1, A-2 10T Aux. Hook A-3, in 8-9-78 Reactor Vessel 120T letter Closure Head (including studs)

Upper Guide 40T Also refer to Structure (including 01-HE-1 lifting rig)

Auxiliary Bldg. Auxiliary Bldg. Spent Fuel IT. OI-HE-5 Crane Crane Pool Gates 75T Main Hook- elev. 1065'-0" 10T Aux. Hook New Fuel 1.5T. SP-NFR-2 Receipt Spent Fuel 30T No procedure Shipping Cask now. Will be developed when needed.

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TABLE 3-3 OVERilEAD AND GANTRY CRANES COMPARISON OF STRUCTURAL DESIGN CRITERIA FORT CAlll0UN STATION UNIT 1 Allowable Stresses lloisting '(2)

' Structural Structural -(hsi) Rope Non~ Structural Requirements Design Forces Steel (1) Related Load Bearing Specification Impact =I Lateral Material Tension Compression Shear Bearing Cap Capacity i CMAA Spec. 1. 1/2% Load 2-1/2% of ASTH-A36 17.6 17.6 for 13.2 26.4 20% 20%

Breaking Fultimate

1. 70 Copyright x (lloist (live Load b/c $ 38 Strength-1975 Speed in + Bridge)

Class Al ft/ min (Standby 2. 15% $1.150% '

Service) of rated capacity .

Fort Calhoun I=15% 5% of (3) 16.0 g6.0for 12.0 21.6 20% 20%

Breaking Fultimate Polar Crane of the rated (Live Load ASTH-A36 /c $ 41 Strength EOCI capacity + Bridge)

Spec. #61 NOTES:

1. b= distance between web plates (inches). .

c= thickness of top cover plate (inches).

2. Fult = published average utlimate stress of material.

3. We specified ASTM-A36 steel, instead of ASTH-A7 as published in EOCI #61 D

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TABLE 3-4 COMPARISON OF E0CI AND CMAA DESIGN ST1tESS CRITERIA EOCI #61 CMAA #70 Design stress of load carrying Shall not exceed Shall not exceed 20% of parts except structural members, 20% of the assumed the published average gearing and hoisting ropes average ultimate ultimate strength of the strength of the material material Hoisting rope selection The rated capacity The rated load capacity plus load divided by the the bottom block divided by number of parts of the number of parts of rope rope shall not exceed shall not exceed 20% of the 20% of the published published breaking strength breaking strength of of the rope the rope Structural Materials Selection ASTM-A7 or Suitable ASTM-A36 or Suitable alternate alternate

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Basic allowable stresses for Tension =16,000 psi Tension =17,600 psi

• Bridge Girder Compression =16,000 psi Compression =17,600 psi Shear =12,000 psi Sheat=13,200 psi Basic allowable stresses for Shall not exceed 20% Tension =14,400 psi End trucks of the assumed average Compression =14,400 psi ultimate strength of the Shear =10,300 psi material Basic allowabit stresces for Shall not exceed 20% Tension =14,400 psi Trolley Frames of the assumed average Compression =14,400 psi ultimate strength of Shear =10,800 psi the material Gear strength Shall be such that the Shall be per the American stress in the material Gear Mfrs. Assoc,-(AGMA) does not exceed 20% of Standard the assumed average ultimate strength of the material

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TABLE 3-5 COMPARISON OF USAS B30.2.0'and ANSI B30.2.0 .

USAS B30.2.0 - 1967 ANSI B30.2.0 - 1976

. Clearances from Specified as 3" overhead Does not specify specific-Obstructions 2" laterally clearance dimensions

Welding Per AWS D 2.0-66 Per AWS D14.1 Girders Required to be of To be designed io either adequate design CMAA, AISC or AISE Cab clearances- Specified as 3" from_ Does not'specify a specific all fixed structures clearance dimensions-Toeboards & Handrails Per USAS A 12-1932 Per latest issue of ANSI A 12.1 Ladders Per USAS A 14.3-1956 Per latest addition of ANSI 14.3, which requires cages on ladders greater than 20 ft.

,, . Egress from Operator's homentionofegress Recommends a means, of egress Cab ,

for emergencies.

Bridge & Trolley Bumper Recommends the use of Recommends the use-of Bumper, Bumper or other automatic means pro-viding equivalent effect

Bridge & Tr'olley Brakes Specifies a size require- Specifies a deceleration re-ments for deceleration quirement for the brakes in addition to size' requirements.

Electrical Equipment Per Article 610 of Per latest issue of NFPA 70, USAS CI-1965 Article 610, which requires a 30" walkway width in front of electrical enclosures

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TABLE 3-5 (Cont'd)

USAS B30.20.0 - 1967 ANSI B30.3.0 - 1976

-Hoisting Ropes Requires selection con- Requires selection con-sidering the rated load sidering the rated load only 'plus the load block Hooks. Does not address safety Requires safety latches unle-latches the application makes the use of the latch impractical Rated Load Test Does not specify'the extent . Requires traversing the bridge of traversing for the bridge the full length of the runway and trolley and the trolley the full lengt ,

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Modifications Required to Meet the Guidelines of NUREG 0612 -

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A review of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG 0612 has shown that Fort Calhoun

' Station i~s'substantially in compliance. Only four (4) points of deviation

.are discernable.and these are itemized below.

1)' In item 1) of paragraph 5.1.1 of NUREG 0612, Saf s Load Paths, a requirement is made for clearly marking load paths on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled.

2) Also, deviation from defined load paths should require alternative procedures approved by the plant safety reviek committee.

DISCUSSION:

Loads are moved by the safest and shortest paths. Load paths had been previously submitted in T.E. Short's-letter to Robert W. Reid, l 8-9-78. The drawings showing paths are IA, Diagram A-1, A-2, A-3.

The District is of the opinion that it is not apparent that marking load paths on the floor is feasible or would contribute to reactor safety.

As to alternative procedures for deviation from defined load paths, we feel that the restrictions placed on the Polar Crane operation provide for a safe load path by exclusion as discussed in response to 2.1-3b. Thus no alternative procedures will be required.

. We feel that this is sufficient justification for not making any required changes.

3) In item 3) of paragraph 5.1.1 of NUREG 0612, Crane Operators, a requirement is made for training and qualifying crane operators in accordance with Chapters 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976.

DISCUSSION:

A review of Fort Calhoun's crane operator training program has shown that it does comply with Chapters 2-3 of ANSI B30.2.-1976. However to insure that the intent of the specific questions is met, a refe-rence to Chapters 3 of ANSI B.30.2-76 will be included in our current program, and a review of that document will'also be provided.

4) In Item 5) cf paragraph 5.1.1 of NUREG 0612, Special Lifting Devices, a requirement is made for satisfying the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978.

Discussion:

We cannot at this point in time show compliance or noncompliance due to . lack of information on the design of our lifting rigs.

However if it is shown that our design deviates greatly from the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 we will be prepared to make the necessary changes to comply with this standard. We will inform the Commission at a later date as to the modifications if any to be performed to show compliance to item 3 NUREG 5.1.1.

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