ML20004F592
| ML20004F592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1980 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20004F589 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106190175 | |
| Download: ML20004F592 (30) | |
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L POST-EXERCISE EVALUATION STATE OF ILLINOIS AND GRUNDY, KENDALL AND WILL COUNTIES' EXERCISE OF THE ILL?NOIS PLAN FOR RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS FOR DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, MORRIS, ILLINCIS OCTOBER 28,.1980 PREPARED BY:
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGE' TENT AGENCY PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS DIVISION, REGION V FEDERAL CENTER BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN 49016 6106.190l?5 I
o a.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
INTRODUCTION.............................................
1 1.
FEMA Responsibilities - Role of the Regional Advisory Committee (RAC)l...................
1 2.
Exercise Objectives..................................
1 3.
Critique.............................................
2 4.
Public Meeting.......................................
2 5.
RAC Evaluation Objectives............................
2 6.
Participating State 6 Local Organizations............ 2 7.
Federal Observer Team......................,..........
2 8.
Evaluation Criteria.......................
.......... 4 9.
Remedial Action Procedures...........................
4 10.
Review and Approval Procedures.......................
4 II.-
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
....................................... 6 III.
E XE RC I S E S CEN A RI 0........................................ 7 Synopsis and Critique................................
7 State o f Illinois Mas te r Scenario.................... 7 Channahon Scenario...................................
8 Grundy County / Morris Scenario........................
9 Minooka Scenario................................... 10 Will County Scenario................................
11 Recommendation......................................
12 IV.
EVALUATIONS............................................. 13 A.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY (ORGANIZATION CONTROL).13 State E0C...........................................
13 Recommendations.....................................
13 Grundy County.......................................
14 Re c o mm e nd a t i o n s..................................... 14 Kendall/Will Counties...............................
14 Recommendations.....................................
15 B.
ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION......................
16
-(A licensee related function only.)
C.
EMERCENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES............ 17 State...............................................
17 Recommendation......................................
17
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D..
EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM..................... 18 State /Loca1.........................................
18 Recommendation.............................
........ 18 E.
NOTIFI CATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES................. 19 State / Local E0C's...................................
19
-Recommendation......................................
19 F.
EME RGENCY COMMUN I CAT IONS............................ 2 0 State /Loca1.........................................
20 Re c o mm e n d a t i o n s..................................... 2 0 G.
PUBL1 C EDUCATION AND INFORMATION.................... 21 Recommendations.....................................
21 H.
EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT..................
22 State...............................................
22 Recommendations.....................................
22 Grundy County.......................................
22 Recommendations.....................................
22 Will County / Municipalities..........................
23 Recommandations.....................................
23 I.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT.................................
24 State...............................................
24 Recommendations.....................................
24 J.
P ROT E CT I VE RE S P0NS E................................. 2 5 State /Loca1.........................................
25 Recommendation...................'...................
25 K.
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL.......................
26 State...............................................
26 Recommendations.................................... 26 L.
MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT...................
27 State /Loca1.........................................
27 Recommendations.....................................
27 M.
RE - ENT RY AN D RE C0 VE RY............................... 2 8 State /Loca1..........................................
28 Re c o mm e n da t i o n s..................................... 2 8 N.
EXERCISES AND DRILLS................................
29 State /Loca1.........................................
29 Recommendations.....................................
29 0.
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING............
30 Recommendations...............................<.....
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I.
INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.
1.
FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility-Radiological Emergency Planning include:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning a.
and review and evaluation of State and local government' emergency plans for adequacy.-
b.
Determining whether the plans can be implemented, based upon observation and evaluation of exercises conduct'ed in these jurisdictions.
c.
Coordinating the. activities of all of the involved Federal and Volunteer Agencies:
(1)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
(2)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
(3)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
(4)
Department of Energy (DOE)
(5)
Department of Health and Euman Services (HHS)
(6)
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 4 (7)
Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Representatives of these agencies strve as members of the Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.
4 Fermal submission of emergency plans to the RAC by the States and involved local jurisdictions is, in each case, followed closely by the exercising, critiquing and evaluation of those plans.
A-follow-up Public Meeting is held to acquaint the citi:enry with contents of the plans, answer questions about them and receive suggestions on the plans.
2.
A radiological emergency exercise was conducted October 23, 1980, between the hours of S:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. by the State of Illinois and Grundv, Kendall and Nill Counties of Illinois to assess the adequacy of the Illinois and County Plans ~for Radiological Accidents and preparations to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency involving the Dresden Nuclear Power Plant operated by Commonwealth Edison Company, near Morris. Illinois.
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3.
A critique of the October 28, 1980 exercise was held at 1:00 p.m. October 29,-1980 at the Holiday Inn, Morris, Illinois.
4.
A Public Meeting was conducted at 10:00 a.m.,
October 30, 1980 at the Holiday Inn, Morris, Illinois.
5.
General RAC objectives for the operational phase of the plans were to exercise and evaluate the.following elements as described in the All-State Letter to State Emergency Services Directors in Region V, August 28, 1980:
Communications and Warning Accident Assessment Capability of Field Assessment Teams Use of Protective Action Guides (PAG's)
Public Information-Evacuation Methodology that would be used Provisions for.Re-entry ar.d Recovery of the Affected Area.
Direction and Control Comments on-those general areas follow.
The basic planning documents on which the State and local plans were developed was NUREG 0654-FEMA REP-1.
6.
Participating organization.c included:
a.
Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) and the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, along with a dozen other State-level agencies, operating at Soringfield and in the F.meraenev pi nnnino zone (Fozi.
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b.
Governments o,f Grundy, Kendall and Will Counties.
c.
Go'vernments of the cities of Channahon and Minooka.
7.
Federal observers were:
OBSERVER AGENCY SITE FUNCTION 1.
P. McCollough FEMA RAC Chairman 2.
R.
Lee FEMA State EOC Diroetion r, control 3
R. Liebel Center for Planning 5 Research 4.
P. Frost FEMA state EOC Communications 5.
H. King-R, Lee FEMA State ECC Public Information 6.
F. Egland FEMA State EOC Evacuation, Re-entry and Recovery, Transoortation 7
D. King
. FEMA State EOC Accident Assessment-Radiological Healt Team. 6 Protective l
S.
g, Grant-NRC State Dept. of Accident Assessment-Nuclear Safety Rad. Health 5 PAG' 2
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OBSERVER AGENCY SITE FUNCTION 19, D. Trites FEMA
- Morris, ESDA State Staging Collins Area, State Command Station Post 6 3 Comm. Vans.
10.
E. Jascewsky DOE
- Morris, DNS Mobile Lab.
Assessment, Rad.
Health 11.
P, Tedeschi EPA
- Morris, Protective Action Guides 12.
D. Bement FEMA Grundy Co.
Direction 5 Control EOC 13.
P. Zaferopulos FEMA Grundy Co.
Direction 5 Control EOC Communications 14.
F. DeLach Center for Grundy Co.
Public Information Planning EOC Evacuation and Research 15.
M. Vandel FEMA Grundy Co. EOC Transportation 5 Re-entry / Recovery M. Vandel FEMA Kendall Co.EOC Direction 5 Control Communications Public Information 16.
G.-Barber Center for Will Co. EOC Direction 5 Control "lanning Communications and Research 17.
W.
Weaver FEMA Will Co. EOC Public Information 18.
R.
Meyer FEMA Will Co. EOC Public Information 19.
D. Johnson FHA Will Co. EOC Trans:ortation 20.
.J.
Pagliaro NRC Will Co. EOC Accid'ent Assessment Protective Action Guides 5 Re-entry 5 Recovery 21.
B. McMahan FEMA Utility EOC, Communications GE Tng Center Public Information 22.
~ Communications GE Tng Center Public Information 23.
E. Robinson FEMA Channahon EOC Direction 6 Control Public Information 24.
G. Pierson FEMA Channahon EOC Direction 5 Control Public Information 25.
D. Smaston FEMA Channahon EOC Communications 26.
G. Rapp FEMA Channahon EOC Evacuation 6 Host Center 27.
D. Harris FEMA Channahon EOC Transportation Evacuation, Re-entry 5 Recovery 28.
R. Kellogg FEMA Minooka EOC Direction 5 Control Public Information 29.
J. Devlin Center for Minooka EOC Communications Planning Transportation 5 Research Re-entry 5 Recovery 30.
~W.
Curtis Red Cross Minooka EOC Evacuation and Host Centers 31.
B. Bailey FEMA Secretary 32.
M. Quellette FEMA Secretary 3
8.
Major ~ functions' witnessed by Federal observers were evaluated in accordance with the following_ criteria:
Capability outstanding; excellent demonstration Capability good; exceeds minimum standards - some improvements recommended.
Capability acceptable;. meets minimum standards -
significant improvements needed.
Capability weak; does not meet minimum standards -
significant improvements needed.
Capability not demonstrated or lacking.
9.
State and local jurisdictions are required to take remedial actions responsive, on a point-by-point basis, to the formal recommendations of the RAC.
One month from receipt of this document State and local juris-dictions should submit to the RAC the corrective measures they have taken or intend to take.
If remedial actions cannot be instituted immediately, then a detailed plan scheduling and implementing remedial actions must be provided.
Recommendations for correcting deficiencies are listed in continuing numerical sequence following the critique of each observed function.
Herein is an example of the format to be used when.
indicating remedial actions.
CRITIQUE:
"The exercise was terminated without proper reduction from the ' General Emergency' 1
classification."
Sample:
RECOMMENDATION # 1 - REMEDIAL ACTION:
Exercise Controllers have been directed to terminate future exercises af ter the nuclear olant is released from " General Emergency" status a'd appropriate n
re-entry and recovery actions are taken according to State and local plans and procedures.
l 10.
The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, Radiological Emergency Planning, Washington, D.
C., that any deficiencies noted t
in the exercise have been corrected and such corrections incorporated in the plan.
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7-A State which seeks review and approval by FEMA of its plan, with annexes, shall suomit an application for revie'r and approval to the FEMA Regional Director of the Region in which the State is located.
The applica-tion, in the form of a letter from the Governor or other State official as the Governor may designate, shall contain one copy of the completed State plan with an indication that deficiencies have been corrected.
Uaon receipt of a State nian from the Regional Director, t.1e Associate Director shall cause copies of the plan together with the Regional Director's evaluation, to be distributed to the members of the Federal Interagency Central Coordinating Committee (FICCC) and other FEMA offices with appropriate guidance relative to their assistance in the FEMA review procers as described in 44 CFR Part 350, Federal Register, Volume 45, Number 123, Tuesday, June 24, 1980 (Review and Approval of State and local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness).
The Associate Director shall conduct such review of the State plan as deemed necessary prior to its being forwarded to the appropriate NRC licensing bodies.
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II.
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
,The consensus of the Federal observers was that the objectives 1
of the exercise were achieved.
Most of the participating organi-zations effectively demonstrated an outstanding capability to take measures to' protect their populations in the event of a nuclear emergency at the Dresden power plant that involves the safety of the public in adjacent areas.
Some deficiencies were observed but most had a minimal impact on performance, and generally were con-sidered feasibly rectified -- in nost cases at relatively little expense.
Participation and professionalism of State and local officials and emergency staffs were generally excellent.
Prepara-tion for the exercise was thorough and did much to assure success in te as of meeting objectives of all participants.
The scenario was viewed as too long which resulted in lagging play during the afternoon.
Communications systems were excellent, but more informa-tion could have been provided downward from the State ESDA and DNS to the local jurisdictions, and more information upward especially concerning evac eation and relocation.
The Illir.ois State Radiological Emergency Response Plan reflects the lessons learned at the Three Mile Island incident, and it was highly regarded by the observers.
As a follow-up to this exercise both the State and local plans should reflect the experience this exercise provided,_especially guidance on phasing local ooerations.
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EXERCISE SCENARIO SYNOPSIS AND CRITIOUE:
The exercise scenario was designed to provide an outline' of a natural or expected course of events leading to and including a nuclear emergency at the Dresden Nuclear Power Plant, near Morris, Illinois.
The accident scenarios were developed by the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety and the State Emergency Services and Disaster Agency.
" Elapsed time" is that time which elapses following the initial event.
" Scenario time" refers to the time for various events in the scenario itself; scenario times are real times.
The scenario date is identical to the exercise date, October 23, 1980.
The State Master Scenario which is the basis for operational response along with the local scenarios follow:
STATE OF ILLINOIS MASTER SCENARIO 9ctober 28, 1980, Dresden Nuclear Power Plant Incident Exercise Site Emergency at Dresden initiated.
Grundy County Sheriff Dispatcher and Will County /Plainfield EOC notified by ESDA using NARS.
CommonwealthEdisonCompanyObserver/CSntrollerhandsaDresden Operator a Control Message containing an Emergency Action Level simulating an imminent loss of the third fussion produce barrier (i.e. primary containment); such that a General Emergency should be declared for the Dresden Station.
General Emergency declared using NARS.
CECO - Detects an elevated release of radioactive material.
CECO - Notified that release consists of noble gases released at the rate of curies /second, and iodines being released at a rate of curies /second.
All appropriate off-site agencies /organi:ations are notified by CECO that the radioactive release has stopped, the plant is under control, and the potential for further release of radioactive materials no longer exists.
Upon receipt of notification that radioactive release has stopped as per above, SEOC notifies all State liaison personnel, all RC's and State comnand post.
DNS wind increase to 15 mph.
- Notification may. occur t.coner if station evaluation is complete.
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CHANNAHON SCENARIO October 28, 1980 Exercise - Dresden Channahon Police Dispatcher receives notification of a Site Emergency via radio or telephone from the Will County /Plainfield EOC Dispatcher, completes Nuclear Accident Report Form,and noti-fies key City officials through fanout system.
Dosimeters are distributed to emergency workers and exposure record forms are completed.
Police Department / Fire Department Dispatches squad car (s)/
fire truck (s) for public notification via mobile PA.
Evacuation message is broadcast to squads / fire trucks via radio.
Local School District Superintendent is notified by Regional Superintendent to initiate evacuation procedures.
District Superintendent contacts bus drivers and directs them to assenbly points.
District Super-intendent advises EOC of response.
Channahon Police Department seals access control points at key intersections leading into the city.
Channahon Police Dispatcher notifies special concern faci.lities.
Channahon E0C advises Will County EOC of sheltering situation.
Advises how many people coming; where to route traffic; etc.
Mayor of Channahon orders closing and evacuation of E0C.
Channahon Police Dispatcher notifies Will Gounty/Plainfield EOC via telephone of EOC closing.
Communications maintained via mobile radio through State Police District 5 headquarters.
Emergency workers relocate EOC to designated assembly point and establish communications with Will County EOC.
Channahon Police Discatcher is advised from Will County Sheriff's mobile van via ' radio that radioactive release has stopped.
Advises ECC.
Channahon Police Dispatcher is advised v's radio from Will County. Sheriff's mobile van that re-entry procedures may be initiated.
Dispatcher advises EOC.
Mayor of Channahon orders re-entry to begin.
Exercise terminated by exercise director.
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GRUNDY COUNTY / MORRIS SCENARIO October 28, 1980,_ Exercise Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher receives notification of a Site Emergency via NARS, completes Nuclear Accident Report Form, notifies Grundy County ESDA Coordinator, key County offi-cial.s, and notifies local governments throughout fanout system.
Dosimeters ~ are distributed to emergency workers and exposure record forms are completed.
Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher receives notification of a General Emergency via NARS, comotetes new Nuclear Accider.t Report Form and advises County and local government EOCs.
Grundy County receives call from State ESDA to verify General Emergency, wind direction, time, evacuation of Jectors B, C, D, etc.
Sheriff's Department Dispatches squads for public notifica-tion via mobile PA.
Evacuation message is broadcast to squads via radio.
Regional Superintendent of Schools notifies School Administrators / bus drivers to initiate evacuation procedures and directs them to assembly points.
Sheriff's Department seals access control points at' key intersections in the affected area to Dresden Power Plant.
4 Grundy County ESDA Coordinator contacts Morris radio station for broadcast of public information messaSe.
Sheriff's Department notifies special concerns facilities. (simulated)
Grundy County E00 advises State ESDA of sheltering situation.
~
Advises how many people coming; where to route traffic; etc.
'Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher is advised via NARS of start of elevated relgase of radioactive material.
Adds information to new Nuclear Accident Report Form, advises local E0Cs.
State ESDA advised Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher to pre-pare for sustained operations and alert alternate shift personnel for 24-hour operations.
Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher is advised via NARS that release has stopped, adds information to new Nuclear Accident Reoort Form.
Advises local EOCs.
Sheriff's Deuartment Discatcher receives notification via NARS re-entry pro'edures are ' initiated and notifies local EOCs, that c
adds information to new Nuclear Accident Report Fo rn.
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MIN 00KA SCENARIO October 28, 1980, Exercise - Dresden Minooka Police Dispatcher receives notification of a Site Emergency via Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher and notifies key village officials, through fanout system.
Dosimeters are distributed to emergency workers and exposure record forms are completed.
Minooka Coordinator contacts Grundy County EOC and requests that the ICC be contacted to control rail traffic through the village.
Minooka Police Dispatcher receives notification of a G?neral Emergency via Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher and conpletes a new Nuclear Accident Report Form.
Advises EOC.
Minooka Police Department dispatches souad car (s) for public notification via mobile PA.
Evacuation message is broadcast to squads via radio.
(siculated)
Local School District Superintendent of Schools is notified by Regional School Superintendent to initiate evacuation procedures.
Minooka school superintandent contacts bus drivers and directs them to assembly points. (simulated)
Adyise EOC of response.
Minooka Police Department seals access points at key inter-sections leading into the village of Minooka.
Police Dispatcher notifies special concerns facilities, Minooka EOC advises Grundy County EOC of sheltering situation.
Advises how many people coming; where to route traffic; etc.
Minooka Police Dispatcher is advised via Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher of the start of elevated release of radioactive material.
Add information to new Nuclear Accident Report Form.
Dispatcher advises local EOC.
Minooka Police Dispatcher is advised by Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher that release has stopped and advises emergency workers.
Minooka Police Chief receives notification via mobile radio from the Grundy County Sheriff's Dispatcher that re-entry procedures may be init'sted.
Exercise terminated by exercise director.
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WILL COUNTY SCENARIO D~ctober 28, 1980, Exercise - Dresden
~
Will County /Plainfield EOC Dispatcher receives notification of a Site Emergency via NARS, notifies key County officials, and notifies local governments throughout fanout system.
Dosimeters are distributed to emergency workers and exposure record forms are completed.
Will Coraty/Plainfield EOC Dispatcher receives notification of a General Emergency via NARS, comoletes new Accident Report Form and advises County and local government EOCs.
Sheriff's Department Dispatches squads for public notifica-tion via mobile PA.
Evacunf on message is broadcast to squads via radio.
Regional Superintenocr.t of Schools notifies School Adminis-trators/ bus drivers to initiate evacuation procedures and directs them co assembly points.
Sheriff's Department seals access control points at key inter-sections in the affected crea to Dresden Power Plant.
Will County ESDA Coordinator contacts WJOL radio for broad-cast of public information message.
Sheriff's Department notifies special concerns facilities.
(simulated)
Will County /Plainfield EOC advises State ESDA of sheltering situation.
Advises how many people coming;.where to route traffic, etc.
Will County /Plainfield EOC Dispatcher is advised via NARS of start of elevated release of radioa'ctive material.
Adds informa-tion to new Nuclear Accident Report Form, advises local EOCs.
Will County /Plainfield EOC updates State ESDA Command Post on evacuation, traffic control, status based on information from local EOCs.
State ESDA advises Will County /Plainfield EOC to prepare for sustained operations and alert alternate shift personnel for 24-hour operations.
Will County /Plainfield EOC Dispatcher is advised vic NARS that release has stopped, advises local E0Cs.
Will County /Plainfield EOC Dispatcher receives notification via NARS that re-entry procedures are initiated, and notifies local EOCs.
Exercise terminated by exercise director.
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1 The exercise of the scenario was a very satisfactory experience for the State and local jurisdictions according to participants.
It was evident that thorough preparation for the exercise had been made by Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (ESDA) and Department of Nuclear Safety (DNS) which was reflected by the outstanding performance.
The exer-
- ise. demonstrated to observers that the public near the Dresden Nuclear Power Station can be protected.
Observed deficiencies were very minor, and did not seriously detract from the excellent performance by the participating government agencies and depart-mental units.
Major strengths demonstrated during the exercise based on scenario events were:
4 a.
Overall commitment towards the' exercise demonstrated by the thorough preparation by ESDA; professional, positive attitudes, initiative and dedication shown by most of the individual participants; and high level of interest by.the State and almost all local chief executives.
4 b.
Leadership demonstrated by ESDA staff at both State and local levels, including introduction of free-play items at some locations.
c.
Proper functions carried out successfully by the new Department of Nuclear Safety personnel.
d.
Highly successful use of NARS, and,other communication systems.
e.
Generally excellent security measures.
f.
Use of CAP resources, primarily in Will County.
The exercise, however, lagged because the scenario allowed for actual movement of DNS and ESDA personnel and ecuipment from the State capitol to the locs1 scene.
The simulated ?rotective actions were conducted based on a conservative approach iy Illinois (in accordance with the scenario and the Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents.)
This resulted in a lag during the mid and pre-closecut phase because protective actions were taken earlier.
RECOMMENDATION :
1.
The mobilization of the State personnel and equipment to the acciden: scene has been demonstrated.
Future scenarios should be of shorter duraticn to reduce time demands on the participants while still demonstrating State and local capabilities to respond to a nuclear incident.
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IV.
EVALUATIONS A.
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY. (ORGANIZATION CONTROL)
STATE EOC:
The exercise clearly demonstrated to Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) observers that the primary responsibilities for emergency response had been assigned and that supporting organi-zations at each level were aware of their responsibilities.
Direction. and Control capabilities exceeded minimum standards.
State-level functions were effectively carried out at the State EOC and by the ESDA field teams at the Staging Area and Command Post.
There was strong leadership and professionalism exhibited.
Security However, procedures were effective at all State and local sites.
some. improvements are recommended.
There was a serious lack of information flow concerning actions, radiological conditions, etc., from the State ESDA to local EOCs, with the exception of the major status and emergency class changes
~
transmitted ever NARS.
Comments were nade by a number of local participants that this exercise went much smoother b~ecause of the lessons learned during a drill held in mid-1980.
A full shift change of personnel was not conducted at the State ESDA EOC except that names were provided indicating available staff for relievine the carticipants, thus s'uch a capability was considered acceptable.
RECOMMENDATIONS :
2.
There must be a two-way flow of information between EOC's for ef fective direction and control to take place.
The State ESDA should provide more inforr.ation, not just direction to the local EOCs.
(Ref:
NUREG- 0 6 5 4 A. 2, F.1, and H.3) 3.
Continue the excellent, attention for conducting exercises and appropriate drills to perfect State and local response.
Whenever possible, all segments of society (including the schools) should be involved in such exercises in communi-ties adjacent to power plants. (Ref:
NUREG-0654 N.1 and N.2).
4 A full shift change of personnel at the State ESDA EOC should be demonstrated during future exercises to decon-
~
strate both availability of personnel and proper relief (brie fing) procedures. (Ref:
NUREG-0654-A.4, H.4.)
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GRDNDY COUNTY:
Direction and Control capabilities at the local level were barely acceptable and significant improvement is recommended.
Department Heads in Grundy County and the Acting Mayor of Morris.
Illinois, need to become more knowledgeable about their emergency plans.
There was some confusion on what the plans called for and how officials were to carry out their roles.
A copy of the plan was available, but was never consulted.
Ne checklists were seen.
There was some lack of seriousness and professional attitudes, possibly because the scenario did not have enough specific tasks or missions for Grundy County to exercise the staff adequately.
The Grundy County ESDA Director was involved in too many roles,
including message controller. and status board plotter, which could hamper his primary coordinating function in a fast-goving situation.
There appeared to be dual operations being carried out within the Grundy County EOC by both ESDA and the Sheriff's office.
Each had separate displays.
When an action was directed by the ESDA Director it was discovered that it was already being implemented by the Sheriff's Office.
No staff briefings were held and coordi-natien between decision-makers and department heads was minimal.
The second shift did not show up at the Grundy County EOC, and the first shift departed at 1:15 p.m. leaving the EOC largely unattended for the balance of the exercise.
RECOMMENDATIONS :
5.
A message controller and a status board plotter should be added to the staffing of the Grundy County EOC.
Additional exercises should be held to provide more, on-the-job-training for the local officials and EOC staff.- (Ref:
NUREG- 06 54 A.1, A. 2, N.1, 0.1, and P.5) 6.
A coordinated direction and control operation should be established in the Grundy County EOC.to avoid possible errors or omissions and redundancy of effort.
(Ref:
NUREG-0654 A.2 and H.3) 7.
The Grundy County EOC staff must be instructed to remain on duty until relieved.
(Ref:
NUREG-0654 A.4 and H.4).
KENDALL/ NILL COUNTIES:
Direction and Control was rated above average in Will County, Minocka and Channahon, demonstrating good capabili ties to protect the publi c.
In accordance with plans. Counties anu municipalities played a passive role, responding in accordance with,sidance and direction from the State.
Nill County and the cities of Minooka and Channahon, in the area affected by the release plume, were well organi:ed and effectively carried out their roles.
The Utility was not represented at principal off-site governmental ECC's nor~ were tho 14
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counties represented at the Utility's interim emergency off-site facility.
Except for information en event classes tran:mitted over NARS, the Counties knew little of the radiological situation until the Department of Nuclear Safety arrived at the scene approximately three hours into the exercise.
NUREG-0654 addresses
-the need for local representatives at the near-site EOF who can provide direct information to their organizations.
RECOMMENDATIONS :
8.
Each county should provide a representative at the litility's near-site EOF who can be in direct telephone contact with the County on the status of events.
(NUREG-065 4 FEMA-REP-1, C. 2) 0 9 e
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- B.
ON-SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION Section B, NUREG 0654-FEMA-REP 1 pertains only to licensee responsibilities for emergency response, and is not included in the exercise evaluation of State and local plans.
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C.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT AND RESOURCES STATE:
While the exercise is not intended to exercise the Federal response capabilities, it is intended to c.ssure that interface among Federsi, State and local jurisdictions can be activated.
Key State and local participants indicated an awareness of provisions and procedures for incorporating the Federal emergency response capebilities as described in its plan.
A 'etter 'from the Mayor of Minooka to all families in his community was especially noteworthy-and considered suitable for adoption elsewhere.
RECOM5fENDATION:
None 4
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EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM STATE / LOCAL: _
i Use of the Standard Emergency Classification System and action level scheme consistent with those established by the
' utility and State and local response plans were adequately addressed during the exercise.
All participants were aware of the correct event classifi-cation and required actions for each classification were adequatcly demonstrated during the exercise.
REC 0hNENDATION:
None.
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NOTIFICATION METHODS AND PRdCEDURES STATE / LOCAL EOC'S:
Notification and Alerting was rated above average demonstrating an acceptable capability for alerting the staff and warning the public.
The State EOC staff was notified and reported for duty in prompt fashion.
Some key staff members apparently were aware of the exercise in advance.
Mobilization and transfer of field teams were effective and timely.
Notification and warning capabilities at the local level was also acceptable.
Public notification was simulated by routing of emergency vehicles along prescribed routes in accordance with plans.
The ESDA coordinator in Will County was apparently aware of the exercise time in advance.
The staffs of local EOC's were not notified though they reported within prescribed times.
RECOMMENDATION:
9.
Minimi:e scenario distribution.
While the date and time an exercise is scheduled are usually known in advance by key participants, scenario events should be kept confidential by exercise controllers and not be provided to participants ir. advance so that mobili:ation and response capabilities can be realistically demonstrated (P.ef:
NUREG 0654 N.1 and N.3).
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EhfERGENCY C0befUNICATIONS STATE / LOCAL:
Th'e Communications Systems between the State ESDA Emergency.
Operations Center, State emergency response organizations and the affected counties was considered by observers to be outstandiag.
The Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) functioned perfectly, as did a11' other systems between State and local units.
Communica-tions. at the local levels were also rated above average.
Effective operations were noted between County EOC's and their local and County services.
However, some improvements are recommended at the local level.
No inter-county communications capability between Grundy and h*ill County EOC's was observed.
This is needed to assure that complementary protective actions, traffic control, access control, etc., are being taken.
There were difficulties activating additicnal installed tele-ohones in the EOC which took two hours rather than less than one hour according te plan.
Clarification of procedures is needed for hard-copy message handling.
Telephones ring simultaneously -- continuously raising the* noise level and impeding efficiency.
. REC 05SENDATIONS I 10.
Direct communications capability between County dO'C's should be established (if not existing) and utilized in future exercises.
(Ref:
NUREG-0654 F.1).
l 11.
Contact Illinois Bell (already being done) to remedy the de, lay of activation of telephor.es, and also to provide a quieter means of identifying incoming calls 4
to reduce the noise level.
12.
Develop or clarify hard-copy message routing procedures within the EOC (Ref:
NUREG-0654 F.1 and H.3).
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.A U.
PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION STATE / LOCAL:
State PIO activities were rated above average.
Public Information functions were very well carried out and were considered acceptable, but there needs to be more coordinction between State and local PIO's.
The State PIO at the Springfield ESDA.EOC, the PIO at the off-site (EOF) press center, and each of"the local PIO's need closer coordination of information and kaowledge of what each is giving to the media.
The Grundy County Public Information Center consisted of a table within the E0C operations area.
If the media were admitted to the EOC during an emergency, it could result in a major disrup-tion of operations.
The ESDA Coordinators in both Grundy and Will Counties serve as the PIO's.
This was a distraction from their primary functions which could be extremely disconcerting during an actual emergency.
Limited activity at the local level was observed except in Will County and Channahon due to media coverage of the evacuation of students.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
13.
A joint medi;. center should be established, presumably at the near-site EOF or another facility-site, staffed by representatives of the State, affected counties and municipalities, the utility, and involved Federal agencies. (Ref:
NUREG-06 54 G. 3 and G. 4).
14.
Space for the Public Information ' function should b'e located outside of the Grundy County EOC operations area, possibly in another location in the Courthouse.
One individual responsible for the PIO function should be designated at both County EOC's.
(Ref:
NUREG-0654 G. 3' 15.
The Utility should be requested to provide a representa-tive at the Joint Press Center and the State and each principal off-site governmental EOC to provide technical infornation for decision-making and also for public information briefings for the news media. (Ref:
NUREG-0654 H. 2 and H. 3).
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EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT STATE:
The State ESDA Emergenpy Operations Center (EOC) is ccnsidered above average with an outstanding capability for conducting response activities in event of a nuclear accident.
However, some improve-ments are recommended.
The State EOC in Springfield was the focal point for the exercise and effectively coordinated communications and liaison personnel for all State. agencies involved in the exercise.
All Emergency Operations Centers in the affected areas were also operational as was the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety (DNS) Radiolog.' cal Emergency Assessment Cent e r.
The ventilation in the Operations Room was overtaxcd due to many tobacco users.
A noise level problem was noted because of ringing telephones.
Concerns were expressed by some State agency staff about availability of vital records and working materials if principal staff members are not available during an emergency.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
16.
Prohibit smoking within EOC operations areas.
17.
Take steas to establish visual ringing signals, utili:ing quieter bells, or bu::ers.
18.
Provision should be made to store becessary State cgency records and working papers in.the ESDA EOC and have them available for emergencies.
As an alternative, essential emergency operations records should be identifial by State Agencies and provisions made for rapid transfer to the State ESDA E0C.
GRUNDY COUNTY The emergency power generator is inadequately vented and the exhaust'nearly overcame the staff in the Grundy County EOC.
Secured area did not include restroom facilities which same-times inconvenienced the staff.
Tne Status Board needs improvement and was poorly utilized.
?
REC 0\\WENDATIONS:
- 19. _Take measures to preperly vent exhaust gases for the emergency power generator at the Grundy County EOC, 20.
Arrange the secured area to include restroom facilities.
21.
The County sheuld develop with the help of the States, a suitable means for posting the statue of events and actions.
(Ref:
NUREG-06 54 H. 3).
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WILL COUNTY / MUNICIPALITIES:
EOC displays need improvement at.the.Will County EOC.
The Status Board was totally inadequate.
Some maps were too small to be of any value.
- REC 0hBIENDATIONS :
22.
The County should develop, with the help of the State, a suitable means for posting the status of events and actions.
Larger maps should replace those now in use.
(Ref:
NUREG-0654 H.3) 25.
Minooka and Channahon EOC's were acceptable ~ for small jurisdictions with some improvements recognized as needed by their officials.
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~ ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT
/
STATE:
Accident Assessment was rated above average and demonstrated a good capability for protecting the public.
However, some improvements are recommended.
Operation of the mobile lab was successful, although minor problems were observed, such as poor protective bcots that ripped, limited equipment, and a noisy generator.
Local capabilities were not rated since this is primarily a State-level responsibility in accordance with the IPRA.
However, almost no information cn radiological conditions was passed from DNS to local EOC's so local RD0's could not effectively apply and monitor exposure controls or response actions.
There was a noticeable lack cf training in familiarity with radiological matters for officials and in specific radiological skills of emergency services personnel at the local level.
There was limited mobile van equipment available.
For instance, only one shovel was available for scil samples and only one finger-dosimeter was available.
Protective boots ripped at the seams.
The generator was noisy and nearly drowned out the radio.
Use of private (instead of government) vehicles is question-able, particularly in case of contamination.
RECOMMENDATIONS :
24.
DNS should pass appropriate radiological monitoring information to the local EOC's (or at least to County E0C's for relay to municipal EOC's in affected areas,
including confirmation of negative data (or clear conditions) in adj acent areas.
25.
Appropriate training in radiological skills should be provided for local officials and emergency services (police, fire, rescue, highway, etc.)
personnel in all localities within the plume EPZ.
(Ref: NUREG-065 4 0.1, 0.4 and 0.5) 26.
Availability of sufficient tools and supplies should be examined.
A policy concerning vehicles should be established.
(Ref:
NUREG-0654 I.8).
24
J.
PROTECTIVE RESPONSE STATE / LOCAL:
Protective-Response.and Exposure Control Activities were rated above average and demonstrated an acceptable capability for protecting the public.
State-level actions in support of local protective response were good.
There was limited data, however, on student population in Will County schools and a lack of suitable maps locating the school buildings and their capacities.
Details of population movement from evacuation areas and reception centers was sometimes slow in reaching the State ESDA EOC resulting in confusion.
RECOMMENDATION :
27.
Will County (and perhaps other affected areas) should develop lists and appropriate maps delineating school locations and populations.
(Re f:
NUREG-0654 J.
10) 28.
Procedures should be developed for localities to report the status of evacuation, routes being taken, and destinations recommended.
These procedures should include reports from reception centers as to approximate numbers and origination place of relocatees.
(Ref:
NUREG-06 5 4, J. 9 5 10, G. 4.s and b. ).
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RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE CONTROL STATE:
The exercise demonstrated to observers that the capability to control radiological exposure for emergency workers was considered by observers to be -good and the means for accomplishing this objective were present.
The time of initiation of the distribution of KI and the commencing of the evacuation was viewed by observers as premature considering the simulated emergency conditions, although in accordance with-the IPRA.
IPRA apparently calls for a very conservative approach for taking protective actions and imple-menting exposure control measures.
REC 0bD!ENDATIONS :
29.
The finding is not considered as a deficiency per se, but does raise questions suggesting that the conserva-tive approach in the IPRA be reviewed for possible change.
(Ref:
NUREG-0654 J.9, J.10, and K.4).
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MEDICAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH SUPPORT STATE / LOCAL:
.The exercise demonstrated the capability of the State and local jurisdictions to cope with contaminated and injured indi-viduals and provide them with medical services.
The State and local levels of energency government took the ner.essary steps to insure adequate planning for medical problems which may occur.
It war evident that transportation of injured persons to
- hospital facilities had been arranged for and that the capability existed on a stand-by basis during the exercise.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
None.
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RE-ENTRY AND RECOVERY
' STATE / LOCAL:
The State and~1ocal emergency response plan instructions
- for re-entry, recovery and post-accident operations were followed, demonstrating the capability to perform their functions in an acceptable manner.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
None.
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EXERCISES AND DRILLS STATE / LOCAL:
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The exercise, conducted to evaluate major portions of a the State and local jurisdiction emergency plans, was considered
'by observers to be outstanding.
_ RECOMMENDATIONS :
- None.
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RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING RECOM4ENDATIONS :
10.
Each organization shall establish a training program for instructing and qualifying personnel who will implement radiological emergency r.esponse plans.
The specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs (including the scope, nature, and frequency) should be provided for radiological monitoring teams and radiological analysis personnel.
(Re f:
NUREG 0654 0.4c).
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Hr. Brian Grimes
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionDirector, Division o MAY 13 19 81 N
redness Washington, DC 20555
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Dear Brian:
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%e This responds to your memoranda of M
'I, findings and detrmination on the st tarch 10 and March 17 j' '
preparedness relative to the LaSalle na us of State and loca,l off-site 1981, req December 1980.We have reviewed the State and l uclear station in Illinois.
formally submitted its radiologiThe State of Illinois has sin 1991 Emerg,ency Management Agency (FEMA) Regi cal emerge,ncy plans to the Federalby let Plan for Radiological Accidents f on V office, plans for LaSalla and Grundy Counties which are impacted bor the S The FEMA Re the plans. gion V Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) is y the plume zone.
Two joint exercises have been held currently reviewing for the LaSalle site. specific Dresden plan on October 28 on *.ne State plan; the first for the to protect the public in the eventof the earlier exercise, tha The LaSalle exercise evaluation co fi e
n effectively rmed the conclusion a
The two couaties impacted by the pl of a plant emergency. demons widely differing degrees of capabili ume exposure zone, Lalle and Grundy lack of knowledge and familiarity of thCounty's first exp cS ty in the exercise.
This was LaSalle, showed o ogical exercise and it generally reve l correctable through further training e procedures.
County, however This is minor and a ed cxercises by cas,ual indifference an,uor performance it' toth th has given a very cedures.
Grundy d lack of knowledge of its plans a da a le and Dresden There is no reference in any of the pl n
pro-and notification as described in Appendi ans to meeting the requirements for al REP-1, Revision 1 x 3 of Criteria E-6 of NUREG-0654/FE dance with 44 CFR 350.10.A public meeting was held on D Illinois, in accor.
erting recommendations resulting from the LaSall MA-er 5, 1980, at Ottawa, The FEMA Region V has submitted its date, the State has not tesponded e exercise to the State:
From the foragoing, we find that the St but as of this 1
prepared to protect the public in th e event of a nuclear accident at thate of sits.
it does have anWe find that while deficiencies e i t xs ey trcining of its officials and develadequate capability to respond, but cin the capa e laSalle Grundy County, having performed poorloping checklists arid SOPS.onuitioned u mu;t be judged as not having a capabilit y in both the Dresden and LaSalla exeWe find that improvements are needed to meet a l evel of adequacy.y to protect the public and at subs alcrting and notification system does n t
- rcises, meet the current criteria. Finally, we find that th a
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LaSalleThe foregoing des e
at cribes th site outin d in 44 CFR 35this tim. e status and determination0 (proposed), we e
of At s the plans uch time complete the formaland prep as we will promptly r the provide final findi process Sincerely yours ngs GoM'E.Dihk'y~
jPreparedness Divt4, Director, Radio
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i POST-EXERCISE EVALUATQ STATE OF ILLINOIS AND GRUNDY AND LASALLE COUNTIES EXERCISE OF THE ILLINOIS PLAN FOR RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS FOR LASALLE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, OTTAWA, ILLINOIS December 4, 1980 PREPARED BY:
FEDEPAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY PLANS AND PREPAREDNESS DIVISION, REGION V FEDEPAL CENTER BATTLE CREEP., MICHIGAN 49016 TWy'?;;j.
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