05000339/LER-1981-039-03, Blank Flange Found Installed on Redundant Hydrogen Recombiner Return Piping to Containment.Caused by Failure to Remove Flange Following Const for Initial Leak Rate Testing of Penetration 31

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Blank Flange Found Installed on Redundant Hydrogen Recombiner Return Piping to Containment.Caused by Failure to Remove Flange Following Const for Initial Leak Rate Testing of Penetration 31
ML20004E945
Person / Time
Site: North Anna Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 06/10/1981
From:
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20004E941 List:
References
LER-81-039-03L, LER-81-39-3L, NUDOCS 8106160220
Download: ML20004E945 (2)


LER-1981-039, Blank Flange Found Installed on Redundant Hydrogen Recombiner Return Piping to Containment.Caused by Failure to Remove Flange Following Const for Initial Leak Rate Testing of Penetration 31
Event date:
Report date:
3391981039R03 - NRC Website

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UPDATED REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE JUNE 3, 1981 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTROL BLOCK / / / / / / / (1)

(PLEASE PRINT 0,R TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

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LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT

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DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

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On May 10, 1981 during Mode 5 operation, a blank flange was found to be in-

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stalled on the redundant hydrogen recombiner (1-HC-HC-1) return piping to Unit /

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2 containment. The hydrogen recombiner remained operable as required by T.S.

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3.6.4.2 through a discharge path to the process ventilation system and to Unit /

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No. I containment; therefore, the health and safety of the public were not

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affected. This item constitutes a loss of administrative control of an ESF

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system and is therefore reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c.

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SYSTEM

CAUSE

CAUSE COMP.

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SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REVISION LER/R0 EVENT YEAR REPORT NO.

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ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN ATTACHMENT NPRD-4 PRIME COMP. COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT METHOD HOURS SUBMITTED FORM SUB. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER

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CAUSE DESCRIPTIOM AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

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The black flange was installed during construction for the inicial leak rate

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testing of Ur.it 2 containment pene:tration No. 31.

When testing was completed, /

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this blank flange was not removed. The blank flange was subsequently removed /

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and the 1-HC-HC-1 return flow path to Unit 2 containment established.~

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FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS

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PERSONNEL EXPOSLTES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)

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LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

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NRC USE ONLY

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UPDATE REPORT - PREVIOUS REPORT DATE JUNE 3, 1981 Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit #2 Attachment: Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-339 Report No. LER 81-039/03L-1

Description of Event

On May 10,1)81 during Mode 5 operation, the Unit 2 Shift Supervisor noticed that a blank flange was installed on the discharge piping to Unit 2 containment from the Unit 1 Hydrogen Recombiner (1-HC-HC-1).

This blank flange was originally installed during pre-operational leakage testing of Unit 2 containment penetration. Since both hydrogen recombiners remained operable at all times as per T.S. 3.6.4.2, there was no effect on the health and safety of the general public.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence The hydrogen recombiner is required for the removal of hydrogen released into the containment within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following a postulated Loss of Coolant Accident.

Installed redundant piping systems provide suction and discharge piping to two skid-mounted bydrogen recombiners which are completely interchangeable.

In addition, an alternate discharge path is provided for each recombtner to the gaseous vaste system via the containment vacuum pump discharge-line and another path to the alternate containment.

Cause of Event

This event was caused by inadequate administrative control of the pre-operational leakage testing of containment penetration No. 31.

Immediate Corrective Action

The blank flange was removed.

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l Schqduled Corrective Action No further corrective action required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence No further action required.

i Generic Implications There are no generic implications of this event.

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