05000261/LER-1981-013-03, Determined Containment Isolation Valves Not Tested in Required Manner.Seven of Eight Valves Functioning as Designed.Eighth Valve Tested & Shown Operable.Test Undergoing Revision

Determined Containment Isolation Valves Not Tested in Required Manner.Seven of Eight Valves Functioning as Designed.Eighth Valve Tested & Shown Operable.Test Undergoing Revision

ML20004E744
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	06/09/1981
From:	Gilman F CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20004E741	List: 05000261/LER-1981-013, Forwards Updated LER 81-013/03L-1 05000261/LER-1981-013-03, Determined Containment Isolation Valves Not Tested in Required Manner.Seven of Eight Valves Functioning as Designed.Eighth Valve Tested & Shown Operable.Test Undergoing Revision
References
LER-81-013-03L, LER-81-13-3L, NUDOCS 8106150151
Download: ML20004E744 (2)

LER-1981-013, Determined Containment Isolation Valves Not Tested in Required Manner.Seven of Eight Valves Functioning as Designed.Eighth Valve Tested & Shown Operable.Test Undergoing Revision

Event date:
Report date:
2611981013R03 - NRC Website

text

- -.

...x x

s.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Update Report - Previous Report Date 5/15/81 NBC FORM 36G

' (17H LICENSEE EVENT REPORT.

CONTROL DLOCK: l l

l l

}

l (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) lo l1l l Sl Cl 11l Bl Rl 2l@l0 l0 l-l0 l0 l0 l0 l0 l - l 0 l 0 l@l 4 l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l@l l

l@

8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LfCENSL isVMBEH 2b 2ti LICENSE T)PE JD bl CAI b8 l0l1l

$n$!Il@l0l5l0l0 l0 l2 l6 l 1 }@[ 014 l 1 l 5 l 8 l 1 l@l 0 l 6 l 0 l 9 l 8 l 1 CON'T 68 63 EVENT D/sTE 74 7b HEPORT DATE 80

/

8 CO Gl DOCKET NUMBE H EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PDOBABLE CONSEQUENCES h datorminod.l

! 10121lon April 15. 1981. durinn a review of Periodic Test (PT) nrocedures_ ft unn lo13]lthat six containment isolation valves were not beinn tested in a manner which I

l o l41 ] fully satisfies Technical Specification 4.4.2.a.

On itav 10,_1_981. two additicnal l

+

lol5) [ valves were identified. Procedures developed to satisfy these requirements l

I

[ precluded the verification of operation of one contact in eacjLvalve control l

o o Q QJ l circuit. This event is reportable purnuar.t to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.3.

1 I

Lo I s I I 7

8 9 C DE CODE

$ BCO E COMPONENT CODE SB DE SU E

ITTol I si Fj@ yh l Z j@ lV l A lL lV lE lX lh lX lh lXlh 7

8 9

10 11.

12 13 18

'9 20 SEGUENTIAL oCCUHRENCE REPORT HEVISION

_ EVENT YEAR REPORT NO.

CODE TYPE NO.

h ogER.ROl8l1l 9

l0l1l3l

!d l0 l3 l lLl l-l l 1l l

_ 21 22 13 24 26 21 28 29 30 31 32 AK A T O PL NT ET HOURS 22 S B IT FO b B.

S PPLIE MAN F TUREH l G lgl34Z jg l3bZ [g gg l10 l0 [0 l0 l lY [g lN lg lN l@

lW l1 l2 l0 lh 4

36 3

40 41 42 43 44 47 3J CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTfVE ACTIONS h i o lRecent operating experience has verified that seven of the eight valves were func-l ltioning as designed. The eighth valve was tested and shown operable.

In order to I

i i recurrence, a PT is being revised to include provisions for fully testing l

ji,7, l prevent g, g 3 g l the valves. This revision will be completed prior to the next scheduled performance I

t

]

i114I Iof this PT (refueling outage).

80 7

8 9 STA S

% POWER oTHER STATUS DISCO H DISCOVEHY DESCRIPTION NA l

W @l Review of Periodic Tests l

l1 l s] l El@ l 0 l 9 l 5 l@l ACTIVITY CO TENT LOCATION OF RELEASE RELCASED OF RELE Af E AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY l

NA l

l NA l1 lGl d h W@l 80 44 45 7

8 9 to 11 PEntONNEL E XPOSURES NUMDFR TYPE

DESCRIPTION

l Q l0]0]0l@ J h]

NA PERSONNEL INJUHIES oESCRIP e TON @

l NUMaE n W l0l0l0l@l NA 80 7

8 9 11 12 LOSS of Ott DAMAGE TO FACILITY l

TYPE DE SCHIPilON NA

@ @l 1 9 7

8 9 10 NRC USE ONLY I UHLICITY r

[NJ l

NA l

lllllll1lllllJ KSUE D@DESCHlPi40N 2 o 6H 69 60 g 4106'15 e 151 (803) 383-4524 2

L TL Gilman m

s m

m SUPPLEMENTAL 7NFORMATION

~

FOR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 81-013, REV. 1 1.

Cause Description and Analysis On April 15, 1981, during a review of the H. B. Robinson Periodic Test isolation (PY) procedures, it was determined that six containment valves were not being tested in a manner which fully satisfied Tech-nical Specification 4.4.2.a.

On May 10, 1981, two additional valves were id entified.

'lhese valves are:

RMS-1, RMS-2, RMS-3, RMS-4, CVC-204A, CVC-?94B, PCV-1716 and SI-855.

These valves are tested for opcrability under the ISI Program.

The containment isolation function is verified by a number of periodic tests; however, these test procedures do notAs a require the above valves to be open prior to conducting the tests.

result a contact in each valve control circuit which is required to open to initiate the auto closure upon an isolation signal is not tested by Recent operating events have serified that each of these procedures.

these valves will close on the isolation signal, except SI-855 which was closed during the events.

SI-855 is the containment isolation valve for This valve which is operated the nitrogen supply to the SI accumulators.

from the control room is normally closed. In addition, there is one remotely operated valve downstream of SI-855 in each accumulator leg and manual valves upstream of the SI-855 valve which are also normally closed.

These valves are manually operated as necessary to add nitrogen to the SI These valves are only opened for very short time periods Accumulators.

Additionally, (2-5 minutes per week) and under direct operator control.

the safeguard position for SI-855 as well as the other seven containment isolation valves above is procedurally verified by a control room status panel following initiation of SI.

Therefore, there has been no undue risk to the public from this event.

This event is reportable pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.b.3.

2..

Corrective Action

these Recent plant conditions and operating events have required that isolation valves respond to the Phase "A" isola tion signal containment I

which has verified the operability of all the valves except SI-855 (normally closed).

SI-855 was tested on June 5,1981, and verified operable. Therefore, no additional immediate actions are necessary.

3.

Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence (PT-2.6) is being revised to include the above valves A periodic test in the pretest valve lineup to insure ' full compliance with the surveil-This revision will be completed prior to the next lance requirements.

refueling outage when the test is scheduled to be performed again.

4 9

,-t y---. -

- r--t 1---

rr-rt'-g

- ry-*=miyw'r e-$"

w

,-t--

P e'

e-

'-t#q v'.

' - = + ~ ~ *