ML20004E674
| ML20004E674 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1981 |
| From: | Paulson W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.A, TASK-3-5.A, TASK-RR LSO5-81-05-035, LSO5-81-5-35, NUDOCS 8106150026 | |
| Download: ML20004E674 (28) | |
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May 20, 1981 Docket No. 50-219
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief G/
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Operating Reactors Branch 5, DL
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FROM:
W. A. Paulson, Project Manager d
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Operating Reactors Branch 5, DL 6S S*Jgga-r:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD WITH JERSEY CENTRAL LIGHT COMPANY (JCP&L) TO DISCUSS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS IMSIDE CONTAINMENT (SEP TOPIC III-5.A.)
On Aprii 13. 1981, a meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland, with repre-sentatives of JCP1L. The purpose of the meetir.g was to discuss SEP Topic III-5.A with regard to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.
' ts a list of attendees.
The following items were discussed during the meeting:
1.-
JCP&L responded. to NRC questions raised during the March 25,
~
1981 meeting.
2.
JCP&L response to the NRC request for additional information on the analysis of the 0.35 square-foot break.
3.
Brief discussion on pipe break interaction evaluations.
A handout provided by JCP&L that provides responses to certain NRC concerns is enclosed (Enclosure 2).
driginal signd >1f.
Walter A. Paulson, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch 5
Enclosures:
As stated THIS DOCUMET.T CONTAINS POOR QUAUTY PAGES 9 a O A ' % 9 Db _
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SUMMARY
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NRC PDR LPOR TERA i
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'CRB #5 RF D. Eisenhut G. Lainas t
H. Smith t
W. Paulson J. Lombardo 1
P. Y. Chen t
R. Hermann W. Russell OELD OI&E (3)
ACRS (10)
B. Grimes E. McKenna
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O. Terao Y. Li C. Li J. Knubel, JCP&L I
D. Strawson, MPR Associates i
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May 20, 1981 Docket No. 50-219 L505-81-05-035
. MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 5, DL FROM:
W. A. Paulson, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch 5, DL
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD WITH JERSEY CENTRAL POWER &
LIGHT COMPANY (JCP&L) TO DISCUSS HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT (SEP TOPIC III-5.A.)
On April 13, 1981, a meeting was held in Bethesda, Maryland, with repre-sentatives of JCP&L. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss SEP Topic III-5.A with regard to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. is a list of attendees.
The following items were discussed during the meeting:
1.
JCP&L response to NRC questions raised during the March 25, 1981 meeting.
2.
JCP&L response to the NRC request for additional information on the analysis of the 0.35 square-foot break.
3.
Brief discussion on pipe break interaction evaluations.
A handout provided by JCP&L that provides responses to certain NRC concerns is enclosed (Enclosure 2).
et N.,C.'-
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n Walter A. Paulson, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch 5
Enclosures:
As stated 4
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Gene Fisher Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge Bureau Chief 1800 M Street, N. W.
Bureau of Radiation Protection Washington, D. C.
20036 380 Scotts Road Trenton, New Jersey 08628 GPU Service Corporation ATTM: Mr. E. G. Wallace Conmissioner Licensing Manager New Jersey Department of Energy 250 Cherry Hill Road 101 Commerce Street Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 Newark, New Jersey 07102 Natural Resources Defense Council Plant Superintendent 91715th Street, N. W.
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Washington, D. C.
20006 Station P. O. Box 388 i
Forked River, New Jersey 08731 i
Steven P. Russo, Esquire i
248 Washington Street Resident Inspector j
P. O. Box 1060 c/o U. S. NRC Tous River, New Jersey 08753 P. O. Box 445 i
Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Joseph W. Ferraro, J r., Esquire r
Deputy Attorney General U. S. Environmental Protection State of New Jersey Agency Department of Law and Public Safety Region II Office 1100 Raymond Boulevard ATTN: EIS COORDINATOR Newart, New Jersey 07012 26 Federal Plaza New Ycrk, New Yort 10007 Ocean County Library Brick Township Branch Mr. Frank Linder 401 Chamoers Bridge Road General Manager Brick Town, New Jersey 08723 Dairyland Power Cooperative 2615 East Avenue South Mayor Lacrosse, Wisconsin 54601 Lacey Township l
P. O. Box 475 i
FoHced River, New Jersey 08731 Commissioner Department of Public Utilities State of New Jersey 101 Commerce Street Newart, New Jersey 07102 af
ENCLOSURE 1 Attendance List MEETING WITH JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
APRIL 13, 1981 SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC III-5. A
, PIPE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT Name Affiliation W. Paulsen NRC E. McKenna NRC Yueh-Li C. Li NRC David Terao NRC (MEB)
Pei-Ying Chen NRC/SEPB R. A. Hermann NRC/SEPB J. Knubel JCP&L/GPU D. Strawson MPR Associates 4
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ENCLOSURE 2 April 13, 1981 OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 SEP TOPIC III-5.A HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAKS INSIDE CONTAINMENT AGENDA 1.
Response to NRC questions of March 25, 1981.
2.
Response to NRC request for further information on analysis of 0.35 square foot break.
3.
Pipe break interaction evaluations:
a.
NRC general questions.
b.
Spot check of previously identified targets based on detailed drawings.
1 l
RESPONSE TO NRC QUESTIONS OF MARCH 25, 1981 1.
Questions which NRC indicated on March 25, 1981, needed additional response were:
B.1, C.2, E.1 and F.2.
2.
Question B.2 a.
Summary of Question:
Correct any inconsistencies between Figures B-6,
-8,
-9,
-10, and -16 and their respectivt tables in the submittal of February 6, 1979, and confirm that the analyses were performed on the finally selected locations, b.
Response
(1)
Figure B-6 shows 11 break locations while Table 6 shows ten break locations.
Break location #6 in the figure did not appear iA I
the stress table.
This is because it is the mid-point of a scraight run of pipe and therefore not a " mesh" point in the stress analysis.
It was selected as a break point to satisfy the R.G. 1.46 requirement for breaks at two intermediate locations.
The interaction analysis covered this break point.
(2)
Figure B-8 shows 11 break locations while Table 8 includes four break locations.
Break locations 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 did not appear in the table.
These break locations were deleted based on the revised seismic analyses, as documented in the submittal of February 6, 1979, Page 5.
Accordingly, while these break locations were included in the original interaction evaluation, they were not included in any subsequent evaluations.
(3)
Figure B-9 shows six break locations while Table 9 includes four break locations.
Break locations 2 and 3 did not appear in the table.
These breaks were deleted based on revised seismic analyses.
Accordingly, while included in the original interaction evalua-tion, they were not included in any subse-quent evaluations.
(4)
Figure B-10 shows four break locations while Table 10 shows three break locations.
Break 4
t location #3 is missing from the table.
The reason for this is not clear.
This break was included in the analyses.
(5)
Break locations 3 and 4 in Figure B-16 are at different locations than given in Table 16.
The break locations in the table are the correct ones, although the break locations in the figure were the ones analyzed.- It is considered, however, that this would not significantly affect the evaluations because:
(a)
The correct location for break #3 is
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adjacent to break #1 and would have the same analysis results.
i (b)
While the correct location for break #4
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was not analyzed, the break locations 3 and 4 which were analyzed need not have been.
The net effect is that one extra break was analyzed.
3.
Questio'n C.2 a.
Summary of Question:
The original question asked for confirmation that the only targets struck by jet impingement are cable trays, and do not in-clude additional targets such as the containment, the biological shield, valve operators, pump motors, pipe lines, etc.
During the discussions on March 25, 1981, it was indicated that addi-tional targets were struck by jet impingement, but were shown to be capable of withstanding the I
jet.
Accordingly, the question was revised to j
request references to 'nformation discussing addi-tional targets which were considered.
b.
Response
(1)
Containment:
Page 7 of Attachment 7C to the document submitted on September 7, 1978, indicates that previous analyses demonstrated the ability of the containment wall to with-stand the effects of jet impingement.
A i
report of the test work which supports this l
conclusion was included as Attachment B to the document submitted on July 30, 1979.
l (2)
Biological Shield:
Page 4 of the document submitted on September 7, 1978, summarizes t i
I
1 evaluations which showed that jet impingement forces would not cause damage to the biologi-cal shield or shield gates.
The evaluations were included as Attachment 6B.
Additional information is included as Attachment 7G in response to NRC questions on Attachment 6B.
This information is summarized on Pages 7 and 8.
(3)
Valve Operators:
Appendix C to Attachment 7C of the document submitted on September 7, 1978, contains various references to valve operators which were considered in the inter--
action evaluation.
(4)
Pump Motors:
The only pump motors inside containment are those for the recirculation pumps.
Operation of these pumps is not required for a safety function.
Accordingly, these motors were not included in the inter-action evaluation.
r (5)
Pipe Lines:
Mechanical interactions between jets and pipe lines were not included in the original interaction evaluation.
This was the reason the NRC requested on February 6, 1979, that such effects be considered for Category 1 and 3 breaks.
The response to this NRL question is contained in the docu-ment submitted to the NRC on July 30, 1979.
4.
Question E.1 a.
Summary of Question:
Provide the basis for the assumption that plastic deformation will not take place in the containment penetration assemblies.
l b.
Response
It was indicated during the meeting of March 25, 1981, that this topic had been pre-viously discussed with the NRC, most likely in Amendment Number 50, although the pertinent docu-mentation had not been included in the documenta-tion submitted in conjunction with SEP Topic III-5.A.
It has since been confirmed that both Amendments 50 and 51 contain the pertinent infor-mation.
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Question F.2 a.
Summary of Question:
Provide the basis for con-cluding there are no adverse effects associated with cascading breaks, e.g., break number 1 in the recirculation piping interacts with the north main steam line, which in turn interacts with the north feedwater and control rod drive hydraulic return lines.
b.
Response
The document submitted on July 30, 1979, included an analysis of the secondary effect of each postulated pipe break which resulted in an interaction with other piping.
The approach taken was to show that each " target" pipe had been con-sidered during the detailed evaluations of the primary effects of pipe whip and the effects of L
jet impingement on electrical equipment and adja-cent piping, and were shown to not prevent safe shutdown.
Accordingly, it was concluded ther'e should be no adverse secondary effects.
Cascading breaks clearly increase the number of
" target" pipes which can occur as a result of an initial break.
However, except for the effect on blowdown transients which are evaluated in accord-ance with the requirements of Appendix K to 10CFR50, the conclusions of the analysis of secondary breaks are applicable as well to cas-cading breaks.
For example, in the particular cascading break described in the NRC question, a 3
break in the recirculation line, the main steam line, the feedwater line and the control rod drive i
hydraulic return line can each be shown to not prevent aafe shutdown.
Accordingly, the combina-tion of these events would have the same result, i.e., safe shutdown would not be prevented.
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1 SPOT CHECK OF PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED TARGETS BREAK POINTS SELECTED BY THE NRC 1.
Cleanup return line, 6-inch ND-10, Isometric Figure B-8, break point number 1 (a Category 3 break *).
2.
Emergency condenser, 10-inch NE-2 fror NE01-B, Isometric Figure B-3, break point number 1 (a Category 2 break).
3.
Feedwater south, 10-inch RF-2, Isometric Figure B-12, break point number 2 (a Category 2 break).
4.
Recirculation loop B, 25-inch, Isometric Figure B-15, break point number 1 (a Category 2 break).
5.
Core spray south, 8-inch NZ-3, Isometric Figure B-5, break point number 1 (a Category 1 break).
The following information from A.ttachment 7C to the document submitted on September 7, 1978, is included for each of these five break points:
The isometric drawing.
The tabular interaction matrix summary in Appendix C.
The written evaluation summary in Appendix C.
- Category 1 - No unacceptable interactions Category 2 - Unacceptable interaction at location of low stress Category 3 - Unacceptable interaction at location of high stress 4
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Unacceptable Interaction U
SOURCE (DamagiJossible)
Svntem REACTOR CLEANUP Acceptable Inter::ction A
Li"C (Damage not Possible) 6" ND-10 (To Recirculation Piping)
No Interaction
.N ISO B-8 TARGET lW. Pt.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 Emergency NE01-B 10" NE-5 N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
Condenser NE01-A 10" NE-5 NE01-B 10" NE-2 NE01-A 10" NE-2 a___
Core (Southi S" NZ-3 Spra v (Nortn) S" NZ-3 J,
Y Yl Yl Vl Y V
Y V
V j
Main (South) 24" MS Y
Y Steam (North) 24" MS Reactor 6" ND-10 Cleanue 6" ND-1 N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
Shutdown 14" NU-1, NU-4 Coollnz 14" NU-2. NU-3 Feedwater (Sou:n) 10" RF-2 (South) 18" RF-2 (North) 10" RF-2 (North) IS" RF-2 Licuid Poison -
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Reactor Vessel e
Head Cooline 2" RHC-2 Rea ctor (Luop A)
Recire.
(Loop B)
(Loop C)
(Loop D)
(Loco E)
Reactor (ByTass A)
Recire.
(Bypass B)
(By7 ass C)
(Bypass D)
(Breass E) 4 Control Rod
.3" NC-4, NC-2 Drive (Supply) 1" NC-3,
- (Return) 3/4" NC-3 Containment 14" CS-2, NQ-2 l
Spray 12" NQ-2 10" NQ-2 py y
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A A
A A
Reactor sel l
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N N
N I
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1 Main Steam Relic' Valve Discharge 8" (4 lines) j 14" (2 lines) l Main Steam Safety Valve thscharge vl l
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Cont.tinnwnt iem;ct Shell Electrical (Wlap) y p
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N gpp p
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(lmisim cment) 11 11 11 N
N N
N N
N N
1 at the third cibow downstream of the reactor which wculd result in an unacceptable i.',
interaction with 3" NC-4 at elevation 75', azimuth 2700 of Sheet 5 (3) or in an ac-ceptable interaction with the Biological Shicld Wall at elevation 82', a:Imuth 270 of Sheet 5 (3).
A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the reactor'in such a manner as to re-sult in an acceptable interaction with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation 56',
azimuth 2700 or an unacceptable interaction with 3" NC-4 at elevation 75', azimuth 2700 of Sheet 5 (3). Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at penetration 2B which would result in an unacceptable interaction with 10" RF-2 (north) at elevation 49', azimuth 2600 of Sheet 4 (3),
j A circumferential break at point 4 will not result in interaction with any of the listed targets (2),
A break at point 3 will result in an unacceptable jet impingement inte -
action with the cable tray at elevation 44', azimuth 2100 of Sheet 3 (3).
A break at any of the remaining points postulated in this line will not
-result in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of'the motor operators.
f REACTOR CLEANL7 SYdicM - 6" ND-10
.e t.
A circumferential break at point 1 will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets.
l A circumferential break at either point 2 or 3 will most likely cause the pipe f
to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the recirculadon piping in such a manner as to result in no interactions.
l A circumferendal break at point 4 or 5 will most likely place the connecdon l
to the recirculadon piping in torsion causing the pipe to whip in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with S" NQ-2 at elevation 37', azimuth 250 of Sheet 3 (3). Such a break could also etuse the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the recirculation piping which would result in an unacceptable inter-action with the containment vessel at elevation 51', azimuth 650 of Sheet 4 (3),
A circumferential break at point 6 or 7 will most likely place the connection to the recirculation piping in torsion causing the pipe to whip in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with S" NQ-2 at elevation 37', azimuth 25' of Sheet 3 (3).
Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the con-nection to the recirculation piping which would have the same result.
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A circumferential break at points S thru 11 will not result in pipe whip as l-check valve V-16-62 isolates these points from the energy reservoir (rcactor).
A b'rcak at point 1, 2, or 3 will result in an unacceptable jet impinge-ment interacdon with the cable tray at 40', azimuth S0 -900 of Sheet 313). A break at any of the remaining points postulated.a this line will not result in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of the motor operators.
REACTOR CLEANUP SYSTEM - 6" ND-1 A circumferential break at point I will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (1).
A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the recirculation piping in such a manner as to result in no interactions with any of the listed targets.
A circumferendal break at either peint 3 or 4 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to recirculation piping in such a man-ner as to result in an acceptable interaction with 24" MS (south) at elevation 60',
of Sheet 5 (3) azimuth 900
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A circumferential break at point 5 will most likely place the connection to recirculation piping in torsion causing the pipe to whip in such a manner as to re-sult in an acceptable intgracdon wi$ de Biological Shield Wall at elevation 60',
of Sheet 5 ( ).
Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about 0
azimuth 95 a hinge formed at the first elbow downstream of the connection which would have the same result.
A circumferer al break at point 6 will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets
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A break at any of the points postulated in this line will not result in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of the motor operators.
SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM - 14" NU-1 and NU-4 A circumferential break at point I will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (1).
A circumferential break at either point 2 or 3 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the recirculation piping in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with 14" NU-2 at clevation 49', azi-muth 3000 of Sheet 4 (3).
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LEGEND:
Unacceptab!c Interaction U
SOURCE (Darnage Possible)
Svst m EMERGENCY CONDENSEll Acceptabic Interaction A
Line 10" NE-2 10" NE-2 h
(Damage not Possibic).
Urom NE01-B)
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(from NE01-A) i No Interaction N
15 0 g.3 B-4 TARGET lik. Pt.
1 2
3 4
1 2
3 4
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N N
N N
N N
N Condenser NE01-A 10" NE-5 y
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NE01-A 10" NE-2 N
N N
N Core (South) S" NZ-3 N
N N
'N Sora v (North) S" NZ-3 l
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Main (South) 24" MS Steam (North) 24" MS L
Reactor 6" ND-10 Cleanuo 6" ND-1 Shutdown 14" NU-1, NU-4 Coolin:r 14" NU-2. NU-3 V
r Feedwater (South) 10" RF-2 A
(Scuth) IS" RF-2 N
y-(North) 10" RF-2 A
(North) IS" R y
Licuid Poison - 1. 5" NP-2 l
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seae Coot 1=c 2
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(Loop B) l l
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(Loop E) i Rea ctor (Bypass A)
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(Bypass B) i (Bypass C)
(Bypass D)
(Bvnass E)
Control Rod 3" NC-4, NC-2 Drive (Supply) 1" NC-3 I
(Return) 3/4" NC-3 l
Containment 14" CS-2, NQ-2 l
Spray 12" NQ-2 l
10" NQ-2 s" No-2 y
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Reactor Vessel l
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3 l
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Main Steam Kelief Valve Discharge j
8" (4 linen)
N N
l 14" (2 lines) l Main Ste:im Safety Valve Discha.o.
8" (16 linen)
Containnient Vesnel.'. hell l
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(lintiint" tisent) 11 ll I
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A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely cause the pipe to whip s
about a hinge formed at the connection at the reactor in such,a manner as to re-sult in an acceptable interaction with 10" NE-5 (reactor to NE01-B) at c!cvation 85', or with the reactor vessel at c!cvation 84', azimuth 3350 of Sheet 6 (3)
Such a break could cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the first elbow down-stream of the reactor which would have the same result.
A'efrcumferential break at point 4 will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (2),
A break at any of de points postulated in this line will act result in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of the motor operators.
EMERG7NCY CONDENSER SYSTEM - 10" NE-2 (NE01-B to Reactor)
A circumferential break at point I will not result in an Interaction with any of the listed targets (1).
A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at de: connection to the Shutdown Cccling Piping in such a manner as to result in an a{) eptable interaction with 10" RF-2 (scuch) at elevation 75', azimuth of Sheet 5 (
Such a break could also cause de pipe to whip abcut a hinge 0
45
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formed at the first weld upstream of the cennection which would have the same result.
A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the Shutdown Cccling ?! ping in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction wid de Biological Shield Wall at elevation S2',
azimuth 25 of Sheet 5 (3)
Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the first wcld upstream of the connection which would have the same result.
A circumferential break at point 4 will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (2),
A break at point I will result in an unacceptable jet impingement inter-actica with the cable tray at elevatten 40', azimuth 3000-3600 of Sheet 3 (3), or in an acceptable interaction with motor operators V-14-37, V-17-54 or V-17-19. A break at any of the remaining points postulated In this line will act result in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of the motor operators.
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l-FW -12.18 B-FW-1269 l-FW-lz 87 B-FW 1283 2-S W -ICOT 9-S0 -1015 2-S W-lo!L 9-S W - to28 5-fW -l270 to-Su -1012 3-FW-IL89 to-S W-Icz7 4-SW-1476 Il-FJ-l267 4-SW-14 T7 Il-N-1261
$ ~ $ IJ-lJ72 A 5-5d-ll13 h by: G.7~R
( - Fs!- 1:63 L-FW - 1277 Dae: sfic(N Rev.1 7-5 V - /361 1-SV-1576 FEEDWATEj\\ SYSTEtn (Hcr1R and Scut!)
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j
.LECCND:
J Unacceptable Interaction -
U SOURCII (Damage Possible)
Svsrem FEEDWATER Acceptable Interaction A
Line 10" RF-2 18" RF-2 10" RF-2 (Damage not Possible)
(North)
(North)
(North)
N No 7ateraction ISO 6-12 IL B-12 i
u-12
~
TARGET ltik. Pt.
3 f
4
,3 l
3 a
3n Emergency NE01-310" NE-5 N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N N
N Condenser NE01-A 10" NE-5 NE01-B 10" NE-2 NE01-A 10" NE-2 Core (South) 8" NZ-3 Sora v (North) S" NZ-3 Main (South) 24" MS y
p Steam (North) 24" MS A
A Reactor 6" ND-10 N
I N
Cleanuo 6" ND-1 l
I Shutdown 14" NU-1, NU-4 Cooling 14" NU-2, NL*-3 yl yl.
Fcedwater (Scuth) 10" RF-2 (South) 18" RF-2 1
s(
y g
sg.v v
s (North) 10" RF-2 y
yy
~(
(Nor:h) IS" RF-2 N
N N
N N
N N
N l
N N
'l N
l l
l Licuid Poison - 1. 5" N?-2 l
l l
Reactor Vessel l
l Head Coolin:-
2" RHC-2 I
(
Reactor (Loop A)
Recire.
(Loop B)
(Loop C)
'(
y (Loop D)
A A
(Loco E) l N
N Rea ctor (Sypass A)
Rec 1re.
(Bypass 3)
(Bypass C)
(Bypass D)
(Bvrass E)
Yv Y v Control Red 3" NC-4, NC-2 U
U U
U Drive (Supply) 1" NC-3 N
N N
N (Return) 3/4" NC-3 1
Containment 14" CS-2, SQ-2 f
Spray 12" NQ-2 10" NQ-2 Y
y 8" NQ-2 U
U N
Reactor Vesset M
Y Y
Y Y
13iolo<tical Shield Wall A
A A
A Main Steam Relief Valve Discharge
?." (4 lines)
N N
N N
14" (2 lines)
A A
l l
Main Steam Safety V ilve Dischary,e 3" (16 lines)
Y N
n Containtuent Vestel Shell
{
j U
U i
U
-l l
lilectrical (Wlup)
T Y
'{'
T l
N f
N y
Y
'7
'(
(imoinecment)
N U
U U
U U
U U
N N
N l
c.1n l
1
~.
FEEDWATER SYs16M (NOR7E) - 10" RF-2 and IS" RF-2 A circumferential break at point I will most likely cause the pipe to whip
^
about a hinge formed at the connection between the tee and the reducer in such a manner as to result in an unacceptable interaction with 3" NC-4 at clevation 56',
azimuth 290 of Sheet 413), or with 8" NQ-2 at elevation 66', azimuth 315 of 0
Sheet 5 (3)
Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the third elbow upstream of the reactor which would have the same result.
A circumferential break at any cf points 2 thru 4 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the reactor in such a manner as to result in an unacceptable interaction with 3" NC-4 at elevation 56', azimuth W
290 of Sheet 4 A circumferential break at point 5 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the tee in such a manner as to result in no interactions wim any of the listed targets. Such a break would also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connecdon at penetration 48 which would result in an unacceptable interacdon with the containment vessel at elevation 27',
azimuth 1900 of Sheet 2 (3), or in an acce table interaction with 24" MS (north) at elevation 27', azimuth 190 cf Sheet 2 W.
A circumferential break at point 6 will most likely cause de pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at peretration 4B in such a manner as to result in an unacceptablegteraction with the containment vessel at elevation 33',
(
I. Such a break would also cause the pipe to whip about azimuth 1950 of Shee: 2 a hinge formed at the connection to de tee which would result in an acceptable in-teractic vith loop D of the recirculation piping at elevation 35', azimud 2160 of Sheet 2 or wid de Biological Shield Wall at elevation 40', azimuth 215 of Sheet 3 (3),or in an acceptable interaction with 14" MS relief valve at elevation 47',
of Sheet 4 (3) 0 azimuth 210 A circumferential break at point 7 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the tee in such a manner as to result in
[
an acceptable interaction with icop D of de recirculation piping at elevation 35',
azimuth 216 of Sheet 2 W, or with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation 40',
azimuth 215 of Sheet 3 (3), or in an acceptable interaction with 14" MS relief valve at elevation 47', azimuth 210 of Sheet 4 (3)
A circumferential break at either point 8 or 9 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the tce in such a manner as to re-sult in an unacceptable interaction with S" NQ-2 at elevation 66', azimuth 2250 of
^'
Sheet 5 (3),
A circumferential break at point 10 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the tec in such a manner as to recult in an acceptable interaction with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation 74', azimuth 225 of Sheet 5 W.
C-28 e
o 0
e e
. e=
(
A circumferential breat at point 11 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the reactor in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation 60', azimuth f Sheet 5 (3), or with 24" MS (north) at elevation 47', azimuth 2250 of Sheet A circumferendal break at point 12 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at penetradon 48 in such a manner as to result in an unacceptable interaction with the containment vessel at elevation 49',
of Sheet 4 (3) 0 azimuth 185 A break at point 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 or 12 will result in an unacceptable jet impingement interaction with the cable tray at elevation 40', azimuth 2100-2500 of Sheet 3 (3)
A break at any of the remaining points postu-lated in this line will not result in any jet impingement interacdens with the cable tray or any of the motor operators.
/ '
LIQUID POISON SY3iiM 1/2" NP-2 A circumferential break at point 1 will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets.(1).
A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely place connection at the reactor in torsion such as to result in an teacceptable interacdon with the contain-ment vessel at elevation 82', azimuth 155 of Sheet 6 (*).
\\
A circumferendal break at either point 3 or 4'will most likely place the con-nection at the reactor in torsion such as to result in an acceq' able interacdon with 8" NZ-3 (south) t elevaden 79', azimuth 115 of Sheet 6 l A circumferential break at point 5 will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (2),
A break at any of the points postulated in this line will not result in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of the motor operators.
REACTOR VESSEL HEAD COOLING SYSTEM - 2" RHC-2 A circumferential break at point I will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (1)
A circumferential break at either point 2 or 3 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the coimection at the reactor in such a manner an to '
result in no interactions with any of the licted targets.
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A 2-IN7*ERMED/ A TE WELO 3-INTERMEDIA TE Wit O
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'l-WELD AT CON.15CTicy,t7 RE4 cT0g 3
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6 4
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4 >,4 \\ REAcroa. REclRCut A rioN SYSTEM (TyicaI for-locps A,S, C,D sn.u), 2G" Ss - A 3l2 'r? 3 I L , Dras9n f-1200 p s3, T-570 of 'Ajd ,\\ , LEGEND: U Unacceptab!c Interaction. (Damage Possibic) SOURCE System A Acceptable Interaction REACTOR RECIRCllLATION LOOP (Damage not Possible) 'I"" Loop A Loop B Loop C t, N No interaction ISO R-15 B-15 B-15
- tik.rt.
TARGET 7 7 g 1 7 3 g 1 7 9 g i Emergency NE01-G 10" NE-5 N N N N N N N N N N N N Condenser NE01-A 10" NE-5 NE01-B 10" NE-2 NE01-A 10" NE-2 r Core (South) S" NZ-3 Spra y - (North) 3" NZ-3 Y Main (South) 24" MS U T j Steam (North) 24" MS N U 1 Reactor 6" ND-10 N Clea nuo 6" ND-1 I Shutdown 14" NU-1, NU-4 l' Coolin:r 14" NU-2, NU-3 t, Feedwa ter (Scuth) 10" RF-2 t (South) IS" RF-2 t (North) 10" RF-2 (North) 18" RF-2 Liquid Pcison.- 1. 5" NP-2 l l ll l l l Reactor Vessel 1 4 d Head Cooling 2" RHC-2 Y T / Y i Reactor (Leop A) T A A 'I l Recire. (Leap 3) N N N N T/ A A (Loop C) N N N N _l (Loop D) Y ( N N N N' (Leco El A A 'I i e Rea cter (Sypass A) N N Recire. (Sypass 3) (Bypass C) (Bypass D) t (Bvnass E) Control Rod 3" NC-4, NC-2 Drive (Supply) 1" NC-3 l (Return) 3/4" NC-3 Containment 14" CS-2, NQ-2 Y Spray 12" NQ-2 U n 10" NQ-2 N I, 8" NQ-2 l (' t' Reactor Vessel j i. I -1 M, ll Y. f I; f Biolo"ical 5:neld Wall A A I A A l A A 1 Main Steam Relief Valve Discharge 8" (4 lines) N N N N' N N '/ 14" (2 lines) l l A, Main Steam Safety Valve U sc!:ari;e 8" (16 lines) s[ C(int. tim: lent Ven,;el SI: ell I i [ U] U i T U i* lilect rical ( Whip) U T T' V M Y U
- l Y
T i; (Im $inr'ettient) A rf U ti A It U If A fr U l' c.11 .'i. of the listed targets (gtfal break at point 4 will not result in an interaction with an A circumfere ) \\. A break at any of the points postulated in this line will not result in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of the motor operators. REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM - LOOP A A circumferential break at point I will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump suction in a manner as to re-sult in an unacceptable interaction with the cable tray at elevadon 41', azimuth 42 of Sheet 3 (3), or with 12" NQ-2 at elevation 26', azimuth 420 of Sheet 4 (3), A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump discharge in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation 40', azimuth 340, or with loop E of the recirculation piping at elevation 40', azi-much 330 of Sheet 3 (3), A circumferential break at point 3 vill most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump discharge in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interacdon with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation g 45', azimuth 3400 or with loop E of the recirculation piping at elevation 45', azi-muth 330 of Sheet 3 (3). A circumferential break at point 4 will most likely place the connecdon at the pump discharge in torsion causing the pipe to whip in such a manner as to re-sult in an unacceptable,interacdon with the containment vessel at elevation 45', of Sheet 3 9) azimuth g0 , or with the cable tray at elevation 41', azimuth 0 of Sheet 3 ( }. A break at point I will result in an acceptable jet impingement inter-action with motor operator V-14-36, elevation 49', azimuth 250 of Sheet 4 (2) A break at point 2, 3, or 4 will result in an unaccept-able jet impingement interaction with the cable tray at elevation 40', of Sheet 3 (3). 0 azimuth 0 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM -- LOOP' B A circumferential break at point 1 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump suction in such a manner as to result in an unacceptable interaction with 24" MS (south) at elevation 49', azimuth of Shect 4 (3) 0 110 t C-30 4 r, A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely cause the pipe to whip i'- ~ about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump discharge in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation 40', azimuth 54 of Sheet 3 (3), or with loop A o' the recirculation piping at ele-of Sheet 3 (3) 0 vation 40', azimuth 42 A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely cata the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump discharge in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with the Biological Shield Wall at eleva-of Sheet 3 (3), or with loop A of the rceirculation piping 0 tion 45', a:Imuth 54 of Sheet 3 (3). at elevation 40', azimtith 420 A circumferendal break at point 4 will most likely place the connection at the pump discharge in torsion causing the pipe to whip in such a manner as to re-sult in an unacceptable interacdon with the containment vessel at elevation 45', azimuth 72 Sheet 3 (3), or with the cable tray at elevation 3S', azimuth 720 3) of Sheet 3 A break at point I will result in an acceptable jet impingement inter-action with the motor op(erator for MS relief valve at elevation 49', azimuth 155 of Sheet 4 3) A break at point 2, 3, or 4 will result in an unacceptable jet impingement intera tion with the cable tray at elevation 40', azimuth 72 of Sheet 3 I REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM - LOOP C A circumferential break at point I will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump suction in such a manner as to result in an unacceptable interaction with 24" MS (north) at elevation 49', azimuth 190 of Sheet 4 (3), A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the pump discharge in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interactf on with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation 40', a:Imuth 1260 of Sheet 3 (3), or with loop B of tae recirculation piping at eleva-tion 40', azimuth 114 of Sheet 3 (3). A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge fonned at the connection at the pump disch" ~e in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with the Siological .cid Wall at elevation 45', azimuth 126 of Sheet 3 W, or with loop B cf the recirculation piping at eleva-tion 45', azimuth 114 of Sheet 3 (3), g C-31 4 9 a '/ ( BREAK PolNTS py U R,n I, r e-B r n ~_ L l a e. I-FN-5733 5-SN-N z 3-/ 2-FW-5751 f.- SW -Ni 3 -2 f 3-FW-5728 7 - SW-N 5 5-3 Q 1-$W-N3-3-2.-2 6-5W-NE-3-3 4
- 5','
9-FW-5929 A b. v-zo u 10- FW-5129 ' l I [T Q' @ /. A i ^ sW I ll-FW-5930 12.- S w-N t 4 2 saoz- /nm.e: @ ff y 13-Sy-yz 5. y-3 4 g e p 'g 3 M ~ "' 7 i i ok i N gA & go.O 9, 3 Y T ~ ,.f,, '-Q,..s ' ) pl 1 3 %/ / J f@, + 9 . Q+d.4 9 i V' ge. s B : GIR y / D Te ' 9 t=l11-RE Y..L ') CORE SPRA Y SYSTEM houTil SIDE)' (.y 8"N2.-3, SS - A 312 TF 316, Onegn P-Ip.so ps.3, T - 515 *F M'[ Ficure B-$ LEGEND: Unacceptable Interaction. U SOURCE (Damage Possible) - S'" tem CORE SPRAY 'A-Acccptable Interaction Lin" (- (Damage not Possible) 8" NZ-3 (South) No Int.:raction N ISO B-5 TARGET
- k.1't, 1
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0 10 11 1? T' f Emergency NE01-510" NE-5 N N N N N N N N N N N N Condenser NE01-A 10" NE-5 i NE01-B 10" NE-2 V \\/ V V V Y V V 5/ NE01-A 10" NE-2 V Core (South) S" NZ-3 f Spra v (North) 8" NZ-3 N N N N N N N N N N N N Main (Soutn) 24" MS _j i' Steam (North) 24" MS Reactor 6" ND-10 Cleanuo 6" ND-1 Shutdown 14" NU-1, NU-4 Coolin:r 14" NU-2, NU-3 Feedwa ter (South) 10" RF-2 (South) 18" RF-2 (North) 10" RF-2 i (North) IS" RF-2 l l l l l l l l l l Liquid Poison - 1. 5" NP-2 Reactor Vessei Head Cooling 2" RHC-2 (, Reactor (Loop A) i Recire. (Loop B) (Loop C) (Loop D) (Loco E) Rea ctor (Bypass A) Recire. (Bypass B) (Bypass C) (Bypass D) (Bvoass E) Control Rod 3" NC-4, NC-2 Drive (Supply) 1" NC-3 (Return) 3/4" NC-3 i l f Containment 14" CS-2, NQ-2 Spray 12" NQ-2 10" NQ-2 8" NO-2 Reactor Vessel I i l l l j i i i l iholocical Shield Wall l I l l j l l t l l Main Steain Relief Valve Discharge j e j 8" (4 lines) l 14" (2 lines) l [ l 'tl Main Steam S.ifety Valve Disclurge I -tVV Y y i \\' 8" (16 lines) Y V Contaimnent Ye set Shell u 9 l n n y y n y y y Elect rical (Wiup) y 11 y y [4 g; y n g; y n g (lmilincement) N N N N N N N N N N N N l l a <.,. ~ EMERGENCY CONDENSER SYSTEM - 10" NE-2 (NE01-A to Reactor) g. A circumferential break at point I will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (I). A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection to the Recirculation Piping in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with 10" RF-2 (north) at elevation 75', azimuth 315 of Sheet 5 (3) Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the second elbow upstream of the connectaan which would have the same result. i A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely cause the pipe to whip I about a hinge formed at the connection to the Recirculation Piping in such a manner as to result in an acceptable interaction with the Biological Shield Wall at elevation of Sheet 5 (3) Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip 0 82', azimuth 335 about a hinge formed at the second elbow upstream of the connection which would have the same result. A circumferential break at point 4 will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (2), A break at point 1 will result in an unacceptable jet impingement inter- ! \\_r action with the cable tray at elevation 40', azimuth 00-600 of Sheet 3 (3). A break at any of the remaining points postulated in this line will not rer.21t in any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or any of the motor cperators. CORE SPRAY - 8" NZ-3 (South) A circumferential break at point I will not result in an interaction with any of the listed targets (1). A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connection at the reactor in such a manner as to result in an unaccep(table interaction with the containment vessel at elevation 90', azimuth 7 of Sheet 6 3). Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the first elbow upstream of the reactor which would result in an unacceptable inter-action with the containment vessel at elevation 89', azimuth 95 of Sheet 6 NI. A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely place the connection at the reactor in torsion caut:ing the pipe to wh. ) in such a manner as to result in an unaccent-able interaction with the containment vessel at elevation 90', azimuth 650 of Sheet 6 (3), Such a break could also cause the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the first cibow upstream of the reactor widch would have the same result. C-21 4 4 4 4 c' os s-i h any A circumferential break at point 4 will not result in an interact of the listed targets (2), hip as Circumferential breaks at points 5 thru 10 will not result in pipe f m the high energy res-check valves NZ-02S and NZ-02D isolate these points ro ervcir (reactor). likely cause A circumferential break at any of points 11 thru 13 will mostction o the pipe to whip about a hinge formed at the connema h any of the listed l in ta rgets. A break at any of the points postulated in this line will not re y of the any jet impingement interactions with the cable tray or an motor operators. CORE SFRAY SYSTEM - S" NZ-3 (North) i ith any A circumferential break at point I will not result in an interact of the listed targets (1). i at A circumferential break at point 2 will most likely place 0 on 62', a::imuth 240 the reactor in torsien causing the pipe to w l acceptable interaction with the Siological Shield Wall at d of Sheet 5(3). at the connection at the reactor which would result in anof Sh 10" RF-2 (north) at elevation 75*, azimuth 225 hip A circumferential break at point 3 will most likely cause the about a hinge formed at the connection at the reactor in suc levation 62, azimuth l in an acce; table interaction with the Biological Shield W r ld have tne same re- ' 250 of Sheet 5 (3). formed at the second elbow upstream of t l sult. i with any A circumferentist break at point 4 will not result in an interac of the listed targets (2), h!p as check Circumferential breaks at points 5 thtu S will not result in p h valves NZ-02A and NZ-02C isolate these points from t el use the A circumferential break at any of points 9 thru 11 will mo fh ipe to witip abaut a idnge formed at the connec lic *d targets. C-22 f h _ _ _