ML20004E082
| ML20004E082 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1981 |
| From: | Kintner L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8106110122 | |
| Download: ML20004E082 (27) | |
Text
.
3na UNITED STATES 5
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3.,
g WASHINGTON, d, C. 20555 y4 1981 Decket No. 50-341 APPLICANT:
Detroit Edison Coapany FACILITY:
Fermi 2
SUBJECT:
Su m ARY OF MAY 27, 1981 OL REVIEW MEETING REGARDING THE FERMI P FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW The purpose of the meeting was to hear applicant's plans for revision to fire protection features to meet current staff requirements, as requested in Request No. 021.32. One of the major modifications is provision of alternate shutdown capability for a fire in the control room, cable spreading room or relay room.
- is a list of attendees. is a copy of slides showing existing and proposed alternate shutdown capability for a fire in the control room. The proposed system would provide a means for hot shutdown from outside the control room, if only one control panel is destroyed by fire. provides a draft response for Request 021.32.
Applicant has completed its identification of interaction areas, where redundant, cables (Division I and II) in cable trays or conduits are 'less than 20 feet apart Drawings showing these locations will be submitted, together with response to Request 021.32, and a revised and updated Fire Hazards Analysis during the week of June 1, l
1981. Procedures for bringing the plant to a cold shutdown after a fire were requested to be completed and available at the plant 3 months prior to fuel loading.
At the conclusions of the meeting staff sczted that:
(1) The CO2 systems should be replaced with less toxic and more effective systems for fire fighting, e.g. halon with a manual water system as i
backup.
Applicant stated that, because of its relay room under the cable spreading room, it preferred not to use water. However it will consider a dry pipe system as a backup.
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2-(2) A fire in the control rocm external to the panels must be considered, e.g. due to a spill of a flamable fluid. Applicant stated it will run a test to demonstrate that its panels will protect the wiring and switches inside of the panel from such a fire.
Staff will consider test plans and test reselts in its evaluation.
-L L%
L. L. Kintner, Project Manager Licensing Branch No.1 Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
As stated cc:
See next page l
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Mr. Harry Tauber Vice President Engineering & Construction Detroit Edison Company 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan
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Eugene B. Thomas, Jr., Esq.
David E. Howell, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 21916 John R 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Hazel Park, Michigan 48030 Washington, D. C.
20036 Mr. Bruce Little Peter A. Marquardt, Esq.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Co-Counsel Resident Inspector's Office Thb Detroit Edison Company 6450 W. Dixie Highway 2000 Second Avenue Newport, Michigan 48166 Detroit, Michigan 48226 Dr. Wayne Jens Mr. William J. Fahrner Detroit Edison Company Project Manager - Fermi 2 2000 Second Avenue The Detroit Edison Company Detroit, Michigan 48226 2000 Second Avenue Detroit, Michigan 48226 Mr. Larry E. Schuerman
. Detroit Edison Company.
3331 West Big Beaver Road Troy, Michigan.48084 1
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4 ENCLOSURE 1 List of Attendees for May 27, 1981 Meeting, NRC-Detroit Edison Company NRC Detroit Edison L. L. Kintner Larry E. Schuerman Jerry L. Mauck William F. Colbert Victor Benaroya William Fahrner A. Saeed Evalds Lusis Raj Anand Lawrence F. Wooden l
C. Woodhead Terence M. McKelvey R. L. Ferguson Richard C. Anderson Faust Rosa Rick L. Shaw John W. Honkala i
Edison Electric Inst.
Gage-Babcock & Assoc.
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ENCLOSURE 3
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l DMFT 021.32 PESPCt SE Detroit Edison has provided many design features on Fermi 2 to assure that it meets the requirements of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A, and that the reactor can be shut down in the event of a fire. The electrical design of the plant was developed in 1970 to meet 3-feet horizontal, 5-feet vertical separation criteria, in response to PSAR Question 6.8.1.
Conduit separation criteria was develcped with the sxte criteria as the cable trays.
Instrument cable trays are totally enclosed. Other cable trays have covers in areas where additional protection is required. The electrical cable insulation is a fire retardant as established by fire tests using propane burners and typical tray installation. The cabic, trays, and conduits are color coded to assure that the installation follows the intended divisional routing. The routing of the cable is performed t,y a crrputer program based on the separation criteria.
No power cables are allowed in the critical control areas of the control center control room, cable spreading rocm, or relay room.
A verification program has been conducted as an additional assurance that the electrical design was installed to the above criteria.
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W e control room and relay room panels are designed to prevent an internal fire i
frca spreading out of the cabinets. A steel barrier with no penetraticos allc w d is provided between divisional cabinets. % e fire hazards analysis of this plant l
was conducted by an independent consultant in accordance with Appendix A to BIP 9.5-1.
Autcxetic water or gaseous suppression systems were provided in fire areas that contained both safety related divisions. Where the fire hazard analysis indicated, the walls, ceilings and ficors were designed to provide rated fire barriers and seals. Manual water hose reels are provided to cover all areas of the plant as backup to autcuratic suppression. Manual CO2 hose reels are provided outside the relay rocm and switchgear rocm in addition to the water hose stations.
I 4
W e above features show that the Fermi 2 design meets the criteria of Appendix A l
to BTP 9.5-1, and thereby provides assurance that the plant can be shut dem due to a postulated fire.
%e review requested in the question poses new requirements beyond that required of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1.
%e'following responses are provided to the sub-section part of 021.32:
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DRAFT DRAPT 021.32 Response (Additional Information)
- l. A list of systems required to shut down the plant was developed.The systems identified are the minimum necessary to achieve shutdown, with the following assumptions:
There are no single failures outside of the effects frcui the single a.
fire.
b.
A loss of offsite power occurs and the B..ergency Diesel Generators start and successfully restore the onsite electrical system.
For hot shutdom systems, any operator action is frca the main control c.
For cold shutdown systems, however, some local operations or rocm.
repair is allowed if such operation or repair can be readily accomplished.
d.
No additional transients, accidents or release of radioactivity is assumed.
The. systems for shutting down the reactor are identified in Table 021.32-1 of this The systems are categorizea according to hot shutdown only systems, response.
cold shutdown systems, and both hot and cold shutdown systems.
The systems are all redundant; both divisions are included when the divisional reference is not
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marked. The HPCI system (Division II) is redundant to the ICIC system and Division I safety-relief valves.
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The HPCI and ICIC systems containment isolation valves have cross divisional cir-cuits for he diverse containment isolation function. The cross-system valves l
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remain open.
In the fire scenario, there is no need to assure the isolation function l
as transients other than the fire are not imposed.
From the shutdown system list, the Table 021.32-2 was developed that identifies the minimum number of valves, equipment, and instrumentation necessary to use the I
shutdown system. In addition to the valyes that must operate, valves are also listed that must be maintained in one position in order to assure system integrity h
I or,functionability.
Instruments and controls were included when automatic ini-tiation was required or where inadvertent operation would cause a system trip.
'Ihe RW level and pressure and suppresion pool temperature were included as the basic operating instrumentation.
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'1hc cable routings of the basic shutdown systems were identified, using Edison's cmputerized cabic routing program. The cmputer was utilized to identify all of the cable trays and conduits that contain circuits for the shutdown systm equipnent of Table 021.32-2. The identified cable trays were marked on " field verified" cable tray layout drawings to physically identify the tray location. Edison routes instrumentation, cont.ol, and power cables in separate trays that are differentiated by the tray classification. 'Ihe conduit routings were added.to the cable tray drawings to form the emplete cm.posite.
The layout drawings were marked with the varicus fire barriers identified in the fire hazards analysis of FSAR Appendix 9B.
The layout drawings were reviewed for the possibility of divisional inter-action where there was less than 20 feet separation between divisions.
These areas were marked by cross-hatching on the drawings and a sumary list of problem areas is provided in table 021.32-3. This table includes the areas, suppression, dete:: tion, and corrective action necessary to achieve empliance with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
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Table 021.32-1 SYSTDS RDQUIRED FOR SIRTIDOWN Evsters Required for Hot and Cold Shutdown Cll Control Rod Drive - Manual Scram Circuits Only B21 Main Steam Isolation Valves (manual closure only)
T50-04 Suppression Pool Tenperature Monitoring B21 Reactor Vessel Pressure Instrumentation T41 Control Center ilVAC T41 ESF Fan Coil Units, for Areas Servicing Shutdown Systems P44 ED34 P45 EESW R30-01 Dnergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries X41-03 EDG and EDG Switchgear Room HVAC R32 ESF DC System R30, R14, R16 ESF AC Distribution System, for Shutdown System Equipnent Ell-51 RHRSW System Ell-56 RHR Cooling Towers Systers Required Only for Hot Shutdown t
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RCIC (Div. I)
B21 Safety *!elief Valves (Div. I)
E41 IIPCI (Div. II)
Ell R!IR, Contairmnt Cooling Mode Systems Required Only for Cold Shutdc g Ell RIIR, Shutdown Cooling Mode B31 Recire. (Inboard Isolation Valves Only)
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Table 021.32-2 Equipment, Valve and Instrument List Unicss otherwise noted, all entries to this list are used for hot shutdown or hot and cold shutdown.
B21 - Nuclear Boiler System Division I Division II Valves:
B2103-F022A B2103-F022B
-F022C
-F022D
-F028A
-F028B
-F028C
-F028D B2104-F013A
-F013B
-F013C
-F013D
-F013E
-F013F B31 - Recirculation Valves:
B3105-F031A B3105-F031B Instrumentation:
g B3100-P401A B3100-P401B Racks:
H2100-P006 H2100-P022 C11 - Reactor Protection System (Manual Scram Circuit)
Relay Cabinets:
H1100-P611 H1100-P609
-P619 Racks:
H2100-P084 H2100-P085
-P086
-P087
w T14_ie 021.32-2 (Continued)
El1-RHR Systan Division I Division II Pumps:
E1102-C002A E1102-C002B
-C002C
-C002D i
l Valves:
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E1150-F003A E1150-F003B l
-F004A
-F004B
-F004C
-F004D F006A
-F006B
-F006C
-F006D
-F007A
-F007B
-F008 (Cold Shutdown System)
-F009 (Cold Shutdown System)
-F0llA
-F011B
-F015A (Cold shutdown System)
-F013B (Cold Shutdown System)
-F016B l
-F016A
-F017B (Cold Shutdown Systm.)
-F017A (Cold Shutdown System) l l
-F023 1
-F024A
-F024B i
-F026A
-F026B l
-F027A
-F027B l
-F028A
-F028B
-F047A
-F047B
-F048A
-F048B
-F049 l
-F068A
-F048B h
-F073
-F104A
-F104B
-F606
-F607
-F608 (Cold Shutda.m Systun)
Instruments:
Backs:
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H2100-P018 H2100-P021
-P080
-P081
-P082
-P083
-P488 Relay Panels:
H1100-P601 H1100-P602
-P617
-Pfl2
-P822
-P618
-P823
-P820
-P821
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Table 021.32-2 (Continued)
E1151 - RHRSW Systcm and E1156 - RHR Ccioling Towers Division I Division II Pumps:
E1151-C001A E1151-C001B
-C001C
-C001D Fan Motors:
E1156-C001A E1156-C001B
-C001C
-C001D Valves:
E1150-F603A E1150-F603B
-F604A
-F604B 1
-F605A
-F605B Instrumentation:
H1100-P807 H1100-P810
-P809 E41 - HPCI Systcm Pumps:
E4101-C002
-C003
-C004
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-C005 Valves:
E4150-F001 E4150-F002
-F003
-F004
-F006
-F007
-F008 s
-F012
-F021
-F022
-F041
-F042
-F059 O
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Table 021.32-2 (Continued)
E41 - HPCI System (Continued)
Division I Division II Instrumentation:
E4101-N028B E4100-N028A
-N029A
-N029B
-N030A
-N030B
-N062B
-N062D Instrument Racks:
H2100-P080 H2100-P083
. -P082
-P081
-P014 Relay Panels:
H1100-P617 H1100-P620 Control Operating Panel:
H1100-P602
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FSI - RCIC SYSTm DIVISION II DIVISION I' hS_
ESIO1C002 ESIOlCOO3 E5IO1 COO 4 Valves Valve E5150 F007 E5 ISO F001 E5 ISO F008 F010 F012 F013 F019 F022 F029 F031 F045 F046 F059 F062 F084 Instrumentation E5IO0 N0ll ESIO0 N021 B ESIO0 N021 A N022 B N022 A NO23 B P
N023 A E5I00 NO25 B l
ESIO0 N025 A N025 D l
N025 C N026 B l
N026 A NO26 D f
NO26 C N027 B f
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N027 A-NO27 D N027 C Instrument Racks H21-P081
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H21-P017 l
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Hil-P618 l
H11-P614 i
Hil-P617 Hil-P621 CDP Hil-P601 i
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q P44 - EECW SYSTD1 DIVISION I DIVISION II Pumps Pumps P4400C001A P4400C001B Valves P4400 F 601A P4400 F 601B F 602A F 602B F 603A F 603B Instruments P44 N 403A P44 N 403B N 404A N 404B N 405A N 405B N 406A N 406B N 409A N 409B N 413A N 413B N 431A N 431B N 432A N 432B N 433A N 433B Racks H2100P447 H2100P448 H2100P475 Relay Cabinets H1100P808 H1100P817 P857 P868
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P891 P45 - EESW SYSTDi Pumps Pumps P4500C002 A P4500C002 B Relay Cabinets H1100 P817 H1100 P808 P870 P857 P868 P891 i
R14 - 4160V Swgr Buses R1400S001 B R1400S001 E 9'
R1400S001 F R1400S001 C R1400S002 A R1400S002 C RHR Ccuplex R1400S002 B R1400S002 D lO
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. DIVISIOJ I-DIVISIOJ II 4160 - 480 V Transformers R14005022 A
.R1400S020 A Rx Bldg.
R1400S023 A R1400S020 B R1400S036 A R1400S038 A M C g lex R14005037 A R14005039 A 480 V Voltage Regulators R1400S020 B Rx Bldg.
R1400A021 B R1 00!0 s 0 RHR Complex 480 V Swgr Buses R1400S022 R1400S020 Rx Bl@.
R1400S023 R1400S021 R1400S036 R1400S038 C g lex R1400S037 R1400S039 R16 - 480 V bbtor Control Centers R1600S002 A R1600S004 B R1600S002 B R1600S005.A R1600S003 A R1600S005 D Rx Bldg.
R1600S003 B R1600S005 C R1600S003 D R1600S016 A R1600S018 A HR W lex R1600S017 A ltl600S019 A R31 - 120 V AC rower Supplies (MPV's)
R310lS001 R3101S002 R32 - DC System Batteries R3200S003
'R3200S004 Chargers
'R3200S020 A R3200S021 A R3200S020 B R3200S021 B Distribution Cabinets
.R3200S026 R3200S027 R3200S062 R3200S065 R3200SG63 R3200S066 L(
, Distribution Cabinets (cont.)
DIVISIG4 I DIVISIO1 II R3200S061 A R3200S064 A R3200S061 B R3200S064 B DC Motor Control Centers R3200S015 R3200S016 R30 - Emergency Diesel Generators Generators R3000S001 R3000S003 R3000S002 R3000S004 Control Panels R3000S005 R3000S007 R3000S006 R3000S008 EDG Fuel Transfer Pumps R3000C001 R3000C009 R3000C002 R3000C010 R3000C003 R3000C0ll R3000C004 R3000C012 EDG Serv. Water Pumps R3000C005 R3000C007 R3000C006 R3000C008 1
T41 - CORROL CENTER HVAC & ESSEtEIAL FAN COIL UNITS Fans & Heating Coils Fans T4100D007 T4100B006 T4100C031 T4100C030 T4100B007 A T4100B007 B T4100B007 C T4100B007 0 Pumps Pu@s T4100C041 T4100C042
, Compressors Comressors T4100B009 T4100B008 Fan Coil Units T4100B004 (Div. II Swgr}
T4100B002 (Div. I Swgr)
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T4100B005 (Div. II Swgr}
T4100B003 (Div. I Swgr)
T4100B018 (Div. I RHR)
T4100B019 (Div. II RHR) g T4100D022 (HPCI)
T4100B021 (CS & ICIC)
T4100B027 (Div. II AC Equpt.Hm)
T4100B028 (Div. I to Equpt len)
Fan Coil Units (cont.)_
DIVISION I DIVISION II T4100B034 (EECh' Div. I)
T4100B035 (EDCW Div. II)
Instrumentation Racks HllP809 H1100P817 P888 P889 Relay Panels H2100P285 A H2100P285 B H2100P296 A H2100P296 B P296 C P296 D P296 E P296 F P521 PS20 PS27 PS27 A PS28 PS29 TSO Suppression Pool Temperature Monitoring Instrumentation T/C Terminal Box gCTerminalBox H2100P584 M H2100P584 L Relay Cabinet H1100P898 A H1100P898 B P914 P915 Racks H2100P501 A H2100P501 B X41 RHR Complex INAC Fans Fans X4103C001 X4103C005 EDG 11 EDG 13 C002 C006 C003 007 EDG 12 EDG 14 C004 C008 9
EDG 13 Swtch. Gr.
EDG 11 Swtch. Gr.
C010 C0 EDG 12 Swtch. Gr.
HJG 14 Sktch. Gr.
Mtor Operated Dampers X4103 F103 X4103 F127 F104 F128 F106 EDG 11 Swtch. Gr.
F130 EDG 13 Swtch. Gr.
F108 F132 F109 F133
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.gt3_ Ooerated Darrpers (cont.)
F110 EDG 11 Rrt.
F134 EDG 13 Rm.
F115 F139 Fil6 EDG 12 Swtch. Gr.
F140 EDG 14 Swtch. Gr.
Fil8 F142 F120 F144 F121 F145 F122
-EDG 12 Rm.
F146 EDG 14 Rm.
X4103 - RIIR Carplex INAC(cont.)
X4103F149
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EDG 11 Rm.
EDG 13 Rm.
X4103F150 X4103F154 EDG 14 Pm.
EDG 12 Rm.
56 Div. II Pump Rm.
Div. I Pump Rm.
6 F161 F168 F162 F169 Instrumentation Relay Panels H2100P350 H21bve352 P351 P353 s
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TABLE 021.32-3 INTERACTION AREAS LESS THAN 20 FEET Automatic Area Detection Suppression Correction Action AB, Elev. 551' Ionization Sprinklers Provide 1-br barrier wall and 562' or barrier for Div. 2 AB Elev. 583 Ionization Sprinklers Provide one hour barrier North End, around Div. 2 trays South End and Elev. 603'-6" AB Elev. 613' Ionization CO Provide one hoour barrier 2
Relay room around Div. 1 tray interaction AB Elev. 613' Ionization C0 Provide'one hour barrier Cable Tunnel around Div. 2 and swing bus trays AB Elev 613 None None Analyze failure of both Relay Room divisional inutrument Stairwell at
. trays or provide H-17 suppression, detection, and 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier RB Elev. 613' Ionization Sprinklers Provide one hour barrier near F-11 Divl Tray RB Elev. 613' Ionization None Provide one hour barrier near C-ll and suppression or justify.
failure of swing bus and Div. 2 tray AB Elev. 630' Ionization C0 Provide one hour barrier 2
Cable Spreading on both divisional Room Trays in zone AB Elev. 671' Ionization C0 Provide one hour barrier 2
South Cable i around Div. 1 trays in Tray Area NE corner of room AB Elev. 643' Ionization
.,C 0 Provide one hour barrier 2
DC-MCC Area around Div. I trays i
AB Elev. 659' Ionization None Provide one hour barrier around Div. I trays and suppression,or analyze loss of both divisional trays R. C; Anderson
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4.
Fermi 2 will be using a method of remote shutdown from the control room if a control room panel fire causes the need to evacuate the control The design basis for such a fire is that the control room panel rom.
fire wuld be extinguished before damage could occur to more than one panel. The smoke from s'ich a fire could cause the evacuation of the operating personnel after a limited amount of operation is performed.
To address such a scenario, Fermi 2 will have two divisional remote shutdown panels.
Table 021.32-1 lists the systems necessary for shutdown and vital support to achieve hot and cold shutdown from the control rom. Table 021.32-5 lists the instrumentation and manual equignent control provided on the rerrote shutdown panels. Because the control panel fire will leave one of the two redundant divisions intact, credit is taken for the automatic operation of equipment in the functional division. The division I rennte shutdown panel is provided to meet GDC 19 and is provided with equipnent to achieve hot and cold shutdown. Although cold shutdown can be achieved frm this panel, the control room habitability would be re-established before the need to go to cold shutdown. The division II reacte shutdown panel will include instruments and controls necessary to perform the manual operating functiow to achieve hot shutdown.
Fermi 2 is providing remote shutdown capability to bypass any control
- 4 rom operating panel. The cable entry to the control room panels is bottom fed from the cable spreading room.
t o
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3HuTDotbN PANEL (wa EQ UIP MEllT LIST l
CONTROL ITEM P.I.S.
NO.
SERVICE DIV.
DEVICE NUCLEAR BOILER SYSTEM 20 B21-R605A Reactor Level Indicator I
Beckman V5A 21 821-R005A Reactor Pressure I Indicator I
Foxboro 6400C 22 B21-F013D Manual Relief Valve I
BLPB 23 B21-F01311 Manual Relief Valve "I
BLPB RECIRCULkTION SYSTEM 24 B31-F023A Recirc Pump Suction Valve I
BLPB MISCELLANEOUS I
25 Ell 56C001-A Mech. Draft Cooling Tower Fan A I
CMC Sw 26 Ell 56C001-C Mech. Draft Cooling Tower Fan C I
' CMC Sw 27 Cll-COOlA CRD Pump I
CMC Sw l
28 HPCI Manual Trip II Selector Sw l
Cutler Hammer 29 Drywell Press Indicator I
Foxboro 6400HC 30 Suppression Pool Water Temp.
I Weston Indicator Off Temp Element 1316 T50N405A I
31 Transfer Switch Logic Power I
Type SBM Model For 64B BRKR Cont
'0AA50 32 Transfer Switch Logic Power I
Type SBM Model For 64C BRKR Cont 10AA50
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E)CISTIP6-SHOTDew P/)NEL DIVI l
Equip (MENT L)ST l
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ITEM P.I.S.
NO.
SERVICE DIV.
DEVICE RCIC SYSTEM 1
E51-C002 Trip throttle valve I
BLPB 2
E51-C002 Trip throttle valve position
- I-DLDS Manual initiation of RCIC I
Round PB l
3 (Bypass low Reactor Water level) 4 E51-F045 Steam to turbine I
BLPB 5
E50-RE13 Plow indicator I
Beckman V5A RHR SYST'M 6
Ell-COOlA RHR Service Water Pump I
ChC Sw 7
Ell-C001C RHR Service Water Pump I
CMC Sw 8
Ell-C002A RHR Pump I
CMC Sw 9
Ell-F024A Containment spray M.O.V.
I BLPB 10 Ell-F028A Containment spray M.O.V.
I BLPB g
11 Ell-F048A Hx Shell Side Bypass M.O.V.
I BLPB a
l 12 Ell-F068A Cont. Cooling Hx Discharge M.O.V.
I BLPB 13 Ell-F008 RHR Suction Cooling (OUTER)
II BLPB
,f 14 Ell "009 RHR Suction Cooling (INBD)
I BLPB l
15 Ell-F006A Shutdown _ Cooling M.O.V.
I BLPB f
16 Ell-F015A RHR Injection M.O.V.
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MEETING SUfotARY DISTRIBUTION G. Lear Docket File W. Johnston NRC PDR M4 198I S. PawlicH Local PDR TIC /NSIC/JeraD V. Benaroy-1 Z. Rosztoczy N. Hughes W. Haass LB#1 Reading l
D. Muller H. Denton R. Ballard E. Case D. Eisenhut W. Regan D. Ross R. Purple P. Check B. J. Youngblood A. Schwencer Chief, Power Systems Branch
- 0. Parr F. Miraglia F. Rosa J. Miller W. Butler G. Lainas R. Vollmer W. Kreger R. Houston J. P. Knight Chief, Radiological Assessment Branch R. Boscak L. Rubenstein F. Schauer R. E. Jackson T. Speis M. Srinivasan Project Manager L. L. Kintner J. Stolz Attorney, OELD S. Hanauer M. Rushbrook W. Gammill 01E (3)
ACRS (16)
T, Murley F. Schroeder l
R. Tedesco D. Skovholt M. Ernst~
R. Baer NRC
Participants:
C. Berlinger K. Kniel L. L. Kintner, J. Mauck, V. Benaroya, A. Saeed, R. Anand, C. Woodhead, G. Knighton A. Thadani l
R. Ferguson, F. Rosa D. Tondi J, Kramer D, Vassallo P, Collins D. Ziemann l
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